JUDGMENT
1. This is a revision arising out of a partition suit in the Court of an Assistant Collector. March 24, 1920, was fixed for filing objections under Section 110 of the Land Revenue Act. No objections were filed within the period allowed by law. The partition proceedings were then begun, and seven years later objections were put in by certain persons claiming proprietary right in a market. Order on those objections were passed by the partision officer on August 9, 1927. Appeals were filed and final orders were passed by the Board of Revenue on November 6, 1930. On July 5, 1930, the partition officer had allotted the whole of the above mentioned market to two persons, Musammat haima and Mehhdi Husain, and his order was upheld in appeal on December 8, 1930. On July 21, 1931, Hari Das, the present applicant, filed an objection before the partition officer in which he claimed a share in the said market. That objection was dismissed by the partition officer on September 7, 1931. Hari Das appealed to the District Judge and the latter has found that no appeal lies to his court and has accordingly returned it for presentation to the proper court.
2. This objection of Hari Das was made long after the partition case had come to an end. Obviously it was not an objection which was entertained under Section 111 of the Land Revenue Act. We are referred to a Circular of the Board of Revenue (No. 21, Dept. 2, Rule 9) in which the Board has directed that for special reasons to be recorded by the partition officer in writing he consentain an objection about proprietary title after the period allowed by Section 111 has expired. It does not appear that rule provides for appeals, and in any Case we are clearly of opinion that it cannot give powers to the District Judge which are in excess of those conferred by Section 112 of the Land Revenue Act. Under Section 234 of the said Act it is provided that "Board may from time to time, subject to the sanction of the Local Government make rules consistent with this Act" in this respect to certain matters. We do not, however, think that the Circular referred to above, even if consistent with the Act, can enlarge the powers which a District Judge has under Section 112. For this reason, and also in view of the provisions of Section 232 of the Act we are of opinion that no appeal lay in this case to the District Judge and that his order was correct. We accordingly dismiss this application with costs.