JUDGMENT B.N. Katju, C.J.
1. This is an application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. praying that the order of the Sessions Judge dated 6-10-1988 in revision and the summoning order dated 11-8-1986 of the Judicial Magistrate, Meerut as well as the prosecution of the applicants in complaint Case No. 2185 of 198,6 be quashed.
2. A preliminary objection was raised by the State Counsel before the learned single Judge who heard this application that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka, 1988 All Cri C 54 the case of Khem Singh v. Nathoo Ram Sharma, 1978 All Cri C 262 did not lay down good law and this application was not maintainable.
3. The learned single Judge accordingly referred the undermentioned two questions for consideration by a larger Bench:
"The respondent State had challenged the order before Court of Session when the learned Magistrate before whom the matter was proceeding directed release of the truck in favour of the appellant. The Revisional Court dismissed the petition of the State. A second revision did not lie at the instance of the State to the High Court in view of the provisions of Section 397(3) of Cr. P.C. Obviously, to avoid this bar, the application moved by the State before the High Court was stated to be under Section 482, Cr. P.C. asking for exercise of inherent powers. In exercise of that power, the High Court has reversed the order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the Sessions Judge. The question for consideration is as to whether the bar under Section 397(3), Cr. P.C., should have been taken note of to reject the revision at the instance of the State Government or action taken by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power has to be sustained. It is not disputed by counsel appearing for the State that the move before the High Court was really an application for revision of the order of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is exactly what is prohibited under Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted every revision application facing the bar of Section 397(3), of the Code could be labelled as one under Section 482. We are satisfied that this is a case where the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision."
10. It is clearly laid down in the above mentioned case that if a revision is filed by a person against an order of the Magistrate before the Sessions Judge and it is dismissed neither a revision can be entertained in the High Court at the instance of such a person against the order of the Magistrate in view, of Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. nor can the High Court interfere with the order of the Magistrate in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. The bar bf revision against the order of the Magistrate before the High Court under Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. cannot be overcome by labelling the application as under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
11. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 it was held (Paras 6 and 10) :--
"In Amar Nath's case (AIR 1977 SC 2185) as in this, the order of the trial Court issuing process against the accused was challenged and the High Court was asked to quash the criminal proceeding either in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the 1973 Code corresponding to Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 hereinafter called the 1898 Code or the old Code, or under Section 397(1) of the new Code corresponding to Section 435 of the old Code....
As pointed out in Amar Nath's case, AIR 1977 SC 2185 (supra) the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory, orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing Sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include Sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court." But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent powers at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused up to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers."
"The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so, many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law, when a specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye's case, AIR 1978 SC 47 this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistakes....I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us."
14. In the case of V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I., AIR 1980 SC 962 it was held (Para 6) :--
"One of the questions that arose was as to whether an interlocutory order which could be revised by the Sessions Judge, can be further revised under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court because Section 397(3) permitted the power of revision to be exercised only by the High Court or the Sessions Judge but not by both of them. The limitation contained in Section 397(3) runs as follows :--
"(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them".
Sub-section (3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in Section 482, as mentioned above. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Judge under Section 397(1) of the Code. We need not dilate on this aspect because we are not called upon to consider the interpretation of Section 397(3) of the Code, although in one of the cases cited before us this aspect has been gone into and that is why we have indicated the same."
15. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC 47) (supra) a distinction has been made between an order which is purely interlocutory which could be corrected in exercise of revisional power and an order though interlocutory which results in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice. If the order is purely interlocutory it cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. but if the order though interlocutory results in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice it can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. as Section 397(2), Cr. P.C. is a bar to the Exercise of revisional power by the High Court and the Sessions Judge in respect of interlocutory orders but does not bar the High Court from the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. In our opinion the aforesaid principle is also applicable to cases covered by Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. and Section 399(3), Cr. P.C. in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (AIR 1980 SC 962) (supra). If the application in revision is made under Section 397(1), Cr. P.C. to the Sessions Judge by any person the order of the Sessions Judge is final in relation to such a person and no revision at the instance of such person can be entertained by the High Court and revisional power cannot also be exercised suo motu by the High Court in view of Sections 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C. The order of the Sessions Judge in revision can also not be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. except in cases where it has resulted in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or interference is called for to secure the ends of justice. If the order of the Sessions Judge in revision has determined the dispute between the parties, it cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for to do so would make the bar under Sections 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C. inoperative in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (1988 All Cri C 54) (supra). Thus in cases of conviction by the Magistrate which are not appealable the order of the Sessions Judge in revision is final and cannot be interfered with by the High Court in revision either at the instance of the same party or suo motu or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. Similarly the order of the Sessions Judge in revision in cases under Sections 125, 133/138 and 145, Cr. P.C. and against an order of discharge by the Magistrate cannot be interfered with by the High Court-either in exercise of its revisional powers at the instance of the same party or suo motu or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for these are also some of the orders of the Sessions Judge which determined the dispute between the parties. The order of the Sessions Judge in revision against a summoning order or an order framing charge is, however, different as it does not determine the dispute between the parties. If it results in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice it can be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. as this is not barred under Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. and Section 399(3), Cr. P.C.
16. In this view of the matter there is no conflict between the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (1988 All WC 54) (supra) and in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1978 SC 47), Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) (AIR 1980 SC 258) and V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (AIR 1980 SC 962) (supra). In the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (supra) the Magistrate directed the release of truck in favour of the appellant. The order of the Sessions Judge dismissing the revision filed by the State determined the dispute between the parties regarding the possession of the truck and did not result in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or call for interference to secure the ends of justice. It could not thus be interfered with by the High Court either in revision at the instance of the State or suo motu or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. In the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra) the order of the trial Court issuing process against the accused was challenged. In the case of Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) (supra) the order summoning the accused was challenged. In the case of V. C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (supra) the order framing charge against the accused was challenged. The orders of the trial Court in all these cases could result in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or call for interference to secure the ends of justice. In such cases neither Section 397(2), Cr. P.C. nor Section 397(3), Cr. P.C. could bar the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/ or secure the ends of justice. It may be mentioned that in the case of R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 the scope of the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. in the matter of quashing criminal proceeding in Court after the submission of the charge-sheet or complaint has been dealt with.
17. It was thus wrongly held in the case of Khem Singh v. Nathoo Ram Sharma (1978 All WC 262) (supra) that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could be exercised to quash the order of the Additional Munsif-Magistrate discharging the accused in a complaint case as it determined the dispute between the parties in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (supra).
18. For the reasons given above our answer to the first question referred to us is that the case of Khem Singh v. Nathoo Ram Sharma (supra) does not lay down good law with respect to orders of the Sessions Judge passed in revision which determine the dispute between the parties as indicated in our judgment in view of the case of Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Karnataka (1988 All Cri C 54) (SC) (supra) but lays down good law with respect to orders of the Sessions Judge passed in revision which result in abuses of the process of the Court and/or call for interference to secure the ends of justice.
19. Our answer to the second question referred to us is that where an application under Section 397, Cr. P.C. filed by any party in the Court of Sessions is decided against him it is open to that party to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. only if the order of the Sessions Judge has resulted in the abuse of the process of the Court and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of justice as the bar under Sections 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C. is not applicable to the exercise of the inherent powers by the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. in such a case. If on the other hand the order of the Sessions Judge has determined the dispute between the parties as indicated in our judgment, it cannot beinter-fered with by the High Court in revision at the instance of the same party or suo motu or in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. in view of the bar under Sections 397(3) and 399(3), Cr. P.C.
10. Let the record of the case be placed before the learned single Judge with our answers to the questions referred to us.