ORDER
1. The present revision has been filed by the tenant under S. 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 against the judgment and decree dated 16-8-1985 passed by Sri D. C. Srivastava, IVth Additional District Judge, Kanpur in S.C.C. Suit No. 117 of 1982.
2. By the decree which is impugned in the present revision, respondent's suit for eviction of the applicant from the accommodation and land in suit, which in the common parlance is called 'petrol pump' and for recovery of damages at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month w.e.f. 1-7-80 till the date of eviction has been decreed with cost.
3. For the purpose of effective disposal of the revision, facts of the case which are not disputed may be briefly stated as follows:--
M/s. Kailash Motors (hereinafter referred to as 'the landlord') under an agreement dated 4-7-1960 let out the property in suit (hereinafter called 'building') to M/s. Standard Vacuum Oil Company on rent of Rs. 500/- per month for a period of ten years with the liberty to get the lease renewed for another period of ten years. Subject matter of lease was open space of land with right to construct oil dispensing pump with show room and lavatory. The tenant M/s. Standard Vacuum Oil Company was a sister concern of M/s. ESSO, and it was M/s. ESSO which owned and controlled the tenant M/s. Standard Vacuum Oil Company. The lease at the first instance expired on 3-7-1970 before which, on 12-3-1970, the lessee exercised its right of renewal but no agreement deed of lease was executed for further period of ten years though the tenancy continued and the lessee, namely, M/s. Standard Vacuum Oil Company continued to remain tenant of the property in suit.
4. In the year 1974, ESSO (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1974 hereinafter referred to as 'the ESSO Acquisition Act') was enacted by the Parliament for the purposes of acquiring rights and interest of the ESSO and vesting it in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. The Central Government subsequently transferred its rights which it had acquired from ESSO under the ESSO Acquisition Act to M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the applicant'). The applicant consequent to cntrustment of the assets acquired from M/s. ESSO by the Central Government, became lessee of the property in suit. The stipulated period of tenancy, at the first hand had expired on 3-7-1970 whereafter the next ten year's period of lease for which the Standard Vacuum Oil Company had exercised the option by seeking renewal on 12-3-1970 also came to an end in March 1980. Despite that the tenancy continued between the lessor and lessee inasmuch as the landlord did not exercise its right of seeking eviction of the lessee by giving notice. An oral request appears to have been made to the applicant on 14-6-1980 by the landlord to vacate the premises but no notice of such a request appears to have been taken. A letter by the applicant was written to the landlord with the request to renew the lease of the building for another period of ten years from 1-7-1980 however by letter dated 24-7-1980, the landlord refused the request for renewal of me lease and on 19-1-1982, a legal notice under S. 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was sent by the landlord to the applicant terminating his tenancy and in May, 1982 on failure of the applicant to vacate the building the landlord filed the suit for eviction of the applicant. This revision arises from that suit. Though one of the grounds taken for eviction of the applicant from the building also was non-payment of rent by the applicant but that ground did not find favour with the trial court; hence no reference in that regard will be made in this judgment.
5. Applicant opposed the sui on the plea, inter alia, that since the plaintiff was a registered partnership firm, hence the suit was barred by S. 69 of the Partnership Act. It was also pleaded that since the suit involved complicated question of law, therefore, it was not triable by Small Cause Court, it was pleaded that the plaint was liable to be returned to the plaintiff. It was further pleaded by the applicant that the lease of the building subsisted for another period of ten years after the applicant had become lessee under the provisions of the ESSO Acquisition Act. Applicant placed reliance on the provisions of Ss. 5 and 7 of the ESSO Acquisition Act to contend that the option for renewal of the lease was rightly exercised which was illegally turned down by the lessor.
6. The trial court turned down objections raised against the maintainability of the suit taken by the applicant and decreed the suit. It was held that the right of renewal of the lease was not exercised properly. The tenancy was rightly terminated by notice sent by the respondent. Hence the applicant was liable to be evicted.
7. In the present revision, Sri Pankaj Bhatia. learned counsel for Ihe applicant (tenant) has not pressed the revision on the grounds which were pressed by the applicant in the trial court on which that court had decided against the applicant. Sri Bhatia has confined his attack against the judgment and decree of the trial court only on the ground that the suit was not liable to proceed and decree in view of the amendment of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rent Act') by means of U. P. Act No. 17 of 1985, which became effective from 18th May, 1983. It was contended that as a result of the aforesaid amendment the provisions of the Rent Act became applicable to buildings of which Government or Public Sector Corporations were tenants inasmuch as definition of 'public building' was changed so as to exclude from the purview of the Rent Act only those buildings which were in the ownership of the Government or of public sector Corporations and not buildings which were in their tenancy; result being that the provisions of the Rent Act, including Ss. 20 and 21 extended protective sheild against eviction of Government or Public Sector Corporations from buildings of which they were tenants.
8. On the other hand. Sri Bharatji Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-landlord contended that the provisions of the Rent Act, despite its amendment with effect from 18-5-1983 would have no application to the building involved in the suit, the rights of the parties to the suit had to be determined by the trial court in that suit on the basis of the law as it stood on the date when the sui! was filed by the respondent. According to Sri Agarwat. since the suit had been filed in May, 1982 which was much before the date when the provisions of the Rent Act became applicable to buildings in the tenancy of the State Government or Public Sector Undertakings by virtue of enforcement of U. P. Amendment Act No. 17 of 1985 w.e.f. 18-5-1983 therefore, the suit in question having been filed prior to that date, was not at all affected by the provisions of the Rent Act, including the provisions of S. 20 which imposed a bar against filing of the suit for eviction of tenants on grounds other than those which arc mentioned under sub-sec. (2) thereof. Sri Agarvval further contended that for this reason, the trial court was fully justified in proceeding with the trial of the suit and decree ing it. Learned counsel also contended that applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act to the building in suit at a stage after the respondent had filed suit for eviction of the applicant therefore was of no consequence to the fate of the suit and the suit had to be decided in the light of the law which stood at the time when the suit was filed and not in the light of the change in the law brought about subsequent to the filing of the suit inasmuch as that was barred by S. 20(1) of the Rent Act was filing of the suit for eviction and not the trial and decision of a suit which had already been filed by the landlord for the eviction of the tenant in exercise of his constitutional or other legal rights.
9. Having noticed respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties it is necessary now to examine their respective merits in the light of the provisions of the Rent Act.
10. Rent Act was brought into force on 15-7-1972. By its S. 43, the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. III of 1947) were repealed. The Rent Act. as well as the earlier Act of 1947, is directed to provide, in the interest of the general public, for regulation of letting of certain buildings or accommodations, rent payable for it and the circumstances under which the tenants occupying the accommodation can be evicted, in urban areas. 1947 Act was enacted for a temporary period but it stayed in the statute book for about 25 years and during that period necessity for permanent law on the subject was felt. Section 1(3) applies the provisions of the Rent Act to all cities, municipal areas, notified areas and town areas. It affords power to State Government to enforce the provisions of the Rent Act to any other area or cancel such order. It also empowers the State Government to make a declaration that the provisions of the Act shall cease to apply to any city, municipality, notified area or town area etc.
11. Section 2 excepts certain buildings from the operation of the Rent Act. For the purposes of the present case, change made in S. 2 from time to time needs to be noticed. In the Rent Act, as originally enacted, S. 2 read as follows:--
"2. Exemptions from operation of Act-- (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to-
(a) any building belonging to, or vested in, the Government of any State or any local authority; or
(b) any tenancy created by grant from the State Government or the Government of India in respect of a building taken on lease or requisitioned by such Government."
12. This provision was amended in 1976 by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 and S. 2(1) was entirely substituted. After its amendment in 1976, it read as follows:--
"2. Exemptions from operation of Act--(1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to-
(a) any public building; or
(b) any building belonging to or vested in recognised educational institution, the whole of the income from which is utilised for the purposes of such institution:
....."
13. From reading of the provision as it was initially enacted buildings belonging to Public Sector Corporations or buildings in their tenancy and of local authorities were not subjected to the exemption from the provisions of the Rent Act. In 1976 however buildings belong to or taken on lease by Government (Central or State) or local authority or Public Sector Undertakings/ Corporations too were subjected to exemption from the provisions of the Rent Act.
(sic) immediately after amendment of 1976 taking out buildings either in the ownership or tenancy of Public Sector Corporations etc., from the clutches of the Act, Ordinance No. 11 of 1977 was promulgated to exclude from the operation of the Rent Act only those buildings which were owned amongst others by Government and Public Sector Corporations. This position was short lived as the Ordinance lapsed and could not be substituted either by enactment by the legislature or by promulgation of another Ordinance. The position which was brought about the Ordinance No. 11 of 1977 was restored again on 18-6-1983 by another Ordinance issued on that date being Ordinance No. 28 of 1983. This Ordinance was substituted by successive Ordinances until the enactment of U.P. (Amending) Act 17 of 1985 on 20-8-1985 which was however brought into force with effect from 18-5-1983, the date when Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 was promulgated. Thus, from 18-5-1983 and for some time in 1977 when Ordinance No. 11 of 1977 was promulgated all buildings which were in the tenancy of Public Sector Corporations came to be governed by the provisions of the Rent Act. However, from the very inception of the Rent Act. except for some time between 27-4-1977 till Ordinance No. 11 of 1977 lapsed, buildings which were in the tenancy of Public Sector Corporations were exempted from the provisions of the Rent Act including from the bar against the power of Courts to entertain a suit for the eviction of Public Sector Corporations after termination of their tenancy under the general law and a suit for eviction from building could be filed by the landlord without having regard to the restrictions imposed in that respect in the Rent Act.
14. In the present case, as noticed above, the suit, from which the present revision application has arisen, was filed by the respondent for the eviction of the applicant, in exercise of his rights under Ihe terms of the lease deed under which he had let out the building to applicant's predecessor-in-interest, after terminating applicant's tenancy therefrom in May 1982 itself much before bar of S. 20(1) of the Rent Act could be applied by the legislature against eviction of Public Sector Corporations from buildings in their tenancy situate in urban areas; this was done by the respondent after termination of applicant's tenancy by sending him notice underS. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
15. It was argued by Sri Pankaj Bhatia that consequent upon the enforcement of U.P. Act No. 17 of 1985 w.e-f. 18-5-1983, the provisions of the Rent Act including S. 20(1) thereof which imposes bar against filing of suit for eviction of tenants, except on the grounds mentioned in sub-sec. (2) thereof became applicable to the suit filed by the respondent with the result the suit was rendered incompetent for being not maintainable for reasons which will be given hereafter, I find no merit in the above argument of the learned counsel.
16. Section 20 of the Rent Act, insofar as it is relevant for the purposes of decision of this revision, reads as follows:--
"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds:--
(1) Save as provided in sub-sec. (2) no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of lime or on the expiration of a notice to suit or in any other manner:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by afflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant.
(2)....."
17. From a reading of the extracted portion of S. 20, it is clearly made out that a suit, excepton any or more than one of the grounds, mentioned in sub-sec. (2), is barred from being instituted even after termination of tenancy of the tenant in respect of a building. The bar which is imposed in S. 20(1) is against filing of the suit and not against the power of the court to try or decree a suit which was lawfully filed for the eviction of a tenant from a building on a ground which is not covered by any of the grounds which have been enumerated in sub-sec. (2) of S. 20. Therefore, if a suit was filed by a landlord at a time when the bar under S. 20(1) was not applicable to the building but it became applicable at a stage subsequent to its filing, the suit which was filed at a time when it was maintainable would not become incompetent on account of subsequent imposition of bar against filing of suit. Applicant's learned counsel however contends that subsequent imposition of the bar of S. 20(1) of (he Rent Act against filing of suit for eviction is as good as existence of that bar at a lime prior to the filing of the suit. This argument however has been countered by respondent's learned counsel who maintains that notwithstanding subsequent imposition of the bar from 18-5-1983 against filing of suits for eviction of Public Sector Corporations from buildings under their tenancy the suit in question having been filed much before the imposition of the bar had to proceed without being influenced by the bar created by S. 20 of the Rent Act; learned counsel laid emphasis on the words "no suit shall be instituted" which have been used in S. 20(1) of the Rent Adas opposed to the words "no suit shall be maintainable" or "no decree in a suit shall be passed" which have not been used in that section.
18. Havinggiven my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions and in the light of the provisions of the Rent Act and the judicial precedents on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel in support of their respective contentions, I am of the view lhat the revision must fail.
19. Rights of landlord and tenants are normally governed by the terms of contract of the tenancy, if any, and in any case by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The Rent Act or any other law providing protection to tenants in the matters of letting, rent and eviction from building under his tenancy is by way of curtailment of the rights which has possessed by the landlord under the contract of tenancy or under the provisions of Ihe law on the subject (Transfer of Property Act). If under the general law a right has accrued to landlord to evict his tenant from his building and that right has accordingly been exercised by filing a suit for that purpose in accordance with the provisions of the general law, then the right of the landlord to evict his tenant from Ihe building in question can be curtailed by express words either by providing in the special enactment like the Rent Act, a provision expressly curtailing that right, or by giving retrospective operation to the provisions of that Act so as to bar trial of pending suits though at the time of their institution its institution was not barred by any law. Whether such a provision would stand the test of permissible legislation under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India or not, that question fortunately does not arise in the present case.
20. U. P. Act No. 17 of 1985 has not been applied retrospectively. It has been made operative with effect from the date since when the bar against institution of suits for eviction of tenants (Public Sector Corporation) was introduced for the first time with the promulgation of Ordinance No. 28 of 1983 on 18-5-1983.
21. Thus, with promulgation of that Ordinance and successor Ordinance Nos. 43 of 1983. 6 of 1984, 20 of 1984 and finally 9 of 1985, institution of suits for eviction against Public Sector Corporations stood barred right from 18-5-1983 hence the Amendment Act No. 17 of 1985 was not meant to affect suits which were already filed prior to its (deemed) enforcements on 18-5-1983. Therefore, a suit which was filed by a landlord prior to 18-5-1983 for eviction of his tenant, who, for the purposes of this case, happened to be a Public Sector Corporation, except for anything else either in the Rent Act or otherwise, had to be tried and decided by the court which was seized of the suit without attracting the bar imposed under S. 20(1) of the Rent Act to that suit. No provision has been brought to my notice by Sri Bhatia nor despite my best efforts, I could lay my hands upon any provision either in the Rent Act or in any other enactment, which could prevent the court from proceeding with the trial of the suit which bad been filed before it prior to 18-5-1983 for eviction of the applicant from the building; though as a result of the amendment of the provisions of the Rent Act by Amending Act No. 17 of 1985 bar against filing of such a suit became applicable to buildings in the tenancy of Public Sector Corporations by virtue of S. 20(1).
22. In the absence of any statutory provision which may expressly curtail the power of the court, where the suit was pending on the date of imposition of the bar to try the suit or in the absence of any statutory provision for abating pending suits, I do not think respondent's right to evict the applicant from the building in suit by obtaining a decree of eviction in the suit which he had filed before the imposition of the bar can be curtailed only for the reason that on a date subsequent to the date of the filing of that suit, suits of that nature could not lawfully be filed, because of the bar imposed by S. 20 of the Rent Act. This irresistible conclusion has been drawn because the bar which has been imposed under S. 20(1) is against filing of the suit and not against its maintainability, nor the said provision curtails the power of the court from passing a decree in suits which had lawfully been filed before it.
23. Sri Pankaj Bhatia however, placed reliance on some judicial precedents both of this Court as also of the Supreme Court. Reference to these precedents shall be given at its due place. However, on the force of those judicial precedents, the learned counsel strenuously argued that since the Rent Act is a procedural law, its provisions including S. 20(1) would become immediately applicable even to pending suits and the rights of the landlord and tenants will have to be determined strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Act from the moment those provisions are applied to the buildings in question. According to the learned counsel without there being express words in either the amending Act or in S. 20(1) of the Rent Act, the provisions of the Rent Act as soon as it is made applicable to any building will have full effect until the tenant has already been evicted from the building on a dale before the enforcement of the Act (in the present case 18-5-1983) in respect of that building.
24. Before dealing with Ihe merits of the controversy as to whether the suit had become incompetent due to subsequent imposition of bar against maintainability of suit of that nature, it is necessary to make it clear that right of a landlord to file a suit for eviction of the tenant after terminating the tenancy is a substantive right which is curtailed by S. 20(1) of the Rent Act during the course of the operation of that provision in respect of building involved in the suit. Thus, the effect of the bar which is created by S. 20(1) of the Rent Act is that landlord's substantive right to file a suit against the tenant, which is vested on him under the general law, is suspended from the date the bar has been enforced by extending the provisions of the Rent Act to the building involved in the suit. If, however, before the bar against filing of the suit was imposed, the suit had already been filed, the imposition of bar has no consequence on the suit.
25. I, therefore, do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that since the provisions of S.20(1) are procedural in nature, it will have retrospective application to the pending suits also; the contention is thoroughly misconcieved.
26. In this background, can be provisions of S. 20(1) of the Rent Act be construed in such a way so as to render suits, which had already been filed for eviction of tenants from buildings on a date prior to the enforcement of the provisions of the Rent Act incompetent though when the suit was filed it was competent and maintainable?
27. Learned counsel for the applicant, on the force of the judgments, on which he has placed reliance, wants the court to answer the question in the affirmative. According to him, as soon as amending Act 17 of 1985 came into force (from 18-5-1983) when pending suils which had already been filed for eviction of tenants on grounds other than those which arc mentioned in clause (2) would be rendered incompetent on account of the bar created by S. 20(1) against institution of suit. He has placed reliance on a single Judge judgment of this court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 23723 of 1995. decided on 21-2-1996 -- Jenson and Nicholson (India) Ltd., Ghaziabad v. Ist Addl. District Judge. Ghaziabad (1996 (2) All Rent Cas 38).
28. In Jenson and Nicholson (supra), this court had the occasion to examine the applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act in the light of the amendment made in the definition of the word 'building'. During pendency of appeal by the landlord amendment of the word building was made by which buildings fetching rent of Rs. 2000/- or more were taken out from the purview of the Rent Act. In the light of the amendment made in the Act rendering buildings fetching Rs. 2000/- and above free from the applicability of the Rent Act, the landlord sought an order in accordance with the amendment and prayed that since, the building in question wasalso fetching monthly rent of Rs. 2000/- or above, the building should be declared to be beyond the purview of the Act and proceedings for the release of the building filed by him under S. 21 of the Rent Act be accordingly terminated. The District Judge, before whom the appeal was pending and the application had been filed by the landlord, rejected the contention of the landlord and held that pending proceedings were not affected by the amendment, and the provisions of the Rent Act will continue to be applicable irrespective of the amendment made in the Rent Act. Landlord challenged the view which was taken by the District Judge in writ petition which he filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution. This court accepted the contention of the landlord after placing reliance on Parripati Chandrasekharrao and Sons v. Alapati Jalaiah, 1995 (4) JT (SC) 187 : (AIR 1995 SC 1781), and held that the prelection provided by the Rent Act to the tenant was by way of an encroachment on the vested rights of the landlord which he possessed under the general law (namely, the law of contract and the Transfer of Property Act) and once the clog on vested rights of the landlord was removed with the Rent Act ceasing to be applicable to the building in the tenancy of the tenant, landlord's rights under the general law are restored back with the result the suit or appeal has to be decided between them as if the provisions of the Rent Act were not applicable. This court held that the principles of vested right under the general law was applicable only to the landlord and not to the tenant, inasmuch as. Rent Act did not confer any right on the tenant; it only provided protection against his eviction from the building so long the provisions of the Rent Act were applicable to that building. This court quoted the observations of the Supreme Court, which need not be repeated here. The judgment of the Supreme Court on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel, supports the stand of the respondent than that of the applicant. Learned counsel, therefore, does not get any assistance from the view which has been expressed by this court in Jenson and Nicholson (supra).
29. The other case cited by Sri Pankaj Bhatia is Punjab National Bank, Ghaziabad v. Dr. Rajcndra Nath Azad, 1996 (1) All Rent Cas 348. This judgment too is by a single Judge which was given in situation which are exactly identical to that of Jenson and Nicholson (supra), hence no discussion on this case is required to be made except for reiterating that this judgment too does not help the argument which has been advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant. Similar is the position in respect of the last case which has been cited by Sri Bhatia. It is an unreported judgment in Civil Misc. Writ No. 12637 of 1996, Punjab National Bank v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, decided on 21-8-1996. In this judgment also, a learned single Judge held that U.P. Act No. 5 of 1995 whereby provisions of S. 2 of the Rent Act had been amended for taking out from the purview of the Act buildings fetching rent amount to Rs. 2,000/- or more would also apply to the pending suits. This judgment too falls in the same line as the judgment in Jenson and Nicholson (supra).
30. No o!her judgment was cited by learned counsel for the applicant.
31. From reading of the abovcmcntioned judgments and that of Supreme Court in Perripati Chandrashekharrao and Sons (supra) there should be no iota of doubt left in concluding that once a building which is gowned by rent laws is taken out from its purview then the vested rights of the landlord, which he possesses under the general law immediately revive and the landlord is free to exercise it from that very stage when the building in question is taken out from the purview of the rent law. Similarly the said vested rights of the landlord arc suspended and he is debarred from enforcing it only so long the provisions of the Rent Act arc applicable to the building which has been let out by him. It further follows therefrom that applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act to a building let out by a landlord would not curtail his vested rights under the general law; it is only suspended for the period during which the Rent law is made applicable to the building.
32. In para 13 of the judgment in Perripati Chandrashekharrao (supra), the Supreme Court concludes as follows (at page 1784 of AIR):--
"According to us there is a material difference between the rights which accrue to a landlord under the common law and the protection which is afforded to the tenant by such legislation as the Act. In the former case the rights and remedies of the landlord and tenant are governed by the law of contract and the law governing the property relations. These rights and remedies continue to govern their relationship unless they are regulated by such protective legislation as the present Act in which case the said rights and remedies remain suspended till the protective legislation continues in operation. Hence while it can legitimately be said that the landlord's normal rights vested in him by the general law continue to exist till and so long as they are not abridged by a special protective legislation in the case of the tenant, the protective shield extended to him survives only so long as and to the extent the special legislation operates ....."
33. In the same continuation, the Supreme Court goes on to say that the tenant gets no vested right from the protection offered to him under the rent laws and the protection so offered does not operate beyond the period of operation of the Act. As soon as the protection ceases to exist, normal relation between landlord and tenant comes into operation. Hence the theory of the vested right which may be validly pleaded to support the landlord a case is not available to the tenant. These observations of the Supreme Court would clearly show that the vested right of the landlord under the general law and under the terms of contract remain only suspended during the period when the Rent Act has become applicable to the tenancy in question. As soon as that protection is removed, the landlord's vested rights under the general law gets revived whereas in the case of tenant, the position is not so.
34. In the present case, applicant as a tenant, therefore cannot take advantage of the protection provided under the Rent Act against the eviction of tenants under S. 20(1) of the Rent Act so as to relate it back to a period when there was no such protection. The right, of tenant to get proicction against eviction which has been provided by S. 20(1) of the Rent Act, therefore, would be available to him after the enforcement of the Act in respect of the building in question. In case, however, before the protection of S. 20 of the Rent Act came to be extended to him, the landlord had already exercised his vested right of seeking his eviction by filing a suit under the general law, the protective shield of S. 20 cannot relate back to the suit, which has already been filed so as to render it not maintainable.
35. In D. C. Bhatia v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 104, the Apex Court of the land had the occasion to consider a similar argument as had been advanced in the case of Pcrripali Chandrasekharrao and Sons (supra). In para 52 of the judgment. Supreme Court rejected the argument advanced on behalf of the tenant that the provisions of the Rent Act which look out buildings fetching monthly rent of Rs. 3,500/- or more from the purview of the Delhi Rent Act would not apply to the rights acquired by the tenants under that Rent Act before its amendment in 1988, the Apex Court observed as follows:--
"We are unable to uphold this contention for a number of reasons. Prior to the enactment of the Rent Control Act by the various State Legislatures.
the legal relationship between the landlord and tenant was governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Delhi Rent Control Act provided protection to the tenants from drastic enhancement of rent by the landlord as well as eviction, except on certain specific grounds. The legislature by the Amendment Act No. 57 of 1988 has partially repealed the Delhi Rent Control Act. This is a case of express repeal. By Amending Act the legislature has withdrawn the protection hitherto enjoyed by the tenants who were paying Rs. 3,500/- or above as monthly rent. If the tenants were sought to be evicted prior to the amendment of the Act, they could have taken advantage of the provisions of the Act to resist such eviction by the landlord. But this was nothing more than a right to take advantage of the enactment. The tenant enjoyed statutory protection as long as the statute remained, in force and was applicable to him. If the statute ceases to be operative, the tenant cannot claim to continue to have the old statutory protection."
Again in para 57, the Apex Court concluded as follows:--
"In view of the aforesaid, we are unable to uphold the contention that the tenants had acquired a vested right in the properties occupied by them under the Statute. We are of the view that the provisions of S.3(c) will also apply to the premises which had already been let out at the monthly rent in excess of Rs. 3,500/- when the amendment made in 1988 came into force.''
36. The view expressed by the Supreme Court in Perripati Chandrasekharrao (supra) and D. C. Bhatia (supra), therefore, clearly indicates that the tenant is entitled to the protection of Rent laws only after that Act has become operative so as to govern the relationship of the landlord and tenant in respect of the building and as soon as the Act becomes inoperative on account of certain amendments, landlord's vested right under the general law immediately revives and the tenant is exposed to be treated in accordance with the provisions of the general law in the matter of eviction and other matters too. He cannot claim any protection from the provisions of the Rent Act on the principles of vested rights once the building is no more subject matter of the protection offered by the provisions of rent law.
37. In State of. U.P. v. Malik Zarid Khalid. 1988(1) All Rent Cas : (AIR 1988 SC 132); in paragraph 14, while concluding its view, the Supreme Court observed as follows:--
"But the legislation has advisedly given these enactments effect only from 18-5-1983 this means that the amendment of 1976 was intended to be effective between 5-7-76 and 18-5-83 and it also means that the amendment of 1983 onwards is not intended to be read back for that period .....
The Supreme Court further held (at page 138 of AIR):--
"Lastly, in any event, the interpretation given by us will create no lasting difficulties for the Government and other organizations which are tenants only, since after 18-5-1983 they will be in a position to claim all the immunities available to other tenants under the Act."
38. The abovementioned view expressed by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Malik Zarid Khalid (supra) clearly supports the argument of the respondent that the bar created against institution of suits under S. 21 of the Rent Act will have no retrospective operation and will not affect the fate of pending suits.
39. Similarly in Bhola Nath Varshney (since dead) through his LRs v. Mulk Raj Madan, 1994 (1) JT (SC) 181 : (AIR 1994 SC 1664), Supreme Court negatived the argument that a suit filed by landlord for eviction of tenant for terminating his tenancy at a time when the provisions of Rent Act were not applicable to the building in question, will be governed by the provisions of the Act if during the pendency of the suit the provisions of the Act become applicable on account of expiry of period of ten years since after the construction of the building in question. The Supreme Court held that if the provisions of the Act were not applicable to the building at the time when the suit was instituted then the pendency of the self and decision in that suit will remain unaffected by the subsequent applicability of the provisions of the Act to the building in question. It observed that the law applicable on the date of institution of suit will govern the suit and not the subsequent law.
40. Similarly, in Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge, (1992) I SCC 751 : (AIR 1992 SC 1106), the Supreme Court held that the law applicable on the date of institution of the suit would govern the suit and since on the date of institution of suit, building was exempted from operation of the Act. the suit will proceed notwithstanding subsequent applicability of the Act to the building in question.
41. Similar view was expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Prakash v. IIIrd A.D.J. Agra, 1994 (2) All Rent Cas 48.
42. Again in Nand Ram Goel v. Abhal Singh, (1994) 2 All Rent Cas 319, learned single Judge of this Court reiteratcd the same view which was expressed by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge (supra) and by this Court in Ram Prakash v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Agra (supra).
43. In the light of the consistent view, which has been expressed by Supreme Court as well as by this Court, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that provisions of the Rent Act (S. 20(1)) would also govern the suits filed by the landlord for the eviction of the tenant even prior to the date on which Amending Act 17 of 1985 was enforced, cannot be accepted. In the light of foregoing discussion, I find no force in the present revision and it deserves to be dismissed.
44. In the result, revision fails and is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
45. Revision dismissed.