JUDGMENT J. C. Gupta, J.
1. Heard the petitioner's counsel as well as Sri Shakti Swaroop Nigam for the respondents.
2. By means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order of the Additional District Judge dated 1.7.81 whereby petitioner's suit for ejectment and mesne profit has been dismissed.
3. Undisputedly petitioner filed suit for rent and ejectment after serving a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on respondent No. 3 whereby her tenancy was terminated. The trial court decreed the suit for rent as well as for ejectment. The revisional court, however, set aside the judgment of the lower court so far as it related to the decree of ejectment.
4. The only point for consideration in this writ petition is whether the notice under Section 106, Transfer of Property Act served by the petitioner on the respondents was a valid notice. The revisional court has taken the view that since it was admitted to the petitioner-landlord himself that during the life time of his mother, he (plaintiff) realized rent from the defendant/tenant on behalf of his mother and after her death, he realized the rent for himself as well as for his brothers and sisters, the plaintiff was not the sole owner-landlord of the disputed accommodation and he alone was not entitled to terminate the tenancy of the defendant by sending a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and with these findings, suit for ejectment has been dismissed. It is also borne out from the Judgment that the notice of termination was not sent by the brothers and sisters of the plaintiff nor the notice in question was alleged to have been sent by the plaintiff on behalf of other co-lessors namely plaintiffs brothers and sisters. In the suit also, none of the plaintiffs brothers and sisters were impleaded as parties. In the case of Tara Chand v. Vishambhar Nath, 1981 ARC 688, it was held that the notice should be given by all the landlords and they should all join in the suit. That will apply not only to a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act but also to a notice under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act.
If notice did not fulfil this requirement, the same was not valid to bring suit for ejectment. In another case of Hira Lal Jasrapuri v. IIIrd Additional District Judge. Gorakhpur and others, 1982 (1) ARC 117, it was held that unless the other co-landlords were impleaded as defendants in the suit filed by one of the co-landlords alone, even a decree for arrears of rent could not be passed. In that case, reliance was placed on the decision in P. K. Tondon v. Smt. Ganga Devi Rathor, 1969 ALJ 405. Similar view was also expressed in the case of Ganga Narain and another v. IXth A.D.J., Kanpur and others, 1984 (1) ARC 342.
5. From the petitioner's side, reliance has been placed on the Supreme Court decision in Kanta Goel u. B. P. Pathak and others. AIR 1977 SC 1599. This case was also referred before the revisional court and the revlsional court has rightly distinguished this case, inasmuch as the definition of the word 'landlord' as given in U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 materially differs from the definition as given in Section 2(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Under the Delhi Rent Control Act the said Section defines 'landlord' as under :
"Landlord means a person who, for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would use and receive the rent, or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant."
The word 'tenant' was also defined to mean any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is payable.
It was in the context of the above two definitions that the Supreme Court took the view that the co-heirs of a deceased-landlord constituted a body of the landlords and, by consent, implicit or otherwise, of the plurality of landlords, one of them representing them all, was collecting rent and for all practical purposes he was the landlord of the tenant. The position under the U.P. Act is, however, different because of the different language used while defining the word 'landlord' in Section 3(j) which runs as follows :
"Landlord", in relation to a building, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building were let, would be, payable and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person."
6. Where a word or expression has been defined in a statute, the courts have to read and accept its meaning as contained in the definition itself. It cannot add or substract any word to or from the meaning nor can it assign a meaning different from the one used in the definition on the ground of general understanding of the term.
7. In Suresh Lohiya u. State of Maharashtra and another. JT 1996 (8) SC 72, it has been held that where the Legislature has made a specific definition, it is not permissible to court to read in the definition something which is not there. It is not open to courts to legislate, or to weave a new texture. If there being any lacuna in the definition it is for the Legislature to take case of the same. Where a word or expression is defined by the Legislature, courts have to look to that definition ; the general understanding of it cannot be determinative.
8. Under clause (g) of Section 3 of the present Act, it is not essential for a person in order to be landlord of a building, that rent must actually be paid to him. What is required is, that the rent must be payable to him. In the present case, even as per the own admission of the plaintiff after the death of his mother, rent became payable to the plaintiff and his brothers and sisters and plaintiff also realized rent for himself and on behalf of his brothers and sisters. He, along with his brothers and sisters thus became 'landlords' as per the definition contained under Section 3(g) of the Act and not the plaintiff alone.
Therefore, neither the meaning of the word 'Landlord' contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act, nor the ratio laid down in the decision of Konta Goel's case (supra) can be applied to the facts of the present case and 1 am inclined to follow the decisions of this Court rendered in the abovementioned cases of Tara Chand; Hira Lal Jasrarpuri and P. K. Tandon.
9. A plain reading of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act also makes it clear that every notice under the Section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it. It would be a different situation where a notice of termination is sent on behalf of all co-lessors by one co-lessor under his signatures, such a notice could be treated to be a notice on behalf of all co-lessors but where the notice is given by only one person claiming himself to be the sole landlord but the evidence proved that even as per the admission of the landlord, there were co-landlords and they have not Joined the plaintiff in the notice or in the suit, the notice of ejectment and Of demand under the Rent Control Act would be invalid.
10. This Court, therefore finds no valid reason to take a view contrary of the one which has been taken by the revisional court.
11. For the abpve reasons, this writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs is made.