JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J.
1. Appellant Jagdish Kumar Agrawal is the owner of house No. 579 in mohalla Sahukara in the city of Bareilly. A portion of this house was vacated by the tenants and the appellant made an application for its release on the around that he required it for his personal need. The accommodation was released in his favour. Subsequently, an application was made by Ashok Kumar, respondent No. 2, for allotment of the aforesaid portion in his favour on the ground that the portion had been let out to him by the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs. 20 and that he was in occupation of the accommodation since February, 1970. Notice of this application was issued to the appellant. He filed an objection on the ground that the accommodation was still needed by him. In fact, his mother was living in it. The respondent was the son of one of his friends who requested the appellant to permit the respondent to occupy the accommodation in order to enable him to study and appear in his examination. On this request the respondent was permitted to reside in the accommodation temporarily without charging any rent and it was incorrect to say that the accommodation had been let out to the respondent.
The Rent Control and Eviction Officer came to the conclusion that it appeared that the appellant had let out the disputed portion on rent to the respondent and that he did not require it for his own use inasmuch as he was residing at Delhi. On this finding he directed the accommodation to be allotted in favour of the respondent. Against this order the appellant made a representation to the State Government under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act After hearing the parties the State Government allowed the said application. Aggrieved by that order the respondent No. 2 instituted a writ petition in this Court which has been allowed by a learned single Judge. The appellant has now come up in special appeal.
2. It was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the State Government after considering the entire material on record believed the appellant's version that the accommodation was never let out to respondent No. 2 but that he had been permitted to occupy it in the manner stated by the appellant. According to learned counsel, the reasons which weighed with the State Government in cancelling the order of allotment were based on material on record and were not irrelevant and it was consequently not open to the learned single Judge to quash that order under Article 226 of the Constitution. Having heard learned counsel for the parties we are of opinion that the submission made by learned counsel for the appellant is well-founded. A perusal of the order of the learned single Judge indicates that he was of opinion that the State Government took into consideration two circumstances which were not borne out by the record. One was that the landlord's family was residing in the house and the other was that the respondent's father was residing in the city of Bareilly. So far as the question as to whether the landlords' family was residing in the house is concerned, a perusal of the order of the State Government indicates that while dealing with the case of respondent No. 2 that a sum of Rs. 20 was paid to the mother of the appellant by him on the date when the house was taken on rent, the State Government held that on his own case it was proved that the mother of the appellant was at that time in the house in question. As is clear from the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer which was set aside by the State Government this was the case of the appellant in his objection that his family came to Bareilly of and on and that his mother lived in Bareilly. If the State Government took into consideration the case of respondent No. 2 himself in recording a finding in favour of the appellant it cannot be said that the said finding was in any way irrelevant or not supported by any material on record.
So far as the second circumstance is concerned, a perusal of the order of the State Government indicates that it has not been found in the said order that the father of the respondent No. 2 was residing in the city of Bareilly. It has been said in that order that if the father of the respondent No. 2 had been residing at Bareilly, it is he who would have taken the accommodation on rent and would have fought out the litigation. This indicates that the State Government was in fact not satisfied that the father of the respondent No. 2 was residing at Bareilly. In our opinion the learned single Judge was not right in taking the view that the State Government has held that the father of the respondent No. 2 was residing in the city of Bareilly.
3. The learned single Judge has also said that the last consideration taken by the State Government into account that a student should not be encouraged to get allotment order is again an irrelevant consideration. The order of the State Government, however, does not indicate that the State Government was of the view that no allotment order should be made in favour of a student. What has been stated in the said order is that the respondent was a student, that the case of the landlord had substance that a room had been given to him and that in these circumstances the respondent should not be given any encouragement. This clearly indicated that the State Government was taking into consideration the conduct of the respondent namely-- occupying one of the rooms of the accommodation with the permission of the landlord and then subsequently trying to get it allotted in his favour. The State Government has not stated in its order that a student should not be encouraged to get an order of allotment in his favour. In our opinion, the grounds which appealed to the State Government in setting aside the order of allotment were not irrelevant and were based on the material on record. It was only a matter of believing or disbelieving the version of one party or the other. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer believed the version of the respondent whereas the State Government believed that of the landlord. It was a case just of appraisal of evidence.
We are further of opinion that even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted that one of the several reasons which weighed with the State Government in setting aside the order of allotment was not relevant, that alone would not be sufficient to set aside the order under Article 226 of the Constitution in case the other grounds were sufficient to justify the said order. In Zora Singh v. J. M. Tandon, (AIR 1971 SC 1537) it was held that the principle that a decision of a Tribunal would be vitiated if some of the reasons relied on by it for its conclusion turn out to be erroneous or otherwise unsustainable, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at on subjective satisfaction. For, in such cases it would be difficult for the Superior Court to find out which of the reasons brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, if it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a Superior Court would not interfere, if the finding can be sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the Superior Court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and therefore does not enter into question of sufficiency of evidence.
4. Learned counsel for the contesting respondent urged that the State Government had not considered the entire material and had not recorded a categorical finding on the question as to whether the accommodation was or was not vacant. In our opinion, this submission has no substance. Once the State Government came to the conclusion that since the accommodation was released in favour of the landlord it could be presumed that his need was found to be genuine and further that the landlord had permitted the respondent to occupy one room in the manner alleged by him, it is apparent that the State Government was of the view that the accommodation was never let out to the respondent nor was intended to be let out. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the State Government did not consider the question as to whether the accommodation was or was not vacant for purposes of allotment. It is clear that in the opinion of the State Government the accommodation was not available for allotment. It has not been disputed that the entire record was before the State Government before it disposed of the application under Section 7-F. In B. A. Singh v. M. D. Agarwal, (1969 All LJ 1060) a Division Bench of this Court held that in a situation where the entire record was before the Government before passing the impugned order, the omission of the State Government to refer in its order to all the material on the record does not vitiate the order. In our opinion, therefore, the order of the State Government was not such which could be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution.
5. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the learned single Judge is set aside. The appellant will be entitled to costs.