ORDER
1. The sole question for consideration in this writ petition is whether the petitioner, a Limited Company, engaged in the business of manufacture of katechu from Khair wood, is liable to pay market fee to the Krishi Uptadan Mandi Samiti (briefly the Samiti') respondent No. 1, on the purchase of Khair wood from the U.P. Forest Corporation, respondent No. 2.
2. It is indisputed that Khair wood, which is a raw material for the manufacture of katechu, is purchased by the petitioner from various Depots of the U.P. Forest Corporation, respondent No. 2. After manufacturing katechu from the Khair wood, purchased from the Forest Corporation, the petitioner sells out the finished product, i.e., katechu.
3. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition, it is averred that the Samiti does not render any service to the petitioner and, therefore, it cannot levy any market fee. In short, the contention is that fee can be realised only when there is quid pro quo and that when no services are rendered by the Samiti, no fee can be charged from the petitioner. It is, further, contended in paragraphs 15 and 28 of the writ petition that if at all the Samiti is entitled to levy market fee, that can be charged from the Forest Corporation, which is a selling trader, and not from the petitioner which is a purchasing trader. The submission of the Counsel for the petitioner in short is that the petitioner is engaged in ordinary course of business in the purchases of the raw material, i.e., Khair wood, for the manufacture of katechu and therefore, is a 'trader' within the meaning of Section 2(y) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (for short, 'the Act') and that as the Khair wood, which is nothing but a forest produce, is purchased by the petitioner a purchasing trader, from the Forest Corporation a selling trader; the latter being the trader, selling the forest produce, shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Samiti under Section 17(iii)(b)(3) of the Act.
4. The Samiti, respondent No. 1, has filed counter-affidavit. In paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit, it is pleaded by the Samiti that the petitioner is not a trader but a mere consumer and, therefore, it is liable to pay the market fee. The contention, in brief is that the transaction of, sale and purchase of Khair wood is not between two traders and, therefore, the case of petitioner does not fall under Section 17(iii)(b)(3) but under Section 17(iii)(b)(4) of the Act and hence the petitioner being the purchaser of the wood is liable to pay the market fee.
5. Though the petitioner pleaded that there being no quid pro quo, the Samiti is not at all entitled to charge market fee, this plea was not pursued during arguments and the question for consideration, therefore, remained whether the petitioner or the Forest Corporation is liable to pay the market fee to the Samiti. The arguments proceeded on the assumption that the market fee is payable. The controversy was narrowed down to the question as to whether the petitioner or the Forest Corporation is liable to pay the market fee. To consider this question it is nothing but appropriate to dissect the anatomy of Section 17 of the Act.
6. Section 17, which bears the heading "Powers of the Committee" so far as relevant for the purpose of this case is reproduced below:
17. "A Committee shall, for the purpose of this Act, have the power to-
(i)....
(ii)....
(iii) levy and collect:
(a)....
(b) market fee, which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at such rates.......... and such fee shall be realised in the following manner-
(1) if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent may realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the Committee;
(2) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee;
(3) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce may realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee; and (4) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee;"
7. Neither party relied on clauses (1) and (2). Relying on clause (3) Sri Navin Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that the business of the petitioner of manufacture of katechu could not be carried on with'ou.t the raw material and, therefore, purchase of the Khair wood, which is nothing but agricultural produce, from the Forest Corporation, is necessary and, as such, the petitioner purchased the Khair wood from the Forest Corporation to run its business. It was urged that purchases of agricultural produce from the Forest Corporation by the petitioner were in ordinary course of business and that being so, the petitioner is nothing but a purchasing trader. According to Sri Sinha, if a person is engaged in buying or selling of agricultural produce, he will partake the character of trader. The submission was that the petitioner being engaged in purchasing the Khair wood, i.e. agricultural produce, is a trader within the meaning of Section 2(y) of the Act. The petitioner and the Forest Corporation both being the traders, according to Sri Sinha, the Forest Corporation a selling trader -- shall be liable to pay the market fee to the Committee under Section 17(iii)(b)(3).
8. It is not disputed by Sri Mandhyan, learned Counsel for the Samiti, that the Forest Corporation, respondent No. 2, is a trader. He, however, disputes that the petitioner is a trader! The submission of Sri Mandhyan is that the petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacture of katechu and, therefore, the petitioner is trader in katechu and not in the Khair wood, which is consumed for the manufacture of katechu. His submisison is that the petitioner is a consumer of wood simpliciter and not a trader. The petitioner not being a 'trader', Sri Mandhyan urged that the case of the petitioner will not be covered by clause (3) -- The case of the petitioner not being covered by clauses (1),(2) and (3), Sri Mandhyan urged that the petitioner being a consumer is covered only by the residuary clause (4) and hence is liable to pay the market fee to the Committee.
9. The question is whether the petitioner is a trader within the meaning of Section Section 2(y)?. Section 2(y) runs as follows:
2. "(y) 'trader' means a person who in the ordinary course of business is engaged in buying or selling agricultural produce as a principal or as a duly authorised agent of one or more principals and include a person, engaged in processing of agricultural produce."
10. From the above reproduced definition, it appears that a person who is engaged in buying or selling agricultural produce in ordinary course of business and who is engaged in processing of agricultural produce, will be a trader. The question is whether the petitioner can be said to have been engaged in buying agricultural produce in ordinary course of business and whether it can be said to have been engaged in processing of agricultural produce. To become a trader it is not necessary that a person should engage himself in the activity of buying and selling agricultural produce concomitantly. A single activity of either buying or selling agricultural produce is enough, if such activity is carried on in ordinary course of business. The business of the petitioner is of manufacture of katechu, which cannot be carried on without buying the raw material. The Khair wood which is sold by the Forest Corporation from its various Depots, is a raw material which is to be purchased necessarily by the petitioner for carrying on its business. Purchase of raw material is integral part of the business and, therefore, purchase of the Kh'air wood is a purchase in ordinary course of business. Since the petitioner is engaged in buying the Khair wood from the Forest Corporation, it is nothing but a trader under Section 2(y). The argument of Sri Mandhyan that the petitioner is only engaged in buying agricultural produce and, therefore, is not a trader is fallacious. The words "buying or selling" under Section 2(y) have been disjunctively and not conjunctively and, therefore, the submission of Sri Mandhyan that since petitioner is engaged only in the single activity of buying, it cannot be a trader, is erroneous. To become trader under Section 2(y) it is not necessary for a person to engage himself in the twin activities of buying and selling of agricultural produce. Since the words "buying or selling" have been used disjuctively, a person carrying on either of the activities will become a trader. The argument of Sri Mandhyan that the petitioner is merely a consumer of the agricultural produce, i.e., Khair wood, and hence it cannot be a trader, does not commend to us. The cardinal principle of interpretation is that the words being used in a statute if they are free from ambiguity should be given their plain meaning. We see no reason to read the words "buying or selling" occurring in Section 2(y) as 'buying and selling'. The disjunction "or" used between the words "buying and selling", in Section 2(y), is significant and that indicates that it is not necessary to carry on both the activities of buying and selling concomitantly. Sri Mandhyan is, therefore, not right in arguing that the petitioner cannot be said to be a trader, because it is engaged only in the single activity of buying of wood. The words used in Section 2(y) are unambiguous and therefore, they have to be read as they stand. We are, therefore, justified in taking the semantic view that the petitioner buying wood in ordinary course of business is a trader.
11. The matter can also be looked at from a different angle. Sri Mandhyan has not taken note of still more important phrase being used in Section 2(y). Section 2(y) does not give the exhaustive definition, but it gives inclusive definition of 'trader' as well, inasmuch as, it states:
"..... and includes a person engaged in processing of agricultural produce."
The portion underlined by its indicates that even if a person is engaged in processing of agricultural produce, he may become a trader under Section 2(y). Can the petitioner en-gaged in the manufacture of katechu from the Khair wood, be said to be engaged in processing of agricultural produce. If it can be so said, then the petitioner will be covered by the inclusive definition being given in Section 2(y). In the New Lexicon Webster's. Dis-tionary the word 'Process' means, inter alia a method of manufacture or conditioning some thing." So the words processing and manufacturing are not distinct, but they overlap. Sri Mandhyan is, therefore, wrong in saying that the petitioner being engaged in the business of manufacture of katechu from the Khair wood, cannot be a trader. As per Chambers English Dictionary, the word 'process', amongst others means: "to prepare (e.g. agricultural produce) for marketing by some special process, e.g., canning or bottling; to perform operations of adding, sub-stracting etc. or other operations; to subject (data) to such operation." The petitioner manufactures katechu from the Khair wood by subjecting the wood to successive oper-tions and, thus, the petitioner can be said to have been engaged in processing the wood, which after being subjected to successive operations, is transformed into katechu. Therefore, the submission of Sri Mandhyan that the petitioner cannot be a trader because it is engaged in the manufacture of katechu from Khair wood, has to be rejected. The petitioner is engaged in processing of agricultural produce and, therefore, the inclusive definition of trader takes the petitioner within its sweep. Both parts of the definition of the word 'trader' under Section 2(y) cover up the activity of the petitioner and we, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the petitioner is a trader under Section 2(y). The definition of the word 'trader' under Section 2(y) is very wide and we see no justification to give it restrictive meaning as sought to be given by Sri Mandhyan.
12. The petitioner being a trader under Section 2(y) and the Forest Corporation being admitted to be trader by Sri Mandhyan, we hold that the case of the petitioner falls under clause (3) of Section 17 of the Act. This is a case where the petitioner being a purchasing tradef, carried on business with the Forest Corporation -- a selling trader -- and, there-fore, the latter ts liable to pay the market fee to the Samiti under Section 17 (iii) (b) (3). The case of the petitioner having fallen under Section 17(iii)(b)(3), recourse cannot be taken to clause (4).
13. Sri Mandhyan relied on certain observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in U.P. Forest Corporation, Lucknow v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, (1985 UPLBEC 1192) (para 36 at page 1206), in this authority, the Division Bench while considering, if the case falls under clause (3) of Section 17(iii)(b) observed that the Railways or Public Sector organisation would normally be not covered in the definition of trader in sub-clause (y) of Section 2. The case of the Railways is entirely different from that of the instant petitioner; the former is merely a consumer of the wooden sleepers which are used by the Railways to lay down Railway tracks, but the latter is engaged in processing of agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2(y) and hence is a trader. Therefore, the reliance of Sri Mandhyan on the case of U. P. Forest Corporation (supra) is misplaced.
14. For the reasons, we accept the contention o.f the Counsel for the petitioner that the case of the petitioner having fallen under clause (3) of Section 17(iii)(b), clause (4) of Section 17(iii)(b) cannot be invoked. The petitioner as well as the Forest Corporation, respondent No. 2, both being the traders, the latter is liable to pay the market fee to the Committee under Section 117(iii)(b)(3).
In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Respondent No. 1 is restrained from collecting the market fee from the petitioner with regard to the transactions of purchase of the Khair wood by the petitioner from respondent No. 2. If any market fee on such transactions has been paid by the petitioner to respondent No. 1 under protest, the same will be refunded to the petitioner within a month from the date a proper application is made by the petitioner in this behalf to respondent No. 2 annexing a certified copy of this order, No order as to costs.
15. Petition allowed.