Jai Prakash Singh vs Bachchu Lal & 17 Ors.

Heard Sri R.P. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Abhisht Saran along with Sri Rahul Kumar Kashyap, learned counsel for the opposite parties.

The petitioner-Jai Prakash Singh, now deceased and represented through legal heirs, being aggrieved by the order dated 05.03.2002, passed by District Judge, Unnao, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2001 and the order dated 15.03.2001, passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division), North, Unnao, in Civil Suit No. 176 of 1988 (Nirvikar Singh and others Vs. Smt. Ram Rani and others), has approached this Court by means of present writ petition.

In the Civil Suit No. 176 of 1988, the issue no. 1 related to the jurisdiction was framed. The issue no. 1, as appears from the order dated 15.03.2001, is reproduced as under:-

ÞD;k bl U;k;ky; dks Jo.kkf/kdkj izkIr ugha gS tSlk fd izfroknh la0 1 o 2 us izfrokn i= dh /kkjk&23 esa dgk gSAß Vide order dated 15.03.2001, the issue no. 1 was decided by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), North, Unnao, against the plaintiffs including Jai Prakash Singh (now deceased). The operative portion of the order dated 15.03.2001 is quoted below.

Þokn fcUnq la0 1 ldkjkRed fu.khZr fd;k tkrk gS oknh dk okn vkns'k 7 fu;e 1 nh0v0l0 ds varxZr l{ke U;k;ky; esa izLrqr fd;s tkus gsrq okil fd;k tkrk gSAß Aggrieved by the order dated 15.03.2001, the petitioner-Jai Prakash Singh (now deceased) filed the Misc. Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2001, the same was dismissed by the District Judge, Unnao, by the order dated 05.03.2002. The operative portion of the order dated 05.03.2002 is quoted below.

Challenging the aforesaid orders, the present writ petition has been filed.

The issue in this case relates to jurisdiction of Civil Court and Revenue Court. The question, which can be formulated is to the effect that "In which Court, "Civil or Revenue", the suit would lie, if the prayer in the suit is for cancellation of sale deed of agricultural property." In another form, the question before this Court for consideration in this case is that "Under what circumstances, the suit for cancellation of "Sale Deed" of agricultural property would lie before the Civil Court or Revenue Court."

Before coming to the facts of the case, this court feels it appropriate to take note of the judgments of this Court as well as of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the aforesaid issue.

In the case of Dr. Ajodhya Prasad v. Gangotri Prarsad reported in 1980 SCC OnLine All 551 : 1981 All LJ 647 : 1981 AWC 469, this Court observed as under:-

"5. It makes clear that for purposes of cognizance of suit in the revenue court it is the cause of action and not the relief that is relevant. In Ramdhari's case (AIR 1973 All 81) (supra) learned single Judge had obviously overlooked the Explanation in Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. As the cause of action in the present case was the interference or threatened invasion to the rights of the plaintiff over an agricultural holding, the relief could be claimed against that cause of action in the revenue court and the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred?

11. In view of the Explanation to Section 331 even, if the relief for injunction was included in the plaint the suit would be cognizable by the revenue court because the revenue court could give an effective relief by way of declaration and, if necessary, by possession over the land in suit. In Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal (1973 RD 365) the suit had been filed for the relief of permanent injunction and in the alternative for possession. The suit was instituted in the civil court and decree was passed. Considering the effect of Sections 209 and 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the Supreme Court held that the civil court had no jurisdiction and the suit was liable to be dismissed. We, accordingly, hold that the case decided by the learned single Judge in Ramdhari v. Jodhan (AIR 1973 All 81) does not lay down the correct law."

In the case of Ram Padarath and others v. 2nd Addl. D.J, and othersreported in 1988 SCC OnLine All 685 : (1989) 1 AWC 290 (FB) : 1989 RD 21 (FB), the Full Bench of this Court observed as under:-

"7. So far as voidable documents like those obtained by practising coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence etc., are concerned, their legal effect cannot be put to an end without its cancellation. But a void document is not required to be cancelled necessarily. Its legal effect if any can be put to an end to by declaring it to be void and granting some other relief instead of cancelling it. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any court or authority being of no legal effect or consequence. A document executed without free consent or one which is without consideration or the object of which is unlawful or executed by a person not competent to contract like a minor or in excess of authority would be a void document. In case it is in excess of authority it would be void to that extent only. There is presumption of due registration of a document and correctness of the facts mentioned in the same, but the said presumption is not conclusive and be dislodged.

8. On the finding that a particular instrument or document was void because of any reason, it will be of no legal consequence and binding on any one without even its cancellation. But existence of such a document or instrument, more particularly for a substantial period may cause injury to the person whose rights are effected by it and place his right and title over any property in doubt and dispute and may create complications and give rise to unnecessary litigations. But for those who are aware of any judgment holding a particular document or instrument to be void or supposed to be aware of it, others can be misled by its existence if it does not contain any endorsement of its cancellation subsequent to its execution by any competent court of law. Reasonable apprehension of serious injury from a void document provides a cause of action to a person to approach the competent court of law, that is, civil court for its cancellation. But this entitlement goes into background or becomes restricted if because of certain statutory constraints, restraints and prescription some other relief can be claimed or is to be granted by adjudging the document or instrument void and thereby declaring it to be legally ineffective and of no consequence. Such a situation can arise if apart from cancellation, some other relief is claimed which is real relief and the claim for which provides the proximate ground or reason for approaching the court of law or when any other relief can be claimed or involved in the matter cropping up because of the evidence of void document or instrument. There can be other situation also, all of which Gan be created by statutory provisions as the jurisdiction of civil court can be ousted only by some specific provisions of law or by necessary implication sprouting out of statutory provisions. Such a situation arises when more than one reliefs are claimed in any action pertaining to agricultural land. If the relief claimed or the real and the main relief is one which is mentioned in Schedule II to U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the same can be granted by the revenue court only and the jurisdiction of civil court to grant such a relief or reliefs is ousted by Section 331 of the said Act.

9. The law relating to right, title and interest over the agricultural land is contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, hereinafter known as the ''Act', which is a complete Code by itself and is wider than the earlier Act, i.e., U.P. Tenancy Act which too was replaced by it. The said Act more particularly the Schedule to it enumerates the suits etc., the cognizance of which is to be taken of by the revenue court specified therein. The said Act being special Act, its provisions would prevail over the general law. The jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted if the relief can be granted by the special court conferred with jurisdiction to grant such reliefs. In Section 331 of the Act which specifically ousts the jurisdiction of other courts in respect of all suits, applications etc., enumerated in Schedule II the main emphasis is on the words ''cause of action and any relief'. The said section reads as under:

"Section 331. Cognizance of suits etc., under this Act-- (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof, or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.

Provided that where a declaration has been made under Section 143 in respect of any holding or part thereof; the provisions of Schedule II in so far as they relate to suits, applications, or proceedings under Chapter VIII shall not apply to such holding or part thereof.

Explanation-If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court would have granted.

(1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (i) an objection that a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II, or, as the case may be, a civil court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suits, application or proceedings, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate so revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been consequent failure of justice."

12. It is the real ''cause of action' which determines the jurisdiction of the court to entertain particular action notwithstanding the language used in the plaint or the relief claimed. The strength on which the plaintiff comes to the court does not depend upon the defence or relief claimed which could determine the forum for the entertainment of claim and grant of relief. It is the pith and substance which is to be seen and not the language used which may even have been so used to oust the jurisdiction of a particular court.

16. A revenue court may grant a relief in present, but so far as relief for future is concerned the revenue court may not be in a position to grant such a relief as the same may travel beyond the relief which could be granted by it mentioned in Schedule II to the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.

17. It is the alleged injury or apprehended injury or cloud on the right and title of a person by some action on the part of any other person, or interference or attempt to interfere or encroach upon the right and title of a person over a particular property by any positive or negative act or declaration etc., which give a suitor came of action to approach a court of law for relief or reliefs against the same. The dispute as to jurisdiction arises when more than one reliefs are claimed in an action on the same cause of action one of which can be granted by a civil court. If the principal or real relief can be granted by the revenue court, then the ancillary relief or the relief which flows out from the principal relief can also be granted by the revenue court notwithstanding that all the reliefs can be granted by the civil court and if things are in reverse direction then all the reliefs can be granted by the civil court, but if the so-called main relief is redundant or mere surplusage then it is the real relief involved in the matter which may or may not have been claimed as ancillary relief will determine the jurisdiction of the court which is to entertain a particular action. Even if a plaint or application is couched in such a language so as to oust jurisdiction of a particular court then it is the cause of action and relief flowing out of such cause of action which would determine the forum for entertaining the said action and not the so-called relief claimed.

18. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, 1968 AWR 731 (FB) which was constituted in view of conflict between two Bench decisions of this Court observed that "where in a suit, from a perusal only of the relief claimed, one or more of them are ostensibly cognizable only by civil court and atleast one relief is cognizable by the revenue court, further questions which arise are whether all the reliefs are based on the same cause of action and if so, (a) whether the main relief asked for on the basis of the cause of action is such as can be granted only by a revenue court or (b) whether any real or sub-stantial relief, though it may not be identical with that claimed by the plaintiff could be granted by the revenue court. There can be no doubt that in all cases contemplated under (a) and (b) above, the jurisdiction shall vest in the revenue court and not in the civil court."

19. If more than one reliefs are claimed by a particular person, no relief can granted to that person unless declaration of his tenancy rights is made and in that situation the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court as declaration can be granted by the revenue court. Similarly if a person claims relief of injunction and in the alternative for possession if he is found to be out of possession and his name is not on the record then without declaration that in fact he is the tenant or he is in possession of the tenancy rights no further relief can be granted and the suit is cognizable by the revenue court. In case the suit is for injunction and/or possession if he is out of possession then the suit will be cognizable by the revenue court notwithstanding the relief for injunction is to be granted by the civil court. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Chandrika Misir v. Bhaiya Lal, 1973 RD 498. The said case arose out of suit for injunction and in the alternative for possession in respect of agricultural land. It was held that in view of Schedule II to the Act, the relief for possession could be granted by the revenue court only and Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act ousted the jurisdiction of civil court. In the said case though no observation in respect of relief for injunction has been specifically made out, but from the judgment the picture is very clear. The finding of the subordinate court was that the plaintiff was out of possession on the basis of allegations which were not true and which he failed to establish merely because relief for Injunction was claimed. The Civil Court would have no Jurisdiction as the case first involved declaration of right as tenure-holder which could be granted by the revenue court only and thereafter relief could have been granted only if he was held to be tenure-holder by succession.

20. The forum for action in relation to void documents or instrument regarding agricultural land depends on the real cause of action with reference to the facts averred. Void documents necessarily do not require cancellation like voidable documents. A simple suit for cancellation of a document or instrument if the same casts cloud on one's right and title or is likely to cast cloud over it or affects the same adversely in respect of agricultural property, that is, ''land' poses no difficulty provided further it does not necessitate any declaration as to the claimant's right and title over the land i.e. tenancy rights under the existing law. The difficulty arises when more than one reliefs are involved or claimed. It may be that one may get effective relief in presenti without cancellation of the document, but if a document remains uncancelled for several years its existence may give rise to new trouble and litigation. The decree of a court in which a document is declared to be void and is avoided is obviously a decree in personam and the same undoubtedly binds a party but it will not be binding to each and every person as no note of such a decree can be made in the Sub-Registrar's register as provided in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. Such a document may mislead many and may give rise to various transactions and litigations.

28. In Ram Roop v. Smt. Budhiya, 1979 RD 212, the character of the document itself was challenged and the suit was essentially not for cancellation of sale-deed. The court found that the suit involved declaration of status of a Sirdar as well as possession over land. The challenge to the document was on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation as her thumb-impressions were obtained by telling her that it was for rationcard. The court found that the suit essentially was not for adjudication of sale-deed to be void, but involved declaration of sale-deed to be void, and involved declaration of status as Sirdar as well as possession.

33. In Purshottam v. Narottam, 1970 AWR 312, which in fact was not a case for void or voidable document, it was held that if plaintiff had no grievance against record maintained by State Government and Gaon Sabha, suit for permanent injunction would lie in revenue court and any other person who disputes plaintiff's right he shall also be impleaded as a defendant. But if the village records support the claim of the plaintiff, suit would not lie under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, but would lie in civil court if plaintiff's right is disputed by a third person.

41. In the case of void document said to have been executed by a plaintiff during his disability or by some one impersonating him or said to have been executed by his predecessor whom he succeeds, the relief of cancellation of the document is more appropriate relief for clearing the deck of title and burying deep any dispute or controversy on its basis in presenti or which may take place in future. The document after its cancellation would bear such an endorsement in Sub-Registrar's register and would be the basis for correction of any paper and revenue record including record of register. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act itself prescribes as to who can seek relief of cancellation. A third person cannot file a suit for cancellation of a void document. If in fact no decree for cancellation was needed and real and effective relief could be granted by the revenue court only, the civil court decree would even then be valid and not void if no objection to the same was taken before the trial court. If such an objection was taken before the trial court before framing of issues and objection continued to be taken before appellate and revisional court and there has been failure of justice because of change of forum then the civil court decree could be said to be without jurisdiction.

46. We are of the view that the case of Indra Deo v. Smt. Ram Piari, 1982 (8) ALR 517 has been correctly decided and the said decision requires no consideration, while the Division Bench case, Dr. Ayodhya Prasad v. Gangotri, 1981 AWC 469 is regarding the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities, but so far as it bolds that suit in respect of void document will lie in the revenue court it does not lay down a good law. Suit or action for cancellation of void document will generally lie in the civil court and a party cannot be deprived of his right getting this relief permissible under law except when a declaration of right or status of a tenure-holder is necessarily needed in which event relief for cancellation will be surplusage and redundant. A recorded tenure-holder having prima facie title in his favour can hardly be directed to approach the revenue court in respect of seeking relief for cancellation of a void document which made him to approach the court of law and in such case he can also claim ancillary relief even though the same can be granted by the revenue court."

In the case of Indrapal and others v. Jagannath and others reported in 1992 SCC OnLine All 1092 : 1993 All LJ 235 : (1992) 2 AWC 1118 : 1992 RD 231, this Court observed as under:-

"4. It is well established by several decisions that if the sale-deed is void and a declaration of right is claimed.the suit is triable by the revenue court, ohterwise it is triable by the civil court vide Ram Padarath v. IInd Addl. District Judge, 1989 AWC 290 (FB) and Smt. Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, 1989 ALJ 1335 (SC).

9. Thus, the essence of the matter in deciding whether the suit is cognizable by the civil Court or the revenue court is whether Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is attracted to the facts of the case. If in substance, the main question involved relates to declaration of right or title, then the suit would lie in the revenue court and not in the civil Court."

In the case of Deokinandan and others v. Surajpal and others, reported in 1996 (27) ALR 71:1995 Supp(4) SCC 671: (1995) 6 Scale 213, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

"3. The controversy is no longer res integra. Admittedly, the suit lands are governed by the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 [for short, 'the Act'). The appellant had raised the objection to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in his defence in the Trial Court. He pleaded thus:

"The suit is barred under the provisions of Section 331 of U.P. Zamindari & Land Reforms Act. The sale is not barred under the provisions of Section 168-A of Z.A. Act. The plaintiffs suit is liable to be dismissed with costs."

4. In the appellate Court also the same point has been reiterated but negatived. The second appeal was dismissed by the High Court in limine. Thus this appeal by special leave.

5. This Court in Chandrika Misir and Anr. v. Bhaiya Lal MANU/SC/0328/1973: [1974]1SCR290 had to deal with the same question. It was held that:

"Sections 209 and 331 of U.P. Zaminadari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, when read together, showed that a suit, like the present one, had to be filed in a Special Court created under the Act within a period of limitation specially prescribed under the Rules made under the Act, and the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts to entertain the suit was absolutely barred.

Since the Civil Court which entertained the suit suffered from an inherent lack of jurisdiction because of special provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951, the present appeal filed by the appellants had to be dismissed."

6. The above ratio applies to the facts in this case. As pointed out earlier, the lands are covered by the provisions of the Act and express objection as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was raised. The appellant had purchased 0.7 acres of land out of 2.17 acres. The abadi site comprises one Kachha Kotha and Ghar having boundary walls. Since the lands are admittedly covered by the provisions of the Act, the Civil Court inherently lacked jurisdiction to go into the question of title.

7. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the suit stands dismissed in so far as it relates to 0.7 acres of land purchased by the appellant. No costs."

In the case of Smt. Lakhpata and others v. IInd Additional District Judge and others, reported in (1998) 4 AWC 969, this Court observed as under:-

"8. After considering the averments of the parties made in the writ petition and in the counter-affidavit and hearing arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the suit filed by the petitioner with respect to khata No. 306 measuring 10 Biswas which also included the house, 'sahan', 'ghera' and 'saria', well and trees of the petitioners as well cannot be thrown out by the civil court, as the revenue court, cannot grant the relief in respect of house 'sahan', 'ghera', 'saria', well and trees and such a relief can only be granted by the civil court. The fate of the case filed by the petitioner under Section 229B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act before the revenue court is not known. The consolidation operations must have taken place during all these years and the counsel for the parties could not state as to whether in respect of properties in question, revenue court or the consolidation courts have passed any order or not. This aspect of the matter may be looked Into by the civil court where the matter will be heard and tried again, in view of the orders which are being passed by this Court.

9. There is another aspect of the matter which requires consideration. Ori was undoubtedly recorded as tenureholder. His name was expunged from the revenue court. The petitioners have asserted that an imposter was set up, who filed a compromise and on the basis of that compromise, the name of Ori was expunged. The petitioners, by leading evidence on that question, can prove that fact. That exercise can only be done by the civil court and not by the revenue court.

10. In view of what has been indicated heretnabove, I am of the view that the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial court as well as the revisional court have committed manifest error of law in returning the plaint for presentation to the revenue court. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and in view of the aforesaid observations, a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 6.10.1982 and 5.5.1984 (constained in Annexures-2 and 3 to the writ petition) passed by opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, is issued. The trial court will register the case and decide the same on merits in accordance with law and the directions contained in this order. "

In the case of Shri Ram and another v. Ist Addl. District Judge and others reported in (2001) 3 SCC 24, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

"7. On analysis of the decisions cited above, we are of the opinion that where a recorded tenure-holder having a prima facie title and in possession files suit in the civil court for cancellation of sale deed having been obtained on the ground of fraud or impersonation cannot be directed to file a suit for declaration in the Revenue Court, the reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure-holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure-holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the Revenue Court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession."

In the case of Smt. Kalindi and another v. IIIrd Additional District Judge and others reported in 2001 SCC OnLine All 316 : (2001) 45 ALR 265 : (2001) 3 AWC 1978 : 2001 All LJ 2054 : 2001 AIHC 4964 : (2001) 92 RD 546, this Court observed as under:-

"4. The question is what is the main relief in the suit. In Ram Padarath v. Second Additional District Judge, Sultanpur, [ 1989 RD 21.] the Court held that the suit for cancellation of a sale-deed or other instruments and documents are essentially suits of civil nature and every suit of civil nature is cognizable by a civil court except cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred. In respect of the cancellation of the sale-deed, the suits are entertainable only by a civil court and no revenue court or any other court can entertain such a suit.

Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under:

"(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable, and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.

(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the facts of its cancellation."

In respect of voidable documents, it was observed as under:

"So far as voidable documents like those obtained by practising coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence etc., are concerned, their legal effect cannot be put to an end without its cancellation. But a void document is not required to be cancelled necessarily. Its legal effect if any can be put to an end to by declaring it to be void and granting some other relief instead of cancelling it. Once it is held to be void it can be ignored by any court or authority being of no legal effect or consequence. A document executed without free consent or one which is without consideration or the object of which is unlawful or executed by a person not competent to contract like a minor or in excess of authority would be a void document. In case it is in excess of authority it would be void to that extent only. There is presumption of due registration of a document and correctness of the facts mentioned in the same, but the said presumption is not conclusive and be dislodged."

8. In the present case there are two main questions--one is whether the gift-deed and sale-deed are voidable on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint, namely, fraud in obtaining the deeds. The documents were not duly executed by the vendor. They did not contain his signatures and was without jurisdiction and the second question is whether the plaintiff-respondent was born prior to the enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. If he was born prior to the enforcement of the Act, he will have right over the sir land in question.

9. In view of the allegations contained in the suit for the cancellation of the documents, the suit is maintainable in the civil court. There is no merit in the writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed."

In the case of Jai Singh v. IInd Addl. District Judge and others, reported in 2001 SCC OnLine All 607 : (2001) 45 ALR 579 : (2001) 4 AWC 2826 : 2001 All LJ 2621 : (2002) 1 ALT (DNC 2.2) 2 : (2001) 92 RD 817 : (2001) 4 CCC 322, this Court observed as under:-

"20. There is another reason for which the plaintiff should not be precluded from going to the civil court to get the deed cancelled even though, he is not recorded in the revenue papers as in the event of cancellation of deed, further action about correction of the revenue entry will be just a sheer formality which can be said to be a follow up action and it will be just a ministerial act to be performed by revenue authorities. If the plaintiff after getting declaration in his favour by civil court visits revenue authority and brings this fact to his notice then the revenue authority after finding it out that the name of the defendant came to be recorded only on the basis of the deed in question, which having been cancelled, will have no option but to restore the entry. In this view, no adjudication by revenue authorities of any kind will be required, if the main bone of contention between the parties i.e. deed goes away from the hands of the defendants on account of its cancellation by civil court. The decision as has been referred in support of the argument for abating the suit under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, reported in Smt. Sumitra Devi v. Addl. District Judge [ 2000 (91) RD 45.] , to my mind have not dealt the aspect that if there is no specific bar in maintaining the suit in the civil court for the relief for which the plaintiff has come i.e. cancellation of the deed, then irrespective of availability or the claim for another relief which might be available in the revenue court or consolidation court, why the civil court is not competent to grant the relief of cancellation of deed for which the plaintiffs have come to the civil court. As a deed, if remains in existence, it causes or may cause the mischief in various manners which may not be foreseen today but that may create a situation in future and therefore, why that be permitted to remain if its existence can be taken away by competent forum of the civil court.

21. To my mind the jurisdiction of the civil court as is provided under Section 9 of C.P.C. cannot be permitted to be curtailed indirectly unless it is expressly barred. The pretext of ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court, on the plea that the relief claimed by the plaintiff appears to be ancillary and the main relief is of declaration of right which is to be given by the revenue court and, therefore the civil court lacks jurisdiction, to my mind will not be laying down a correct law as the plaintiff has come to the civil court for a relief of cancellation, which can only be given by civil court and therefore, even for the sake of argument, it is accepted that the relief claimed is ancillary relief, why the civil court will lack jurisdiction to grant it, (i.e. relief of cancellation of deed) especially in view of the fact that by grant of that relief, no adjudication between the parties in respect to their rights will survive either before the Revenue Court or before Consolidation Court and the correction of entry will remain a ministerial act.

22. In view of the aforesaid analysis, in respect to all the questions, (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) posed above, it is being held that the suit will lie in the civil court. If a plaintiff comes to the civil court for seeking cancellation of deed which may be void or voidable whether the name of the plaintiff is recorded or not, the jurisdiction of the civil court not having been expressly barred to try such suits, the suit will be maintainable in the civil court."

In the case of Kishori Prasad v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge and others reported in 2002 SCC OnLine All 937 : AIR 2003 All 58 : (2002) 5 AWC 4269 : 2003 All LJ 393 : (2003) 94 RD 36, this Court observed as under:-

"14. The settled position is that where the plaintiff is neither executant of the Instrument nor successor and happens to be a third party, notwithstanding the fact that a deed is cancelled on the basis of a Civil Court, the name of the plaintiff cannot be entered in the revenue record unless the plaintiff files a suit for declaration of his Bhumidhari rights on the basis of so-called sale deed executed by the Bhumidhar and this necessarily entails declaration of rights by the Revenue Court and plaintiff cannot claim any relief unless declaration is made in his favour, of his rights as Bhumidhar. The whole matter thus pivots on the cause of action and in order to properly appreciate the controversy the Court will have to recense the plaint allegations to dig out the real cause of action. What is the intendment behind real cause of action has been considered and thrashed out by the Full Bench decision in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shanker, AIR 1969 All 526. In paragraph 54 of the said decision, cause of action has been ex-patiated upon at prolix length. It has been observed in that decision taking cue from a decision in Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub All Mian, AIR 1949 PC 78 that cause of action determines the jurisdiction of a Court. The term "cause of action" though nowhere defined is now very well understood. It means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support his right to the judgment. The Court has to delve deep and scrutinise the pith and substance of the allegations in the plaint constituting cause of action in order to determine whether the plaintiff could avail of remedy in Revenue Court. In the facts of the present case, according to the plaint allegation, a sale deed is executed in favour of the plaintiff on 24-11-81. The sale deed in favour of defendant was, executed on 17-4-1981. The defendants are recorded tenure holders. Even if it be presumed that sale deed in favour of the defendant was cancelled, the plaintiff cannot appropriate it to his advantage by claiming any right unless a declaration comes to be made by Revenue Court that his sale deed is valid and he is the real and bona fide Bhumidhar. In this perspective, the pith and substance of the cause of action in the, present case is declaration of his rights as Bhumidhar. It is not a case where after obviating the hurdles by cancellation of the void document, the name of the original tenure holder will be automatically restored by ministerial act. It is thus, obvious that the plaintiff cannot derive any right unless declaration is made by Revenue Court. In the instant case, the plaintiff being third person, reliance on a subsequent sale deed dated 24-11-1981 i.e. about seven months, after the execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant, he cannot claim any relief unless rights of the plaintiffs come to be declared as Bhumidhari. Before entering into the question of cancellation of the void document, the Civil Court has to adjudicate upon, and make declaration whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is valid one and this necessarily entails declaration of the title of s the plaintiff as Bhumidhari. It is not simply denial of the title of the defendant itself on the basis of the deed but it is declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff. In the above conspectus, it is only the Revenue Court which has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the revisional Court rightly concluded that Civil Court has no jurisdiction. According to the own admission, the plaintiff has not been in possession of the portion of land covered by the sale deed and by this reckoning, his claim of possession could also be entertained by Revenue Courts and in case, his title is established and if law so permits, the decree of possession could also be given to him by the Revenue Court. From the perusal of the plaint allegation, it is amply borne out that the cause of action emerging from the aforesaid allegations is to seek declaration of his rights as Bhumidhar on the basis of sale deed dated 24-11-1981 and unless it is done no relief can be granted in his favour. It is not a case of removal of hurdle looming over the title of the original tenure holders by filing a suit for cancellation of void document but it is a case of third party who is neither executant nor successor."

In the case of Kamla Prasad v. Krishna Kant Pathak reported in (2007) 4 SCC 213, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

"10. The learned counsel for the appellant-defendants contended that the trial court as well as appellate court were right in holding that civil court had no jurisdiction to decide the question as to ownership of agricultural land and the only court which could decide such question is Revenue Court and the High Court had committed an error in reversing the said orders which deserve interference by this Court. It was submitted that so far as abadi land is concerned, the court was right that it could be decided by civil court but in respect of agricultural land, civil court has no jurisdiction. The plaintiff was bound to approach Revenue Court under the provisions of the Act. It was also submitted that the High Court had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in not considering the fact that the case of the plaintiff in the plaint itself was that over and above the plaintiff, Defendants 10 to 12 had also right in the agricultural land. Such a question can be decided only by Revenue Court in a suit filed under Section 229-B of the Act. It was also submitted that when the name of the plaintiff was deleted and of the purchasers entered in revenue records, Revenue Court alone could consider the grievance of the plaintiff. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed by setting aside the order passed by the High Court and restoring the orders of the courts below.

12. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties, in our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants deserves to be accepted. So far as abadi land is concerned, the trial court held that civil court had jurisdiction and the said decision has become final. But as far as agricultural land is concerned, in our opinion, the trial court as well as appellate court were right in coming to the conclusion that only Revenue Court could have entertained the suit on two grounds. Firstly, the case of the plaintiff himself in the plaint was that he was not the sole owner of the property and Defendants 10 to 12 who were pro forma defendants, had also right, title and interest therein. He had also stated in the plaint that though in the revenue record, only his name had appeared but Defendants 10 to 12 have also right in the property. In our opinion, both the courts below were right in holding that such a question can be decided by a Revenue Court in a suit instituted under Section 229-B of the Act. The said section reads thus:

"229-B. Declaratory suit by person claiming to be an asami of a holding or part thereof.--(1) Any person claiming to be an asami of a holding or any part thereof, whether exclusively or jointly with any other person, may sue the landholder for a declaration of his rights as asami in such holding or part, as the case may be.

(2) In any suit under sub-section (1) any other person claiming to hold as asami under the landholder shall be impleaded as defendant.

(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall mutatis mutandis apply to a suit by a person claiming to be a bhumidhar with the amendment that for the word ''landholder' the words ''the State Government and the Gaon Sabha' are substituted therein."

13. On second question also, in our view, courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that legality or otherwise of insertion of names of purchasers in record-of-rights and deletion of name of the plaintiff from such record can only be decided by Revenue Court since the names of the purchasers had already been entered into. Only Revenue Court can record a finding whether such an action was in accordance with law or not and it cannot be decided by a civil court.

14. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant rightly relied upon a decision of this Court in Shri Ram v. Ist ADJ [(2001) 3 SCC 24] . In Shri Ram [(2001) 3 SCC 24] A, the original owner of the land sold it to B by a registered sale deed and also delivered possession and the name of the purchaser was entered into revenue records after mutation. According to the plaintiff, sale deed was forged and was liable to be cancelled. In the light of the above fact, this Court held that it was only a civil court which could entertain, try and decide such suit. The Court, after considering relevant case-law on the point, held that where a recorded tenure-holder having a title and in possession of property files a suit in civil court for cancellation of sale deed obtained by fraud or impersonation could not be directed to institute such suit for declaration in Revenue Court, the reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure-holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land.

15. The Court, however, proceeded to observe: (Shri Ram case [(2001) 3 SCC 24] , SCC p. 28, para 7) "The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure-holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the Revenue Court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession."

16. The instant case is covered by the above observations. The lower appellate court has expressly stated that the name of the plaintiff had been deleted from the record-of-rights and the names of purchasers had been entered. The said fact had been brought on record by the contesting defendants and it was stated that the plaintiff himself appeared as a witness before the mutation court, admitted execution of the sale deed, receipt of sale consideration and the factum of putting vendees into possession of the property purchased by them. It was also stated that the records revealed that the names of contesting defendants had been mutated into record-of-rights and the name of the plaintiff was deleted.

17. In the light of the above facts, in our opinion, the courts below were wholly right in reaching the conclusion that such a suit could be entertained only by a Revenue Court and civil court had no jurisdiction. The High Court by reversing those orders had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction which deserves interference by this Court."

In the case of Indraj (dead) @ Talewar and others v. Smt. Bharpai (dead) and others reported in 2015 SCC OnLine All 8827 : (2015) 113 ALR 904 : (2016) 157 AIC 942 : (2016) 130 RD 542, this Court observed as under:-

"6. A perusal of the pleadings as well as two judgments make it clear that disputed property is agricultural land and admittedly only the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to decide its title and ownership. It is also admitted legal position that when consolidation proceedings initiate then only Consolidation Courts have right to determine rights and title of such agricultural land under consolidation proceedings; and Civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine or decide title of such agricultural land. The only point of disputed between the parties in Lower Court was regarding ownership of disputed agricultural land. Both the parties to dispute claimed there ownership on the basis of sale-deeds executed in their favour, but it is settled legal position that when dispute relating to title and ownership of agricultural property comes under consolidation proceedings then jurisdiction of other Courts seizes.

7. Pith and substance of the dispute between the parties is the ownership of agricultural land; and the point relating to authority to execute valid sale-deed becomes ancillary matter. Since main dispute relates to the title of agricultural land which is within jurisdiction of Consolidation Court, therefore the ancillary dispute relating to sale-deed regarding them or authority to execute the valid sale-deed or about the effectiveness of such sale-deed will also come within the jurisdiction of consolidation Court in present matter. The main dispute between the parties relating to ownership and title of disputed agricultural property has been finally decided in favour of Smt. Bharpai (plaintiff of original suit No. 423/1989 through successors), therefore the ancillary dispute regarding authenticity and cancellation etc. of sale-deed relating to such property will also be dependent on the judgment of such main dispute finally decided by consolidation Court; and after completion of consolidation proceedings by competent Revenue Court. In such circumstances, ancillary dispute relating to relief sought in original suit regarding sale-deed in question also comes within jurisdiction of competent consolidation/Revenue Court."

In the judgment and order dated 24.05.2016, passed in the case of Chandrika v. Shivnath and others, reported as 2016 (132) R.D. 247, by this Court observed as under:-

"5. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the basis of sale-deed dated 5.5.1997, the name of the petitioner has been recorded over plots 488, 487 and 494, which are subject-matter of sale-deed and he is in possession over it. At present, the petitioner is a recorded tenure holder and in possession of agricultural land i.e. plots 488, 487 and 494, which are subject-matter of sale-deed as such the suit is essentially a suit for declaration of title and possession over agricultural land. Jurisdiction of Civil Court to try such suit is barred under Section 331 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951. He relied upon the judgments Supreme Court in Kamla Prasad v. Krishna Kant Path, MANU/SC/7086/2007 : (2007) 4 SCC 213 and judgment of this Court in Kundan Singh v. Additional District Judge and others, 2009 Rajaswa Nirnay Sangah 59.

6. I have considered the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner and examined the record. In order to appreciate the controversy, relevant provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and Specific Relief Act, 1963 are quoted below:

9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.--The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

31. When cancellation may be ordered.--(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the Court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.

(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the Court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.

7. In view of Section 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, a suit for cancellation of sale-deed, void or voidable, is a suit of civil nature and can be filed before Civil Court and Civil Court has jurisdiction to try it under Section 9 C.P.C. A Full Bench of this Court in Ram Padarath v. Second. ADJ, Sultanpur and others, MANU/UP/0475/1988 : 1989 RD 21 (FB), held suit for cancellation of void and voidable sale-deed shall lie in Civil Court. This judgment has been approved by Supreme Court in Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, MANU/SC/0759/1989 : AIR 1990 SC 540.

8. Now question arises that if a sale-deed is in respect of agricultural land, suit for its cancellation is barred under Section 331 of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951, relevant part of which is quoted below:

Section 331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act.--(1) Except as provided by or under this Act, no Court other than a Court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 take cognizance of any suit, application or proceeding mentioned in column 3 thereof or a suit application or proceeding based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.

9. Under Section 331, jurisdiction of Civil Court is expressly barred for the suits mentioned in Column 3 of Schedule II of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and impliedly barred for a suit based on a cause of action, in respect of which, relief could be obtained by revenue Court (mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II). Column 3 of Schedule II of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1951 does not provide for a suit for cancellation of sale-deed of agricultural land as such Section 331(1) does not expressly bar a suit for cancellation of sale-deeds.

10. Now it has to be examined as to whether suit for cancellation of a sale-deed is impliedly barred as the required relief based on the cause of action in the suit could be obtained from revenue Court. It is the cause of action, which determines jurisdiction of a Court. Cause of action means the facts which will be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in order to obtain decree. Supreme Court in Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, MANU/SC/0759/1989 : AIR 1990 SC 540, held that in order to determine the precise nature of the action, the pleadings should be taken as a whole. If as, indeed, is done by High Court the expression 'void' occurring in the plaint as descriptive of the legal status of the sales is made the constant and determinate and what is implicit, in the need for cancellation as the variable and as inappropriate to a plea of nullity, equally, converse could be the position. The real point is not the stray or loose expressions which abound in inartistically drafted plaints, but the real substance of the case gathered by construing pleadings as a whole. It is said "Parties do not have the farsight of prophets and their lawyers the draftsmanship of a Chalmers".

11. In Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, MANU/SC/2531/2005 : (2005) 10 SCC 760, held that a plea of bar to jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety. The Court may not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed de-hors the factual averments made in the plaint. The rules of pleadings postulate that a plaint must contain material facts.

With a view to determine the question as regards exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the Court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the Court comes to the conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court must be held to have been ousted. The questions which are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated.

12. Full Bench of this Court in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, MANU/UP/0100/1969 : AIR 1969 All 526 (FB), held that (a) where on the basis of cause of action, the main relief is cognizable by a revenue Court, the suit would be cognizable by revenue Court only. The ancillary relief would be immaterial for determination of proper forum for the suit. (b) Where on the basis of cause of action, main relief is cognizable by a Civil Court, the suit would be cognizable by Civil Court only. The ancillary relief which could be granted by revenue Court may also be granted by Civil Court.

(Paragraph-90) A document under which the plaintiffs share also purports to have been transferred by a person not authorized to do so, can be canceled through Court to the extent of the plaintiffs share and after a decree has been passed in his favour, information regarding the same has to be sent to the registration department for making a note in their register. To have the document adjudged void or voidable, the suit provided under Section 31 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot be considered to be altogether unnecessary because after lapse of several years, the unchallenged existence of such document can cause serious difficulty to the plaintiff in establishing his title to the land. The plaintiff is not bound to ask for mere declaration of his title in respect of the land when he could pray for cancellation of the entire sale-deed.

13. Thus cancellation of a registered sale-deed has been held to be main relief as cause of action for the suit, is the sale-deed. The present suit has been filed for cancellation of sale-deed dated 5.5.1997. Mutation order, on its basis, directing to record the name of the petitioner is a consequential action based on sale-deed. So long as a registered sale-deed is not cancelled by Civil Court, revenue Court will be bound to respect it and will not able to ignore it as held by Full Bench of this Court in Ram Nath v. Munna, 1976 RD 220 (FB).

14. Arguments of the counsel for the petitioner is on the allegations made in the plaint, sale-deed dated 5.5.1997 is a void document and can be ignored by revenue Court. Supreme Court in Bismillah v. Janeshwar Prasad, MANU/SC/0759/1989 : AIR 1990 SC 540, held that as suit or action for cancellation of void document will generally lie in the Civil Court and a party cannot be deprived of his right of getting this relief permissible under law except when a declaration of right or status and a tenure holder is necessarily needed in which event relief for cancellation will be surplusage and redundant. A recorded tenure holder having prima facie title in his favour can hardly be directed to approach the revenue Court in respect of seeking relief for cancellation of a void document which made him to approach the Court of law and in such case he can also claim ancillary relief even though the same can be granted by the revenue Court.

15. So far as the arguments that on the basis of sale-deed dated 5.5.1997, the name of the petitioner has been recorded over plots 488, 487 and 494, which are subject-matter of sale-deed and he is in possession over it and the suit, is essentially a suit for declaration of title and possession over agricultural land, is concerned, title of the plaintiff is admitted on the date of sale-deed. In case sale-deed is canceled, there will be no requirement for declaration of the title of the plaintiff. Relief for ejectment of the petitioner and possession of the plaintiff being an ancillary relief can be granted by Civil Court also as held by this Court in Ram Awalamb's case (supra). The case law relied by the counsel for the petitioner, are applicable where declaration of title would be necessary for grant of relief to the plaintiff, while in this case, as stated above, title of the plaintiff on the date of sale-deed is admitted and cancellation of sale-deed is main relief. Supreme Court in Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commr., MANU/SC/7303/2007 : (2007) 6 SCC 186, held that it is well-settled that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only "fiscal purpose" i.e. payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent Civil Court. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality. The petition has no merit and is dismissed."

In the case of Banshi Dhar v. Sheela Devi and others in S.A. No. 279 of 2019, reported in 2016 (132) R.D. 3:(2016) 3 AWC 3192: (2017) 4 ALJ 177, this Court observed as under:-

"11. In Kamla Prasad v. Kishna Kant Pathak, (2007) 4 SCC 213 the Apex Court had held as under:

"16. The instant case is covered by the above observations. The lower appellate court has expressly stated that the name of the plaintiff had been deleted from the record-of-rights and the names of purchasers had been entered. The said fact had been brought on record by the contesting defendants and it was stated that the plaintiff himself appeared as a witness before the mutation court, admitted execution of the sale deed, receipt of sale consideration and the factum of putting vendees into possession of the property purchased by them. It was also stated that the records revealed that the names of contesting defendants had been mutated into record-of-rights and the name of the plaintiff was deleted.

17. In the light of the above facts, in our opinion, the courts below were wholly right in reaching the conclusion that such a suit could be entertained only by a Revenue Court and civil court had no jurisdiction. The High Court by reversing those orders had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction which deserves interference by this Court."

12. In Azhar Hasan & others vs. District Judge, Saharanpur & others, 1998 (34) A. L.R. 152 (SC) full bench of Apex Court has held:

"On reading the plaint and on understanding the controversy, we get to the view that whether those persons who succeeded the recorded tenants, were rightly recorded as tenants or not, was a question determinable by the Revenue Authorities. Besides that, the sale deed which has been questioned on the basis of fraud, was not executed by the plaintiffs but by others, and they were not parties thereto so as to allege the incidence of fraud, In these circumstances, we are of the view that the plaint was rightly returned to the plaintiffs. They are even now at liberty to approach the Revenue authorities and claim deduction of time spent in these proceedings, in computing limitation for the purposes of the suit."

13. In present case, admittedly, plaintiff/appellant is not a recorded tenure-holder of disputed agricultural land whereas earlier defendant no.-1 was recorded, and after execution of gift-deed in question the the proceedings of mutation of defendants no. 4 & 5 over the disputed property in revenue records is pending, in which plaintiff-appellant is participating. Therefore, granting of any relief in present matter would involve adjudication of an issue relating to co-parcenary right in agricultural land and jurisdiction of the Court as held in Sri Ram's case (Supra). Since declaration of title and right of share of disputed agricultural land is necessary pre-condition involved for grant of relief sought by plaintiff/appellant, therefore, as it is held by Apex Court in Sri Rams' case (supra), plaintiff cannot get any relief unless his rights are declared by the revenue court. Pith and substance of the present dispute involves the declaration of bhumidhari rights of plaintiff/appellant; therefore the relief sought by him even in the garb of relief of cancellation of gift-deed, cannot be granted by the civil court.

14. No relief of declaration of ownership of agricultural land specifically sought in plaint, but in essence the claim of plaintiff was based on his ownership right of the disputed land, while the plea of defendant was that plaintiff was not owner of the property. Then adjudication of title of land in substance was the main question involved in the suit, although, it was not expressly prayed for in plaint. Therefore, in substance, when the main question involved for adjudication in this case relates to declaration of right or title then suit would lie in revenue court and not in civil court. Therefore, in such mattrt the jurisdiction of civil court is barred under Section 331 of UPZA & LR Act. This provision of Section 331 is attracted when in substance main question to be determined for resolving dispute between parties relates to declaration of rights or title of agricultural land.

15. In Ram Padarath vs. Second Addl. District Judge, Sultanpur, 1989 R.D. 21 the Full Bench of this Court had held as Under:

"It is the alleged injury or the apprehended injury or cloud on the right and title of a person by some action on the part of any other person, or interference or attempt to interfere or encroach upon the right and title of a person over a particular property by any positive or negative act or declaration etc., which give a suitor cause of action to approach a court of law for relief or reliefs against the same. The dispute as to jurisdiction arises when more than one reliefs are claimed in an action on the same cause of action one of which can be granted by a civil court. If the principle of real relief can be granted by the revenue court, then the ancillary relief or the relief which flows out from the principal relief can also be granted by the revenue court notwithstanding that --then all the reliefs can be granted by the civil court and if things are in reverse direction then all the relief can be granted by the civil court, but if the so-called main relief is redundant or mere suplusage then it is the real relief involved in the matter which may or may not have been claimed as ancillary relief will determine the jurisdiction of the court which is to entertain a particular action. Even if a plaint or application is couched in such a language so as to oust jurisdiction of a particular court then it is the cause of action which would determine the forum for entertaining the said action and not the so called relief claimed."

16. In fact for an adjudication of an issue relating to jurisdiction the averments contained in the plaint have to be taken in their entirety. The effort of the court has to be to gathered from the pith and substance of what is alleged in the plaint. The pith and substance of the plaint in the instant case necessarily involved the adjudication of the question as to whether the plaintiff was or not the co-bhumidhar of the land in dispute. The plaintiff was not recorded in the revenue papers and the entry stood in favour of the defendants. Obviously, therefore, the plaintiff had to seek a declaration in his favour. Moreover, the absence of the names of the plaintiff in the revenue record necessitates an action for declaration on the part of the plaintiff because the entries may not be set right without such declaration being asked for and given as contemplated under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. There can be no escape therefore, from the conclusion that upon the cause of action set up in the plaint, the suit would lie for declaration in the revenue court under Section 229-B of the U.P. Act No.1 of 1951.

20. Apart from it, as discussed and held earlier, civil court had no jurisdiction to grant the main relief of declaration of title and coparcenary right of agricultural land. Therefore, suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

21. On examination of the reasoning recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the learned first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of the trial court as well as the first appellate court are well reasoned and are based upon proper appreciation of the entire evidences on record. No perversity or infirmity is found in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court that has been affirmed by the first appellate court to warrant interference in this appeal. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, was involved in the case before the this Court. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant- plaintiffs can be sustained."

This Court has also taken note of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pyarelal v. Shubhendra Pilania, (2019) 3 SCC 692 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 393 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 98. The Apex Court after considering Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 88, 207 and 256 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 and Section 331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, observed to the effect that jurisdiction to declare khatedari rights exclusively vests with the Revenue Court and only after declaration of rights by the Revenue Court the suit would be maintainable before the Civil Court. While holding/observing on the issue of jurisdiction of the Revenue Court and/or Civil Court the Hon'ble Apex Court also considered the judgment passed in the case of Ram Vs. Additional District Judge, (2001) 3 SCC 24. The relevant paragraphs on reproduction reads as under:-

22. The appellant has prayed that the gift deed dated 10-2-2011 be declared void to the extent of the share claimed by the appellant and that Respondents 1 to 5 be restrained from alienating the share of the appellant. The civil court may decree the relief prayed only if it is first determined that the appellant is entitled to khatedari rights in the suit property. Under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction to declare khatedari rights vests exclusively with the Revenue Court. Only after such determination may the civil court proceed to decree the relief as prayed. The Explanation to Section 207 clarifies that if the cause of action in respect of which relief is sought can be granted only by the Revenue Court, then it is immaterial that the relief asked from the civil court is greater than, or in addition to or not identical with the relief which the Revenue Court would have granted. In view of this matter, the civil court may not grant relief until the khatedari rights of the appellant have been decreed by a Revenue Court.

23. A claimant whose khatedari rights have been decreed by a Revenue Court is however on a different footing from a claimant whose khatedari rights are pending adjudication by a Revenue Court. Where the khatedari rights are yet to be decreed, a claimant must first approach the Revenue Court. The relief to declare the gift deed void and to restrain Respondents 1 to 5 from interfering with or alienating the property vesting in a civil court may be sought for in a suit by a claimant in whom khatedari rights have been decreed by a Revenue Court.

24. In Ram v. Addl. District Judge [Ram v. Addl. District Judge, (2001) 3 SCC 24] , a suit was filed before the civil court for the cancellation of a sale deed of an agricultural land on the grounds of fraud and impersonation. The defendant contended that the suit is barred by Section 331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 which reads thus:

"331. Cognizance of suits, etc. under this Act.--(1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in Column 3 thereof, or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application:

Explanation.--If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the Revenue Court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the Revenue Court would have granted."

25. The question before this Court was whether a recorded tenure-holder having prima facie title in his favour and in possession was required to file a suit in the Revenue Court, or where the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit seeking relief of cancellation of a void document. Upholding the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit, a two-Judge Bench of this Court differentiated between a recorded tenure-holder, and an unrecorded tenure-holder with the following observations: (Ram case [Ram v. Addl. District Judge, (2001) 3 SCC 24] , SCC p. 28, para 7) "7. ... we are of the opinion that where a recorded tenure-holder having a prima facie title and in possession files suit in the civil court for cancellation of sale deed having been obtained on the ground of fraud or impersonation cannot be directed to file a suit for declaration in the Revenue Court, the reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure-holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure-holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud or impersonation. There necessarily the plaintiff is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the Revenue Court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for giving him relief for declaration and possession."

26. Though the above principles emerge in the context of the bar under Section 331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, the logic of the judgment extends to the bar under Section 207 read with Section 256 of the Tenancy Act. A recorded khatedar stands on a different footing compared to a claimant seeking a decree of their khatedari rights. A claimant seeking a decree of khatedari rights is barred from filing a suit in the civil court prior to their khatedari right being decreed by a Revenue Court when the relief sought for by the civil court includes a determination of khatedari rights."

From the various authorities/judgments referred hereinabove, the position which culled out in regard to the questions framed by this Court is as under:-

If a person who questions sale deed executed or purported to be executed by him in respect of agricultural land can file the suit for its cancellation before Civil Court, if it is alleged by him that the sale deed is void or voidable on the ground of fraud, coercion, undue influence, misrepresentation or impersonation. Similarly sale deed executed or purported to be executed by predecessor-in-interest of a plaintiff can also be challenged by him before civil court on the same grounds. However, in such a situation, it is necessary that immediately before the execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-interest must undisputedly be recorded in the revenue records.

If sale deed executed by a person is challenged by another person on the ground that even though immediately before the sale deed only the name of vendor/vendors was undisputedly recorded in the revenue records, still plaintiff had a right in the revenue records, still plaintiff had a right in the said land, then such suit is not maintainable before Civil Court, as it primarily involves question of declaration of right in the agricultural land. In such a situation, it is not actually the sale deed and state of affairs coming in existence by execution of the sale deed which is being challenged. The challenge in such a situation in real sense is to the position and affairs in existence immediately before the execution of the sale deed. If a person asserts that apart from the recorded tenure-holder he also has got a right in the agricultural land then his only remedy lies in filing a suit for declaration before the Revenue Court.

Now coming to the facts of the case, from the pleading on record, it appears that Original Suit No. 176 of 1998 was initially filed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs and also for restraining the defendants from alienating the property in issue in suit. Subsequently, the suit/plaint was amended and the relief for cancellation of sale deed dated 09.02.1988 executed by defendant no. 1/Smt. Ram Rani in favour of defendant no. 2/Bachchu Lal/opposite party no. 1 was added/incorporated. Relevant to state here that the property in suit is agricultural land/property, of which the sale deed dated 09.02.1988 was executed.

Initially the suit was filed by Nirvikar Singh and Arjun Singh. During the pendency of the suit both the plaintiffs, who filed the suit, expired and in place of them the legal representative/heirs were substituted.

One legal heir of Late Nirvikar Singh, who filed the present writ petition, namely Jai Prakash Singh expired during the pendency of the present writ petition and pursuant to the order of this Court dated 14.05.2018, the name of legal heirs of Jai Prakash Singh, were substituted on 16.05.2018.

In the suit for the reliefs sought for permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed dated 09.02.1988, it has been stated that the defendant no. 1 Smt. Ram Rani wife of Durga Prasad was the maternal aunt of the Banchchu Lal/opposite party no. 1 and on account of poor financial condition of Durga Prasad the defendant no. 1/Smt. Ram Rani started living with the mother of Bachchu Lal, who is the real sister of defendant no. 1/Smt. Ram Rani. Subsequently, the defendant no. 1/Smt. Ram Rani started living with Mewa Lal, who was neighbor of Banchchu Lal, for the purposes of her maintenance. It has also been stated in plaint that the defendant no. 1 was caring/looking after Mewa Lal. Wife of Mewa Lal was expired prior to his death. Mewa Lal expired issueless. After the death of Mewa Lal the name of defendant no. 1 was mutated in the revenue record with respect to the property in suit. The plaintiffs, who were the successors of the Mewa Lal, as per plaint averments, never objected with respect to mutation of name of defendant no. 1 in revenue record in place of Mewa Lal keeping in view the fact that the defendant no. 1 served Mewa Lal, the predecessor of the plaintiffs, as well as considering that the mutation is only for the purposes of social and finance security and defendant no. 1 would possess the property in suit till her death with permission of defendant no. 3 to 13. The defendant sold the property in suit by executing a sale deed dated 09.02.1988 in favour of Bachchu Lal/defendant no. 2/opposite party no. 1 without any right, title or interest in the property of Mewa Lal.

From the averments made in the plaint, it is evident that at the time of execution of sale deed dated 09.02.1988, the property in suit was in the name of Smt. Ram Rani in the revenue records and plaintiffs were not recorded tenure holder, at that point of time, nor they were in.

From the record, it appears that in the Written Statement, a plea to the effect that the suit involves declaration of title and therefore it should have been filed before the Revenue Court and not in the Civil Court thus Civil Suit is not maintainable. This plea has been taken in paragraph 24 of Written Statement of defendant no. 2, which is on record as Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition. It has also been stated in the Written Statement that the plaintiffs have no right/title/interest in the property in suit and they are not in possession of the same.

In view of the plea of maintainability of the suit taken in the Written Statement, the issue no. 1, as mentioned hereinabove, was framed by the Trial Court i.e. Civil Judge (Junior Division), North, Unnao, which was to the effect that "whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try and hear the suit".

The Trial Court vide order dated 15.03.2001 decided the issue no. 1 against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendants and directed to return the plaint, under Order 7 Rule 1, for presenting it before competent Court. The Trial Court while deciding the issue no. 1 considered the facts and reliefs sought in the plaint and on due consideration came to conclusion that the suit is in fact is for declaration of title/rights and possession over the agricultural land/property in suit.

Aggrieved by the order dated 15.03.2001, the Misc. Civil Appeal No. 21 of 2001 was filed by Jai Prakash Singh (now deceased), original petitioner, and by the detailed judgment and order dated 05.03.2002, the District Judge, Unnao dismissed the appeal with costs. The said order was passed after considering the allegations/averments made in the plaint. The learned District Judge held that the suit involves the declaration of title of the agricultural land under the garb of relief of permanent injunction. The learned District Judge while dismissing the appeal also recorded a finding that the recorded tenure holder has executed the sale deed and the relief of cancellation of sale deed has been sought by way of amendment. The learned District Judge while dismissing the appeal also considered the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Indra Pal(Supra).

Assailing the impugned orders dated 15.03.2001 and 05.03.2002, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned orders are liable to be interfered by this Court as both the Courts below have failed to consider the scope/jurisdiction of the Civil Court keeping in view the provisions as envisaged in Section 9 of the CPC and Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as well as the reliefs sought in the suit i.e. for permanent injunction and cancellation of sale deed. In support of his submissions the counsel for petitioner Sri R.P. Singh placed reliance on the judgments, which have already referred hereinabove.

Per contra, learned counsel Sri Abhisht Saran and Sri Rahul Kumar Kashyap, who appears for opposite party no. 1, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned orders dated 05.03.2001 and 15.03.2002, passed by both the Courts below as the same have been passed after considering the averments made in the plaint to the effect that the sale deed has been executed by the recorded tenure holder and the plaintiffs are not recorded tenure holders of the suit property and accordingly the Courts below came to the conclusion that in fact relief of declaration of right/title/interest over the property in issue is involved, which is agricultural property. The reliance has been placed on the judgments, already referred hereinabove. In addition, it has also been submitted declaration to the effect that the transfer is void amounts to cancellation of transfer deed and as such the declaration of right/title/interest by the Revenue Court would suffice. In this regard reliance has been placed on the judgment of Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh Vs. Randhir Singh, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 112 and J. Vasanthi Vs. N. Ramani Kanthammal, reported in (2017) 11 SCC 852, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that "Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him."

Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the respective parities and perused the record.

From the record particularly the averments made in the plaint, it is evident that at the time of execution of sale deed dated 09.02.1988, the property in suit was in the name of Smt. Ram Rani in the revenue records and plaintiffs were not recorded tenure holder. The executant of the deed was in possession of the property in suit (agricultural land). It also appears from the averments made in the plaint that in fact the main relief sought in the suit is for cancellation of sale deed by the non executants of sale deed and the persons, who at the time of execution of sale deed were not recorded tenure holder. Thus, this Court is of the view that in fact the declaration of right/title/interest is involved in the present case.

In view of the above, the finding given by this Court as well as the conclusion given with respect to jurisdiction of Revenue/Civil Court and the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pyarelal (supra) this Court is of the view that in the instant case the suit would lie before the Revenue Court.

For the forgoing reasons, the impugned orders dated 15.03.2001 and 05.03.2002 are not liable to be interfered with.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the writ petition lacks merit.

Hence, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 27.09.2019 Arun/-