IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA & THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND FOURTEEN PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR WRIT PETITION No.19149 of 2014 BETWEEN Gollapally Kista Reddy and two others.
AND ... PETITIONERS The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Secretary, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and others.
...RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Petitioners: MR. P. VENU GOPAL For MR. CH. SIDDHARTHA SHARMA Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR REVENUE (TG) The Court made the following:
ORDER:
I have heard learned senior counsel for the petitioners.
As is evident from the relief claimed, the petitioners question the order of the District Revenue Officer, Hyderabad District in Case No.B1/301/76 dated 10.05.1978 as well as the proceedings of the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District in Memo No.F2/5890/2013 dated 11.06.2014.
2. Brief facts, to the extent necessary, are as follows:
(a) The General Power of Attorney of the petitioners submits that his principals were granted certificates under Section 38-E of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Act’) by the Additional Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad (west) in File No.LRW/229/75 dated 31.05.1975. The writ petitioners along with four others were jointly granted 38-E certificates with respect to Ac.35.25 guntas in Sy.Nos.20, 21, 24 to 33, 35 and 36 of Shamshabad village, Shamshabad Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.
(b) It is pleaded that the aforesaid land originally belonged to one Quairunnisa Begum W/o. Nawab Mohd. Mohinuddin Dowlah Bahadur. Petitioners’ predecessors along with four others were inducted into possession in 1950 as tenants. It is stated that the said land was sold by owners to one P. Rajagopala Raju and two others and they were required to get clearance under Sections 47 and 48 of the Act but could not secure the same and therefore, mutation could not be made in favour of the purchasers. It is stated that the said purchasers alienated the said land to respondent No.6, who filed an appeal questioning the grant of 38-E certificates to the petitioners’ predecessors in interest under Section 90 of the Act. The said appeal was heard by the District Revenue Officer in File No.B1/307/76 on 10.05.1978 wherein it is recorded that the respondents therein i.e. petitioners’ predecessors in interest and other sharers conceded that ownership certificates issued to them were wrong since they had surrendered tenancy rights and requested cancellation of the certificates and to make necessary entries in the revenue record.
The statement of their counsel and the deposition of the said respondents certified by the Personal Assistant to the Collector in the presence of other witnesses were produced before the said District Revenue Officer and under the said order, the District Revenue Officer directed cancellation of certificates by allowing the appeal. The said order is one of the impugned orders in this writ petition.
(c) Petitioners, further, state that since their predecessors were granted 38-E certificate they approached the District Collector, respondent No.2 herein, by filing application under Section 38(5) of the Act on 25.11.2013 requesting the Collector to conduct enquiry with regard to the said order of the third respondent dated 10.05.1978 but the said application of the petitioners was rejected under impugned memo dated 11.06.2014, primarily, on the ground that the District Revenue Officer, who passed the order dated 10.05.1978 is an Officer of equal in rank to the second respondent and as such, on the point of jurisdiction, the second respondent cannot conduct enquiry. Petitioners, however, were granted liberty to seek appropriate remedy from competent forum. The said memo is second impugned proceedings in this writ petition.
3. Learned senior counsel, who appeared in support of this writ petition, strenuously contended that the petitioners’ predecessors could not have relinquished statutory right under Section 38-E of the Act and the order dated 10.05.1978 passed by the then District Revenue Officer is void on the face of it and as such, there was no impediment for the second respondent to conduct enquiry with respect to the said order on the application of the petitioners under Section 38(5) of the Act.
4. I regret my inability to agree to the contentions aforesaid, primarily, in view of the fact that the impugned order was passed as far back as on 10.05.1978 and the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition does not satisfactorily explain any reasons for the said huge delay and laches on the part of the petitioners.
Secondly, the said order appears to be a consent order as not only the counsel for the respondents therein conceded but the respondents themselves filed sworn statements duly attested by the Personal Assistant to Collector and other witnesses. Thus, having consented to the order, which has remained in operation for about four decades, cannot be allowed to be put in jeopardy at the instance of the successors of the said respondents, who are petitioners herein.
Several valuable rights settled among the parties over the years, therefore, cannot be set at knot at this distance of time, particularly, when express consent was recorded in the order dated 10.05.1978.
5. Moreover, the petitioners approached the Collector questioning the very same order on 25.11.2013 requiring him to conduct an enquiry under Section 38(5) of the Act. The said application was rejected at the threshold by the second respondent under the second impugned order on finding that the order dated 10.05.1978 was passed by an Officer holding the same rank as that of second respondent. Hence, liberty was granted to the petitioners to approach competent forum. Petitioners, however, chose to question the second impugned order by way of this writ petition without approaching any competent forum. In my view, therefore, apart from the unexplained huge delay and laches, the petitioners cannot be permitted to question the consent order passed at the instance of their predecessors by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. I am, therefore, not satisfied that the writ petition deserves to be entertained at this distance of time.
Hence, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, this will not preclude the petitioners to approach the competent forum, as directed by the second respondent, in accordance with law.
As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.
VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J July , 2014 DSK