Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.
(Per: Hon'ble M.C. Tripathi, J)
1. We have heard Shri Ashok Bhalla and Shri J.B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.K. Singhal, learned counsel for respondents-bank.
2. J. K. Chandna is before this Court with the request to issue suitable writ or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the record and quashing the entire enquiry and disciplinary proceedings and the impugned order of punishment dated 4.12.2009 passed by respondent no.3 as modified by the order of respondent no.2 dated 22.9.2010. He has further prayed for direction restraining the respondents from withholding or denying the petitioner his due promotion and all other service benefits to him in pursuance of the impugned orders of punishment passed by the respondents concerned.
3. Brief background of the case, as is reflected from the record, is that Pradhama Bank (in short, the Bank), which is a Regional Rural Bank, established under the provisions of Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to Act 1976). The Bank has its 212 branches spread in three districts namely Moradabad, Rampur and Jyotiba Phule Nagar in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Syndicate Bank is its sponsor bank. The main function of the Bank is to carry out the banking business. The Bank is State within the meaning of Article 12 of Constitution of India and its banking activities including supervisory, finance and administration are managed and controlled by the Government of India. The share capital of the Bank is held by the Central Government, State Government and Sponsor Bank in the ratio of 50%, 15% and 35% respectively and the Bank is primarily an agency and instrumentality of the Central Government. Under Section 29 of the Act 1976 the Central Government has power to make Rules after consultation with the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (in short, NABARD) and Sponsor Bank. The Board of Director of the Bank has the power to make Regulations after consultation with Sponsor Bank and NABARD and with previous sanction of the Central Government. The appointment and other conditions of service of officers and employees of the Bank are governed by statutory regulations known as "Prathama Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2001" (in short, Regulations 2001) framed by the bank in exercise of its powers under Section 30 of the Act 1976. Chapter-IV of Regulations, 2001 deals with the conduct, discipline and appeals of the officers and employees of the bank. Regulation 38 (1) of Regulations 2001 provides penalties in respect of officers as under:-
"38. Penalties Without prejudice to foregoing Regulations of this Chapter an officer or employee who commits a breach of these Regulations or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who commits acts detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in conflict with its instructions, or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other acts of misconduct, shall be liable for any one or more penalties as prescribed hereinafter.
1. Officers
(a) Minor Penalties
(i) Censure
(ii) Withholding or stoppage of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect.
(iii) Withholding of promotion.
(b) Major Penalties
(i) Recovery from emoluments or such other amounts as may be due to him, of the whole or part or any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by negligence or breach of orders.
(ii) Reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower scale in a time scale.
(iii) Compulsory retirement
(iv) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment.
(v) Dismissal."
4. It appears from the record in question that the petitioner was working as Manager in Thakurdwara Branch of the Bank, Moradabad Head Office. While he was posted as Manager of Town Hall Branch of the Bank at Moradabad, which was a new and TBM (Total Branch Mechanization) branch, one Rafat Ali Khan had approached to the petitioner for sanction of loan credit limit known as Secured Over Draft (SOD) of Rs.25 lacs for his proprietorship firm M/s P.S. Handicrafts, Budh Bazar, Moradabad, which was claimed to be engaged in the business of manufacturing of Brass, Iron, Aluminum and wooden items. It has also been contended that Rafat Ali Khan was introduced by a renowned Medical Practitioner and Eye Surgeon of the area Dr. Virendra Singh Chauhan, who had also a loan account in the said branch. It has been claimed that the branch in question was a new and TBM branch of which the petitioner did not have much experience of working. On receiving the said loan application on 13.9.2007 the petitioner had processed the said application on the basis of collateral security by the loanee and the reports of the valuer and panel lawyer and accordingly recommended for sanction of Rs.25 lacs as loan credit limit to the said firm. The same was forwarded to the Area Manager of the area office of petitioner's bank on 23.9.2005.
5. Record in question also reflects that in the normal practice of sanctioning of loan credit limit to the tune of Rs.25 lacs, the loan proposal is to be processed at the first instance by the Branch office concerned and the same is to be forwarded to the Area Office alongwith its recommendation/appraisal note with all necessary documents and information. Thereafter, the said proposal is to be examined and scrutinized by the Area Office concerned and if it is found in order in all respect, the same is submitted with its recommendations to the credit department of the head office. Thereafter, the entire proposal/recommendation and documentations are then closely scrutinized and verified by the credit department and then the same is liable to be placed before the sanctioning authority i.e. the General Manager for sanction. In the present matter, on the basis of the said recommendation the said loan credit limit of Rs.23 lacs was sanctioned on 28.9.2007 and after the said approval, the loan limit was disbursed by the petitioner to the loanee on 30.9.2007.
6. This much has also been averred in the writ petition that a news item was published in daily newspaper 'Amar Ujala' on 20.10.2007 by which the petitioner got an information that Rafat Ali Khan had committed some sort of fraud in obtaining the loan from Punjab National Bank, Civil Lines, Moradabad. Immediately on receiving the said information the petitioner had apprised to higher officers and after receiving instructions from the higher authority, a first information report was lodged by the petitioner against Rafat Ali Khan and its firm. A charge sheet had also been submitted against the loanee by the local police. Thereafter, a preliminary enquiry was made by the inspection department at the Head Office of the Bank and consequently on the basis of preliminary enquiry report, a show cause notice was served upon the petitioner on 26.11.2007 to show cause within seven days, as to why the disciplinary proceedings be not initiated against him for alleged irregularities committed by him in recommending the said proposal for the loan credit limit of Rafat Ali Khan. The petitioner had submitted a detailed reply on 7.12.2007 narrating the entire facts and circumstances of the case.
7. Thereafter, the petitioner was placed under suspension vide an order dated 17.12.2007 but later on he was reinstated by the Competent Authority on 23.2.2008. A charge sheet dated 18.3.2008 had been served upon the petitioner containing two charges namely procedural irregularities in recommending the said loan credit limit of the firm of Rafat Ali Khan and thereby violating Regulation 17 and 19 of the Regulations. In the said charge sheet the petitioner was charged of being guilty and liable for punishment under Regulation 38 for putting a sum of Rs.23 lacs of the bank at stake which was likely to cause a financial loss to the bank. Thereafter the petitioner proceeded to file his reply on 15.5.2008 to the charge sheet denying both the charges levelled against him and further explaining the entire facts and circumstances and thereby pleaded himself as not guilty of the said charges and requested for his exoneration. Shri V.K. Rastogi, Senior Manager of Loan Department at the Head Office of the bank was appointed as enquiry officer. In the course of enquiy proceeding on 26.8.2008, the Bank's representative Sri A.K. Sharma, who was the Manager, Inspection Department at the Head Office, filed a list of only ten documents and two witnesses.
8. This much is also reflected from the record in question that the enquiry was conducted strictly as per Regulations and finally the enquiry officer submitted the report on 1.8.2009 to the Disciplinary Authority holding both the charges levelled against the petitioner as fully proved. Consequently, the Disciplinary Authority had proceeded vide letter dated 4.8.2009 to ask the petitioner to submit his representation/comments, if any, within seven days. On 12.8.2009 the petitioner had submitted detailed reply. Thereafter the Chairman/Disciplinary Authority passed an order dated 4.12.2009 imposing a major penalty/punishment of reduction of basic pay of the petitioner to five stages lower in the time scale of pay and also holding the petitioner liable to the financial loss to the bank. Apart from it, the Disciplinary Authority also passed an administrative order on 4.12.2009 for not treating the period of petitioner's suspension as the duty period. Aggrieved with the said punishment order, the petitioner had filed an appeal on 31.12.2009 and the same was rejected by the Appellate Authority vide an order dated 22.9.2010.
9. Shri Ashok Bhalla, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the entire enquiry and the disciplinary proceedings have been held by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority in most arbitrary, impartial, unfair and biased manner and the same cannot be sustained. Various documents, which had been asked by the petitioner, were not supplied and only on the basis of the preliminary enquiry report the enquiry officer had proceeded and drawn conclusion against the petitioner and the said preliminary enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner. He further made submission that the petitioner was only a recommending authority at the first instance of the loan proposal and the said loan was not even within his domain for sanctioning limit. The same could only be sanctioned at the head office on the basis of recommendations made by the Area Office as well as the credit department of the Head Office. The petitioner has not at all been made liable for the said dereliction of duty and even the petitioner himself was a victim of fraud of the loanee on account of negligence and carelessness of the Area Office and Credit Department of the Head Office. In the present matter, the petitioner had taken every care at the initial stage and forwarded the said application only on the basis of recommendations made by the approved valuer and the lawyer concerned but while inflicting punishment no suitable punishment had been made against the officer concerned and they are also responsible for the said loss to the bank but none of them has been charge sheeted and the petitioner, who alone has been singled out, has been made a scapegoat in the matter.
10. In this background, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on account of pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him, the petitioner has already been deprived of his promotion to the next higher Grade-III in the year 2010. The charges against the petitioner in the charge sheet were to the effect that the petitioner had put the money of bank at stake due to which the monetary loss was likely to cause to the bank but there was no finding returned on this score whether any actual loss to the bank had occurred or not. While inflicting punishment, the charge of pecuniary loss has also been levelled against the petitioner and as such, the same is the second punishment for the same cause of action and the same is double jeopardy. The loss is liable to be recovered from the defaulter and the same cannot be directed to be recovered against the delinquent employee. He has placed his reliance on Lt. Governor, Delhi & ors vs. HC Narinder Singh (2004) 13 SCC 342 and in State of Uttar Pradesh & ors vs. Madhav Prasad Sharma (2011) 2 SCC 212.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in the present matter, the pick and choose policy has been adopted and the petitioner has been made as a scapegoat. He has proceeded to recommend for sanction of loan credit limit of Rs.25 lacs in favour of Rafat Ali Khan only on the basis of valuer's report. He himself had taken extra precaution while making the proposal to the extent that he had proceeded to inspect the property in question, which had been put as collateral security in the matter and the valuer and panel lawyer submitted their valuation and verification reports dated 18.9.2007 and 19.9.2007 respectively, wherein they had mentioned that the said properties were of a sound value and were free from all encumbrances and as such, the punishment is discriminatory. He has placed his reliance on the judgements passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Trilok Nath vs. UOI 1967 SLR 759; Union of India & ors vs. J. Ahmed AIR 1979 SC 1022; T.V. Chaudhary with ES Reddi vs. Chief Secretary, Government of AP & another (1987) 3 SCC 258; State of UP vs. Shatrughan Lal & another (1998) 6 SCC 651; Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd vs. Jitendra Pd. Singh & another (2001) 10 SCC 530; Tata and Moni Shankar vs. UOI & anr 2009 (3) Scale 455; State of UP & ors vs. Raj Pal Singh (2010) 5 SCC 783 and Rajendra Yadav vs. State of MP & ors (2013) 3 SCC 73 in support of his submission.
12. Per contra, Shri P.K. Singhal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-bank has vehemently opposed the writ petition on the ground that in the present matter, the bank was cheated by the borrower by hatching a well-organized conspiracy in collusion with some person. The borrower procured a sum of Rs.23 lacs by getting loan sanctioned on the basis of fake/manipulated documents in a planned manner. The matter was thoroughly investigated and it was found that the fraud was committed by the borrower in collusion with some person and caused heavy loss to the extent of Rs.23 lacs to the bank and the said loan was sanctioned due to negligence of the petitioner and as such, the petitioner failed to perform his duty as per rules and procedures of the bank. He further made submission that the petitioner in very hurriedly manner recommended for sanction to headquarter for such a huge loan amount, even though the borrower had little dealing with the bank. There was almost no banking behaviour of the said customer till the petitioner recommended the said Secured Over Draft limit. This also clearly indicates that the petitioner showed extra interest in finalisation of the proposal and acted with gross negligence in recommending the said proposal for sanction. The petitioner obtained two co-obligants in the said loan proposal. As per procedure and rules of the bank, KYC (Know Your Customer) Rules laid down by the Reserve Bank of India are necessary to be complied with. Even the petitioner had not taken a care to open the account of one of the co-obligants namely Mohd. Ahsan son of Mohd. Jaan.
13. In this background, learned counsel for the respondents bank further submitted that the so-called co-obligant had been found to be a fictitious person during the investigation. The petitioner had obtained the details regarding bonafide of the co-obligant in a very casual manner without ascertaining the facts such as his occupation, identity and address. He further submitted that the petitioner furnished information in regard to the co-obligants in the specified format of the bank but no documents were obtained in support of the said information. He has also placed his reliance on the averments contained in para-9-I, 9-J, & 9-K of the counter affidavit wherein details have been averred regarding the properties, which were used in the present matter as collateral securities. The claim of the petitioner, that he himself had inspected the property in question, cannot be substantiated in the light of the averments made in paras 9-I, 9-J and 9K of the counter affidavit. While sanctioning the said loan limit by the Head Office of the bank, some conditions were liable to be fulfilled by the petitioner himself for disbursement of the loan limit but the petitioner for the reason best known to him had not taken care to comply with the very important conditions and hurriedly disbursed the loan amount.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents further placed his reliance regarding the explanation of the petitioner dated 7.12.2007 submitted in response to the charge sheet in which it has been stated that he disbursed the said loan amount in good faith and he was assured by the borrower that the said documents will be got completed by him within 2-4 days, which could not be completed because the borrower was arrested. He further made submission that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary action taken by the employer is extremely limited and in most of the cases, the Courts did not interfere with the punishment imposed on the employee. If it is shown that the action of the employer is vitiated due to violation of the statutory rules or regulations or the principles of natural justice, and such violation has prejudiced his cause but in the present matter, the enquiry was got conducted by the enquiry officer strictly in consonance with the regulations and as such, no interference is required in the matter.
15. Heard rival submissions and perused the record.
16. We have proceeded to examine the record in question and find that a Secured Overdraft limit No.13/07 for Rs.23 lacs was disbursed at Town Hall branch on 30.9.2007 in the name of M/s P.S. Handicrafts, Budh Bazar, Moradabad (Prop. Rafat Ali Khan) by the petitioner as Branch Manager of the said branch of respondent bank. The bank was cheated by the borrower by hatching a well organized conspiracy in collusion with some persons and succeeded in procuring an amount of Rs. 23 lacs by getting the above loan sanctioned on the basis of fake and manipulated documents.
17. This much is reflected that in the present matter, the bank had proceeded to make the preliminary enquiry and thereafter the departmental enquiry was conducted wherein at every stage the petitioner was afforded an ample opportunity to defend himself. The petitioner had obtained two co-obligants against the said loan proposal and as per the procedure and rules of the bank, the KYC Rules laid down by the Reserve Bank of India are necessary to be complied with and at every stage the petitioner being as Manager of the bank had deviated with the norms and terms and conditions laid down by the bank. At the time of investigation, it was also revealed that the residents of the locality were not aware of any Rafat Ali Khan and as such, there was no property in his name in the said locality. The property in question, which was mortgaged, was actually belonging to three brothers namely Arshad Khursheed, Mohd. Habib and Mohd. Asharaf, all sons of Mohd. Khursheed and the property was mortgaged in the loan of M/s M.H. Pool Point (Prop. Mohd. Habib son of Mohd. Khursheed) for Rs.1,80,000/- which was sanctioned by Indian Overseas Bank, Budh Bazar, Moradabad. The borrower Rafat Ali Khan submitted manipulated title deed to defraud the bank and the petitioner in most casual manner had acted negligently in the matter and as such, the claim of the petitioner, that he himself visited the property in question, cannot sustain and as such he failed to inspect/enquire about the properties offered as collateral security of the loan.
18. This is also reflected from the record in question that after receiving the said loan application alongwith documents and appraisal note the petitioner had forwarded the papers to the Area Manager, who was supposed to have made his own independent enquiry, and as such the Area Officer was equally responsible and had the vital role for sanctioning of the loan credit limit. The petitioner is alone victimized in the matter. Being as Manager of the bank it was incumbent upon the petitioner to protect the interest of the bank and in this background, he cannot submit that in the good faith and in bonafide manner, he had proceeded to process and recommend the proposal of the loan to the Area Officer. Admittedly the petitioner had initially forwarded the said proposal and finally he had disbursed the cash credit limit. It was initially incumbent on his part to verify the credentials of an applicant and at least he could ascertain the property in question, which had been put as collateral security. The claim set out by the petitioner cannot be sustained on the ground that he himself admitted in response to the charge sheet that he had disbursed the said loan limit in good faith and was assured by the borrower that the documents will be got completed within 2-4 days' time, and the said formalities could not be completed on account of arrest of Rafat Ali Khan. Moreover, Regulation 38 of Regulations 2001 clearly proceeds to make a mention that an officer or employee who commits a breach of Regulations or who displays negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who commits acts detrimental to the interests of the Bank or in conflict with its instructions, or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other acts of misconduct, shall be liable for any one or more penalties as prescribed in the Regulations 2001 and as such, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner regarding double jeopardy would not be attracted. Even otherwise, if the argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then in such an eventuality, if any pecuniary loss has occurred to the respondent-bank, then only remedy available to the respondent Bank is to dispense with the services of the incumbent and not to proceed for recovery of the said loss. We do not subscribe to such interpretation of law, and are of the opinion that under the compelling facts and circumstances of the case, the Bank can proceed to award major penalty and simultaneously can also ask to the delinquent employee to make good the loss occurred to the Bank.
19. In State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra AIR 1963 SC 779, the Supreme Court considered whether the High Court can interfere with the order of punishment simply because finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer in respect of some charges is found to be vitiated by an error of law and whether it can go into the sufficiency and adequacy of punishment. While reversing the order of Orissa High Court, which had allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent, the Supreme Court observed:-
"But the Court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanour established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an inquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the Court. If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were 'unassailable', the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a Competent Authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the Inquiry Officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice."
20. In State of A.P. v. Sree Rama Rao AIR 1963 SC 1723, the Supreme Court indirectly reiterated the proposition laid down in Bidyabhushan Mohapatra's case (supra) and held:-
"The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental inquiry against a public servant; it is concerned to determine whether the inquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the inquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the inquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding ... under Article of the Constitution.
21. In Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh AIR 1969 SC 966, the principle laid down in Bidyabhushan Mohapatra's case (supra), was reiterated. In State of Madras vs. G. Sundaram AIR 1965 SC 1103, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the following proposition:-
"High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in a properly conducted departmental enquiry except when it be shown that the impugned findings were not supported by any evidence. It cannot consider adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge.
22. In State of A.P. Vs. C. Venkata Rao (1975) 2 SCC 557, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court referred to the judgments of Syed Yakoob Vs. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, Bidyabhushan Mohapatra's case (supra), Niranjan Singh's case (supra) and observed:-
"In considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court need not be applied. Even if that rule is not applied by a domestic tribunal in any inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a Court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal."
23. In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India (1995 ) 6 SCC 749, the Supreme Court, while considering the appellant's challenge to the order of punishment passed as a sequel to the departmental enquiry held against him, highlighted the limited scope of judicial review by making the following observations:-
"Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of that case."
24. In Tara Chand Byas vs. Chairman JT 1997 (3) SC 500 a bank employee was punished for giving loans without adequate security. The Supreme Court upheld the punishment.
25. In Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K. Chopra AIR 1999 SC 625, the Supreme Court again considered the High Court's power to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings and held:-
"It is a settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty.
Further, it is a well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process.
Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority."
26. In Regional Manager and Disciplinary Authority SBI Hyderabad vs. S. Mohad. Gaffar the Supreme Court interpreted the words 'gross misconduct' as against the 'minor misconduct' under the 'Shashtriya Award' and 'Desai Award' applicable to the employees of the bank and held that the expression 'gross misconduct' is not to be viewed or considered as it may appear or appeal to the perception of the court. It has to be construed in the context of the definition. If any act is done prejudicial to the interest of the bank or gross negligence involves, or is likely to involve the bank in serious loss and where the employee of the bank knowingly makes a false statement in any document pertaining to or in connection with the employment with the bank, the findings on such issue would amount to gross misconduct. The penalty or punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority will not be treated to be excessive, shocking conscious of the court, if it is permissible. The High Court does not normally interfere or substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty than the punishment imposed by the bank.
27. Similar view was also taken in Union of India and ors vs. K.G. Singh (2006) 3 ESC 373 (SC) limiting judicial review to the deficiency in the decision making process and not the decision itself. In State Bank of India vs. T.J. Pal (1999) 4 SCC 759 the Supreme Court observed that proof of actual loss was not necessary for punishing a bank employee. In Union of India vs. Vishwa Mohan 1998 (4) SCC 310 it was held by the apex court that absolute devotion, diligence and integrity is required from the employees in the banking business, otherwise the confidence of the public will be impaired.
28. This Court has consistently held in D.S. Bisnoi vs. State Bank of India 2004 (1) ESC 381; Sudhir Singh vs. District Cooperative Bank 2003 (1) ESC 465; Ram Pratap Sonekar vs. Allahabad Bank 2000 (2) ESC 814; K.K. Singh vs. Gomti Gramin Bank 2002 (1) ESC 257, delivered by Division Benches, relying upon Disciplinary Authority vs. N.B. Patnaik 1996 (4) SCC 457; State Bank of India vs. T.J. Pant 1999 (4) SCC 759, that the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority of the bank based upon the enquiry report. Where full opportunity is given to the employee of the bank to defend himself, the High Court would not interfere in the findings on technical and flimsy grounds. In Disciplinary Authority vs. N.B. Patnaik (supra) the Supreme Court observed that even if no loss has been caused to the bank, an act beyond the authority of the officer of the bank amounts to misconduct.
29. In Dr. Ram Pal Singh vs. State of UP and ors (2006) 2 ESC 1182 Allahabad (DB) a Division Bench of this Court held that the jurisdiction of court in the matters of challenge to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority is very limited. The Court cannot sit in appeal over such findings. It only reviews the manner in which the decision was taken. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters is confined to correct errors of law or procedural matters and violations of principles of natural justice resulting in miscarriage of justice. The judicial review is permissible against the decision making process and not against the decision itself. A similar view was taken by Division Bench in Sarvesh Kumar Sharma vs. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd and another 2006 (2) ESC 1153.
30. Scope of the judicial review of the disciplinary action taken by the employer is extremely limited. The Court can interfere with the punishment imposed on the employee only if it is shown that the action of the employer is vitiated due to violation of the statutory rules, or regulations or the principles of natural justice and such violation has prejudiced his cause. The Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and/or disciplinary authority except when it is convinced that the finding is perverse. It is impermissible for this Court to re-appreciate the evidence like an Appellate Court. Jurisdiction of this Court would be to find out whether there is no evidence on record or whether on the evidence on record, no person would come to the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer. For both, evidence would have to be read as it is without it being re-appreciated.
31. The petitioner was given full and adequate opportunity to defend himself. He was served with chargesheet alongwith statement of allegation. The enquiry officer considered the documents produced by the respondent bank and the defence and found both the allegations levelled against him to be proved. The charges proved against the petitioner related to irregularities committed by him in recommending the said proposal for the loan credit limit of Rafat Ali Khan. The petitioner was found guilty of the allegations levelled against him and the punishment of reduction of the basic pay of petitioner to five stages lower in the time scale of pay and simultaneously holding him liable for the financial loss to the bank due to his acts of misconduct, was awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellate Authority observed that the petitioner had committed many mistakes such as not following KYC norms in regard to the borrowers, co-obligants and not verifying the property offered by the borrower as collateral security of the loan. The petitioner could not appraise the proposal as expected from him as an appraiser at the initial level. He failed to adhere to the sanction conditions stipulated by the head office. However, considering the overall aspects of matter including that the concerned Advocate and the valuer of immovable property were already depanelled by the Bank and that the petitioner was simultaneously personally liable for the financial loss, the Board had taken a lenient view in the matter and accordingly, the penalty of reduction of the basic pay of the petitioner to five stages lower in the time scale of pay and holding him liable to the financial loss to the Bank due to his acts of misconduct is amended as Reduction of basic pay of the petitioner to three stages lower in the time scale of pay and simultaneously holding him liable for the financial loss to the Bank due to his acts of misconduct.
32. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the writ petition.
33. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed.
Order Date :- 03.03.2016 RKP