JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. This revision was heard by me on 5th August, 2004 and after hearing learned counsel for the parties the revision was dismissed for the reasons to be recorded later on. Now here are the reasons :
2. This revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act is directed against the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 17th April, 1999, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff-landlords was decreed for eviction and arrears of rent.
3. According to plaint allegations, the plaintiff-landlords let out the premises in question to the applicant-tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 600 plus house and water tax. On 30th May, 1981, a rent deed was executed between the plaintiffs and defendant, according to which the premises in question was let out with effect from 1st January, 1981, at the rate of Rs. 600 per month plus house and water tax. The tenant-defendant has paid rent up to 30th July, 1988 and the water tax was paid only upto 1981-84. Thereafter, neither rent nor house or water tax was paid by the tenant. Therefore, the landlord-plaintiffs served a notice dated 21st August, 1991, terminating the tenancy and demanding the arrears of rent and damages and further requesting to vacate the premises within 30 days. This notice, according to plaintiff, was served on 3rd September. 1991, but since the defendant has not vacated the premises nor paid rent and damages, thus the suit.
4. The defendant in his written statement disputed the title/ ownership of the plaintiffs of the premises in question. Therefore, it was pleaded on behalf of the plaintiffs that this is additional ground for eviction of the applicant-tenant from the premises in question. The defendants filed written statement in which it was admitted that the defendant was tenant at the rate of Rs. 600 per month but liability regarding payment of house and water tax was not admitted. It is also admitted by the tenant that he is tenant since 1980 and since then he is regularly paying the rent. The defendant further set up the case that defendant is tenant since the time of late Dr. Tara Chand when he was alive and that Dr. Tara Chand died in the year 1983 leaving behind two sons, his widow Arvind Chaudhary. The premises in question belongs to Joint Hindu Family of which Dr. Tara Chand was the karta. Therefore, the plaintiffs, who are sons of late Dr. Tara Chand, cannot be said to be only landlord or owner of the premises as widow of Dr. Tara Chand has not filed the present suit. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues :-
"(1) Kya keval vadigan vivadit dukan ke landlord hain ?
(2) Kya prativadi dinank 1.4.1981 se vivadit dukan men kirayedar hai ? Athwa varsh 1980 se kirayedar hai?
(3) Kya kiraydari prarambh hote samay vivadit dukan par U. P. Adhiniyam 13, 1972 ke pravidhan lagu hote thhe tatha kya avantan ke abhav men kirayedari avaidh evam nlshprabhavi hai ?
(4) Kya Shrimati Arvind Chaudhary is vaad men avashyak pakshkar hai ? Yadi han to iska prabhav.
(5) Kya prativadi ne kiraya ada karne men chook (default) kiya hai ? Yadi han to uska prabhav.
(6) Kya prativadi ne vadigan ke swamitva se inkar kiya hai ? Yadi han to kya us adhar par bina notice deye vadigan niskashan kara pane ke adhikari hain ?
(7) Kya vaad nibandhan evam maun svikriti ke siddhant se badhit hai ?
(8) Kya prativadi ne jalkar euom grihkar san 1984-85 se ada nahin kiya hai ?
(9) Vadigan kya anutosh pane ke adhikari hain ?
5. The trial court in its lengthy judgment which runs in almost 49 typed pages discussed the evidence and arguments advanced on behalf of the plaintiffs as well as the defendant and arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiffs are landlords and even if their mother is also one of the landlords, the suit cannot be rejected only on the ground that one of the landlords has not joined in the suit. The trial court also recorded a finding that the rent is Rs. 600 per month and since the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to the accommodation in question, the liability of the tenant in paying rent also includes liability to pay proportionate house and water tax. The trial court also recorded a finding that admittedly the defendant had not paid proportionate house tax and water tax, therefore, he has made a default in payment of rent as contemplated under Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. On the question of benefit of Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act has been denied by the trial court that admittedly the admitted rent which includes proportionate water tax has not been deposited on the first date of hearing as contemplated under proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. On the question of denial of title the trial court also recorded a finding against the tenant and held that the tenant is liable to be ejected on this ground.
6. Aggrieved by the order passed by the trial court, the tenant preferred this revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the findings arrived at by the trial court on various issues, including the issues on which the suit has been decreed, suffer from error of law which can be corrected by this Court exercising powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. This Court laid down a law with regard to interference under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as laid down by a Division Bench in the case of Lakshmi Kishore and Anr. v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545, wherein this Court has ruled that the revisional court can interfere with the findings recorded by the trial court only if the trial court had based its finding on misreading of evidence or has arrived at finding on the basis of evidence which was to be ignored. In the present case nothing of the sort has been referred to nor demonstrated which may warrant this Court to exercise jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act on the basis of aforesaid law laid down by Division Bench.
7. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further submitted that the issue regarding applicability of Act No. 13 of 1972, has been incorrectly decided as admittedly the premises was not governed by the provisions of U. P. Temporary Control of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The Act No. 13 of 1972, will come to apply to the building only when the building completes ten years from the date of its construction. The trial court has recorded a finding that since the shop in question was constructed in the month of September, 1974 and agreement of tenancy has been entered Into with effect from 1st April, 1981, therefore, on the date when the agreement of tenancy was entered into, the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972; were not applicable. This submission cannot be accepted in view of Section 1 of the Act which is reproduced below :
"1. Short title, extent, application and commencement.-
(1)................................................
(2)................................................
(3) it shall apply to-
(a) every city as defined in the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 (U. P. Act II of 1959) ;
(b) every municipality as defined in the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (U. P. Act II of 1916) ;
(c) every notified area constituted under the United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916 (U. P. Act II, of 1916) ; and
(d) every town area constituted under the United Provinces Town Areas Act, 1914 (U. P. Act II of 1914) ;
......................................................"
8. Even according to the defendant on the date when the suit was filed in the year 1993, more than ten years have already passed, therefore, the view taken by the trial court that Act No. 13 of 1972, are applicable cannot be said to suffer from manifest error of law.
9. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon a decision, regarding applicability of the Act, Civil Appeal No. 2131 of 1995, Suresh Kumar Jain v. Shanti Swarup Jain and Ors., decided on November 21, 1996. Para 33 of the said decision is reproduced below :
"33. The other contentions raised by the respondent-landlord about the finality of the concurrent finding of fact of deemed date of construction and impropriety of interference in exercise of discretionary remedy under Article 136 of the Constitution cannot be accepted being devoid of any substance. The deemed date of construction as found earlier by the courts below was not approved by this Court in allowing the appeal arising out of the earlier special leave petition preferred by the tenant appellant and the High Court was specifically directed to decide the deemed date of construction under Section 2(2) of the Rent Act in the light of the observation made by this Court. In the facts of the case, such determination of deemed date of construction by appreciating and interpreting municipal records and assessment proceedings was not determination of a fact simpliciter but such determination involved a determination of mixed question of law and fact. It is the case of the landlord that after evicting erstwhile tenant, the appellant tenant was inducted for the first time in 1973 at a monthly rent of Rs. 75. It is not in dispute that the tenant appellant is in exclusive possession of the shop room in question as a tenant under the respondent-landlord. Such shop room is undoubtedly a separable unit of construction and the same is in possession of the tenant-appellant. The very fact that the appellant was inducted as tenant in respect of the said shop room clearly indicates that such unit of tenancy had been constructed as a unit fit for occupation at least in 1973 when the appellant was inducted as tenant in such shop room. The report of the head clerk of the Municipality is also to the effect that the shop room is well constructed. The eviction suit was instituted only in 1990. It will be travesty of justice if such suit is decreed in favour of the landlord by allowing the untenable plea that the premises in question was constructed within a period of ten years from the date of the institution of the suit. Thus, the appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the eviction suit stands dismissed with cost."
10. On the facts of the present case, the principles laid down by the Apex Court do not apply because here the finding is admittedly in favour of the landlords that the tenancy has commenced in the year 1974-75, therefore, the building had completed more than ten years when the notice was served on the date of institution of the suit.
11. In this view of the matter this revision has no force and is dismissed.