JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J.
1. Petitioner, who retired from Government Service as Consolidation Officer on 31.7.92, has invoked the procedure of this Court by means of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking relief of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 28.3.95 of the State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and disciplinary proceeding initiated against him qua charge-sheet embodied in office memo No. 2075/VI-Ka-ST, dated 2.4.1988. The departmental proceedings which were admittedly pending at the time of petitioner's retirement, are sought to be quashed basically on two grounds, firstly that after retirement, no departmental proceedings could be continued against a Government servant and secondly, that the proceedings are barred by Section 49A of the U. P. Consolidation of Holding Act in that the disciplinary proceedings appertain to judicial duties performed by the petitioner as Consolidation Officer and Section 49A provides in no uncertain terms, that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under the Act or the Rules made thereunder.
2. Subsequent to his retirement, the petitioner filed two separate claim petitions, viz., Claim Petition No. 1518 of 1993 and Claim Petition No. 1517 of 1993 challenging the impugned departmental proceedings. The State Public Service Tribunal by its order dated 28.3.95 declined to interfere with the departmental proceedings though attended with the observation that in view of the provisions contained in Articles 351AA and 919A of Civil Services Regulations, the provisional pension as provided in Article 919A may be sanctioned for the period commencing from the date of relirement till the conclusion of the departmental proceedings.
3. I have heard the petitioner, who appeared in person and the standing counsel representing the opposite parlies. In Union of India and others v. A. M. Saxena, (1992) 3 SCC 124. It was canvassed before the Supreme Court that as the respondent A. M. Saxena was performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions in making the assessment orders under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, his actions even if wrong, could be mended/repaired in appeal or revision and no disciplinary action could be taken against him regarding such actions. The argument was repelled in the following words :
"In our view, an argument that no disciplinary action can be taken in regard to actions taken or purported to be done in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not correct. It is true that when an officer is performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions disciplinary proceedings regarding any of his actions in the course of such proceedings should be taken only after great caution and a close scrutiny of his actions and only if the circumstances so warrant. The initiation of such proceedings, it is true, is likely to shake the confidence of the public in the officer concerned and also if lightly taken likely to undermine his Independence. Hence the need for extreme care and caution before Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer performing Judicial or quasi-judicial functions in respect of his actions in the discharge or purported to discharge his functions. But it is not as if such action cannot be taken at all. Where the actions of such an officer indicate culpability, namely a desire to oblige himself or unduly favour one of the parties or an improper motive there is no reason why disciplinary action should not be taken."
In Govinda Menon a. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1274. It was contended that no disciplinary proceedings could be taken against the appellant Govind Menon for acts or omissions with regard to his work as Commissioner under Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act, 1951, inasmuch as the orders made by him, were quasi-judicial in character and they should be challenged only as provided for under the Act. It was held that the disciplinary proceeding against the appellant could be taken "in respect of his acts or omissions which cast reflection upon his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty as a member of the service".
4. The Apex Court considered the aforesaid decisions in Union of India and others v. Sri K. K. Dhawan, JT (1993) 1 SC 236. and held that the disciplinary action can be taken even with regard to exercise of quasi-judicial powers provided ; (i) the act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the Government Servant for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, or (ii) there is prima facie material manifesting recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of the official duty, or the officer had failed to act honestly or in 'good faith' or had omitted to observe the prescribed conditions, which are essential for the exercise of statutory power. Section 49A of the U. P. Consolidation of Holding Act, reliance on which was placed by the petitioner to lend cogency to his contention that disciplinary proceedings were Incompetent in respect of acts done or purported to be done by the petitioner in his capacity as Consolidation Officer reads as under :
"49A. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or Rules made thereunder."
5. It is thus evident that what is conceived for protection by Section 49A is "anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or Rules made thereunder". To rephrase it, the acts and omissions which reflect on the reputation of the petitioner for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duly, are not intended to be protected by Section 49A of the U. P. Consolidation of Holding Act. There is no whisper in the writ petition that there is prima facie no material reflecting on the reputation of the petitioner for his integrity and/or good faith and devotion to duty. In Pearce v. Faster, (1866) 17 QBD 536, it was observed by Lopes. L.J., "If a servant conducts himself in way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal". These observations have been quoted with approval in K. K. Dhawan (supra). The question whether the acts or omissions complained of, were done in good faith, is a question which can more appropriately be dealt with on conclusion of enquiry for it is a mixed question of law and fact. It would. therefore, be not in the fitness of things to scuttle the departmental enquiry at this stage.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed credence on a single Judge decision of this Court [Lucknow Bench) in State of U. P. and another v. Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad Azmi and another, Writ Petition No. 801 of 1987, decided on 10.4.97, in which it was held that the matter regarding good faith should be decided by the Tribunal itself. In my opinion, the ratio decidendi of the said decision sans reasons, is not quotable as a binding precedent.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner then switched gear to the submission, relying upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in State of U. P. v. Aditya Narain Misra and others, 1973 (1) SLR 679, that the petitioner having already retired from service, no punishment comprehended by Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, could be awarded to him and hence, it will be an exercise in futility to allow the departmental proceeding to go on. It is true that punishment comprehended by Rule 49 of the C.C.A. Rules, could be imposed upon the "members of the services and not to a pensioner" as held by the Division Bench in the aforestated case but the disciplinary proceeding may culminate tn an order being passed under paragraph 351A of the U. P. Civil Services Regulations, which empowers the Governor to withhold or withdraw a pension or any part of it whether permanently or for a specified period and direct recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government If the pensioner is found in departmental or judicial proceedings to have been guilty of grave misconduct, or to have caused pecuniary loss to Government by misconduct or negligence, during his service. I will have no qualms to observe that the Division Bench decision in the State of U, P. v. Aditya Narain Misra (supra), shall be borne in mind by the disciplinary authority while taking a final decision on the conclusion of the pending departmental proceeding. The fact that the petitioner has retired from service is by itself no ground to be reckoned with to issue a writ of prohibition restraining the authorities from taking the disciplinary proceeding to some finality. In Union of India v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 2 UPLBEC 966, the Supreme Court has held that a writ of prohibition Is issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out and in the case of charges framed in a disciplinary enquiry, the Tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any), no misconduct or other irregularities alleged, can be said to have been made out or the charges framed militate against any law. At this stage, it is not possible to pronounce on the correctness or truth of the charges for this Court cannot overstep the mark of its supervisory jurisdiction and encroach into the functions of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter to be first delved into by the disciplinary authority, While exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, it must be reckoned with that if a Court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it passes comprehension how can that be done by the Court at the stage of framing of the charges. The Services Tribunal in the instant case has already directed the authorities to sanction provisional pension pending enquiry as comprehended by Articles 351AA and 919A of the Civil Service Regulations. In the above perspective, I am pursuaded to the view that no case is made out for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
8. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the petition falls and is dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs.