JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. Mr. S. U. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the order of suspension dated 18th November, 1998 contained in Annexure-3 to this writ petition on two-fold grounds. The first is that the alleged misconduct is not related to the petitioner's employment or during the course of discharge of duty in relation to his employment and, therefore, it cannot be brought within the purview of misconduct in employment so as to invite disciplinary proceedings under the relevant rules. The second is that the order of suspension was issued by the disciplinary authority at the behest of his superior without application of mind and as such, cannot be sustained. In connection with the second contention. Mr. Khan had relied on the decision in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan, v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1997 SC 3400, while he was relying on the decision in the case of M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd., v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and others. AIR 1984 SC 505, in support of his first contention.
2. Mr. B. K. Rai, learned brief holder for the State on the other hand had contended that by reason of Rule 5A of the U. P. Government Servant Conduct Rules. 1956, appearance in a public place in a State of intoxication is a misconduct on the part of a Government servant and, therefore, on the basis of the allegations prima facie, there are substance or material on which a proceeding can be initiated and if the disciplinary authority is satisfied, an order of suspension can very well be issued and it cannot be termed as without jurisdiction.
3. In reply, Mr. Khan had contended that the allegation which has been made are wholly vague and appears to be baseless and cannot form material to come to a conclusion that there are sufficient reasons to suspend the petitioner. Even if for the sake of argument, it can be presumed that there should be material to proceed against indisciplinary proceeding, relying on Rule 7 of the Lekhpal Service Rules, 1958, he contends that the Assistant Collector being the appointing authority as defined in Rule 3 (a), the order issued by him at the behest of the District Magistrate without any application of mind, is squarely covered by the decision referred to by him as above and as such, the order of suspension cannot be sustained.
4. I have heard both the learned counsel at length.
5. From the impugned order, it appears that the petitioner was suspended by an order dated 18th November, 1998 contained In Annexure-3 on the ground that he had used unparliamentary language and had abused in intoxicating state and attempted to assault the complainant R. P. Manglik, Tehsildar due to which he was being suspended. In the order of suspension, however, it has not been mentioned that any enquiry is contemplated. Only it is apparent that any enquiry officer has been appointed. There may be doubt that as to whether suspension has been made in contemplation of an enquiry or by way of punishment. However, one line has been added at the bottom of the said order contained in Annexure-3 that Naib Tehsildar is being appointed as an Enquiry officer. But the fact remains that In the order itself, the mind has not been disclosed as to whether any enquiry is contemplated or not. But only a line has been added at the bottom of the order which might be taken to be an Indication of the contemplation of an enquiry.
6. Be that as it may, Mr. Khan in his usual fairness has not stressed on the said point in view of the ambiguous situation as observed above.
7. From the order dated 14/15th November, 1998 contained in Annexure-2, it appears that the District Magistrate had forwarded the complaint of Sri Manglik to the Assistant Collector with a direction that in such circumstance, the petitioner should be suspended immediately and a disciplinary proceeding be initiated against him, on the ground that the District Magistrate had asked Mr. Manglik, who had informed him that the petitioner had used unparliamentary language and had abused him in an intoxicating state having arrived at his house and had also attempted to assault him. It is apparent on record that the Assistant Collector had suspended the petitioner on the basis of the instruction given by the District Magistrate without applying his mind. It seems that the Assistant Collector has not arrived at any Independent decision to hold any enquiry against the petitioner. Neither there was any application of mind as to whether the circumstance warranted any suspension or there was any material to come to a conclusion that an enquiry should be held against the petitioner pursuant to such allegation.
8. At the same time, admittedly, the allegation is based on certain transaction between Sri Manglik and the petitioner not during the course of discharge of their duties in relation to their employment. In the case of M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has observed that to enable an employer to peacefully carry on his industrial activity, the Act confers powers on him to prescribe conditions of service including enumerating acts of misconduct when committed within the premises of the establishment. The employer has hardly any extraterritorial jurisdiction. He is not the custodian of general law and order situation nor the Guru or mentor of his workmen for their well-regulated cultural advancement. If the power to regulate the behaviour of the workmen outside the duty hours and at any place wherever they may be was conferred upon the employer, contract of service may be reduced to contract of slavery. The employer is entitled to prescribe conditions of service more or less specifying the acts of misconduct to be enforced within the premises where the workman gather together for rendering service. The employer has both power and jurisdiction to regulate the behaviour of workmen within the premises of the establishment or for peacefully carrying the industrial activity in the vicinity of the establishment."
9. This judgment was rendered in the background of interpreting a particular standing order in respect of an industry. Whereas, we are concerned with the conduct of a Government employee, who is governed by the U. P. Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956, which fact is not disputed. Now a Government servant is required to maintain a different kind of dignity and status of the post which creates an impression in the public mind in the discharge of his duties which are public in nature and as such, are more touching and is to be preserved in a more dignified manner so as not to create wrong Impression or send a wrong signal. A Government servant is not supposed to behave in a manner which might create a wrong example and set up a wrong impression. But still then, it cannot include his personal behaviour, in the private or personal capacity between the two Government employees subject to general law. It can be comprehended only within the rules as might be prescribed as in the present case being U. P. Government Servant Conduct Rules. 1956 where conduct has been specified. Rule 4A of the said 1956 Rules provides as follows :
"4A. Consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs.--A Government servant shall-
(a) strictly abide by any law relating to intoxicating drinks or drugs in force in any area In which he may happen to be for the time being ;
(b) not be under the influence of an intoxicating drinks or drug during the course of his duty and shall also take due care that the performance of his duties at any time is not effected in any way by the influence of such drink or drug;
(c) refrain from consuming any Intoxicating drink or drug in a public place ;
(d) not appear in a public place in a state of intoxication ;
(e) not use any intoxicating drink or drug to excess.
Explanation I.--For purposes of this rule 'public place' means any place or premises (including a conveyance) to which the public have, or are permitted to have, access, whether on payment or otherwise.
Explanation II.--Any club-
(a) which admits persons other than Government servant as members ; or
(b) the members of which are allowed to invite non-members as guests thereto even though the membership confined to Government servants.
shall also, for purposes of Explanation I, be deemed to be a place to which the public have or are permitted to have access."
10. The said Rule provides certain embargo in the consumption of intoxicating drugs and drinks in public. Clause (d) prohibits appearance in a public place in a state of intoxication. In the present case, it might be said that the petitioner had abused the complainant at his house. The house of the complainant cannot be a public place. But then in order to have access to the house of the complainant, the petitioner might have traversed public place. But those are questions which requires to be weighed with by the disciplinary authority for forming of an opinion as to whether any enquiry would be contemplated upon facts and that it requires an order of suspension. At this stage, therefore, it cannot be said conclusively that there was no material which can subject the petitioner to a contemplated enquiry. The question is a question of merit of the case itself. Therefore, I do not propose to deal with the same at this stage and in such a circumstance, it has not been possible for this Court to find favour with the contention of Mr. Khan with regard to his first point. The decsion in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan [supra) does not throw any light in the contention of Mr. Khan in view of the peculiar situation attracted in the present case emanating from Rule 4A of the 1956 Rules, which also includes behaviour of a Government servant even outside the establishment of his employment, in relation to his behaviour at a public place. It may not include abuse or attempt to assault but there being an allegation of state of Intoxication, it may come within the ambit of Rule 4A. But that is a question to be weighed with by the disciplinary authority upon application of proper mind and in accordance with law of normal rules of procedure so as to find out reasons for forming an opinion.
11. So far as the second question is concerned. It appears from Rule 7 of Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 that the Assistant Collector is the appointing authority. It is the appointing authority who can formulate an opinion as to the necessity of holding of a disciplinary proceeding and in connection therewith, suspend an employee as discussed hereinbefore. There is nothing to indicate that the Assistant Collector had formed his opinion on the basis of application of his mind independent of the order of the District Magistrate contained In Annexure-2. On the other hand, the record shows that he had passed the order on the basis of the instruction of his superior pursuant to the order contained in Annexure-2. The order contained in Annexure-2 clearly indicates a specific direction of suspending the petitioner with immediate effect and initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. The basis by which the said opinion was formed by the District Magistrate is indicated in the said order being the complaint made by the complainant added with the fact that the District Magistrate was informed by the complainant on being so asked by him. It does not indicate as to in exercise of which jurisdiction he could hold a preliminary enquiry on the basis of forming an opinion when he himself was not the disciplinary authority. It seems that he had no business to ask any question to the complainant. At best, he could have forwarded the complaint to the disciplinary authority or could have advised the complainant to bring the complaint before the disciplinary authority. Mr. Khan had submitted that to the knowledge of the petitioner, no complaint was lodged in the form of a first information report in any police station by the complainant. If it is so, in that event it is preposterous for the District Magistrate to form an opinion to suspend the petitioner and to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him solely on the basis of his assertion that the complainant had told him that the petitioner had abused the complainant in an unparliamentary language and had attempted to assault in an intoxicating state when he was not the disciplinary authority. The appointing authority being Assistant Collector as defined in Rule 3 (a) of the Lekhpal Service Rules, 1958 as Assistant Collector Incharge of a sub-division, it is for the Assistant Collector to form such an opinion on the basis of the complaint that might be made by another Government employee, which is wholly unconnected with the employment of the petitioner. But for this Rule 4A of 1956. Rules, an allegation with regard to a misconduct outside the employment falling within the ambit of Rule 4A cannot be accepted to be within the knowledge of any employee In the establishment or the superior. Therefore, in such cases a little more care and caution should be taken. There may be animosity between the complainant and the delinquent. An allegation by another employee cannot be taken for granted and has to be asserted upon application of proper mind in order to put a person on suspension bringing disrepute In service conditions which requires assertion of the prima facie truthfulness in the allegations made. Such steps should not be taken in a casual manner which requires a little more application of mind for the purpose of asserting the truthfulness in the allegation, viz., existence of a prima facie case and the necessity requiring holding of a disciplinary proceeding or the necessity to suspend. Suspension is not a simple and regular course of action which can be issued casually. Such power is to be exercised only when it is so necessary in aid of the disciplinary proceedings or to protect the purity of the service atmosphere. It cannot be issued as an ordinary course.
12. In the present case, I have found that there was no proper application of mind. On the other hand, the order was issued at the behest of the superior. In the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (supra), the Apex Court had held that the decision has to be taken independently and not on the basis of any instruction or orders of any authority and if it is not so done, in that event the Court would intervene.
13. Mr. Khan had relied on paragraph 23 of the said decision in which it was observed as follows :
"In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the statute, does not act independently and passes an order under the instructions and orders of another authority, the Court would intervene in the matter, quash the order and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own discretion."
14. In the facts and circumstances of the case relying on the decision in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan (supra), it appears that the impugned orders contained in Annexures-2 and 3 cannot be sustained for the foregoing reasons and as such, are liable to be quashed.
15. Mr. B. K. Rai, learned brief holder for the State appears on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case as would be appearing from the discussion made hereinbefore, service upon respondent No. 3 is dispensed with. Since the order which has been passed after hearing Sarvashri S. U. Khan and B. K. Ral, learned counsel for the respective parties, namely, that the same will not prejudice the respondent No. 3 in any manner and his interest has been protected in the manner as would be apparent from the order which is being passed hereby.
16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders contained in Annexures-2 and 3 to the writ petition are quashed. No cost.
Let a writ of certiorari do issue accordingly. However, this order will not prevent the Assistant Collector to take appropriate decision on the basis of the alleged complaint made by Sri Manglik in accordance with law having applied his mind in the light of the observations made hereinbefore.