JUDGMENT V.N. Khare, J.
1. The main question which requires to be decided by this Full Bench in this Special Appeal arising out of judgment and order dated March 25, 1992 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court allowing the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 32 against termination of their services as Routine Grade Assistants is as to "whether the administrative wing of the High Court not directly connected with the actual adjudication of the cases can be categorised as an industry within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act."
2. The detailed facts of the case have been set-out in the judgment of the learned Single Judge and I need not repeat those facts to save the bulk'.of this judgment However, I would briefly notice certain facts which led the respondents to file the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in this Court. On April 29, 1987 the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice of High Court issued a direction to the effect that some Routine Grade Assistants may be appointed on ad hoc basis and appointments so made shall be purely contractual and will be terminable at any time without any notice. It was also directed that the candidates to be appointed as such shall be required to sign a contract to the said effect before their appointment. Subsequent thereto, with the approval of the then Hon'ble the Chief Justice some candidates were engaged on daily wages basis. The appointment letters issued to the respondents inter alia stated that, the Court has been pleased to engage them on daily wages basis; that they will not be entitled to any wages for Sundays and other holidays unless called for work; that their services can be dispensed with at any time without notice and that they will have no claim for substantive/regular appointment on any post in the office of the High Court. These letters were signed by the Registrar of the High Court and the respondents were appointed on the aforesaid terms and conditions as Routine Grade Assistants in the High Court. While they were working as Routine Grade Assistants regular exanimation for recruitment to the posts of Routine Grade Assistants was held. After the selected candidates became available and were issued letter of appointment, the services of respondents Nos. 1 to 32 were dispensed with as no longer required. It is at this stage that the respondents filed the writ petition and challenged the termination of their services.
3. Before the learned Single Judge number of arguments were pressed but the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition inter alia on the ground that the High Court is divisible in two separate parts i.e. one, the judicial wing and other, the administrative wing, that the judicial wing which is entrusted with the function of dispensation of justice although exercises sovereign function but the administrative wing of the High Court is an 'industry' for purposes of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and that since the respondents have put in service for more than 240 days, the termination of their service is in violation of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, as no retrenchment compensations were paid to them before termination of their services. In view of the said findings, the writ petition was allowed and order passed by the Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dispensing with the services of the respondents was set aside.
4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. On the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, the questions which arise for considerations are:
1. Whether the High Court exercises regal or sovereign functions or it merely renders service to the people in discharge of its duties?
2. Whether the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is divisible in two separate parts namely the judicial side and other the administrative side?
3. Whether the administrative wing of the High Court which includes Class III and Class IV employees, fulfils the requirement in order to constitute industry as defined under Section 2(k) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act?
4. Whether the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act can be applied to the staff including Class III and Class IV employees, working in the High Court on the administrative side for whom power to frame rules has been conferred on the Chief Justice of the High Court by Article 229 of the Constitution subject to the law made by the State Legislature?
5. Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the respondents, urged that the High Court does not exercise regal or sovereign functions and in fact it merely renders service to the people in exercise of its duties and as such the High Court as a whole is an industry. This argument of the learned counsel for the respondents was rejected by the learned Single Judge. However, he raised this argument again before us but he did not elaborate this argument. He frankly stated that his argument may be merely noted in the Judgment. Since learned counsel for the respondents has questioned the structure of the Constitution of India, it is necessary for me to decide it briefly, although much could be said on this subject.
6. The sovereign functions are not defined any where in the statute. I, therefore, have to look into the provisions of the Constitution and various decisions of the Supreme Court in this respect. Article 215 of the Constitution provides that every High Court shall be court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 216 of the Constitution provides that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. By virtue of Article 219 of the Constitution a Judge is required to take oath or affirmation of office. Article 225 of the Constitution provides the jurisdiction of the High Court and also empowers the High Court to make rules of the Court. Article 226 of the Constitution em-
powers the High Court to issue extra ordinary writs. Article 227 of the Constitution lays down that the High Court shall have power of superin-tendance over all subordinate courts and the tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Under Article 229 of the Constitution the Chief Justice of the High Court has exclusive powers to make appointment of the officers and servants and lay down their conditions of services subject to the provisions of any law made by the legislature of the State. These Constitutional provisions show that the High Court has been created by the Constitution and functions under the Constitution. It is very well recognised that the dispensation of justice is one of the essential functions of the State. The functions assigned to the High Court to dispense justice and further to supervise and control the subordinate courts, is under the Constitution of India. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether a Constitutional authority which has been assigned one of the essential functions of the State i.e. dispensation of justice is regal or not. In the case of Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa (1978-I-LLJ- 349) Hon'ble the Supreme Court laid down two tests for finding out as to whether a Constitutional authority exercises regal or sovereign functions or not. The tests laid down are, firstly that whether the authority is discharging primary and inalienable functions of the constitutional government and secondly, whether the functions of the State could be left to private enterprises to be performed. Let us examine whether the functions of the High Court conforms the two tests, stated above for being termed as regal or sovereign or not. The dispensation of justice which is one of the primary functions of the State has been exclusively entrusted to the High Court by the Constitution of India. Except the High Court no other authority is entrusted to discharge the function of the administration of justice by interpreting law. Further under the Constitution High Court is not empowered to alienate its function of dispensation of justice and supervision and control of subordinate courts to any private enterprise or to corporation. In view of this I find that the High Court conforms the two tests laid down by the Supreme Court for being termed as regal. In the case, of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its employees (1960-I-LLJ-523) it was held that regal functions shall be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. From this I conclude that the High Court exercises primary and inalienable functions of the State which cannot be left to the private enterprises to be performed. In view of aforesaid discussions I reject the argument of learned counsel for the respondents and accordingly hold that the High Court exercises its constitutional function which can be termed regal or sovereign functions.
7. The first argument of Sri. S.C. Budhwar, learned counsel for the appellant is not the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is not divisible in two departments i.e. the Judicial wing and the Administrative wing while discharging its sovereign functions of dispensation of justice and supervision and control of subordinate courts and the view taken by the learned Single Judge contrary to it is erroneous. Whereas Sri Sudhir Chandra, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that it is only the work which the Judges perform i.e. actual adjudication of a case, that can be termed as performance of regal or sovereign functions and all other work that is carried on in the office of the High Court though ancillary and supportive of sovereign functions is not itself regal or sovereign. Learned counsel for the respondents elaborated his argument by referring that there is an army of clerks in the High Court who are involved in the work of maintaining records, making paper books, posting orders, filing documents in various sections, maintenance of library, court rooms, drawing cause list and further there is an army of peons who are performing manual work of maintenance of the Court are in fact do not perform the sovereign functions of the State, therefore, the administrative wing of the High Court is industry for the purposes of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. In support of his argument learned counsel relied upon dominant nature tests laid down in the para 131 in the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case (supra). Interestingly counsel for both the parties relied upon the dominant nature tests laid down in para 131 in the decision of Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case (supra) and tried to interpret it in their own way. It is, therefore, necessary to quote relevant para 131 of the said case.(p. 405) "IV. The dominant nature test:
(a) Where a complex of activities, some of which qualify for exemption, others not, involves employees on the total undertaking, some of whom are not 'workmen' as in the University of Delhi case (1963-II-LLJ-335) or some departments are not pioductive of goods and services if isolated, even then, the predominant nature of the services and the integrated nature of the departments as explained in the Corporation of Nagpur case (supra) will be the true test. The whole undertaking will be "industry" although those who are not 'workmen' by definition may not benefit by the status.
(b) Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign functions, strictly understood, (alone) qualify for exemption, not the welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by government or statutory bodies.
(c) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially sever-able, then they can be considered to come within Section 2(j).
(d) Constitutional and competently enacted legislative provisions may well remove from the scope of the Act categories which otherwise may be covered thereby."
While dealing with the argument of learned counsel for the respondents I have held earlier in this judgment that the High Court while discharging its function of administration of justice performs primary and inalienable function of the State which is regal. However, the question which arises for consideration is whether the High Court is divisible in two distinct wings i.e. the one engaged in discharging dispensation of justice and control and supervision over the subordinate courts and other performing administrative functions. To decide this controversy it would be fruitful to quote a passage of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) which is extracted below: (1978-I-LLJ-349 at 375):
"Although we are not concerned in this case with those categories of employees who particularly come under departments charged with the responsibility of essential Constitutional functions of Government, it is appropriate to state that if there are industrial units severable from the essential functions and possess an entity of their own, it may be plausible to hold that the employees of those units are workmen and those undertakings are industries."
The above passage shows that what the Supreme Court had laid down is in the department which is charged with the responsibility of sovereign functions and if there are industrial units in it, the said industrial units firstly should be severable from the sovereign or regal function of the said department and secondly such industrial units should possess entity of its own. In this background let us examine whether administrative wing of the High Court fulfils the requirements of two tests laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply (supra) in order to constitute an industrial unit. Admittedly, the High Court is entrusted with the functions of administration of justice by interpreting law and is not engaged in any other welfare activities or economic adventure. There is neither any pleading in the writ petition that the staff of the High Court or respondents are engaged or appointed for any economic or welfare activities undertaken by the High Court which is severable from its sovereign functions nor any such example was given by learned counsel for the respondents during course of his argument. So far my knowledge goes, High Court excepting exercising functions of dispensation of justice and supervising and controlling the subordinate courts has not undertaken any economic or welfare activities in connection of which employees including the respondents have been appointed. From this it can be concluded that the function that the High Court performs is only its Constitutional function of dispensation of justice and supervision and control of subordinate courts. Once it is held that the High Court exercises only Constitutional function of dispensation of justice and is not engaged in other economic or welfare activities and further the employees are not required to perform any economic or welfare activities unconnected with the function of dispensation of justice performed by the High Court, the inevitable conclusion is that the so called administrative wing of the High Court is neither an industry which is severable from the Constitutional function that the High Court discharges nor it possess entity of its own.
8. It was argued on behalf of the respondents that the Judge of the High Court, his personal Assistant and Reader of the Court are the only persons who are involved in actual adjudication of the cases which is sovereign functions. Let us see what is the actual dispensation of justice or actual adjudication of the cases. The actual adjudication of the case mean adjudication of a dispute in accordance with law, procedure laid down under the rules and fair-play. After a petition is prepared, it is presented before the Stamp l Reporter who gives his report about limitations and Court fee etc. Such report is necessary as only those petitions which comply the rules can be entertained for adjudication on merits. For example reports in respect of limitation which is based on public policy that no stale case is triable in the Court, is necessary before the petition comes to Judge for adjudication. Similar is the case in respect of other information required to be supplied by Stamp Reporter. Then the petition is filed before the Registry and from Registry it is Class-IV employee who brings the record of the petition before the Court. After the petition is entertained, the rules of the Court and fair-play require notices to be sent to the respondents intimating them the date of hearing. Is it conceivable that any adjudication of a case is possible without giving notice to the respondent which rule of natural justice demands. Thus, the sending of notice to the respondents is integral part of adjudication of dispute. This work of sending notices has neither to be discharged by the Judge nor by the office. Since it is not physically possible for the Judge to prepare and send notices to the respondents, it is class III and class IV employees who prepare and send notices to the respondents to file their return. After the respondents put in their appearance in the Court and file their return, paper book is prepared which is placed before the Court for hearing. After the judgment is delivered the typists who are Routine Grade Assistants type-out copy of the judgment and again it is class IV employee who stamps the seal of the High Court on the certified copy of the judgment, so delivered by | the Judge. The above working would show that in fact dispensation of justice is a complete one act which starts from institution of the case, proceeding of the case, maintaining of the records, hearing of the case, delivery of judgment, issuing of certified copy of the judgment and all such other incidental matters which are necessary for dispensation of justice. In fact each employee of the High Court can be identified that he is in one or other way involved in assisting the cause of dispensation of justice by the High Court. In other words the staff of the High Court including class HI and class IV employees work in assisting, aiding or abetting the cause of the dispeasation of justice. Can it be imagined that without the work and involvement of the staff of the High Court is it possible for the Judge to dispense with justice. Thus the High Court being one entity includes the class III and the class IV employees within its ambit and the High Court as a whole is responsible for the dispensation of justice. In this view of the matter the functionsof the staff of the High Court including class III and class IV employees constitute part and parcel of one and the same transaction namely for adjudication of the case and supervision and control of subordinate courts and there is no division in it. The respondents have failed to show that the administrative wing of the High Court is severable from the authority which is charged with the responsibility of the administration of justice and further the administrative wing possess entity to its own. In view of this, I am of opinion that the administrative wing of the High Court is not severable from the judicial wing and further has no separate entity of its own. I, therefore, find that the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court is not divisible in two wings, i.e. the administrative wing and the judicial wing has merit and deserves to be accepted. The reason which prevailed upon the learned Single Judge in holding that the High Court has two wings namely the judicial wing and the administrative wing was that since the Chief Justice of the High Court takes many decisions on the administrative side which are amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court, the administrative functions of the High Court cannot be termed as regal. I am of the opinion that this view of the learned Single Judge is not correct. The acts of the Parliament and the Legislature, the order issued by the President of India, the ordinance promulgated by the Governor of the State are open to judicial review and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction. In the case of Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar AIR 1987 SC 579 the Supreme Court virtually cautioned the Governor of the State from exercising his ordinance making power where it amounts to repromulgation of ordinance, although power of Governor under Article 213 of the Constitution to promulgate ordinances is undoubtedly legislative in nature which is sovereign function. In view of this the reason given by learned Single Judge for holding that the High Court has two wings is not correct.
9. The other view taken by learned Single Judge that it is Judge, his Personal Assistant and the Reader of the Court are the only persons who are actually involved in the adjudication of the case and the rest of the staff of the High Court is unconnected with the said sovereign functions of the High Court. The reason given by the learned Single Judge again is not correct in law. If this view of learned Single Judge is accepted, then in the case of Parliament or Legislature only the members of Parliament, the Speaker, or such officer who work in the house of Parliament or Legislature will be sovereign and remaining staff of Parliament or Legislature would constitute an industry within the meaning of Section 2-J of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.
10. In viewof aforesaid discussion I hold that the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is not divisible in two wings namely administrative wing and judicial wing and the case of respondents does not fall within the ambit of Clause (c) of dominant nature test laid down in the decision of Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply case (supra).
11. Learned counsel for the respondents then urged that the functions performed by the staff of the High Court including class III and class IV employees in fact exercise alienable functions of the sovereign authority i.e. High Court, therefore, the administrative wing of the High Court should be treated as industry within the meaning of Section 2K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and in support of his argument learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra). Learned counsel for the respondents elaborated his argument by referring that the nature of the work performed by the Class III and Class IV employees of the High Court is in respect of maintenance of record, preparation of paper books, maintaining statistics, drawing cause list, posting orders, filing documents in various sections, maintenance of library, typing certified copies of the judgment which may be entrusted to the individual or to the Corporation forperformance as the same is not required by the constitutional functionary to perform. Learned counsel gave an illustration of preparation of paper book of a case out side the Court in support of his submission. This argument of the learned counsel for the respondents need not detain me any longer. While deciding the question whether the High Court is divisible in two wings, I have already held that the staff employed by the High Court is for the purposes of assistance to the discharge of the constitutional and statutory functions of constitutional authority which in term means essential and sovereign functions of the State. It is unthinkable that the maintenance of record, preparation of certified copies, sending of notices and processes can be left to the private enterprises. The Routine Grade Assistants type out certified copies of judgment. The class IV employee stamps the seal of the High Court on these certified copies. Can the judgment delivered by the Court and the seal of the High Court be handed over to a private person for preparation of certified copies of the Judgment, So far as the illustration given by the learned counsel for the respondents about preparation of paper books out side the Court is concerned under the rules of the Court, in exceptional cases, it can be done only by the permission of the Chief Justice of the Court. Even if such permission is given the paper book has to be certified by the Advocate and checked by the office. Moreover in that case the original record remains with the Court. Thus, the illustration given by the learned counsel for the respondents that functions of the administrative side of the Court is alienable functions of the sovereign is not correct. I, therefore, hold that functions performed by the officers and servants of the High Court is inalienable functions of the sovereign authority namely the High Court. I accordingly reject the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents then referred Section 2-k of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and argued that a close reading of definition of the industry makes it clear that the question whether an establishment is an industry or not has to be reckoned not only from the point of view of the employer but also whether the services therein of its employee amounts to an industry. In support of his argument learned counsel relied upon page 529 of the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur (supra). Item (i) in p.535 of the Supreme Court's decision in Corporation of the City (supra) and Section 2-k of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act are extracted below:
(i) "The definition of "industry" in the Act is very comprehensive. It is in two parts; one part defines it from the stand-point of the employer and the other from the stand-point of the employees. If an activity falls under either part of the definition, it will be an industry within the meaning of the Act." (1960-I-LLJ-523 at 535) 2(k) U.P. Industrial Disputes Act: Industry-means any business, trade undertaking manufacture or calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation of avocation of workmen."
This argument of learned counsel for the respondents again need not detain me any longer. This argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is based on sub-paragraph 1 of paragraph 17of Supreme Court's decision in the case of Corporation of City of Nagpur (supra) and answer to the said argument is in sub-paragraph 3 of the said paragraph, which is extracted below:
"(3) "The regal functions described as primary and inalienable functions of State though statutorily delegated to a corporation are necessarily excluded from the purview of the definition. Such regal functions shall be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power."
In sub-paragraph 3 of the said paragraph, it is held that the regal functions described as primary and inalienable functions of the State are excluded from purview of the definition of industry. I have earlier held that the staff of the High Court work in assisting, aiding and abetting the cause of the dispensation of justice, which is sovereign function. In view of the above discussion I am of opinion that employees working in the High Court do not constitute industry within meaning of industry under Section 2-k of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
13. The only one case remains to be seen in this regard which was strongly relied upon by the learned Single Judge as well as learned counsel for the respondents for purposes of holding that High Court is industry is decision of Supreme Court in the case of Des Raj v. State of Punjab (1988-II-LLJ-149). In the said case the Supreme Court clearly held that the main functions of the Irrigation Department clearly come within the ambit of industry inasmuch as functions of the Irrigation Department was welfare activities of the State Government and was not governed by the term sovereign functions or regal functions. In view of this the respondents cannot derive any assistance from this decision. I, therefore, reject the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents and hold that staff and servants of the High Court do not constitute industry within meaning of industry under Section 2-k\ of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
14. The last argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that under Article 229 of the Constitution the Chief Justice of the High Court is conferred with the exclusive power of appointment of the staff and servants of the High Court and to terminate their services and if the State Legislature makes any law abrogating the said power of the Chief Justice it would be ultra vires and, therefore, U.P. Industrial Disputes Act cannot be applied to the staff and employees of the High Court. His further argument is that since the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court in exercise of power conferred by Clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution has already framed Rules known as Officers and Staff (Conditions of Services and Conduct) Rules for the employees of the High Court, the general law contained in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is not applicable to the employees of the Allahabad High Court, However, learned counsel for the respondents contended that the expression conditions of services occurring in Clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution is an expression of wide import and dismissal or termination of services is a matter which falls within the expression "conditions of services" of public servants and therefore, the State Legislature can make law in respect of termination of services of the staff and the servants of the High Court and the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which is general law enacted by State Legislature can be applied to the staff of the High Court. Learned counsel in support of his argument relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirza Khasim Ali Beg(1917-l-LLJ-262) and the decision of Privy Council in the case of North Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand AIR 1949 PC 112. Under Article 229(1) of the Constitution, it is exclusive power of the Chief Justice of the High Court to appoint officers and servants of the High Court. Clause 2 of the Article 229 of the Constitution provides that subject to the provision of any law made by the Legislature of the State the condition of services of officers and servants of High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by the Rules made by the Chief Justice of the High Court Under Clause 3 of the said Article all salaries, allowances and pensions in respect of the officers and servants of the High Court is chargeable from Consolidated Fund of the State. Thus from Article 229 of the Constitution, it is manifest that the Chief Justice of the High Court is conferred with the exclusive power of appointment of staff and servants of the High Court, but so far as the power of the Chief Justice in respect of laying down conditions of services of staff and servants of the High Court is concerned the same is subject to the provision of any law made by the Legislature of the State. Under Article 229 of the Constitution no expressed power of termination of services of staff has been conferred on the Chief Justice of the High Court In absence of such expressed provision the said power has to be found out either from the power of the Chief Justice to appoint the officers and servants of the High Court or from the expression conditions of services of officer and servants of the High Court under Article 229 of the Constitution which may be prescribed by the rules made by the Chief Justice of the High Court subject to the provisions of any law made by the State Legislature. Under general law the power to appoint ordinarily carries with it the power to terminate the appointment and such a power to terminate the services may in the absence of restriction or limitation expressed or implied be exercised by the authority who has power to appoint. Thus when in an organisation a person is appointed by a particular authority then hi absence of any thing to the contrary the appointing authority has got power to terminate the services of person so appointed by him. Article 361 of the Constitution provides that the provisions of General Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply for interpretation of the Constitution as they apply to all enactments of Legislature of the dominion of India. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act provides that the term "appointment" includes power of suspension and dismissal from services. In fact Section 16 of General Clauses Act has codified the well known rule of general law, stated above, that the power to terminate flows naturally and as a necessary sequence from the power to create. In other words, it is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to or consequence of that power. The authority to call such officer into being necessarily implies to terminate his functions when their exercise is no longer necessary or to remove the incumbent for an abuse of those functions or for other causes shown. Thus, in view of Section 16 of the General Clauses Act it can be held that the power of the Chief Justice to appoint officers and servants of the High Court includes power to suspend, dismiss or terminate their services. In the case of Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Chief Justice AIR 1956 SC 286 their Lordships of the Supreme Court after adverting the history of the power of the Chief Justice to dismiss or terminate the services of the officers and servants of the High Court held as thus;
"..... It would, therefore, follow that at any rate from time of passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, as also under the Constitution, the power of dismissal vests in the Chief Justice notwithstanding that no specific rules have been made in this behalf of the Chief Justice.
It must be mentioned at this stage that so far as the power of dismissal is concerned, the position under the Constitution of 1950 is not open to any argument or doubt. Article 229(1) which in terms vests the power of appointment in the Chief Justice is equally effective to vest in him the power of dismissal."
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court which is squarely on the point, I hold that the Chief Justice has exclusive power under Article 229 of the Constitution to appoint the officers and servants of the High Court and that includes the power to terminate their service.
15. However, difficulty arises when learned counsel for the respondents contends that the power of termination of service of the staff of the High Court resides in the expression condition of service occurring in Clause 2 of the Article 229 of the Constitution which is subject to the law made by the State Legislature. On the strength of this argument learned counsel for the respondents asks us to apply provision of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act to the employees of the High Court which is a general law enacted by State Legislature although not referable to Entry III of List II of VII Schedule of the Constitution. It is true that in the case of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation (supra) the Supreme Court has held that "the expression; 'condition of service' is an expression of wide importand dismissal of service is a matter which falls within the condition of service of public servants". The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt, is attractive but lacks merit for the reasons given hereinafter. The intention of the framers of the Constitution in enacting Article 229 of the Constitution is to secure independence of the High Court which is essential for working of the democratic form of the Government in this country by giving the Chief Justice of the High Court, absolute control over the staff of the High Court subject to the Limitation imposed by the Article itself. If it is accepted that State Legislature can enact law in respect to termination and dismissal of the employees of the High Court, State Legislature by enacting law may give power of termination of dismissal to some other authority other than the Chief Justice of the High Court. In that event can it be said that the Chief Justice of the High Court has absolute control over the staff of the High Court. If the power of the Chief Justice to dismiss the employees of the High Court is abrogated by the State Legislature by making law, i the result not only will be that it would be impossible for the Chief Justice to run the High Court but it would amount to interference in the independence of the High Court which the framers of the Constitution never intended. If I i interpret the expression of "condition of service" as prayed by the learned counsel for the respondents, it would amount diluting the independence of judiciary. For this reason the argument of learned counsel for the respondents cannot be accepted.
16. Second reason for my being not disposed to accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondent is that the decision of Supreme Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose (supra) is by larger Bench and is on the interpretation of Clause I of the Article 229 of the Constitution and, further the Supreme Court in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation (supra) noticed the ear-
lier judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pradyat Kumar Bose (supra) but did not disapprove it. I am therefore, of opinion that respondents cannot derive any help from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation (supra) for asking to hold that State Legislature by enacting law can abrogate or abridge the power of the Chief Justice to dismiss or terminate the services of the employees of the High Court. In view of aforesaid discussions, I hold that the power of the termination or dismissal of employee employed in the High Court is implicit in the power of the Chief Justice of the High Court by virtue of Clause I of Article 229 of the Constitution and the State Legislature cannot make law as to abrogate or destroy the power of the Chief Justice conferred upon him by virtue of Article 229 of the Constitution. In view of above discussion the provision of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act besides being not referable to Entry III of List II of VII Schedule to the Constitution, cannot he applied to the employees working in the High Court.
17. It waas then lastly urged by the learned counsel for the respondents that provisos of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which provide for giving retrenchment compensation before termination of service of employee does not amount to curtailment of the power of the Chief Justice to terminate the service of an employee of the High Court but it only provides the manner in which services of an employee could be terminated. This argument of the learned counsel for the respondents is nol correct. I have already held that the State Legislature cannot make any law as to affect the power of the Chief Justice of the High Court to terminate the service of the employees and further in any case the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is not referable to Entry III of List II of VII Schedule of the Constitution but referable to entry 22 of list III of Schedule VII of the Constitution. Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Dis putes Act in. fact creates an impediment in the power of termination of service cxcrcisable by the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court in exercise of power conferred by Clause 2 of Article 229 of the Constitution has framed Rules known as Officers and Staff (Conditions of Services and Conduct) Rules. These rules do nol provide for giving of retrenchment compensation before the termination of services of the employees of the High Court. In fact the employees of the High Court have to be governed by the provisions of the Constitution, rules framed by the Chief Justice and the terms and conditions of their appointment. In view of this I reject the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents.
18. The result of the aforesaid discussions is that this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order and judgment dated March 25, 1992 passed by the learned Single Judge is set-aside. The writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.