Hon'ble Krishna Pratap Singh, J.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Krishna Pratap Singh, J.) Heard Shri Daya Shankar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Chandra Prakash Yadav and Shri Deepak Mishra learned counsel for Union of India and Shri Vikas Sahai, learned Additional Government Advocate representing the State.
By means of this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition the petitioner, who has been incarcerated in district jail, Muzaffar Nagar, has questioned the validity and correctness of the order dated 06.8.2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar whereby the petitioner has been detained under section 3(2) of the National Security Act.
The detention order dated 06.8.2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar reads as under:
On 27.6.2017 at 9.10 AM, when In-charge Inspector Kotwali, along with SI Sunil Nagar, SI Adesh Kumar Tyagi, SI Sobeer Nagar, Constables Vikas Kumar, Kulwant, Sani Atri, Jitendra Kasana were on patrolling duty and when they reached Kassawan Khalapar, they saw that Mustakeem, son of Majeed, resident of Kassawan Khalapar, Muzaffar Nagar along with Kala, son of Majeed and Mahan son of Munna were slaughtering a cow in front of his shop. Immediately, they were arrested by the police party along with knife for slaughtering cow, Rassi, axe and a piece of wood. In the meantime, the petitioner Imran alias Tendu along with 40-50 persons armed with Lathi, Danda and bricks came there and attacked the police party, due to which Constables Sani Atri, Kulwant, Vikas Kumar and Constable-Driver Jaspal have been seriously injured. Police jeep has also been badly damaged and the persons, who were arrested for slaughtering cow have been got freed by them. They have also taken the cow meat from the spot. Some of the persons, who were identified by the police party and the witnesses present on the spot were:
1. Haji Sarfaraz, son of Munna, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
2. Shamshad, son of Chooha alias Nazir, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
3. Noor Ilahi, son of Kasim, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
4. Abrar, son of Islam, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
5. Imran alias Tendu, son of Jamil, resident of South Khalapar (the petitioner herein )
6. Sayeed Pahalwan, son of Mohammad Shafi, resident of Chauki, Khalapar
7. Ausaf, son of Munna, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
8. Farman, son of Munna, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
9. Nanu, son of Abdul Salam, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
10. Yamin, son of Ahsan, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
11. Shahid, son of Jilani, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
12. Shoaib, son of Shannu, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
13. Vakil, son of Khalil, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
14. Nazim, son of Jilani, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
15. Mustakeem, son of Majid, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
16. Kala, son of Majid, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
17. Mahan, son of Munna, resident of Khalapar
18. Mohammad Shahnawaz, son of Mohammad Abrar, resident of Khalapar.
19. Aas Mohammad, son of Manshad, resident of Machhiyaro Wali Gali, Khalapar
20. Shahbez, son of Jafar, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
21. Taslim, son of Nasim, resident of infront of Mahfooz Masjid, Khalapar
22. Abrar, son of Taufiq, resident of Paldi, Shahpur
23. Jahid, son of Inam, resident of Azad Chowk, Shamli
24. Shahnawaz, son of Abdul Gafoor, residnet of Johad Wali Masjid, Khalapar
25. Danish, son of Yusuf, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
26. Babar, son of Hanif, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
27. Naushad, son of Munna, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
28. Salim alias Nasim, son of Sukha alias Jamil, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
29. Chunna, son of Aquil, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
30. Munshi, son of Islam alias Anis Quraishi, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
31. Tahsin, son of Salim, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
32. Imran, son of Haji Shabbir, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
33. Najju, son of Gutta Gufran, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
34. Imran, son of Haji Sher alias Dilshad, resident of Kunj Gali, Khalapar.
35. Zulfiqar, son of Haji Ahsan, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
36. Haji Inayat, son of Abdul Salam, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
37. Sartaj, son of Islam Bahra, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
38. Adil Jilani, son of Jilani, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
39. Shannu Quraishi, son of Ahsan, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
40. Nazar Quraishi, son of Andha Yasin, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
41. Haji Sher alias Dilshad, son of Maqsood, resident of Kunj Gali, Khalapar
42. Shariq, son of Abdul Salam, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
43. Chunnu alias Irshad, son of Mandu, resident of Kassawan, Khalapar
44. Shahid, son of Nazar, resident of South Khalapar.
In addition to the afore-mentioned forty four persons, some unknown persons, have also participated in the incident. It was also mentioned in the order of the District Magistrate that the police took into possession the articles used for slaughtering the cow and prepared the recovery memo. Due to the attack by the petitioner and others on the police party, people started running helter skelter and the situation has become tense. The police party could, somehow manage to escape and reach the police station. Thereafter a case was registered at case crime No. 1175 of 2017, under Sections 3/5/8 of Cow Slaughter Act against Mustakeem, Kala and Mahan. A case at case crime No. 1176 of 2017 was also registered under sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 332, 336, 353, 427, 201, 224 IPC and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act against Mustakeem, Kala, Mahan, Haji Sarfaraz, Shamshad, Noor Ilahi, Abrar, Imran alias Tendu (the petitioner) Sayeed Pahalwan, Ausaf, Farman, Nanu, Yameen, Shahid, Shoaib, Vakil, Nazim and 25-30 unknown persons on 27.6.2017 at 11.45 AM by the In-charge police station Kotwali, Muzaffarmagar.
However, after investigation, as the participation of Shahid, Manshad, Yasir, Pappu alias Irshad, Sonu, son of Shamim, Shah Alam, Sonu, son of Karim, Farman, Munna, Ehtesham, Aas Mohammad, Chanda and Zulfiqar were found false, they were exonerated.
The petitioner was arrested on 28.6.2017 from his residence and alleged to have confessed his involvement in the crime and was sent to jail. The detention order further indicates that on account of afore-mentioned activities of the petitioner, atmosphere of fear and terror has engulfed the whole vicinity. People started running to reach to a safe place. Due to the atmosphere, people are not attending their day to day business. Due to the act of the petitioner, peace and tranquility of the area and law and order situation was badly disturbed. The detention order also mentions that from the perusal of the report of the In-charge Inspector, Kotwali it appears that the petitioner is of criminal nature and in addition to the present case three other cases at case crime No. 655 of 2010, under sections 147, 148, 149, 307 IPC, PS Kotwali Nagar, Muzaffar Nagar, case crime No. 772 of 2012, under sections 323, 324, 504, 506 IPC, PS Kotwali, district Muzaffar Nagar and case crime No. 1201 of 2016, under sections 147, 148, 336, 427, 295-A, 505, 506 IPC and 7 Criminal Law Amendment Act, PS Kotwali Nagar, Muzaffar Nagar are also pending against him.
The detention order further goes to mention that the petitioner is making endeavour to come out of jail and after rejection of his bail applications from the Magistrate and Sessions Judge, he has moved bail application in the High Court and his release is imminent. In case he comes out of the jail, there is chance of his again indulging in such types of incident due to which law and order situation will be badly affected and that is why this detention is necessary.
The detention order dated 06.8.2017 was served upon the petitioner on the same day at the Jail. Against the detention order, the petitioner has handed over his representation to the Superintendent, Jail, Muzaffar Nagar on 18.8.2017, which was received by the State Government on 21.8.2017, which was rejected by the State Government on 28.8.2017. On 07.9.2017 the matter of the petitioner was heard by the Advisory Board and the report of the Advisory Board was received by the State Government on 18.9.2017. On 25.9.2017 the preventive order was provisionally extended for a period of three months. On 26.10.2017, the District Magistrate has given his supplementary report and on 01.11.2017 the detention order has been extended for a period of six months.
The representation of the petitioner addressed to the Central Government was received by the Central Government on 24.8.2017. On 14.8.2017 the State Government sent his comments to the Central Government under section 3(2) of the National Security Act. On 22.8.2017, the comments under section 3(5) of NSA has been received by the Central Government. Central Government has rejected the representation of the petitioner on 31.8.2017.
Shri Daya Shanker Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was unexplained delay on the part of the authority in disposal of the representation of the petitioner, which is violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. He submits that his representation dated 18.8.2017 received by the Central Government on 24.8.2017, which was rejected by the Central Government on 31.8.2017, whereas the State Government has forwarded its comments to the Central Government on 14.8.2017, which was received by the Central Government on 22.8.2017 and no plausible explanation has been given by the Central Government for the period 24.8.2017 to 31.8.2017 Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Icchu Devi Choraria Vs. Union of India, 1980 AIR 9SC) 1983, Mohinuddin Vs. District Magistrate, Beed and others, AIR 1987 SC 1977, Rajammal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 SCC (Cri) 93 and several other judgements for the proposition that the Government is under Constitutional obligation to consider the representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay.
On the other hand Shri Chandra Prakash Yadav and Shri Deepak Mishra learned counsel for Union of India and Shri Vikas Sahai, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State have placed reliance upon the decision of Apex Court in Yogendra Murari Vs. State of UP and others, (1988)2 SCALE 275 and Union of India Vs. Laishram Lincola Singh, LAWS (SC)2008 3219 to contend that Apex Court has held that there can be no doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be considered, but time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive.
In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India, it is mentioned that the file reached the concerned section on 24.8.2017 and after due process the file was sent to the Under Secretary (NSA) on 25.8.2017, who sent the file with his comments to the Deputy Legal Advisor (DLA) on the same day. Deputy Legal Advisor sent the file to the Joint Secretary (Internal Security-II) with his comments forwarded the same to the Union Home Secretary on 28.8.2017, who rejected the representation on 31.8.2017, i.e. after four days for which no explanation has been given by the Union of India.
In Rajammal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (Supra) the Apex Court held as under:
"It is the constitutional obligation of the Government to consider the representation forwarded by the detenu without any delay. Though no period is prescribed by Article 22 of the Constitution for the decision to be taken on the representation, the words "as soon as may be" in clause 4 of Article 22 convey the message that the representation should be considered and disposed of at the earliest. It was further observed that if delay was caused on account of any indifference or lapse in considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner."
Apex Court in Kundanbhai Sheikh Vs. District Magistrate, Ahmedabad (1996) 2 JT (SC) 532 has held as under:
"In spite of law laid down above by this court repeatedly over the past three decades, the Executive, namely, the State Government and its officers continues to behave in their old, lethargic fashion and like ll other files rusting in the secretariat for various reasons including red tapism, the representation made by a person deprived of his liberty, continues to be dealt with in the same fashion. The government and its officers will not give up their habit of maintaining a consistent attitude of lethargy. So also, this Court will not hesitate in quashing the order of detention to restore the liberty and freedom to the person whose detention is allowed to become bad by the Government itself on account of his representation not being disposed of at the earliest."
A Constitution Bench of Apex Court in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader Vs. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 476, made the following observations:
"It is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenu submits his representation to consider the representation and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. The words "as soon as may be" occurring in clause (5) of Article 22 reflects the concern of the Framers that the representation should be expeditiously considered and disposed of with a sense of urgency without an avoidable delay. However, there can be no hard and fast rule in this regard. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is no period prescribed either under the Constitution or under the concerned detention law, within which the representation should be dealt with. The requirement, however, is that there should not be supine indifference, slackness or callous attitude in considering the representation. Any unexplained delay in the disposal of representation would be a breach of constitutional imperative and it would render the continued detention impermissible and illegal."
The position, therefore, now is that if delay was caused on account of any indifference or lapse in considering the representation, such delay will adversely affect further detention of the prisoner. In other word, it is for the authority concerned to explain the delay, if any, in disposing the representation. It is not enough to say that the delay was very short. Even longer delay can be explained. In this case no explanation was offered by the Central Government as to why the file was kept with the Home Secretary from 28.8.2017 to 31.8.2017.
Shri D.S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that there is no provisions for extension of confirmation order under the National Security Act, hence provisional confirmation is violative of law of preventive detention. However, it is submitted that if the second and third amendment orders had been passed on the basis of the report submitted by the District Magistrate as well as Advisory Board, the petitioner had not been given any opportunity of hearing nor he has been supplied the additional report of the District Magistrate, hence it is violative of principle of natural justice. Shri D.S. Mishra contends that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is applicable in view of provision of Section 14 of the National Security Act. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is very much clear that if any order is modified or changed, the same procedure is to be adopted. Thus, if there was any necessity for the authority to extend the provisional period, the same should be in accordance with section 21 of the General Clauses Act and the matter should be referred to the Advisory Board and report be obtained afresh, which was not done in the present case.
Both Shri D.S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Vikas Sahai, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State have placed reliance upon the decision of Apex Court in Ram Bali Rajbhar Vs. State of West Bengal and others, 1975 AIR 623.
Shri D.S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner has place reliance upon the following paragraph:
"The State Government can revoke or modify a detention order if it is satisfied, on new or supervening conditions or facts coming to light, that a revocation or modification had become necessary. Section 14 of the Act apparently vests a wider power than that which the State Govt. may have possessed' under the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. 1897 which is, by having been specifically mentioned in Section 14 of the Act, made applicable in such cases. The language of Section 14 of the Act, however, makes it clear that the power under Section 14 is not necessarily subject to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. This means that a revocation or modification of an order of the State Govt. is possible even without complying with the restrictions laid down in Section 21 of the General Clause Act. Nevertheless, as the wider power under Section 14 of the Act does not over-ride but exists "without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act", we think that the correct interpretation of the provisions, read together, would be that it is left to the State Government in the exercise of the discretion, either to exercise the power read with provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act or without the aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. We think it will be a reasonable, and judicious exercise of the power under Section 14 of the Act to refer a case once again to the Advisory Board for its opinion before a subsequent representation made on fresh materials by a detenu is rejected." (Emphasis supplied) Shri Vikas Sahai, learned Additional Government Advocate representing the State has placed reliance on the following passage in Ram Bali Rajbhar (Supra):
"We think that the High Court of Calcutta, while dismissing the Writ Petition, need not have expressed any opinion about the words of the affidavit sworn by Lal Mohan Jadav, the tea shop owner. That, we think is the function of authorities constituted under the Act for deciding question of fact. On a Habeas Corpus petition what has to be considered by the Court is whether the detention is prima facie legal or not and not whether the detaining authorities have wrongly or rightly reached a satisfaction on every question of fact. Courts have no doubts to zealously guard the personal liberty of the citizen and to ensure that the case of a detenu is justly and impartially considered and dealt with by the detaining authorities and the Advisory Board. But this does not mean that they have to or can rightly and properly assume either the duties cast upon the detaining authorities or Advisory Boards by the law of preventive detention or function as Courts of Appeal on questions of fact. The law of preventive detention, whether we like it or not, is authorised by our Constitution presumably because it was foreseen by the Constitution-makers that there may arise occasions in the life of the nation when the need to prevent citizens from acting in ways which unlawfully subvert or disrupt the bases of an established order may outweigh the claims of personal liberty."
"Every petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution has to establish an infringement of a fundamental right. Hence this Court cannot order a release from detention, upon a Habeas Corpus Petition, until it is satisfied that a petitioner's detention is really unwarranted by law. This means that, in a case of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, the petitioner has to show a violation of either Article 21 or Article 22 of the Constitution. That personal liberty of the citizen which the law so sedulously and carefully protects can also be taken away by the procedure established by law when it is used to jeopardise public good and not merely private interest."
Apex Court in Cherukuri Mani Vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh and others, (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 345 has held that normally, a person detained under provisions of any law is detained without facing trial which in other words amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial of civil right. In such cases, whether continuous detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be assessed and reviewed from time to time. Taking into consideration these factors, Constitution and legislature have specifically provided mechanism of Advisory Board to review detention of a person. Section 3(2) provision of 1986 Act clearly provides that if Government intends to detain an individual under 1986 Act for maximum period of 12 months, there must be an initial order of detention for a period of three months and at least, three order of extension for a period not extending three months each. Expression"extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time" assumed significance in this regard. It must be remembered that restriction of initial period of detention of three months is nothing but implementation of mandate contained in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution. Where law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in same manner following provisions of law, without deviating from prescribed procedure. Underlying principles cannot be ignored while passing orders of detention or extending detention priod from time to time.
The Court held thus:
"Proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from time to time. An order of detention would in the first instance be in force for a period of three months. The Government alone is conferred with the power to extend the period , beyond three months. Such extension, however, cannot be for a period, exceeding three months, at a time. It means that, if the Government intends to detain an individual under the Act for the maximum period of 12 months, there must be an initial order of detention for a period of three months and at least three orders of extension for a period not exceeding three months each. The "expression extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any time" assumed significance in this regard.
" The requirement to pass order of detention from time to time in the manner referred to above, has got its own significance . It must be remembered that restriction of initial period of detention to three months is nothing but implementation of the mandate contained in clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India."
In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of Apex Court, we are of the view that the State Government has committed a mistake in not sending the matter to the Advisory Board before extending the period for another six months.
The main thrust of Shri Daya Shanker Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner was that the detaining authority, i.e. the District Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar has passed the impugned detention order in a routine manner without application of mind on the report submitted to him by the police authority and that the District Magistrate has failed to record any real subjective satisfaction in the impugned order that there was real possibility of the petitioner, who was in judicial custody to be released on bail. It is further submitted that moreover the material before the detaining authority was not cogent and sufficient to satisfy him that after being released on bail, the petitioner shall again indulge in activities prejudicial to the public order and, therefore, the impugned order being bad in law be set aside and petitioner may be set at liberty forthwith. He placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in Kamarunnissa Vs. Union of India and another, 1990 SCR Suppl (1) 457.
On the other hand Shri Chandra Prakash Yadav and Shri Deepak Mishra, learned counsel for Union of India and Shri Vikas Sahai, learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that the District Magistrate has passed the order on the basis of the petitioner's involvement along with his accomplices in the crime, which took place on 27.6.2017.
It is further contended by Shri Chandra Prakash Yadav and Shri Deepak Mishra, learned counsel for Union of India and Shri Vikas Sahai, learned Additional Government Advocate that detaining authority had passed the impugned detention order after being fully satisfied on the basis of material produced before him that after his release on bail, the petitioner shall again indulge in such activities and pose a threat to the maintenance of law and order.
From the perusal of the detention order, it transpires that only a vague averment has been made in the order that the petitioner has moved a bail application in the High Court and there is possibility of his imminent release by the High Court. Neither any bail application nor the averment made in the bail application has been mentioned in the detention order.
A similar question whether the detaining authority has properly applied its mind in such cases where the persons sought to be detained are already in judicial custody has cropped up before the Constitution Bench of Apex Court in Rameshwar Shaw Vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan, AIR 1964 SC 334. The Court observed thus:
"The first stage in the process is to examine the material adduced against a person to show either from his conduct or his antecedent history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answered against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made. It is obvious that before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of the person is necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, the authority has to be satisfied that if the person is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time. If a person is already in jail custody, how can it rationally be postulated that if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner At the point of time when an order of detention is going to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention. The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner is thus the basis of the order under section 3(1)(a), and this basis is clearly absent in the case of the petitioner.
In Haradhan Saha Vs. State of Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 198, the Apex Court has held that "where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when the order of detention is passed against, and is not likely to be released for a fair long time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in the activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order."
In Shashi Aggarwal Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1988) SCC 436, it was emphasized that the possibility of the Court granting bail is not sufficient nor is a bald statement that the detenu would repeat his criminal activities enough to pass an order of detention unless there is credible information and cogent reason apparent on the record that the detenu, if enlarged on bail, would act prejudicially.
In Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar, (1984)3 SCC 14, the Apex Court has stated that the law of preventive detention being a drastic and hard law must be strictly construed and should not ordinarily be used for clipping the wings of an accused if criminal prosecution would suffice.
In Ramesh Yadav Vs. District Magistrate, (1985) 4 SCC 232, the Apex Court stated that ordinarily a detention order should not be passed merely on the ground that the detenu who was carrying on smuggling activities was likely to be enlarged on bail. In such cases the proper course would be to oppose the bail application and if granted, challenge the order in the higher forum, but not circumvent it by passing an order of detention merely to supersede the bail order.
In Kamarunnissa Vs. Union of India and another (Supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Apex Court after referring catena of judgements held thus:
"From the catena of decisions referred to above, it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is reals possibility of his being released on bail and, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in his behalf, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question the same before a higher Court."
The view taken by the Apex Court in Kamarunnissa Vs. Union of India and another (Supra), was followed by Apex Court as well as High Courts in catena of judgements.
From the perusal of aforesaid pronouncements of Supreme Court, it is clear that an order of detention passed in respect of a person under judicial custody must satisfy the three conditions spelt out by the Apex Court in the case of Kamarunnissa (Supra) and one of such conditions is that the authority passing the order of detention in respect of a person in custody should have the reason to believe that there was real possibility of his release on bail and further on being released he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to public order. The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner is thus, the basis of the order under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act and this basis is clearly absent in the present case.
In view of what has been indicated herein above, the impugned order dated 06.8.2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar along with all consequential orders are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to release the petitioner forthwith unless wanted in any other case.
This Habeas Corpus Writ Petition is allowed as above.
(Krishna Pratap Singh, J ) (Ramesh Sinha, J) Order Date :- 30.3.2018 Ishrat