The petition seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing order dated 01.09.2020 passed by respondent no.6, which is appended with the petition as Annexure - 1.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that office of Superintending Engineer, Nalkoop Mandal, Faizabad (now Ayodhya) issued office memorandum for filling up post of Tube Well Assistant in District Balrampur, Bahraich, Barabanki and Gonda. The petitioner and other eligible candidates appeared in the examination and declared successful vide result dated 07.01.1994. It is submitted that the selection process also took place in Bahraich and Barabanki and several candidates are offered appointment, however in District Gonda, respondent/authority did not issue any appointment letter in favour of selected candidates.
Learned counsel has submitted that some selected persons filed Writ Petition No.3144 (SS) of 1995 and 1455 (SS) of 1998 for direction to implement select list made for appointment for the post of Tube Well Operator. It is also submitted that Writ Petition No.3999 (SS) of 1996 was also filed for the purpose of appointment on the post of Tube Well Operator, which was disposed of with direction to the Engineer-in-Chief that after inuqiry if sufficient good reasons do not exist for denying appointment, the petitioners therein shall be offered appointment.
It is submitted that several orders were passed in the aforesaid writ petitions and after inquiry with respect to denial of appointment, some of the petitioners were given appointment in the year 2006. However, the petitioner could not approach this Court due to serious illness and not knowing the orders passed in the aforesaid writ petitions.
It is submitted that after coming to know about aforesaid litigation, the petitioner approached the authority concerned on 07.08.2020 by way of an application/representation.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that vide the impugned order dated 01.09.2020 (supra), claim of the petitioner has been rejected while other similarly situated candidates have been given appointment, which is unjust and arbitrary.
It is submitted that it is legal obligation on the part of the respondent authority to implement the selection list and also provide appointment to all the selected persons. In the instant case, the respondent authority has made discrimination with the petitioner and has not given appointment. In such circumstances, the impugned order dated 01.09.2020 is bad in law and deserves to be quashed.
Per Conra, learned counsel for the State has vehemently opposed the submissions made by petitioner's counsel and submitted that relief as sought for by the petitioner cannot be granted because claim of only those candidates have been considered who were party in the aforesaid case. It is also submitted that explanation given for not approaching the Court at relevant point of time cannot be accepted.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
It is admitted fact that the petitioner was not a party in any of the litigation by which some of selected candidates have been appointed. From perusal of the record, it is apparent that the petitioner is seeking appointment on the basis of judgment a judgment passed in the year 2005 i.e. after 15 years. Explanation for delay in filing the writ petition, submitted by the petitioner is not justifiable.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2009 (2) SCC 479, S.S. Balu and another vs. State of Kerala & others pleased to observe as under:
"It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002. The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal there against, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage."
Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of NDMC v. Pan Singh reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278 held as under:
"16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347, U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322).
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 524 and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628).
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India this Court held: ((2007) 9 SCC p. 277, paras 9-10) "9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition has been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579).
"10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It wold depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone."
In view of the above, I am not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner for delay.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delay.
Order Date :- 22.1.2021/nishant/-