JUDGMENT Sudhir Narain, J.
1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 15.5.1998 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Dehradun, whereby he declared the accommodation in question as vacant under the provisions of Section 12 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972.
2. Respondent No. 2 is landlady of the accommodation in question, it was let out to the petitioner by her in the year 1984. Respondent No. 2 moved an application under Section 12 of the Act for declaring the disputed accommodation as vacant alleging that the petitioner was a tenant of the accommodation in question on monthly rent of Rs. 1,500. He was transferred to Hindola district Tehri and on transfer, he has taken a residence at Chukuwala but he has got the disputed house locked. H was stated that the accommodation in question be declared as vacant and be released in her favour as she needed it bona fide for residential purpose. The petitioner filed objection. It was stated that the house in question was constructed in the year 1982 and it was assessed for the first time by the Municipal Board in the year 1982. He denied that he has removed his belongings from the said premises. He however, did not deny that he was transferred to Hindola, district Tehri Garhwal. The Rent Control Inspector submitted the report stating that the petitioner has been transferred but he has kept the house locked. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by the impugned order dated 15th May, 1998 found that the petitioner has been transferred to Hindola, district Tehri Garhwal, he has kept the house locked. It was further found that the petitioner was in occupation of the premises in question without any allotment order and his possession was unauthorised. He declared the accommodation in question as vacant. The petitioner has challenged this order in the present writ petition.
3. I have heard Sri Anil Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri K.K. Arora, learned counsel for the respondent.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the landlady-respondent No. 2 had obtained the loan for constructing the house in question in the year 1982. After taking the loan from Oil and Natural Gas Commission, a Government of India Undertaking, the entire amount of the loan was not paid up till the date of allotment to the petitioner. On the date of allotment, the provisions of U. P. Act No. X1I1 of 1972 were not applicable and in that circumstance, H was not incumbent upon the petitioner to obtain any allotment order under Section 16 (1) (a) of the Act. He has placed reliance upon the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act which reads as under;
"2. Exemptions from operation of Act.--(1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to (the following, namely),--
(a) any building of which the Government or a local authority or a public sector corporation (or Cantonment Board) is the landlord ; or . ....
(h) .....
(Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24A, 24B, 24C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed) :
(Provided that where any building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, and the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of such loan or advance (including interest), whichever is shorter).
....."
The proviso referred to above indicates that if the building is constructed substantially out of the funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, and the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years, then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of such loan or advance (including interest), whichever is shorter. This proviso does not include any loan taken from any other authority, be it private corporation or such authority in which the Government has invested the amount.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Oil and Natural Gas Commission is a Government of India Undertaking and, therefore, such authority should also be taken to have been included under this proviso on the principle of ejusdem generis. This principle of interpretation is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words and such general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. In Amar Chand Chakraborty v. The Collector of Excise, Government of Tripura, Agartala and others, AIR 1972 SC 1863, the Supreme Court laid down that the doctrine of ejusdem generis applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words : (ii) the subject of the enumeration constitutes a class or category ; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration ; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration ; and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.
6. Under the proviso referred to above, there is no general word following the particular and specific words and in absence of any such general word, the principle of ejusdem generis cannot be applied as to any authority, advancing loan to the landlord for raising the construction which is occupied by a tenant after its construction. The words have been specified only in respect of the loan advanced by the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a Bank or a Co-operative Society or Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and if the loan is taken by a person from any other authority for raising construction, such authority shall not be deemed to have been included under the proviso.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that it is a mistake by the Legislature by omitting the word "other authority" but the object of the provision is that whenever from any authority the loan is taken in which the Government has any interest, such authority should also be deemed to have been included. The doctrine of casus omissus contemplates that a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute, cannot be supplied by Courts, as to do so will be the legislation and not construction. In Hira Devi and others u. District Board, Shahjahanpur. AIR 1952 SC 262, the Supreme Court observed-"no doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of the Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duly of the Court to stretch the words used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of the Act." The Court held that where the Statute provided the power to suspend an employee on a certain condition, the Court will not add any other ground in the Statute to create a power of suspension. In P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries and others, AIR 1990 SC 933. It was observed that though the period for making an application under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been extended by the Amending Act 104 of 1976 but the Legislature omitted to extend the period to make deposit under Rule 92 (2) of Order XXI. the Court cannot by application of Rule 89 extend the period of limitation for making the deposit under Rule 92 (2) of Order XXI of C.P.C. The Court could not assume that Legislature made a mistake in this respect or made an omission in accomplishing what it had set out to achieve.
8. In view of the above principle, the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that Court should read "all other authority" who had advanced the loan for raising the construction under the first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act No. 13 of 1972, cannot be accepted.
9. The petitioner had occupied the disputed accommodation without any allotment order in the year 1984. The occupation of the accommodation without any allotment order is in violation of Section 13 of the Act which provides that where a landlord or tenant ceases to occupy a building or part thereof, no person shall occupy it in any capacity on his behalf or otherwise than under an order of allotment or release under Section 16 and if a person so purports to occupy it, he shall, without prejudice to the provisions of Section 31, be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of such building or part. In Nutan Kumar v. Additional District Judge and others, 1993 ARC 204, the Full Bench of this Court has held that even if the building is let out by the landlord and a person is in occupation of it, his possession shall be deemed to be unauthorised under law. The view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation. The accommodation in dispute shall be treated as vacant under law and he can take the proceedings for release/allotment under Section 16 of the Act.
10. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed.