JUDGMENT S. Rafat Alam and Sudhir Agarwal, JJ.
1. We have heard Sri Sant Saran Upadayaya, learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents and also perused the order of the Hon'ble Single Judge dated 29.9.2005 dismissing the petitioner-appellant's Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 63064 of 2005.
2. The petitioner who, is a Sub Inspector in UP. Police Force, was appointed in the year 1982. Since the date of his appointment till July, 2004 he has been posted from time to time at different places and particularly at Moradabad, Bijnor (Moradabad Range), Rai Bareli (Lucknow Range) and Sitapur. In July, 2004, he was transferred to Bareilly Range and was posted at Police Station Baheri. It is alleged that on account of Gram Panchayat election at Baheri there was a violent altercation between two factions resulting in lodging a FIR being Case Crime No. 616 of 2005, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307 and 308 I.P.C. Initially one Shambhu Dayal Chaudhary, Sub Inspector, was deputed for the investigation in the aforesaid matter but on account of pressure exerted by the sitting M.L.A. Sri Ata-Ur-Rehman the investigation was transferred to the petitioner-appellant on 4.9.2005. In furtherance of his official duty the petitioner-appellant conducted raid on 18.9.2005 and also sought permission of the Magistrate under Sections 82 and 83 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the attachment of the property of the accused-absconder. The petitioner-appellant further states that the prompt action taken by him in furtherance of the investigation made, respondent No. 5 and his other associates exerted political pressure upon respondent No. 3, who passed the impugned order of transfer dated 15th September, 2005 mechanically. The petitioner-appellant challenged the impugned order of transfer on the ground of mala fide, arbitrariness, non-recording of any reason in the order of transfer and actuated due to political considerations. The petitioner-appellant also submits that his children are studying and he has deposited school fees for the entire session 2005-2006. In case he is required to join in pursuance of the impugned order of transfer, during the mid session, his family, particularly, the children shall suffer irreparable loss due to dislocation and disturbance in their study.
3. The writ petition has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Single Judge after considering the submissions made by the petitioner observing that the allegations of mala fide against respondent No. 5 have not been substantiated by material evidence. So far as the mid session transfer is concerned the Hon'ble Single Judge has given liberty to the petitioner-appellant to move the authority concerned by making representation, who has been directed to consider the same in accordance with law, by means of a speaking order, at the earliest possible.
4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties.
5. Learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the impugned order of transfer is illegal as neither any reason has been mentioned in the order of transfer nor it is in public interest but has actuated on account of mala fide of respondent No. 5. The question of mala fide has been considered by the Hon'ble Single Judge and he has found that, the allegation that Mohd, Azhar, one of the contestant in the election, was the first cousin of respondent No. 5, was factually incorrect. Evidently, the allegation thus made against respondent No. 5, in order to substantiate the plea of mala fide looses, any ground to stand and has rightly been rejected by the Hon'ble Single Judge. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab has clearly observed that the allegation of mala fide have to be substantiated very meticulously and categorically by putting cogent evidence. Heavy onus lies upon a person, who alleges mala fide against individual, to prove the allegation of mala fide.
6. Recently in the case of State of U.P. v. Gobardllan Lal the Hon'ble Apex Court has made the following observations to cautious the Courts while examining the plea of mala fide "even allegation of mala fide when made such as to inspire confidence in the Court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises."
7. In the present case, neither any specific allegation has been levelled in the writ petition nor any cogent material has been placed on record to show that the impugned order of transfer has been issued by respondent No. 3 on account of mala fide. A circuitous and spiral method has been adopted by the petitioner-appellant to make out a case of mala fide, and even that on the basis of sheer conjectures and surmises. The ground to support the allegation of mala fide lost its facts completely when the petitioner in the supplementary affidavit admitted that the allegation, contained in para-7, regarding relationship of respondent No. 5 with one of contestant of election were incorrect. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the Hon'ble Single Judge has rightly rejected the contention of the learned Counsel in respect to mala fide.
8. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant is that the impugned order of transfer does not mention any reason and even otherwise vitiated in law. We have given serious consideration to the aforesaid submission. It is not disputed that the appellant holds a transferable post. A government servant holding transferable post can be transferred from one place to another.
9. As early as in the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under;
It is an accepted principle that in public service transfer is an incident of service. It is also an implied condition of service and appointing authority has a wide discretion in the matter. The government is the best judge to decide how to distribute and utilize the services of its employees. However, this power must be exercised honestly, bona fide and reasonably.
10. In the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka and Ors. held as under:
It is well understood that transfer of a government servant who is appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to another is an ordinary incident of service and therefore does not result in any alteration of any of the conditions of service to his disadvantage. That a government servant is liable to be transferred to a similar post in the same cadre is a normal feature and incident of government service and no government servant can claim to remain in a particular place or in a particular post unless, of course, his appointment itself is to a specified, non-transferable post. (Para-5).
11. In Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration, which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders.(Para-5)
12. In the same judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court also held that a transfer order, even if, is issued to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same can not and should not be interfered by the Court merely because transfer orders were passed on the request of the concerned employees. No person has a vested right to remain posted to a particular place, and unless the transfer order is passed in violation of any mandatory rule, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer orders. Relevant extract is quoted as under:
If the competent authority issued transfer orders with a view to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same cannot and should not be interfered by the Court merely because the transfer order were passed on the request of the employees concerned. The respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. Since they hold transferable posts they are liable to be transferred from one place to the other. The transfer orders had been issued by the competent authority, which did not violate any mandatory rule, therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer orders. (Para-3).
13. Reiterating the aforesaid view, in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. S.L. Abbas the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the transfer is an incident of service and in para-7 their Lordships held as under:
Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the Court cannot interfere with it.
14. In National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Bhagwan and Anr. reported in 2001(91) FLR 259 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
It is by now well settled and often reiterated by this Court that no Government servant or employee of public undertaking has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or category o transferable posts from one place to other is not only an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise of poser or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions prohibiting any such transfer, the Courts or the tribunals cannot interfere with such orders as a matter of routine as though they are the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for that of the management, as against such orders passed in the interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned.
15. In the case of State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal (Supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
It is too late in the day for any Government servant to contend that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order if transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order or transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the office or servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any place in public interest and is found necessitated by exigencies of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely and there is no infraction of any career prospects such an seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision.
(Emphasis added).
16. Instead of burdening this judgment referring catena of decisions on this aspect, it would be fruitful to refer a very recent three Judges judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2005 (107) FLR 37 wherein in order to appreciate the scope of interference in a writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the order of transfer the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to the earlier law laid down in the case of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors. v. State of Biharand Ors. (Supra) and National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation Ltd. v. Bhagwan and Anr. (Supra), and held in para-12 as follows:
It will be noticed that these decisions have been rendered in the case of civilian employees or those who are working in Public Sector Undertakings. The scope of interference by Courts in regard to members of armed forces is far more limited and narrow. It is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. The Courts should be extremely Slow in interfering with an order of transfer of such category of persons and unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no interference should be made.
17. The present case, if not strictly identical to the case of Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India and Ors. (Supra), is quite nearer to the same. The petitioner-appellant in the present case is a member of a discipline force, namely, UP. Police. His requirement and urgency as well as the exigency regarding posting would be totally different than other civil employees. There may be numerous factors on account whereof the competent authority has to post a particular member of Police Force at a particular place and unless and until a case of mala fide is made out or there, is violation of statutory provision, there would be no occasion for this Court to interfere in the case of transfer of a member of a Police Force. The scope of judicial interference would definitely be limited and narrow in case of a disciplined Force comparing to scope available in the case of other civil servants. It is not the case of the petitioner-appellant that the impugned order of transfer is in contravention of any statutory mandatory provision.
18. However, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order of transfer is in violation of Government Order dated 12.5.2005 laying down the transfer policy for the year 2005-2006. Without expressing any opinion as to whether such transfer policy is available to the Member of Police Force, we are of the view that mere non-compliance of some part of transfer policy which is in the nature of guidelines would not confer any cause of action to a Government servant to assail an order of transfer. In the case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu (Supra), Mrs. Shilpi Bose and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (Supra) and Union of India and Ors. v. S.L. Abbas (Supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court has already held that the guidelines are only for general guidance for the higher authorities but infraction thereof, if any, would not provide the cause of action a Government servant to assail the order of transfer in a Court of law. It would be fruitful to refer the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of enforceability of the guidelines, in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. S.L. Abbas (Supra) :
The said guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right, (Para-7)
19. In view of the aforesaid law, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order of transfer on the ground that it is in violation of Government Order dated 12.5.2005.
20. Lastly, the appellant submits that the order of transfer is in the midst of session. Our attention has been drawn to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Director of School Education, Madras and Ors. v. O. Karuppa Thevan and Anr. reported in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 666.
21. The case before the Hon'ble Apex Court pertains to education department and while granting indulgence clearly took into consideration the factum of absence of any urgent exigency of service in the case before it as is apparent from the following;
We are of the view that in effecting transfer, the fact that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight, if the exigencies of the service are not urgent. (Para-2)
22. The facts of the aforesaid case are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In this case, the Hon'ble Single Judge has already allowed liberty to the petitioner-appellant to make representation before the authority concerned agitating his grievance and has already directed the authority concerned to decide, such representation, if made, by a reasoned order at the earliest possible.
23. Even otherwise the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above case observed that the children of an employee are studying should be given due weight. This shows that" the matter is to be examined by the employer as to whether the transfer of an employee can be deferred till the end of the current academic session or not and not by the Court. The Court has neither any means nor sufficient material to assess as to whether there is any urgency of administrative exigencies for necessitating immediate transfer or that such transfer can be deferred in a particular case. Therefore, the Hon'ble Single Judge has rightly allowed liberty to the petitioner-appellant to raise this grievance before the authority concerned by making a representation, who will consider and pass a reasoned order thereupon.
24. We, therefore, do not find any reason to take a different view and to differ with the finding of the Hon'ble Single Judge. We are also of the view that the impugned judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge does not suffer from any legal flaw warranting interference in the present appeal. However, we observe that in case the representation, as permitted by the Hon'ble Single Judge, is filed by the petitioner-appellant before the authority concerned, the same shall be considered and disposed of by a speaking order in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a fortnight from the date of filing of such representation along with the certified copy of this order. We, however, clarify that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the persona! grievance raised by the petitioner-appellant and the authority concerned shall not be prejudiced by the observations made hereinabove while deciding the representation.
25. With the above observation, the special appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs.