JUDGMENT S.K. Singh, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel.
2. Challenge in this petition is the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 17.8.2001 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) by which during pendency of the revision against the order of the appellate authority passed in the allotment of chak proceedings he granted stay to the revisionists to the effect that parties will maintain status quo and order dated 20.9.2004 by which order dated 17.8.2001 was confirmed.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised four points for consideration which can be summarised thus :
(1) Unless and until order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation is implemented and delivery of possession takes place, stay order cannot be granted.
(2) Even there may be a peculiar fact but the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot grant any stay.
(3) Section 28 of the U.P.C.H. Act speaks about delivery of possession within a period of six months and if it is not done it has been mentioned that delivery of possession will be deemed to have taken place and therefore there may not be any occasion to grant stay.
(4) On accpunt of stay order granted by the revisional court petitioner has been deprived of getting any land in his possession.
On consideration of all the aforesaid arguments this Court finds no substance in either of them for the reasons indicated herein.
4. So far the argument that unless and until order of the Settlement Officer. Consolidation is implemented and delivery of possession takes place no stay can be granted, suffice it to say that the argument is quite strange and that do not make out any sense. If the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation is given effect and delivery of possession is done there cannot be any occasion to grant any stay because stay is meant to prevent any happening. By grant of stay any thing which has already taken place cannot be undone and therefore for the aforesaid reason, argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves straightway rejection.
5. So far the argument that even if there is peculiar situation Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot exercise powers, suffice it to say that it has been repeatedly said by this Court as well as the Apex Court that if against the order of the lower court appeal/revision is filed and if the order has civil consequence then normally operation of the order impugned is to be stayed as the higher court should not permit the impugned order to hang like pendulum. Reference can be made to judgment of Apex Court in the case of Mool Chand Yadav, 1983 (9) ALR 403. In view of the aforesaid as the order of the appellate authority was challenged before the revisional court unless the implementation of that order is stayed, order of the appellate authority will take its effect which may not be in the ends of justice. There is another reason for taking this view. In the consolidation proceedings adjustment of chaks are made at three stages. After proposal by the Assistant Consolidation Officer matter is decided by the Consolidation Officer. Settlement Officer, Consolidation and Deputy Director of Consolidation. If at all three stages by order passed by one authority or the other changes are made and thus dispossession is permitted then it will be the concern of both sides as after every stage position on spot may be altered which will be just a futile exercise and that will cause harassment to both sides, and therefore stay has to be granted unless finality is achieved atleast upto the stage of Deputy Director of Consolidation unless there are some extraordinary situation. So far powers of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is concerned needless to say that every Court has inherent powers to pass interim protection unless it is prohibited by any status. The revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation is in continuance of the proceedings as that is statutory right provided under the Act to a party. The power of the revisional court is also now quite wide and in the matter of adjustment of chaks he can balance the equity and thus this Court is of the view that on consideration of the facts Deputy Director of Consolidation has every power to grant interim protection and therefore second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner also merits rejection.
6. So far argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 28 of the Act speaks about delivery of possession within six months failing which delivery of possession will be deemed to have taken place, it appears that learned counsel while advancing this argument fails to notice that procedure is provided for delivery of possession only if there is no impediment in respect to carrying out of the order of the lower court. Section 28 nowhere restricts the powers of any higher forum from granting stay at any stage. If there is stay from the higher forum delivery of possession cannot take place. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted that within a period of six months delivery of possession has to take place failing which it will be deemed to have taken place then even grant of stay by this Court may be against the spirit of Section 28 of the Act which cannot be said to be so. In view of the aforesaid this Court is of the view that if there is any stay granted by the Deputy Director of Consolidation or by this Court Section 28 is not to come in the way and stay of the proceedings of delivery of possession cannot be said to be in violation of Section 28 of the Act.
7. So far the last argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on account of stay petitioner has been deprived of the land, that also proceeds on some misconception and argument in this respect appears to be totally misconceived. It is not the proceedings of adjudication of title In which land is to be retained or is to be given to only one party. These are the proceedings of allotment of chak in which both the parties are allotted the land. The only question in these proceedings is that which land/chak is to be given/allowed in the chak of which party. In these proceedings only grievance of either of the party is to the effect that land given in his chak is of bad quality or it is not convenient and therefore in these cases every party necessarily has to get land and therefore, submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner has not been given any land or he is not able to get any land/chak is neither acceptable nor believable. In view of the aforesaid this argument of learned counsel for the petitioner also does not find favour of the Court.
8. In view of the aforesaid as challenge is to the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by which during pendency of the revision parties have been directed to maintain status quo which has been, confirmed, this Court is of the view that by that order petitioner cannot be said to have suffered any prejudice. The revision is to be finally decided for which revisional court has also said that on the next date parties will appear and argue the matter.
9. Accordingly, this Court is not satisfied that it is a fit cape for interference m the equity jurisdiction. Writ petition thus fails and is dismissed.