JUDGMENT S. H. A. Raza, J.
1. The short question Involved in this writ petition is as to whether an employer can deny the dues of a workman for the reason that the workman has already resigned and was not in service on the date of settlement.
2. In a proceeding under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the Labour Court negatived the contention of the employer by giving a finding to the effect that as the settlement was of a retrospective nature, the workman cannot be denied his dues which were given to the employees similarly situated.
3. The brief facts as set out by the workman and which are admitted by the employer are that the respondent-workman was appointed as a Junior Assistant Trainee with effect from 8.1.1991, firstly on a stipend of Rs. 1.600 per month for 12 months and thereafter on a stipend of Rs. 1,800 per month for 18 months. On 24.2.1992 the workman was appointed as Steno-Typist Trainee for a period of 18 months on a stipend of Rs. 2,000 per month and the period of training already undergone was offered to be deducted from the 18 months' training period. The respondent-workman tendered his resignation on 5.7.1992 and accordingly on his request, he was relieved by the employer on 5.7.1992. Thereafter the workman preferred an application before the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act, claiming certain reliefs on the basis of the settlement dated 4.5.1993 arrived at between the petitioner-Company and the Union. The said application was contested by the petitioner-employer mainly on the ground that the respondent-workman had tendered his resignation which was accepted on 6.7.1992 and hence the workman was not entitled for the benefit of the Settlement dated 4.5.1993.
4. The Labour Court opined that on page 4 of the Settlement, it has been indicated that upgradation could relate to all cases prior to 31.12.1992 and in no case after July, 1992 which was accepted by the Management and the benefit of upgradation was given to all such workmen who had completed 2 1/2 years' service prior to June, 1992. The Management agreed that such workmen would be upgraded with effect from 1.7.1992. As the respondent-workman tendered his resignation on 5.7.1992, he became entitled for the benefit alike other workmen. The relevant portion of the Settlement is reproduced below :
"As requested by the Union for considering the case of upgradation for those workmen who have completed 2 1/2 years' of service in the scale much before June, 1992, the Management has agreed to upgrade them from 1st July, 1992....."
5. The Labour Court was of the opinion that in view of the Settlement dated 4.5.1993 the earlier agreement regarding training had been rescinded, and there existed no controversy with regard to the benefits which had accrued on the basis of the agreement dated 4.5.1993. The workman has staked his claim on the basis of the Settlement. As the other workmen similarly situated were given the grade, and were paid the revised grade, the respondent cannot be denied the same benefit which has accrued to other workmen similarly situated.
6. It is not disputed that by means of the said Settlement dated 4.5.1993 the training period of the workmen was reduced to three months Instead of 18 months and it was also agreed upon that the workmen who were under training will get the regular grade after completing three months' training. Although the Settlement was dated 4.5.1993 but it had retrospective effect.
7. It is not denied by the employer that those workmen who were In the employment on 4.5.1993 have already enjoyed the benefit of that Settlement.
8. In National Buildings Construction Corporation v. Pritam Singh GUI and others, (1972) 2 SCO 1, a controversy arose as to whether there was any repugnancy in the definition of "workman" as contained In Sections 2(s) and 33C(2) of the Act, but that controversy was resolved by Hon'ble Supreme Court by observing that in order to remove this repugnancy. Section 33C(2) of the Act must be so construed as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. It was further observed that the primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workman, with a form similar to the executing courts, it calls for a broad and beneficial construction consistently with other provisions of the Act which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. Similar controversy arose before the Gujarat High Court in Bhaskerbhai G. Soneji v. Manager G.S.F.C., Ahmedabad, 1980 (21) GLR 937. The workman in that case was in employment of the respondent-Corporation from 1.1.1973 till 7.5.1975 on which date he resigned. During that period, which is relevant period he was similarly situated as other employees. All the employees who were in the employment from 1.1.1973 till 7.5.1975, were granted the benefit of pay scales under the rules. The court observed that the petitioner was also entitled to be accorded similar treatment and to be paid similar pay scales. It was further indicated that "in the matter of employment during the relevant period the petitioner was similarly situated as the rest of the employees. He cannot be singled out and denied the benefit of the pay scales without inviting the charge of hostile discrimination offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. There is no Justification for denying to him the emoluments offered to his counterparts during the same period, i.e., 1.1.1973 to 7.5.1975. That he had subsequently resigned is no good ground to deny him treatment similar to the one accorded to the rest of the employees in regard to the period during which he was in the employment. When he was in employment he was entitled to equal treatment. What he did later on is Irrelevant. Moreover, resigning from service is not an obnoxious act. The classification based on this circumstance is wholly irrational and has no nexus with the object. In fact the Corporation has extended the benefit of these rules even to those who had ceased to be in service prior to January 22, 1976 on account of retirement or death. The rules themselves are retrospective with effect from 1.1.73 and make no distinction based on the continuation in service or otherwise. The petitioner is therefore, entitled to claim the benefit of the revised pay scales and to be accorded the same treatment as was accorded to his counterparts."
9. There exists no dispute between the parties that the Settlement was arrived at between the parties on 4.5.1993. As stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the period of training was cut short to three months Instead of 18 months. The Settlement became operative from a retrospective date. All those trainees who completed three months' training were given the regular grade. The said grade cannot be denied to the respondent only because he had resigned. When the respondent-workman was in the employment, he was entitled to equal treatment, but if he has subsequently resigned that would not be a relevant factor for denying him the wages. The Settlement does not make any definition based on continuation in service or otherwise, hence the workman is entitled to claim the same benefit which his counterparts were entitled. The action of the petitioner-management is not in consonance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Labour Court was perfectly justified in allowing the claim of the workman under Section 33C(2) of the Act.
10. The petitioner is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs. The interim order dated 21.2.1997 granted by this Court is vacated.