JUDGMENT D.K. Seth, J.
1. Notification dated 4th February, 1992 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) issued under Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act. 1948, fixing minimum rate of wages in respect of the employees employed in the units manufacturing miniature bulbs and glass products except optical lenses and glass bangles making industry in U. P., is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition,
2. Mr. J.N. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing with Mr. Rakesh Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner is not a manufacturing unit and it does not manufacture any glass product, therefore, it is not covered by the said notification. Secondly he contends that life of the Advisory Board constituted under Section 5 of the Minimum Wages Act. 1948 (hereinafter called as the said Act) having expired on 15.10.1990 and no Board having been constituted thereafter, the notification is void and is a nullity since it has been issued without consulting the Advisory Board. His third contention was that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before fixing the rate of wages. He fourthly contends that alternatively even if the Board is constituted, the same does not include any representative of the employer. He contends fifthly that in the rates fixed 100% neutralisation of dearness allowance has been prescribed which is not permissible under the law. His sixth contention was that while fixing the rate of wages, it is not permissible to determine or lay down any condition of service. His last contention was that instead of fixing the rate, a formula has been fixed on the basis whereof calculation in respect of each individual workman is to be worked out which is not permissible under the said Act. Inasmuch as it is the rate which is to be fixed and not to lay down a formula for calculation of wages.
3. Mr. J.N. Tiwari ably assisted by Mr. Rakesh Tiwari had also relied upon several decisions which will be dealt with at appropriate stages.
4. Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed the said ground and contended that in the counter-affidavit he has specified the particulars of the works carried on by the petitioner and on facts he had asserted that the petitioner is a manufacturing unit of glass products and, therefore, it very much comes within the ambit of the notification. He then contends that after 15.10.1990 a fresh Advisory Board has duly been constituted and the said Board having been consulted as is reflected from the notification itself. Therefore, the second contention of Mr. Tiwari cannot be sustained. He next contends that the fixing of minimum wages being legislative function through a delegated legislation, question of opportunity of hearing of individual employer does not arise. He next contended that in the writ petition itself, no case was made out that the consultation with the Advisory Board was in any manner wrong. The procedure for fixing the minimum wages as contemplated under Section 5 of the said Act have duly been followed. He next contends that the Dearness Allowance can be neutralised to the maximum extend of 100% and not above. Then again in the present case 100% neutralisation is permitted only in respect of the employees in lower category, therefore, the said contention of Mr. Tiwari cannot be sustained. He next contends that the conditions which are being sought to be assailed by the petitioner are conditions as postulated in Sections 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the said Act and as such cannot be questioned. He last contends that the rates have been fixed and how the same has to be calculated is well within the jurisdiction of Government to decide and determine and therefore the same cannot be assailed on that account.
5. By an order dated 8.2.1996 the writ petition was dismissed after adding respondent Nos. 3 to 8 as parties to the writ petition by an order dated 24.1.1996. An application for setting aside the said order dated 8.2.1996 has been moved. On the basis of the said application, the matter has since been reheard on the merit of the case itself. Thus the application for recalling the order dated 8.2.1996 is allowed and the matter is being decided on merit afresh on the basis of the fresh argument advanced by the respective parties.
6. The impugned notification is Annexure 1 to the writ petition which in its preamble provides as follows :
"No. 4472/XXXVI-3-13 (M.W.)-91, dated Lucknow, February 4, 1992.
In exercise of the powers under clause (b) of sub-section (3) read with clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act. 1948 (Act No. XI of 1948) and in supersession of Government Notification No. 4806 (S.T./XXXVI-1-312 (S.T.)-83, dated August 24. 1985 and after consulting the Advisory Board and after having considered the objections and suggestions received in respect of the proposals published with Government Notification No. 2747/XXXVI-3-312 (S.T.)-83, dated August 24, 1991, the Governor is pleased to revise and fix the minimum rates in respect of the employees employed in the employment in Miniatures Bulbs and Glass Products Manufacturing industry (except optical lenses and glass bangle making industry) in Uttar Pradesh with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Gazette."
7. The said preamble indicates that the minimum rate of wages of the employees employed in Glass Works Manufacturing industry, except optical lenses and glass bangles, in U. P., are being included within the ambit of the said notification. In the writ petition, how manufacturing process are taking place has not been indicated. But in the counter-affidavit, a detailed process has been specified which has not been effectively denied. In course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner in his usual fairness admitted the process specified in the counter-affidavit being adopted by the petitioner. But he contends that the process is not a process of manufacturing. It is a process of treatment. The products are made of glass sheet and even after treatment, it remains a glass sheet, might be it is toughened. The treatment for toughening does not change the nature of the product. The raw material remains as it is, The process for such treatment is not a manufacturing process.
8. Admittedly, this treatment includes, heating, cooling, passing through water and adding some more material, namely, an adhesive compound for joining two sheets together and also giving the shape of wind screens, rear screens, window glass of a motor car and buses and other vehicles. Thus giving of shape required moulding of the sheet glass to the required dimension with the specific shape to be used as a wind screen in one or the other motor car having specific design, shape and measurement which specifies definite and distinct specification. Apart from moulding to a particular shape on certain specification, it is also treated by of heating and cooling passing through water and joining two or more sheets with certain compounds definitely makes out altogether a new kind of material which is no more a glass sheet. It becomes a marketable commodity for a particular purpose, for a particular use in a particular kind of things namely motor vehicle. The glass sheet assumes altogether a different characteristic and become a commodity known as such may be base being raw glass sheet apart from being moulded and toughened. Thus a glass sheet acquires some more characteristic through a process of manufacturing even if it is called as a treatment and becomes altogether a different commodity than a glass sheet. By no stretch of imagination, the product can be called glass sheet. In the ordinary market, it is known by its distinguished feature and characteristic. By now it is well-settled principle of law that process of manufacturing means bringing into existence a new substance having distinctive name, character or use capable of being bought and sold. It has been so interpreted in the various decisions right from 1985 as was held in the case of Empire Industrial Ltd. v. Union of India, 1985 (2) ELT 179 ; Ujagar Prints v. Union of India. 1988 (38) ELT 535 ; Commissioner of Central Excise v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works, AIR 1991 SC 2222 ; Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Coco Fibre, AIR 1991 SC 378 ; Union of India v. Banu Bhai, AIR 1991 SC 407 ; I.T.C. v. N. C. Budhraja, AIR 1993 SC 2529. Following the tests laid down in the said cases, the heating and cooling is a process for manufacturing a new substance called wind screen, rear screen or window screens for vehicles having a different characteristic and feature of toughening known as safety glass used for a particular purpose and as such, with a distinguished name and identity the same is bought and sold in the market. Therefore, it is definitely a glass product distinguished from a sheet glass and as such, the petitioner is a glass product manufacturer.
9. Similarly manufacture of mirror glass though claimed by Mr. Tiwari not to be a glass product yet it is not possible to accept such contention because of the reason that mirror has a peculiar and different feature and characteristic and identity distinguished from glass sheet. Through a manufacturing process, a glass sheet acquired different characteristic like mirror which is sold in the market as a mirror and not as a glass sheet. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of Mr. Tiwari that the petitioner does not come within the ambit of the said notification.
10. The next question raised by Mr. Tiwari is life of the Advisory Board having expired on 15-10.1990, there existed no Advisory Board and as such Advisory Board has not been constituted. Mr. Tiwari has produced a notification which specifies that the Advisory Board under the meaning of Minimum Wages Act was constituted on 15.7.1992 but there was no meeting of the said Advisory Board in 1992. It also points out that the Board was earlier constituted by a notification dated 14.10.1988 and its life was to expire on 13.10.1990 but since a new Board could not be constituted, therefore, it had continued till 28.8.1991 within which in four meetings it had revised the minimum wages for the employees employed in manufacture of 28 items. Thus it appears that there was no Advisory Board functioning between 28.8.1991 to 15.7.1992 excluding both these days. Whereas in the notification dated 4.2.1992 which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition, it is pointed out that after consulting the Advisory Board and having considered the objection and suggestions received in respect of the proposal published with the Government Notification dated 24.8.1991, the Governor is pleased to revise and fix the minimum rates of wages in respect of the employees employed in the employment in Glass Products Manufacturing Industry except optical lenses and glass bangles making industry. Therefore, the objection to the proposal for revision of wages was invited through notification dated 24.8.1991, namely, the date till the formal Advisory Board purported to work. Section 5 of the said Act prescribes procedure for fixing or revising minimum wages in the following manner :
"5. Procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages.--(1) In fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of any scheduled, employment for the first time under this Act or in revising minimum rates of wages so fixed, the appropriate Government shall either-
(a) appoint as many committees and sub-committees as it considers necessary to hold enquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision, as the case may be, or
(b) by notification in the Official Gazette, publish its proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and specify a date, not less than two months from the date of the notification, on which the proposals will be taken into consideration.
(2) After considering the advice of the committee or committees appointed under clause (a) of sub-section (1), or as the case may be, all representations received by it before the date specified in the notification under clause (b) of that sub-section, the appropriate Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix, or, as the case may be, revise the minimum rates of wages in respect of each scheduled employment, and unless such notification otherwise provides, it shall come into force on the expiry of three months from the date of its issue ;
Provided that where the appropriate Government proposes to revise the minimum rates of wages by the mode specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1), the appropriate Government shall consult the Advisory Board also."
11. The said section provides two procedure to be followed for the purpose of fixing or revising minimum wages. The first mode is to appoint committee or sub-committees for holding enquiries and advise the Government in respect of such fixation or revision, as the case may be and after considering the advice of such committee or committees, the Government may by notification in the Gazette fix or revise the, minimum wages. The second procedure is that the Government by notification in the Official Gazette publish the proposal for fixing or revising the minimum wages for the information of the persons likely to be affected thereby inviting objections within a date specified which would be not less than two months and after considering all such representations received by the Government, it may by notification fix or revise the minimum wages. Subsection (1) of Section 5 of the Act has two parts, namely, clause Col and clause (b). By the (sic) of the expression 'either' in sub-section (1), the procedure as provided in clause (b) may be adopted. Adoption of one of the other procedure, namely, either clause (a) or clause (b) would suffice the process. It is not necessary to undergo both the processes. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the said Act has also two parts, namely, if the procedure under clause (a) of sub-section (1) is adopted, then after considering the advice of the committee or committees, the minimum rate of wages could be fixed or revised. Similarly, if the procedure under clause (b) of sub-section (1) is adopted, in that event after considering all representations, received by the Government before the date specified, the minimum wages can be fixed or revised.
12. A plain reading reveals that clause (2) does not require considering the advice of the committee or committees appointed under clause (a), sub-section (1) when it adopts the procedure in clause (b) thereof. The proviso to sub-section (2) does not apply in respect of procedure adopted under clause (a) of sub-section (1). It might ordinarily seem without reference to Section 7 that the proviso does not apply when the procedure under clause (b) of sub-section (1) is adopted for fixing the rates of wages for the first time and the application of the proviso is confined only to the procedure under clause (b) adopted for revising the minimum wages already fixed earlier. But the expression also at the end of the proviso indicates that not only in case of fixation but also in case of revision, the Board is to be consulted. In other words, by reason of the proviso to sub-section (2), the State Government has to consult the Advisory Board when the minimum rate of wages are fixed or revised. Section 5 cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read with Section 7. Both Sections 5 and 7 are to be reconciled. Unless reconciled, Section 7 and the proviso to Section 5 (2) would be inconsistent. Use of the expression 'also' in the proviso makes it clear that not only while fixing but also while revising, the Advisory Board is to be consulted. Such an interpretation fits in with the reconciled interpretation of Section 5 read with Section 7.
13. For the purpose of revision, the Government is required to consult the Advisory Board as well. Therefore, when revising the minimum rates of wages, it is incumbent on the Government to consider the representation received and also to consult the Advisory Board before publication of the revised minimum rates of wages. The use of phrase 'shall consult the Advisory Board also' clearly indicates that the consultation is mandatory and not directory. In the absence of consulting the Advisory Board, the rates cannot be taken to be revised following the procedure laid down in Section 5 of the said Act.
14. By reason of Section 7 of the said Act which provides for the purpose of coordinating the work of committees and sub-committees, appointment under Section 5 and advising the appropriate Government generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages, the appropriate Government shall appoint an Advisory Board, a distinction has been made with regard to the committees or sub-committees referred to clause (a) of sub-section (1) to Section 5 on the one hand and the Advisory Board on the other hand. The consideration of the advice of the committee or sub-committees appointed clause (a) of subsection (1) to Section 5 which is referred to in Section 5 (2) also indicates the committee or committees other than the Advisory Board. When it makes it mandatory in case of revision, the Advisory Board is to be consulted. It is incumbent that there shall exist an Advisory Board after the date of publication of the procedure for which the Board is to be consulted after the expiry of two months from the date or such other date beyond two months as fixed in the notification publishing the proposal and before the date of publication of the said notification. Unless an Advisory Board is in existence, there is no question of consultation.
15. Normally notification fixing minimum wages will not be interfered with' under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely on the ground of irregularity in the constitution of the committee or in the procedure adopted by it, is the ratio laid down in the case of Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation v. Defence Barytes Asbestos and Paints Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 1391.
16. Therefore, the ground taken by Mr. Tiwari that there was no proper representation of the employer does not seem to be of any substance and I am not inclined to interfere with if there is an Advisory Board only on that ground. Similarly, this Court cannot interfere with the fixing of the minimum wages as ultra vires if the Advisory Board is consulted and the procedures are followed. The fixation of the wages is an administrative act of the Government and not a legislative exercise as has been contended by Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi. In case the fixation appears to be ultra vires the powers of the Government, it can be declared so and corrected. It was so held in the case of Punchi Boat Service v. Slate of Travancore Cochin, AIR 1957 TC 97. The High Court can examine the administrative orders when they are made in defiance of mandatory provisions or without jurisdiction as has been held in case of Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1953 Ajm 65. An order fixing minimum rates of wages without following the provisions of Section 5 (1) is ineffective as was held in the case of N. K. Jain v. Labour Commissioner, Rajasthan, AIR 1957 Raj 35 (DB).
17. In the present case as is appearing from the notification produced by Mr. Tiwari, it was held that there was no meeting in 1992 of the Advisory Board constituted on 15.7.1992 and that the earlier Board, the life of which had expired on 30.10.1990, continued to function till 28.8.1991, therefore, in the absence of any Advisory Board between 24.8.1991 and 15.7.1992, both days included, it was not possible for the appropriate Government to consult the Advisory Board after proposals were published and the representations were received. Since the consultation by the Board is a mandatory proviso to Section 5 (2) of the said Act, even it is recited in the notification itself that it has consulted the Advisory Board, yet in the absence of any Advisory Board as is evident from the notification produced by Mr. Tiwari, it is not possible to hold that there was any effective consultation with the Advisory Board. The exact expression used in the notification dated 4.2.1992 are that "after consulting the Advisory Board ....."
which clearly indicates this consultation followed 24.8.1991. If there is no Advisory Board between 24.8.1991 and 4.2.1992 in existence, then there cannot be any question of consulting the Advisory Board which is a defiance of mandatory provision, namely, proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the said Act. The non-consultation surely a lapse with regard to the procedure laid down in Section 5 of the said Act that can be prescribed. As failure to follow the procedure of Section 5 (1) of the said Act renders the notification ineffective as has been held in the case of N.K. Jain (supra).
18. Mr. Dwivedi, relies on the decision in the case of Champak Lal Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, 1990 (4) SCC 329, to contend that technical plea such as above to deprive the workmen of minimum wages amounts to flout mandate of Constitution. Such posture cannot be countermanded in law. He contends further, relying on the case of Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation v. Defence Barytees Asbestos and Paints Limited. AIR 1985 SC 1391, that on mere ground of irregularities in the constitution of committee, the power under Article 226 ought not to be exercised to interfere in the fixation of minimum wages. But the said ratio decided in those cases cannot help Mr. Dwivedi in the facts of this case. Non-consultation in the absence of Advisory Board is a defiance of mandatory provision and not a mere technicality or irregularity which can be overlooked. Following the ratio in the case of J.N. Ganatara v. Morvi Municipality. AIR 1996 SC 2521, wherein it is held that "it is a settled proposition of law that a power under a statute has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the statute and in no other manner," there is no alternative but to disagree with the proposition of Mr. Dwivedi argued above.
19. However, the decision in the case of Champak Lal Thakkar (supra) was cited by Mr. Dwivedi in supports of his contention to counter the point raised by Mr. Tiwari to the effect that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. Opportunity to objections were invited by the said notification. If no objection was filed by the petitioner, it cannot claim that opportunity was not given. Then again as it appears from Section 5 (2), it does not postulate giving of hearing. It is only consideration of representation. Such opportunity having not been availed of by the petitioner, it is no more open to it to urge that point any more. The function of revising wages being an administrative function, it also does not break giving of hearing. Therefore, this point raised by Mr. Tiwari cannot succeed and stands decided against the petitioner. The decision in the case of Jaswant Singh Mathwa Singh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 1992 (1) (Suppl.) SCC 5, cited by Mr. Tiwari is of no assistance to him, since the same is distinguishable on facts which in no way could be attracted in the facts and circumstances of this case.
20. Similarly, the decision in the case of Ministry of Labour and Rehabilitation (supra) helps Mr. Dwivedi as cited by him to support his contention to counter Mr. Tiwari's contention that the committee did not contain any representative of employer. Such an irregularity could not stand in the way if there was a Board constituted. In the present case, as held above, there being no Advisory Board in existence, this question becomes insignificant.
21. Mr. Tiwari had attacked the notification on the ground the resultant neutralisation having been fixed above 100%, the notification is bad. But the fact remains that in the present case, the resultant neutralisation is less than 100% in respect of higher category of workmen. Whereas it is 100% and not above in respect of certain lower category of workmen as has been pointed out by Mr. Dwivedi. In the case of Sangli District Powerloom Owners' Association Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra and others, 1989 (58) FLR 68, it is held that:
"The law thus clear that dearness allowance is intended to neutralise a portion of the increase in the cost of living. Though 100% neutralisation is not advisable as it will lead to inflation, full neutralisation may be permissible only in the case of the lowest class of employees. The management is entitled to complain if the neutralisation is more than 100%."
22. The above case was rendered after referring to various decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject while quoting from the decision in the case of the management of Shri Chaithan Vibhag Khand Udyog Sahakari Mandali Ltd. v. C.S. Zarot and another, 1979 (39) FLR 378, the following passage :
"The decision is authority for the proposition that the rate of neutralisation cannot be more than 100% even in the case of lowest paid employees. The propositions laid down in the decisions cited above were reiterated and followed in Salvraj Fine Art, Litho Works v. State Industrial Court, Nagpur, 1978 (36) FLR 347."
Ultimately, the said decision concluded as follows :
"However, it cannot be forgotten that the said portion of the notification is severable. It is again not disputed that in the cases of those employees who are getting minimum basic wage of more than Rs. 184 neutralisation is less than 100% is only in respect of the employees who are getting basic wages less than Rs. 184 neutralisation is something more than 100%. Therefore, fixation of special allowance under the impugned notification as a whole is not bad in law. Therefore, in our view, an equitable order will be to keep the notification intact, with a direction that the special allowance to be paid from 15th November, 1988 shall not exceed 100% neutralisation. We are fixing this date to enable the Government to take appropriate steps, i.e., to suitably modify the notification in accordance with law. The special allowance to be calculated with reference to consumer price Index No. 184 which is, taken as basis for fixing special allowance. No other contention was argued at the time of hearing and Dr. Naik adopted the arguments advanced by Shri Shrikrishna."
23. Thus the contention of Mr. Tiwari with regard to neutralisation does not seem to have any force. Even if there is any substance, then also it could have been remedied in the similar line as was directed in the case of Shri Chaithan Vibhag Khand Udyog Sahakari Mandali Ltd. (supra).
24. The question, as raised by Mr. Tiwari, concerning laying down of service condition, does neither contain any substance nor force. Inasmuch as Section 13 empowers the State Government to fix hours of works while exercising power to fix or revise wages. It can also provide for overtime under Section 14 of the Act. It can also provide for wages of worker who works for less than normal working day under Section 15 or wages for two or more classes of work under Section 16 of the Act. An examination of the notification does not show that anything beyond has been encroached upon. Therefore, the decision cited in this behalf which lays down that while fixing or revising wages service conditions cannot be laid down or encroached upon since it is contract between the employer and the employee wholly outside the scope and jurisdiction encompassed under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, does require any discussion. Inasmuch as in the present case, nothing has been intruded upon beyond those covered under Sections 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Act.
25. If the revised wages are also made payable to contract labours, the same does in no way affect its validity either as a whole or in respect of such part applicable to contract labour. Inasmuch as the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 in Section 20 imposes obligation on the principal employer for ensuring payment of wages to contract labours in the manner and mode provided in sub-sections (2) to (4) thereof. Section 20 is interpreted reconciling Section 30 of the said 1970 Act then it means that the Principal employer has an obligation to see that the wages paid are minimum wages. That apart, minimum wages are fixed in relation to a category of industry. A workman employed in such industry is entitled to the minimum wages prescribed. Whether he is employed by the industry itself or through contractors is immaterial, Even if he is employed through contractor, he remains a workman employed in the industry for which minimum wages is fixed. The above interpretation receives support from the definition of "employer" defined in Section 2 (e) of the said Act which provides :
" "Employer" means any person who employs, whether directly or through another person, or whether on behalf of himself or any other person, one or more employees in any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, and includes, except in subsection (3) of Section 26 :
(i) in a factory where there is carried on any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, any person named under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948) as Manager of the factory;
(ii) In any -scheduled employment under the control of any Government in India in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, the person or authority appointed by such Government for the supervision and control of employees or where no person or authority is so appointed, the head of the department;
(iii) in any scheduled employment under any local authority in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, the person appointed by such authority for the supervision and control of employees or where no person is so appointed, the Chief Executive Officer of the local authority ;
(iv) in any other case where there is carried on any scheduled employment in respect of which minimum rates of wages have been fixed under this Act, any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of the employees or for the payment of wages."
26. Thus the definition as above does not exclude contract labours from the ambit of Minimum Wages Act. If such an interpretation as Mr. Tiwari wanted to press is given, in that event such industry in order to avoid payment of minimum wages would resort to engage contract labours and thereby exploit such labours totally reducing the impact of fixation of minimum wages to nil altogether. It would then frustrate the entire purpose and object of the Act itself. It would be giving the employer a wide opportunity to avoid its liability and to negate the purpose, object and effect of the fixation and revision of wages altogether. An interpretation which does not further the object and purpose but frustrates the same cannot be accepted. Therefore, this point of Mr. Tiwari also falls.
27. As discussed above, except the points with regard to consultation with the Advisory Board, all the points raised by Mr. Tiwari are decided against the petitioner.
28. In that view of the matter, the notification dated 4.2.1992 cannot be sustained because of the absence of consultation as observed earlier and as such the same is liable to be quashed only on that ground alone and the same is hereby quashed. Let a writ of certiorari do issue accordingly.
29. This order, however, shall not prevent the respondents to revise the wages afresh as proposed pursuant to the notification dated 24.8.91 after consulting the Advisory Board on the basis of the consideration of the representation received and considered by the Government pursuant to the said notification dated 24.8.1991 from the stage of or after (as the case may be) consideration of the representations already received within the date notified in the said notification dated 24.8.1991. It would be open to the respondents and who would be free to fix the date of coming into force of such revision as it may deem fit even with retrospective effect but not earlier than 4.2.1992. Inasmuch as sub-section (2) of Section 5 provides unless such notification otherwise provides, it shall come into force on issue of such notification. The phrase "unless such notification otherwise provides" means it may be effective even with retrospective operation particularly in view of the notification containing the proposals having been published on 24.8.1991 and the objections and suggestions thereto were received on the date mentioned therein. In the case of Mizar Govinda Annappa v. State of Karnataka, 1986 Lab IC 1355 (KND), it has been held that the State Government can give retrospective effect to the rates revising the wages. Since a long time has elapsed, therefore, it is expected that the State Government would complete the exercise as early as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before it. The payment of wages if made pursuant to the said Government Order dated 4.2.1992 or if not made both shall be subject to the fresh notification issued in terms of this order. If the payments had already been made in pursuance of the notification dated 4.2.1992, no recovery shall be made till the fresh notification is issued, and the same shall again be subject to the result of the fresh notification.
30. The above director with regard to recovery, etc. would be applicable only in respect of the unit of the petitioner. So far as the units which have not challenged the said notification dated 4.2.1992 shall not be eligible or entitled to any benefit of this order so far as it concerns the payments made under the said notification by other units to its employees and the same shall not be subject to any recovery or otherwise, though however they would be covered by the subsequent notification that might be issued subsequent to this order.
31. The writ petition thus stands allowed to the extent indicated above subject to the observation made hereinbefore.
32. There will, however, be no order as to costs.