ORDER Ravi S. Dhavan, J.
1. By this petition, and the facts averred in it, the Court was led to pass an ad interim order on 21 September, 1993, as the petitioner had contended that the recovery certificate, issued by the Collector, Ghaziabad on the initiative of the Union of India, the Department of Telecommunication, was illegal, without jurisdiction and irregular and the petitioner was a total stranger to the recovery proceedings initiated against him, as he had nothing to do with the amount being realised under the recovery certificate issued under the U. P. Public Monyes (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972. A short resume' of facts is given in the writ petition to suggest that the recovery certificate is connected with a Public Call Office/ Subscriber Trunk Dialling (hereinafter referred to as 'PCO/ STD') connection on a licence was issued to the Messers D. G. Associates, Ghaziabad which, otherwise, is a proprietorship business of one D.P.S. Malik, and that the petitioner has nothing to do with the business and is an alien and an absolute stranger to the licence which may have been granted by the Department of Telecommunication, on the business being run by the firm, aforesaid, through its proprietor, D.P.S. Malik.
2. The contention before the Court was that there being absolutely no nexus at all between the petitioner and the PCO/STD business which was being run under a licence by the firm, aforesaid, through its proprietor, as named above.
3. The Court had called upon the Senior Standing Counsel for the Union of India to examine this matter and find out whether what the petitioner contends is correct and specifically give information to the Court that the recovery certificate, as the petitioner contends, has anything to do with the petitioner, Gulshan Kumar, as he so states in the writ petition.
4. The Senior Standing Counsel sent a message seeking the original record from Ghaziabad, to be made available to the Court, with the matter being adjourned. The record yet not being made available on the adjourned date.
5. On 21 September, 1993, finding that the averments in the writ petition were not controverted, despite an opportunity to the Union of India, and the Court being of the opinion that the Union of India was not placing the original record and while what the petitioner had contended, was not contradicted, there was no occasion to deny an interim order. A stay order was passed staying the recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,45,609.00. The matter was then posted on 6 October, 1993, at the request of the Union of India.
6. On 6 October, 1993 learned Senior Standing Counsel, Central Government, made a submission before the Court that the original record has been made available to him and he would like to submit by a counter affidavit and thereafter place the submissions of the Union of India on an affidavit as well as the record for the perusal of the Court. The Court granted the adjournment though directing that the Senior Standing Counsel will also obtain an explanation from the officials concerned, by an affidavit, on why the record had not been made available to the Senior Standing Counsel, despite being sought, under a direction of the Court on the next day, 7 October, 1993, the Union of India filed two affidavits -- one a counter affidavit in answer to the writ petition and the other an affidavit of the official concerned explaining why the record had not been made available to the Senior Standing Counsel for the perusal of the Court. As 7 October, 1993, was close to the weekend, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B.D. Mandhyan, desired time to file a rejoinder affidavit, until Monday next, which opportunity was granted by the Court. The matter was placed before the Court on Monday, i.e., 11 October, 1993.
7. A perusal of the counter affidavit of the Union of India as also the original record, placed before the Court, now gave an entirely another picture than what the petitioner contended in his petition, supported by an affidavit, and, thus, this Court was of the view that the interim order having been obtained by suppressing and concealing the facts, discharged the interim order.
8. The circumstances of the case were now such that the Court was also of the opinion that this matter must be determined upon the exchange of the pleadings, as the writ had not been admitted. The matter has been placed before the Court, today.
9. Unsolicited, today, during the course of the proceedings, a person was enquiring about this case from the Bench Secretary, inquiring and expressing to the Bench Secretary that while he had not been made a party in the case, but, he desires to submit one short information before the Court. The Court permitted this person to make his submission. He declared his name as D.P.S. Malik. He stated that he was not a party to the petition, but, he desires to submit that Gulshan Kumar Vinayak and him were the partners, under a partnership deed, in the PCO/ STD business in the name of the firm, known as D.G. Associates. The only aspect the Court enquired from the aforesaid D.P.S. Malik was how he happened to walk into the Court in the case. He submitted that in the Original Suit No. 1261 of 1991; D.G. Associates v. Secretary, Door Sanchar Vibhag, pending before the Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, it was contended by the petitioner (Gulshan Kumar Vinayak) that he was going to the Allahabad High Court to file a civil revision. He, thus, came to Allahabad searching for the proceedings which he located through his friend and counsel, Mr. Dharma Pal Singh, Advocate. As the aforesaid, D.P.S. Malik, had himself walked into the Court to record the statement and the only enquiry the Court has made from him was on how he came to know about these proceedings, which answer he has given, in so far as this Court is concerned it has nothing to enquire from the aforesaid, D.P.S. Malik.
10. The petitioner was represented by Messrs B.D. Mandhyan and Ms. P.L. Sawhney, Advocates. During the course, of the proceedings, today, Mr. B.D. Mandhyan, Advocate, sought permission to leave the Court. At the time of the proceedings, today, on behalf of the petitioner, his counsel, Ms. P.L. Sawhney, Advocate, and the Senior Standing Counsel of the Union of India, Mr. Umesh Narain Sharma, Advocate, assisted by Shri L.P. Misra, Additional Standing Counsel, were present. Also present were the petitioner, Gulshan Kumar, and, as already noted in this order, Mr. D.P.S. Malik, at his own initiative.
11. Upon a perusal of the pleadings before the Court and the original record, this Court finds that the discretionary remedy for making writ available to citizens has, indeed, been misutilised and the Court is fully conscious of the aspect that in its writ jurisdiction the High Court is a Court of equity first. The pedestal of the Court, on issue of writs, rests first on equity, justice and good conscience, as this aspect alone makes the jurisdiction of this Court of Record as plenipotent and generally described as unlimited. But, one situation the Court will not suffer and that is presenting the record at variance than they otherwise lie elsewhere. The faith the Court lends to the citizens for issue of writs rests on statements made on affidavits only and it is upon this faith that writs are issued and the citizens are protected from an arbitrary State action. The circumstances, on record of this case, are a total negation of the trust which the High Court reposes on those who seek remedies under its writ jurisdiction.
12. When the counter affidavit was placed before the Court as also the original record, this Court found that the contention of the petitioner that he was a stranger to the recovery certificate and that the Union of India had no prima facie material to make the demand outstanding as arrears against the unpaid bills from running a PCO/STD business on a licence issued to the firm, known as D. G. Associates, turned out to be incorrect. There may be issues between the petitioner and the Union of India on the liability of payment by the petitioner but, the only, aspect, the High Court is concerned, is whether it is correct that the petitioner is an absolute stranger to the recovery certificate? The Union of India, by its record, discloses that a Suit No. 1261 of 1991 has been filed by the firm known as D. G. Associates, by its two partners, seeking a declaration that the demand that has been made by the Union of India (Department of Telecommunications) against unpaid bills from the PCO/STD business, be declared as irregular and illegal.
The counter affidavit states by appending a copy of the plaint, that this plaint has been signed by the petitioner, Gulshan Kumar.
13. The rejoinder affidavit is an answer of the petitioner to the facts hitherto not disclosed in the writ petition but being explained as an afterthought. The contention of the petitioner is that he had moved applications in this suit by submitting to the Court of the Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, that he has wrongly been made a party; that he had nothing to do with the partnership business, that his signatures in the plaint had been wrongly obtained on blank papers. The issue before the High Court in this writ petition is not that the petitioner had been incorrectly made a party in the suit as a co-plaintiff, or that his signatures on the plaint papers had been obtained irregularly. The High Court is only concerned with the fact that the petitioner was aware of the pendency of a suit which seeks a declaration that the dues of the Union of India be declared null and void and that the petitioner, knowing of the pendency of the proceedings, had deliberately omitted a reference to it in the writ petition. This implies that but for the counter affidavit the information on the pendency of the suit, aforesaid, as an alternate remedy had not been volunteered.
14. This is not all. On the original record of the Union of India lies an information of a plaint which the petitioner has filed before the Sub-Judge, Jagadri, Haryana, seeking an injunction, to the effect, that the realisation of the amount in question being a sum of Rs. 2,45,609.00, be restricted and that the party defendants, i.e., the Union of India (and its agents and assigns) be put under an ex parte injunction from seeking the realisation of the aforesaid, sum of moneys from no other person than the petitioner himself. This is the petitioner's document. He sought the same stay from the Sub-Judge, which he seeks from, the High Court. He was seeking a stay order from two Courts in two States. While he may contend that he was seeking a prayer for deletion from the array of parties in a suit filed by the firm in which he was alleged to be a partner, it is difficult to resist the presumption that notwithstanding the suit pending at Ghaziabad, he had, in fact, sought an injunction preventing the realisation of the same amount, for which he has made a prayer to the High Court in this very writ petition, and also from the Sub-Judge, Jagadri, Haryana.
15. The Court also notices that whereas on the record which lie before the Court below, the petitioner has described himself as Gulshan Kumar and is also mentioned by this name in the partnership deed, which he disputes, before this Court, he has signed himself as Gulshan Vinayak. Thus, on the various records, whether before the Court below or before the High Court, the signatures of the petitioner will be found in the style of "Gulshan Kumar" or "Gulshan Vinayak".
16. Then, there is a third aspect of the matter as the aforesaid two references to the records of the Courts below are civil proceedings.
17. On record at the High Court and the lower Courts are other proceedings arising out of criminal cases in which the petitioner is also embroiled. At about the time when the writ petition was being affirmed on 13 July, 1993, the petitioner had already affirmed an affidavit a day earlier on 12 July, 1993, by invoking yet another discretionary remedy of the Court, by a petition under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, registered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 11616 of 1993. Gulshan Kumar Vinayak v. State of U.P. The occasion to refer to these proceedings arose in the rejoinder affidavit in trying to make submissions on the averments made in the counter affidavit. The petitioner by now was aware that the original record of the Union of India would reveal all and threadbare the lis between him and the Department of Telecommunications also. By Criminal Misc. Application No. 11616 of 1993, the petitioner has obtained a stay order by which the proceedings for his prosecution in a criminal case have been stayed by the High. Court. The petitioner was otherwise enlarged on bail by the Court below.
18. The question is why were these proceedings, which were otherwise known to the petitioner, were not disclosed in the writ petition? These proceedings prima facie, from the perusal of the record, reveals that in civil cases the petitioner is protecting himself as being a defaulter for not paying the dues of the Union of India. In criminal cases, the petitioner is defending himself on a charge for an offence under S. 409 of the Indian Penal Code, for criminal breach of trust. The issue before the High Court in this writ petition is not that the contention of the petitioner is that he is not liable. The issue before the High Court is that the record bears out that the petitioner is not a stranger to litigations on the very liability which he disclaims, but is totally familiar and encashed, entangled and involved with court cases, references to which he omitted in his writ petition. But, he solemnly declared in his writ petition that he had concealed nothing. But, this was not correct. The petitioner had already invoked alternate avenues and remedies in the cases he had filed or was defending. The petitioner had not got reliefs from the Courts below. The petitioner explored the possibility of obtaining a stay order from the High Court. He succeeded. If he had referred to all the pending litigations in the Courts below, he would, in all probabilities, would have been required to stick to his alternate remedies.
19. The charge-sheet filed before the appropriate Court, either against D.P.S. Malik or the petitioner, Gulshan Kumar, on the First Information Report of the Union of India, was after due investigation. It is the petitioner's case in his petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, that the charge-sheet was amended, though after investigation. Whether the charges stand proved or not, is not the issue before this Court. The only relevant circumstance, which concerns the High Court, is that both in civil and criminal proceedings, there was an issue that the petitioner (Gulshan Kumar} along with one D.P.S. Malik were alleged to be partners, by the Union of India, in a firm, known as D. G. Associates. The petitioner resists the assertion of the Union of India or the allegations against him in Criminal Courts also, that he is not a partner.
20. Under Chapter V, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, 1952, read with the Indian Oaths Act, 1872, the petitioner was obliged not only to declare that what he had submitted in his affidavit, supporting the writ petition, is true, but, also that he has concealed nothing or that no part of the affidavit was false. How, it is a matter of record that the aforesaid facts on record, within the knowledge of the petitioner, were not brought on record in the writ petition. In the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner found it difficult to deny those facts averred by the Union of India and, thus, was compelled to accept the facts, hitherto not disclosed in the petition, and yet, even after being cautioned by the Union of India that there was much more on record than the record before the High Court, the petitioner conveniently avoided reference to the suit which he has filed before the Sub-Judge, Jagadri, Haryana.
21. These are the circumstances and the reasons by which the Court was compelled to recall it's ad interim order on 11 October, 1993, otherwise granted on 21 September, 1993.
22. The petitioner has testified on oath falsely and wilfully concealed the facts of which he had knowledge, personally, and otherwise from the records of litigations which he either initiated or was resisting. The petitioner was obliged to make a truthful declaration that nothing in the affidavit has been concealed and was suppressed from the Court. On the contrary this Court upon and after notice to the Union of India was intimated and found that the petitioner (1) did not disclose to this Court of the suit which was pending at the Ghaziabad in which proceeding he had participated; (2) did not disclose the fact relating to the suit which he had filed before the Sub-Judge, Jagadri, Haryana; (3) did not disclose to this Court of the charge-sheet filed against him and numbered as Crime No. 296 of 1991, under S. 409 of the Indian Penal Code, P.S. Sahibabad, District Ghaziabad, pending as Criminal Case No. 5308 of 1992 : State v. Gulshan Kumar Vinayak, before Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad; (4) did not disclose to this Court that he had filed a petition under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for quashing the charge-sheet; and (5) did not disclose to the Court that all the aforesaid proceedings are otherwise connected and incidental to the matter relating to the demand which was raised from the firm, known as D. G. Associates, of which the petitioner and one D.P.S. Malik were partners and the issues and the controversies are matters on record and the petitioner knowing that D.P.S. Malik was a necessary party falsely omitted reference to him as a party respondent.
23. This Court is guided by two decisions -- one of the Full Bench of this Court and another of the Supreme Court on what to do next with this writ petition. The relevant extracts from the aforesaid two decisions need to be noticed for the purposes of record. In the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court, on concealment of facts in writ petitions, the Court observed (at p. 767):--
"(51). In our opinion, the salutary principle laid down in the cases quoted above should appropriately be applied by Court in our country when parties seek the aid of the extraordinary power granted to the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. A person obtaining an ex parte order or rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands, must not suppress any relevant facts from the Court, must refrain from making misleading statement and from giving incorrect information to the Court. Courts, for their own protection, should insist that persons invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this, valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or mis-statement of facts. Applying this principle to the present case, we feel that, in this case, the petitioner company has disentitled itself to ask for a writ of prohibition by material suppressions, misrepresentations and misleading statements which have been found by us above."
"The allegations of personal interest and mala fide against the Deputy Custodian (Judicial) were made without any foundation whatsoever for the purpose of inducing the Court to issue a writ of prohibition on the arguments that a Judicial Officer acting mala fide or having a personal interest in the dispute has no jurisdiction to deal with the proceedings before him."
.....
"Misrepresentations about the residence of the share holders were also made for the purpose of meeting this contention. Obviously this is a clear case where, on the principles enunciated by us, the petitioner company, which actually obtained a rule nisi from a Bench of this Court, should be sent out of Court without hearing on merits." (Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Acchru Ram, AIR 1951 All 746).
Taking "a serious note of concealment in pleadings made before the Supreme Court, the Court observed:--
"12. We have set out the facts in this case at some length and passed a detailed order because we are deeply grieved to come accross such conduct on the part of an Association, which claims to represent high placed officers of the premier bank of this country. One expects such officers to fight their battle fairly and squarely and not to stoop low to gain, what can only be temporary victories by keeping away material facts from the Court. It is common knowledge that, of late, statements are being made in the petitions and affidavits recklessly and without proper verification not to speak of dishonest and deliberate mis-statements. We, therefore, take this opportunity to record our strong and emphatic disapproval of the conduct of the petitioners in this case and hope that this will be a lesson to the present petitioners as well as to other litigants and that at least in future people will act more truthfully and with a greater sense of responsibility." (All India State Bank Officers Federation v. Union of India, JT 1990 (2) SC 243).
24. Then, the Court is guided by the provisions of the Procedure of High Court Act, 1869 (U. P. Act No. XIII of 1869) which prescribes for (a) award of costs on petitions, etc., and (b) penalty for making false statements in support of petitions. These aspects are referred in Ss. 3 and 4. These sections are reproduced:
"3. Power to award costs on petitions, etc.-- Whenever any petition, application or motion is made in any matter coming before the said Court in the exercise of its civil or other jurisdiction, the Court shall have power to award and apportion costs in any manner it may think fit."
"4. Penalty for making false statements in support of petitions etc.-- Whenever the Court shall require the statements in support of any such petition, application or motion to be verified by a declaration in writing, the person making such verification shall, if any, such statement is false, and if he either knows or believes it to be false, or does not believe it to be true, be deemed to have intentionally given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceedings."
In a given and appropriate circumstances, the High Court has been conferred the power to award and apportion costs in any manner it may think fit. On concealment in statements in support of pleadings, should the High Court find that concealment and falsehood has been occasioned, then, the Act aforesaid, presumes and deems that a concealment has been, made and a false evidence rendered intentionally in a stage of a judicial proceedings.
25. What remains is the degree of the intention with which the concealment was made by keeping away the correct facts, not stating the truth and only the truth in the writ petition, and the assertion that nothing therein was concealed was a false statement. The affidavit which supported the petition will be deemed to have been intentionally given as false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding. On this, there is and can be no issue.
26. Now, one thing is clear that this Court is obliged, in such circumstances, either not to grant an ad interim order and, further as discussed in this order, when the High Court, comes to know that relevant facts have been concealed, vacate the interim order and thereafter dismiss the writ petition itself. By concealing the references to the aforesaid litigations, the petitioner succeeded in pursuading the High Court that indeed he was a stranger who was wrongly harassed by the respondents in demanding moneys due from the petitioner when he had clearly and absolutely nothing to do either with the money due or the demand made from him. The record not disclosed to the Court revealed otherwise that there were pending litigations with issues between the petitioner and the respondents. Further, a necessary party whom the petitioner was resisting in the Courts below or had made a party in the litigation filed by him, had been omitted in this writ petition. The petitioner feared that this person, D.P.S. Malik, will also tell yet another version. By the concealment made or caused by the petitioner on which this Court was misled to pass an ad interim order on 21 September, 1993, the petitioner is charged with having offended public justice under Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, particularly, S. 191 read with S. 193 of the Code, aforesaid.
27. On what the petitioner has done and by law having deemed to have intentionally given false statemem in a stage of judicial proceeding, the petitioner shall stand to trial.
28. This Court calls upon the Registrar, High Court, and hereby directs him, to take into account what the High Court as held in this order and, particularly, the five points noticed by this Court upon which the petitioner was obliged to declare on an affidavit truthfully that nothing has been concealed, but, in fact, it was concealed, in the writ petition, and this concealment led to the passing of the interim order by this Court on 21 September, 1993. The Registrar will draw up a complaint to be filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, as the cause of action has been occasioned at Allahabad. The Registrar will not be called upon to prove the facts averred in the petition nor the prosecution of the intention of the petitioner to have given the false evidence, as this, the law has presumed, as the petitioner having done so in a judicial proceeding.
29. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, will enquire on the degree of intention of the petitioner and whether the falsehood and the concealment in the affirmation of the petition in the writ petition, was made deliberately and wilfully to obtain an ad interim order and such of those persons who may have abetted with the petitioner, will also be subject of such enquiry.
30. The Registrar will draw up his complaint, regard being had to on-coming Dushehara vacations, within six weeks from today. In drawing up his complaint, should the Registrar need the original record, as was shown to the Court by the Union of India, the Senior Standing Counsel shall made such record available to the Registrar, High Court, and as has been noticed by this Court and the Registrar shall make use of only that record which has been and part of a judicial proceeding.
31. For the interim order which was occasioned because of the falsehood and the concealment made by the petitioner, this Court, after careful perusal of the record and further having given its anxious thought that what the petitioner has done, has offended public justice and the law declares that his concealment tantamounts to, and is deemed to have amounted to, intentionally giving false evidence, an order of costs shall be drawn up by the Registrar. The petitioner is imposed costs of Rs. 5,000-00 for offending public justice. In case the petitioner fails to make the required deposit against costs, within two months from today, the Registrar will draw up an order and cause a decree to be made and these costs will be realised from the petitioner as a decree of the High Court.
32. As the Full Bench (supra) had observed, this writ petition does not deserve consideration on merits and is thrown out of Court as dismissed with costs, as already indicated.
33. Petition dismissed.