JUDGMENT Sunil Ambwani, J.
1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Sri K.C. Sinha, Senior Standing Counsel, Central Government for respondents.
2. By this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing order dated 31.12.1997, passed by the Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Indian Oil Corporation, Mathura Refinery, Mathura; the order dated 15.9.1998 passed by Deputy Inspector General, North Zone, CISF, New Delhi, and to reinstate him on the post of Constable in CISF with all consequential benefits.
3. The petitioner was recruited as Constable in CISF on 29.5.1983. While he was posted at Mathura Refinery, Mathura, by an order dated 2.4.1997, he as transferred and posted to Firoze Gandhi Thermal Power Project, Unchahar. The petitioner made a representation to the Inspector General, North Zone, CISF, on which a direction was issued by the Inspector General, North Zone to Deputy Inspector General, North Zone, CISF by a wireless message dated 17.4.1997 addressed to the Commandant, CISF, Indian Oil Corporation, Mathura, directing that the petitioner be sanctioned one month's leave and be kept in the Unit itself till his representation against the transfer is decided.
4. The contention is that despite the directions given as above by the D.I.G., CISF (NZ), the Commandant, CISF, Mathura relieved the petitioner after sanctioning one month's leave to him from 3.4.1997, permitting him to join at Unchahar. By a wireless message dated 28.4.1997 received from DIG, CISF (NZ), New Delhi the petitioner's request for cancellation of transfer was rejected.
5. The Commandant, CISF Unit Mathura issued a memorandum to the petitioner on 9.6.1997, initiating departmental proceedings against him. He was charged with firstly for failing to carry out the transfer orders and to join on 13.5.1997 after expiry of joining time and earned leave, secondly for refusing to receive the letter issued by the department namely letters dated 22.4.1997, 29.4.1997, 2.5.1997 and 26.5.1997 and thirdly to forcibly entry in the refinery (plant) on a motor cycle on 25.4.1997 at 10.20 hours, despite of a direction of the Sub Officer posted at the outer gate. The petitioner denied all the charges.
6. A departmental enquiry was conducted in which statements of several persons were recorded. The enquiry report was submitted to the Commandant. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, to which he submitted a detailed reply, which was filed on 2.12.1997. The Commandant, CISF Unit, Mathura by his order dated 31.12.1997 found the petitioner guilty of all the charges, and dismissed him from service in exercise of powers under Rule 29 (a) Schedule-II and Rule 31 (a) of the Central Industrial Security Force Rules, 1969. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General (North Zone) CISF on 15.9.1998.
7. Sri Ashok Khare, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the entire proceedings were taken with malafide purpose and on account of collateral objectives. The petitioner had lodged a complaint before the DIG (NZ) CISF, New Delhi, on 19.3.1997, with regard to the corruption at the Mathura Refinery Unit and highlighted the allegations against the Commandant of the unit as also his henchman through whom he was operating including one Sri Gulab Singh. On the basis of this complaint, Sri Gulab Singh was transferred from Mathura to Unchahar by order of DIG (NZ) CISF dated 31.3.1997. There was no occasion to issue the movement order to the petitioner on 2.4.1992 after his transfer was stayed by the DIG (NZ) CISF, New Delhi, as the radiogram was received by the Commandant, CISF, Mathura on 5.4.1997 and this fact was admitted by Sub Inspector B.S. Negi during course of his examination in departmental proceedings before the inquiry officer. The petitioner had represented against the order of transfer on which instructions were issued on 17.4.1997 to grant him one month's leave and to be kept at Mathura till his representation is decided. The petitioner was on leave for a period of one month and thus a fresh movement order was necessary to allow him to proceed to join at Unchahar. The facts and circumstances did not demonstrate or establish the allegations of misconduct against the petitioner. He has relied upon statement of Sri Ram Prakash, P.W.-2 and Sri Roop Chand, P.W.-3 annexed as Annexures 14 and 15 to the writ petition in which they denied that the petitioner had refused to accept the letters detailed in charge No. 2. The petitioner also denied charge No. 3 with regard to forcibly entry in the refinery. It is submitted that he does not own or possess any motor cycle and that the statement of Smt. Geeta Singh did not establish charge against the petitioner. Sri Ashok Khare submits that even if the allegations stood established, the penalty of dismissal from service was extremely harsh and unreasonable.
8. The respondents contend that all the charges were established. The petitioner was relieved on 3.4.1997 to join at Unchahar. He did not Join even after availing the joining time and earned leave and had refused to accept the letter sent to him. He made forcibly entry in the refinery on 25.4.1997 inspite of the fact that he was relieved from the plant. Sri Sinha has relied upon the previous conduct of the petitioner in support of the punishment awarded to him, in which on 13 occasions he was given minor penalties, censure entries and warnings. These are detailed in the charge-sheet as well as the punishment order.
9. I have gone through the charge sheet submitted by the petitioner, enquiry report, petitioner's objections to the findings of the enquiry officer as well as the punishment order. I do not find that the disciplinary authority committed any error in accepting the findings of the enquiry officer. The petitioner was given full and adequate opportunity to defend himself. He was served with notice dated 3.7.1997, sent by the enquiry officer fixing 10.7.1997 for appearance in the enquiry proceedings. The petitioner did not appear on that date. Thereafter further notices were sent to the petitioner on 10.7.1997 and 17.7.1997 but the petitioner did not appear to defend himself. The enquiry proceedings continued on day-to-day basis in which the Sub Inspector (M) B.S. Negi, P.W. 1, Sub Inspector Karam Singh, P.W. 2, Roop Chand, P.W. 3, Gulab Das, P.W. 4, Ranveer Singh, P.W. 5 and Inspector S.R. Yadav, P.W. 6, Ram Prakash, P.W. 7, Dinesh Tiwari, P.W. 8, Makan Lal, P.W. 9, Inspector Geeta Singh, P.W. 10 and other witnesses were examined. These witnesses established on record that the petitioner did not accept the letters sent by the competent authority. On various occasions beginning from 22.4.1997 to 26.5.1997 he did not proceed to join at Unchahar inspite of the communication of the rejection of her representation.
10. The charges with regard to failure to proceed to join at the transferred place; refusal to accept the letters of the department and to forcibly enter in the plant were sufficiently proved by the evidence led before the inquiry officer. There is absolutely no illegality in appreciating the evidence and for consideration of the materials produced before the inquiry officer.
11. The third submission of counsel for petitioner is the proportionality of the punishment. The legal position with regard to reviewing the quantum of punishment awarded to a delinquent employee has been considered by Supreme Court in the following decisions.
12. In Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (2003) 1 UPLBEC 911, the Apex Court held that absence from duty without proper intimation and permission amounted to grave offence warranting removal from service. In the case of State of U.P. v. Ramakant Yadav, 2002 (4) ESC 78, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court whereby the punishment had been reduced to reinstatement in service on payment of 50% of back wages with a warning to the delinquent and held that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the quantum of punishment in the facts of that case. The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Singh, AIR 1996 SC 736, held that where the employee had absented himself from duty without leave on several occasions, the High Court was not correct in holding that his absence from duty would not amount to such a grave charge so as to impose the penalty of dismissal from service.
13. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2386, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court Martial. But, the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It would not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review."
14. In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Giriraj Sharma, AIR 1994 SC 215, the Apex Court held that overstaying of leave subsequent to the order of rejection of application for extension of leave could not be considered to be a severe enough charge to warrant punishment of dismissal from service and the same was held to be harsh and disproportionate. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Harpal Singh v. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and Ors., 2000 (86) FLR 334, held that where it was on account of negligence of the Constable of the G.R.P., that one passenger was misbehaved with and was murdered, the same could not be a case of serious misconduct and held that the punishment of dismissal from service was totally disproportionate to the offence and thus, directed reinstatement of the employee in service, with half back wages and also ordered that he be given a severe warning. Further, in the case of Alexander Pal Singh v. Divisional Operating Superintendent, (1987) 2 ATC 922 (SC), the Supreme Court held that ordinarily the Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion of the punishing authority in imposing particular penalty but this rule has an exception. If the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate with the misconduct committed, then the Court can interfere. The Railway employee on being charged with negligence in not reporting to the Railway Hospital for treatment was removed from service. The Supreme Court found it fit to interfere with the punishment of removal from service and modified it to withholding of two increments.
15. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Tiwari v. D.I.G., P.A.C. and Anr., 2002 Lab IC 259, has, while reiterating the view of the Supreme Court, held that the High Court normally does not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the punishment shocks the conscience of the Court.
16. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is within the jurisdiction of the competent authority to decide, which punishment is to be imposed, and the question of punishment is decided the purview of High Court's interference, unless it is so disproportionate to proved misconduct as to shock the conscience of the Court. Reduction of sentence by High Court will have a demoralising effect and retrograde step Repentence and unqualified apology at the last appellate stage does not call for any sympathy or mercy.
17. In Regional Manager, UPSRTC Etawah and Ors. v. Hoti Lal and Anr., 2003 (2) ESC 97, Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered the effect of the proportionality of the punishment and the judicial review of such quantum of punishment. After following the entire case law on the subject, the Supreme Court held as follows :
"10. It needs to be emphasized that the Court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. As has been highlighted in several cases to which reference has been made above, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases in the indicated circumstances. Unfortunately, in the present case as the quoted extracts of the High Court's order would go to show, no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taken to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. [See Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree]. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. A party appearing before a Court, as to what it is that the Court is addressing its mind. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal."
18. In the present case, while considering the proportionality of the quantum of punishment, it must be warned in mind that the petitioner was a member of disciplined force. He failed to carry out the transfer order inspite of rejection of his representation, and insisted upon the service of a fresh movement order. He refused to accept letters sent by the department and tried to forcibly enter in the plant premises. These charges by itself may not have resulted into extreme penalty of termination of services if the petitioner had a clean service record. I find that the disciplinary authority had considered the effect of earlier minor penalties granted to the petitioner and the fact that he had a chequered history of indiscipline. The petitioner was awarded warning, censure entries and minor penalty on thirteen occasions detailed in the charge-sheet as well as the punishment order. In November, 1984 he was punished by bringing him down in the pay scale for three years for desertion and loss of Government properties. In June 1987 he was given censure entry for absence without authority. In January, 1991 his three days pay was deducted for refusing to receive the movement order. In February 1992 his two increments were withheld on account of absence from duty post and further he was given a censure entry for misbehaving with the employee of the canteen contractor. In July 1992 he was given a censure entry for not reaching at duty post in time. In August 1992 he was given adverse entry for absence in weekly parade. In October 1992, his salary was deducted for two days on account of absence from duty post. In December 1992 he was found absent from Watch Tower No. 5 and was punished with censure entry. In February 1994 he was given censure entry for being late for one day from duty post. In September 1994 he was given punishment of reduction of three days salary for sleeping on duty. In December 1994 his three day's salary was deducted for over-staying from leave and again in February 1997 he was given punishment of stoppage of one increment for remaining absent from watch tower No. 2. These punishments establish on record that the petitioner was highly indisciplined employee and was grossly negligent in discharging his duties and responsibilities. In these circumstances having regard to the case law cited above, I do not find any good ground to review the punishment given to the petitioner.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.