JUDGMENT Ravindra Singh, J.
1. Heard Sri V.C. Mishra, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vivek Mishra, learned counsel for the contemners Nakshetra Pal Singh, Advocate and Vijay Pal Singh, Advocate and the learned Government Advocate.
2. In the present case criminal contempt proceedings have been initiated on the basis of reference made by Sri Virendra Kumar, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2 Saharanpur (hereinafter referred to as Presiding Officer) against the contemners Nakshetra Pal Singh, Advocate and Vijay Pal Singh, Advocate practising at Civil Court, Saharanpur under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971, mentioning therein that on 10.2.2005, the examination- in-chief of P.W. 12 Brijesh Kumar was recorded by the Presiding Officer, in S.T. No. 345 of 2001 under Section 460/411 I.P.C. P.S. Chilkana district Saharanpur. After recording the examination-in-chief of P.W. 12, contemner Nakshetra Pal Singh, Advocate who was appearing on behalf of the accused Sushil and Kulvendra started cross-examining, the witness, who gave the reply. The Presiding Officer asked the contemner Nakshetra Pal Singh to clarify from P.W. 12 whether he was understanding the meaning of the word Vayan, then the contemner Nakshetra Pal Sigh, Advocate and his associate contemner Vijai Pal Singh, Advocate extended the threats to P.W. 12 Brijesh Kumar in the court and started shouting by saying that the presiding Officer was recording a distorted statement of the witness and made allegation against the Presiding Officer that he was having" interest in the said case. Then the Presiding Officer asked the contemners that if they do not want to do this case in his court, the same may be transferred to some other court. Thereafter both the contemners left the court without cross-examining the witness P.W. 12 and due to shouting and extending threat to P.W. 12., the litigants, police personnel, witnesses and other persons attracted to the court room, in their presence also P.W. 12 was given a threat and they caused obstacle in the functioning of the court proceedings as well as made allegations against the Presiding Officer about his integrity and dutifulness, consequently the authority of the court was lowered.
3. On the basis of reference made by the Presiding Officer, this court has taken cognizance and issued notices to the contenmers to show cause as to why the proceedings for criminal contempt be not drawn against them for their alleged act/ misbehaviour with Sri Virendra Kumar, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 2 Saharanpur, which prima facie, amount to interference with the administration of justice and to lower the authority of the court.
4. On 11.8.2005 the contenders have filed an application along with an affidavit mentioning therein that initiation of the proceedings of contempt of court against the petitioners are barred by proviso of Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
5. Sri V.C. Mishra, Senior Advocate, has given an emphasis to decide the question of 'maintainability' of these proceedings, by contending that on the basis of the allegations made in reference, the offence under Section 228 I.P.C. is made out, for which proceedings under Section 345 Cr.P.C. may be initiated against the contemners by the court itself. According to the 'proviso' of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 no High Court shall take cognizance of contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of the court subordinate to it whether such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).
6. We now proceed to deal with the aforesaid contention in respect of the maintainability of criminal contempt proceedings before this court in the light of proviso of Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
7. To answer this question, it will be relevant to make quick survey of Sections 2(c), and 10 of the Contempt of courts Act 1971 and Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which corresponds to Section 480 of earlier Cr.P.C. Sections 2(c) and Section 228 I.P.C. of the Contempt of Courts Act reads:
2(C) "Criminal contempt" means the publication(whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or
(iii)interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;
Section 10 of the Contempt Act reads:
10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts-- Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself: 'Provided' that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to It where such contempt is an offence punishable under Indian Penal Code, 1860(45 of 1860).
8. Section 345 Code of Criminal Procedure reads:
345 Procedure in certain cases of contempt;-
(1) When any such offence as is described in Section 175, Section 178, Section 179, Section 180 or Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is committed in the view or presence of any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, the Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody and may at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day, take cognizance of the offence and, after giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be punished under this section, sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, and, in default of payment of fine, to simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, unless such fine be sooner paid.
(2) In every such case the Court shall record the facts constituting the offence, with the statement (if any) made by the offender as well as the finding and sentence.
(3) If the offence is under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the record shall show the nature and stage of the judicial proceeding In which the Court interrupted or Insulted was sitting, and the nature of the interruption or insult.
9. It is also relevant to consider the provisions of Section 228 I.P.C, which reads as under :-
228 Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceedings- Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, wile such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
10. Section 228 I.P.C. deals with the contempt in the form of personal insult and causing of interruption to a public servant sitting in Judicial Proceedings. Sections 175, 176, 179, 180 of I.P.C. dealt with contempt of lawful authority of a public servant and such act may be a particular case amounting to contempt within the meaning of this section. The contempt of Court is dealt with by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The proviso to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197, provides that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of the court subordinate to the High Court where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860(45 of 1860) but in order to wipe out the jurisdiction of the High Court under the above section in respect of which proceedings are proposed to be started under the Contempt of courts Act, should be punishable under the Penal code as contempt not merely as some other offence
11. Where the matter charged is a contempt amounting to insult to an individual public servant, the offence will not amount to contempt of court, hence will not be a matter which is punishable as contempt under this Act but only as some other offence viz. Insult to a public servant sitting in a stage of judicial proceedings, if the matter charged is not only insult to an individual public servant but amount to what has been termed "scandalizing the court itself the accused persons will be liable to proceed for contempt of courts. In such a case Section 228 I.P.C. does not make the matter punishable as contempt.
12. This question was raised before a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras in which Apex court had considered about Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. This is in para-materia to the proviso to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, In this case defamatory statements was made. Action in contempt was taken. It was argued that the allegations mounted to an offence of defamation and consequently jurisdiction of High Court was barred. This argument was negatived. It was held that jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded only in cases when the acts alleged are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of Indian Penal Code It is held that if the act alleged merely amounts to an offence of other description for which punishment is provided for the Indian Penal Code, then the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance is not taken away in this case, it also held as follows :-
It may be pointed out in this connection that although the powers of the High Courts In India established under the Letters Patent to exercise jurisdiction as Superior Courts of Record in punishing contempt of their authority or processes have never been doubted, It was a controversial point prior to the passing of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, as to whether the High Court could, like the Court of King's Bench in England, punish contempt of courts subordinate to it in exercise of Its Inherent jurisdiction. The doubt has been removed by Act XII (12) of 1926 which expressly declares the right of the High Court to protect subordinate Courts against contempt, but subject to this restriction, that cases of contempt which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not be taken cognizance of by the High Court. This seems to be the principle underlying Section 2(8), Contempt of Courts Act What these cases are, need not be exhaustively determined for purposes of the present case, but some light is undoubtedly thrown upon this matter by the provision of Section 480, Criminal P.C., which empowers any civil, criminal or revenue Court to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing any offence under Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or Section 228, Penal Code In the view or presence of the Court. We are not prepared to say, as has been said by the Patna High Court in Jyanendra Prasad v. Gopal 12 Pat. 172 that the only section of the Indian Penal Code which deals with contempt committed against a Court of justice or Judicial officer Is Section 228. Offences under Sections 176, 178, 179 and 180 may also, as Section 480, Criminal P.C. shows, amount to contempt of Court if the "public servant" referred to in these sections happens to be a judicial officer in a particular case. It is well known that the aim of the contempt proceeding is "to deter men from offering any indignities to a Court of justice" and an essential feature of the proceeding Is the exercise of a summary power by the Court itself In regard to the delinquent. In the cases mentioned in Section 480, Criminal P.C., the Court has been expressly given summary power to punish a person who is guilty of offending Its dignity in the manner Indicated In the section. The Court Is competent also under Section 482, criminal P.C. to forward any case of this description to a Magistrate having Jurisdiction to try it, if it considers that the offender deserves a higher punishment than what can be Inflicted under Section 480. Again the Court Is entitled under Section 484, to discharge the offender on his submitting an apology, although it has already adjudged him to punishment under Section 480 or forward his case for trial under Section 482. The mode of purging contempt by tendering apology is a further characteristic of a contempt proceeding. It seems, therefore, that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate Courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 2(3), Contempt of Courts Act, but it would not be correct to say that the High Court's Jurisdiction is excluded even In cases where the act complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt, Is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code.
13. The same view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Reva Shanker where the allegations were made which amounted to insult. The argument was that an offence under Section 228 I.P.C. was made out and thus, the High Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance. Thus an identical arguments was made as such the argument was negatived. The Apex Court held that if the conduct is one which scandalises the court impairs the administration of justice, the jurisdiction of the High Court would not barred.
14. The same view was taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Brahm Prakash v. State 1954 S.C. 10 and Arun Paswan, S.I. v. State of Bihar 2004(48) A.C.C. 267).
15. The aim of the proceedings of contempt of courts Act is to deter a man from offering indignities to the court of justice. The object of contempt proceedings as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Brahm Prakash v. State of U.P. 1954 S.C. 10 is not to afford protection to judges personally from imputations to 'which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened.
16. We have considered the allegations against the contemners in the reference made by the Presiding Officer, the conduct of the contemners scandalised the court itself and it was tending to demoralise the judicial officer and makes it difficult for him to perform his duties fearlessly because the contemners have shouted in the court, passed contemptuous remarks on the Presiding Officer and extended threat to the witness Brijesh Kumar, P.W 12 which amounts the interference with the due course of judicial proceeding. They have interfered in the administration of justice also. Therefore, the contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are not barred by the 'proviso' of Section 10 of the Act because the allegations are not of such a nature by which merely an insult was offered to an individual public servant but to scandalise the court, other than mere insult and the act of the contemners was pre-intended because contemner Nakshetra Pal Singh, Advocate was having some personal prejudice against the Presiding Officer because the Presiding Officer was the Enquiry Officer of a matter in which the contemner Nakshatra Pal Singh had broken a lock of main gate of the court compound and has beaten a Chaukidar Afzal who was on duty on 24.8.2004 at about 6 p.m.. Its enquiry report was submitted by the Presiding Officer to the Learned District Judge on 8.9.2004 against contemner Nakshatra Pal Singh. In that matter, an F.I.R. was also lodged by Afzal against the contemner Nakshatra Pal Singh. The enquiry report was against the contemner Nakshatra Pal Singh that is why the contemner scandalised the authority of the court and interfered in the judicial proceedings and obstructed the administration of justice.
17. For the reasons stated above and the view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court on this issue, we are of the opinion that the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the contemners in respect of the non-maintainability of the criminal contempt proceedings has no substance, therefore, the contempt proceedings initiated against the contemners in the present case are not barred by the 'proviso' to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore such prayer is refused.