JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J.
1. The appellant, who had not been impleaded as a party-respondent in a proceeding initiated by Dr. Kumari Vimla Gupta--the present respondent, for her being appointed as guardian of the person and property of Km. Sweta Gupta--the minor, has filed this appeal under Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, feeling aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, appointing the respondent in this appeal as guardian of the person and property of minor--Km. Sweta Gupta with certain directions.
2. Since the appellant had neither been impleaded in the proceeding giving rise to this appeal nor, as asserted by him, he had any notice of the same, an application seeking grant of leave to file the appeal being Civil Misc. Application No. 91483 of 2002 had been moved by him. The said application had been allowed after hearing the learned counsel for the parties vide the order dated 23.5.2002.
3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondent.
4. Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court vide the order dated 25.2.2003, Dr. Kumari Vimla Gupta--the respondent has appeared in person along with Km. Sweta Gupta--the minor. The appellant--Jagdish Chandra Gupta is also present in Court as directed.
5. The facts in brief shorn of details and necessary for the disposal of this appeal lie in a narrow compass.
6. Km. (Dr.) Kamla Gupta was the real sister of the present respondent Dr. Kumari Vimla Gupta. The appellant in this appeal, it is not disputed, is the real brother of Dr. Kumari Vimla Gupta. Both the present appellant as well as the present respondent fall in the category IX of the heirs in class-II as indicated in the schedule attached to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Km. (Dr.) Kamla Gupta was a medical practitioner who had set up medical practice in the city of Jabalpur. She had also agricultural properties situate in district Jabalpur. Km. (Dr.) Kamla Gupta had taken in adoption the minor Km. Sweta born on 2.11.1994 while she was about 6 years of age through a registered adoption deed dated 4.6.2000. At the time, of adoption, the age of Km. (Dr.) Kamla Gupta was about 74 years. The minor Km. Sweta Gupta who had been taken in adoption was an orphan and was being brought up in a registered orphanage which is being run in the name and style of Shree Raj Kumari Bai, Bal Niketan (Bal Ashram), near Shastri Bridge, Napier Town, Jabalpur. It is also not disputed that Km. (Dr.) Kamla Gupta fell seriously ill. She had a stroke of paralysis and as stated by Dr. Km. Vimla Gupta, she along with minor had been brought to Kanpur where Dr. Kumari Vimla Gupta, who herself is a medical practitioner, for providing better medical treatment and was being looked after by her. She was brought to Kanpur on 12.11.2001 where she died on 24.11.2001. Km. (Dr.) Kamla Gupta had vast properties in district Jabalpur which Included Nursing Homes and as big residential house besides 5.8 hectares of agricultural holdings. She had also left behind cash deposits valued at Rs. 50 lacs.
7. It may be noticed that in the application under Section 10 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, in the clause meant for disclosing the names of the near relations and their residential address. Dr. Km. Vimla Gupta had mentioned her own name and her residential address. She had not disclosed that the present appellant the real brother of deceased Km. (Dr.) Kamla Gupta was also a near relative.
8. Relying on the affidavit filed by Dr. Km. Vimla Gupta and noticing the fact that despite the proclamation having been made by beat of drum and publication having been made in Dainik Kanpur Ujala for notice to general public, none had come forward either to contest the petition or to file any objection against it, had allowed the application with certain directions.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the district court at Kanpur had no Jurisdiction to entertain the application and to appoint a guardian of the person and property of the minor. It is urged in this connection that according to the applicant herself while the immovable properties left by the deceased belonging to the minor were situate in the district of Jabalpur, the minor in the present case could not be deemed to be ordinarily residing in the district of Kanpur as she had been brought along with her ailing adoptive mother for treatment at Kanpur a few days before her death.
10. The provisions contained in Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, regulate the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain an application for appointment of guardian of the person and property of the minor. The aforesaid provision is to the following effect :
"9. Court having Jurisdiction to entertain application.--(1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the district court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides.
(2) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of the property of the minor, it may be made either to the district court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides or to a district court having jurisdiction in a place where he has property.
(3) If an application with respect to the guardianship of the property of a minor is made to a district court other than that having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides, the Court may return the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by any other district court having jurisdiction."
11. The provisions contained in Section 9(1) of the Act mandates that if the application is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor, it shall be made to the district court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. However, the provisions contained in Section 9(2) of the Act cover a situation where the applicant seeking guardianship of the property of the minor has been given a choice providing that the application may be made either to the district court having jurisdiction in a place where the minor ordinarily resides or to a district court having jurisdiction in a place where he has properly.
12. In the present case, it is urged that the minor had her properties situate in the district of Jabalpur from where for a temporary period she was brought to the district Kanpur during the severe illness of her adoptive mother for providing better treatment to her as there was better medical facilities available at Kanpur. This was so indicated by Dr. Kumari Vimla Gupta who had attended this Court on the date of hearing of this appeal as indicated hereinabove.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that since no opportunity to contest the application had been provided, the present appellant who was a near relative not only of the applicant but also of the minor, he could not bring on record the relevant evidence which could have clinched the issue in regard to the question relating to the stay of the minor at Kanpur being only of a temporary or casual nature. In the aforesaid connection, the learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to the provisions contained in Rules 654(2), 659 and 660 of Chapter XXVIII of General Rules (Civil), 1957.
14. The aforesaid rules have been framed by the High Court in exercise of powers conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The rules contained in Chapter XXVIII of the aforesaid rules regulate the procedure to be followed in the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Rule 654(2) of the Rules requires that all persons of the same degree of relationship, or of nearer degree than the proposed guardian, and where a female is proposed guardian, the nearest male relation of the minor shall be specified. Rule 659 of the Rules requires that all the persons mentioned in Rule 654(2) besides those required to be served with notice by Section 11 of the Act shall be served with the notice of the application which has to be filed in the prescribed proforma. Rule 660 of the Rules requires that whenever the application made under Section 10 of the Act states that the property of the minor consists of land or any interest in land, a copy of the petition shall be sent to the Collector of the district in which such property or any part of it is situate.
15. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned District Judge had acted with material irregularity in altogether omitting to take into consideration the vindication arising under the aforesaid provisions and further omitting to ensure the strict compliance thereof before proceeding to adjudicate upon the claim of the respondent, Dr. Km. Vimla Gupta.
16. It should not be lost sight of and must be emphasized that in custody cases, a child has not to be treated as a chattel in which its parents have a proprietary interest. It is a human being to whom the parents owe serious obligations. One's own self-interest sometimes clouds his perception of what is the best for those for whom he or she is responsible. It takes a very high degree of selflessness and maturity--which Is for most of the people probably un-attainable degree--for a parent/ proposed guardian to acknowledge that it might be better for the child to be brought up by someone else.
17. Where the object of a person who applies to be appointed as guardian of a minor is not so much the welfare of the minor as the vindication of his own right to be appointed as a guardian, his application does not deserve to be granted specially when the minor is in the custody of proper person and is in the custody of a near close relative and is being properly looked after.
18. Further, a claim to the custody of the child by the guardian has not to be treated as vindication of a right in the nature of the property but it is in the nature of trust only for the benefit of the minor. The expression "should" as used in Section 7 of the Act is quite significant. There must be an existing necessity for the appointment of a guardian and the Court must be satisfied about it before passing of the order.
19. It has been urged that the expression "ordinarily resides" as used in Section 9(1) of the Act signifies dwelling in a place for some continuous time. "Ordinarily resides" therefore, has to be some thing more than a temporary residence. Even though the period of such temporary residence may be considerable, the place where the minor generally resides and would be expected to reside but for special circumstances may be taken to be the place denoting a place where the minor ordinarily resides. The other aspect which cannot be ignored is that when a person leaves a place where he had been residing as permanent resident for good, i.e., with no Intention to come back and goes to some other place to live there, the former place where he used to live, ceases to be his ordinary place of residence and the latter place becomes his ordinary place of residence. The question of residence is largely a question of intention. However, in cases of the minor, no question of intention can arise but the Court will have to take into consideration all the relevant facts as brought on record to determine the actual place of residence looking the attendant circumstances. The past abode for however a long period it may be, can cease to be a place where the minor can be said to be ordinarily residing depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature and duration of the residence. The mere fact that a minor is found actually residing at a place at the time of the application is made by itself is not sufficient to determine the jurisdiction.
20. The expression 'ordinarily resides' and residing at the time of the application are not synonymous and stipulate different situations which are not inter-changeable. The place where the minor ordinarily resides indicates a place where the minor is expected to reside but for the special circumstances. It excludes places to which the minor may be removed at or about the time of the filing of the application for the enforcement of the guardianship and custody of the minor. The place has to be determined by finding out as to whether the minor was ordinarily residing and where such residence would have continued but for the recent removal of the minor to different place.
21. In the present case, as has already been indicated hereinabove, no opportunity had been afforded to the present appellant to put in a contest and place his version before the court below. The contesting respondent had also not approached the Court with clean hands and had not supplied the details and the addresses of the near relations and taken steps to serve them as required under the Rules.
22. The District Judge had also without any justifiable reason omitted to discharge his duty by ensuring that the provisions contained in the Rules stand complied with before passing the final order disposing of the application. The district court was dealing with the question relating to the custody of a female minor aged about 6 years.
23. As has already been indicated hereinabove, the claim of the custody of the child by a guardian is not in the nature of property but it is in the nature only of trust for the benefit of the minor. The welfare of the minor so far as the guardianship regarding person of the minor is concerned is the primary consideration. So far as the property of the minor is concerned, it has to be ensured that it is to be in proper hands for its effective and fruitful management protecting the Interest of the minor.
24. The court below has not applied his mind to the relevant aspects while disposing of the application. In this connection, it may also be noticed that as provided under Section 9(3) of the Act, if an application with respect to the guardianship of the property of a minor is made to a district court other than that having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides, the Court may return the application if in its opinion the application would be disposed of more justly or conveniently by any other district court having jurisdiction.
25. In view of what has been indicated hereinabove, we are clearly of the opinion that the matter requires consideration afresh by the court below.
26. In the result, this appeal succeeds in part and setting aside the impugned order, the District Judge is directed to restore the application filed by the respondent giving rise to this appeal on its original number and after affording an opportunity to the applicant to amend the same dispose that of in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove expeditiously preferably not later than 2 months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.
27. There shall be no order as to cost.