THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.SURI APPA RAO SECOND APPEAL No.996 of 2010 and CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4551 OF 2010 Dated 27.06.2014 Between:
Bobba Venkateswara Rao .. Appellant and Gogineni Satyanarayana & others .. Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. SURI APPA RAO SECOND APPEAL No.996 of 2010 and CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4551 OF 2010 COMMON JUDGMENT:
Since both the second appeal and civil revision petition preferred by the third party claimant are arising out of common suit, at the request of both the counsel, they are clubbed, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Second Appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment dated 16.07.2010 rendered in A.S.No.523 of 2009 by the V Additional District & Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Guntur confirming the judgment and decree dated 12.10.2009 in E.A.No.33 of 2008 in E.P.No.364 of 2007 in O.S.No.127 of 2007 on the file of V Additional Senior Civil Judge, Guntur.
3. Civil Revision Petition is filed aggrieved over the in action of the Executing Court in refusing to receive the decretal debt before commencement of auction and in not passing any order on the Memo filed by the J.Dr.
4. Facts leading to filing of the present matters, in a nutshell, are as follows:
O.S.No.127 of 2007 was filed before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Guntur, by the D.Hr. viz., Gogineni Satyanarayana against the J.Dr. viz., Kothapalli Krishna Kumari for recovery of money basing on pro-note and the same was decreed ex parte vide judgment dated 31.07.2007 for a sum of Rs.2,05,680/- together with costs and subsequent interest at 6% per annum on Rs.1,20,000/- from the date of the suit till the date of realization. Pursuant to the same, D.Hr. filed E.P.No.364 of 2004 seeking attachment of properties i.e. item Nos.1 and 2 shown in schedule and the same was allowed.
5. Subsequently, appellant herein viz., Bobba Venkateswara Rao, who is the third party to the suit, filed E.A.No.33 of 2008 before the Executing Court seeking to raise the attachment of E.P. in respect of item No.1 of the schedule properties on the ground that he purchased the said property from Jagan Mohan Rao under registered sale deed dated 01.11.2006. It is further submitted that the said Jagan Mohan Rao purchased the property from one Vallabhaneni Padmini, who is the daughter of the J.Dr.-Krishna Kumari, and she became the absolute owner of the suit properties by virtue of gift deed dated 18.08.2005 executed by the J.Dr. and her sons in favour of Vallabhaneni Padmini towards pasupu kumkuma. Thus, the appellant filed E.A.No.33 of 2008 seeking to raise E.P. attachment in respect of item No.1 of schedule properties on the ground of sale deed dated 01.11.2006.
6. The Executing Court dismissed the said application on the ground since no possession was delivered to the vendor of the appellant i.e. Jagan Mohan Rao under Ex.P.2, Ex.P.2 cannot be treated as a sale deed and when said Jagan Mohan Rao himself does not possess any right, title or interest over the schedule property, he cannot transfer the same to his vendee i.e. appellant herein.
7. Aggrieved over the same, appellant herein preferred A.S.No.523 of 2009 and the same was also dismissed by the V Additional District & Sessions Judge, Guntur, vide impugned judgment confirming of the order passed by the Executing Court in E.A. Challenging the same, present Second Appeal has been preferred.
8. Subsequent to passing of attachment order in E.P., the J.Dr. filed a memo before the Executing Court seeking to grant permission to deposit the warrant amount into the Court by way of cash. Since no orders are passed in the said memo, C.R.P. has been preferred questioning the in action of the Executing Court.
9. The following substantial questions of law arise for consideration in the Second Appeal:
a) When the Judgment Debtor has no saleable interest in the property, as by the date of attachment the property was already alienated in favour of 3rd parties under registered document, who in turn sold to others under the Agreement of Sale, whether the Decree Holder can still attach the property on the ground that no title passes to the purchaser under the agreement of sale and whether the Court can still presume that the title of the Judgment Debtor is not divested?
b) Whether the subsequent attachment of property is not subject to the rights of earlier Agreement holder on the principle enshrined under Section 48 of Transfer of Property Act?
c) Whether the validity of the Gift Deed can be gone into in a claim petition without challenge to the same as required under law?
d) Whether the title conveyed by the Agreement holder on the basis of power of attorney executed by the original owner is not valid and binding even if it construed that the agreement holder had not acquired any subsisting interest in the property?
10. In order to prove the case of the petitioner/appellant in both cases, claimant examined himself as PW.1 and also examined one T.Jagan Mohana Rao as PW.2 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.3. On behalf of the respondents, decree holder was examined as RW1 and marked Exs.R1 to R.3.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant submitted that the orders of the Courts below against facts and unsustainable, that the Court below ought not to have sold the entire property at once for recovery of a meager amount and that it is mandatory to sell only such portion of the property which is sufficient for realization of the decretal amount and therefore, the orders under challenge are unsustainable. He also contends that it is obligatory on the part of the court to stop the sale immediately when the debt due is offered or paid before the sale is knocked down. In support of his contentions he relied on the decisions reported in VARANASAYA SANSKRIT VISHWAVIDYALAYA AND ANOTHER v DR.RAJKISHORE
[1]
TRIPATHI AND ANOTHER A N D BISHUNDEO NARAIN AND
[2]
ANOTHER v SEOGENI RAI AND OTHERS .
12. In BISHUNDEO NARAI’s case (2 supra), it was held that:
“In cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Ct.ought to take notice however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion.”
There is no dispute with regard to the prepositions laid down in those decisions.
13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the property which was brought to sale is not partable and as such the entire building was put to auction and that JDr has not raised any objection with regard to conduct of sale or filed any petition before the Court alleging the illegalities in conducting sale and that unless petitioner’s vendor has got title to the property he cannot convey it to the petitioner, and when the vendor of the claim petitioner has no title in the property the appellant cannot acquire better title than what his vendor has in the property. It is also contended that several creditors also filed criminal cases against the 2nd respondent and her family alleging that they have cheated them and some of the creditors have also filed cases under N.I.Act against the 2nd respondent and her family members and the same are pending; that there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned orders of the courts below. In support of his contention he relied on VIJAY KUMAR TALWAR v
[3]
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI , CCEC&ST,
[4]
VISAKHAPATNAM v JOCIL LIMITED , UNION OF INDIA v
[5]
IBRAHIM UDDIN AND ANOTHER , SURAJ LAMP AND INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED (2) THROUGH DIRECTOR v
[6]
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER , ALAMELU AMMAL v
[7]
CHINNASWAMY REDDIAR , C.ABDUL SHUKOOR SAHEB v ARJI PAPA RAO (DECEASED) AFTER HIS HEIRS AND LEGAL
[8]
REPRESENTTIVES AND OTHERS , MARIMUTHU PILLAI v
[9]
KRISHNA PILLAI AND OTHERS , JAGADISH VAISHNAV v
[10]
ARPOS LEADING CATEROR AND OTHERS , PALLEPU POLESWARI v TAMMISETTY NAGESWARA RAO AND
[11]
OTHERS , VISHWANATH AGARWAL S/O SITARAM AGARWAL v SAU SARLA VISHWANATH AGARWAL
[12]
, GURVACHAN KAUR AND OTHERS v SALIKRAM (DEAD)
[13]
THROUGH LRS. and KUMAR GONSUSAB AND OTHERS v
[14]
MIYAN URF BABAN AND OTHERS
14. In VIJAY KUMAR TALWAR’s case (3rd supra), it was held that:
“It is manifest from a bare reading of the Section that an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal lies only when a substantial question of law is involved, and where the High Court comes to the conclusion that a substantial question of law arises from 9 the said order, it is mandatory that such question(s) must be formulated. The expression "substantial question of law" is not defined in the Act. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronouncements. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons, Ltd. Vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.1, a Constitution Bench of this Court, while explaining the import of the said expression, observed that: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." It was further observed that: Similarly, in Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari28 (AIR 1962 SC 1314 2) a three judge Bench of this Court observed that:
"A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law "involving in the case" there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact Vijay Kumar Talwar vs Commnr. Of Income Tax, Delhi on 6 December, 2010 (1 (2001) 3 SCC 179 1)arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis."
15. In IBRAHIM UDDIN AND ANOTHER’S case (5th supra), the Supreme Court held that:
“Section 100 CPC provides for a second appeal only on the substantial question of law. Generally, a second appeal does not lie on question of facts or of law. In SBI V S.N.Goyal this Court explained the terms “substantial question of law” and observed as underLSCC p.103, para 13) 13. … The word ‘substantial’ prefixed to ‘question of law’ does not refer to the stakes involved in the case, nor intended to refer only to questions of law of general importance, but refers to impact or effect of the question of law on the decision in the lis between the parties. ‘Substantial questions of law’ means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. .. any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. .. There cannot, therefore, be a straitjacket definition as to when a substantial question of law arises in a case.”
16. In SURAJ LAMP & INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. case (6th supra), wherein it was held that:
“We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of `GPA sales' or `SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the TP Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an 17 end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.”
17. In ALAMELU AMMAL’s case (7th supra), it was held that:
“After hearing the arguments of both sides and on going through the judgment of the lower appellate court, I find that the learned Judge has not property understood the amended provision of Order 21, Rule 58, C.P.C., and the presumption raised under Tamil Nadu Act 15 of 1976 in the case of alienation during the period of moratorium. Further, the learned Judge, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, relied on Rukkumani Animal v. Kamachi Animal , and held that such questions can be agitated only by a separate suit either under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act or by resorting to the provisions of the insolvency Act and the same cannot be gone into in these proceedings. The decision relied on by the lower appellate Court in Rukkumani Animal v. Kamachi Ammal , was one rendered prior to the amended Act 104 of 1976. But the learned Judge failed to consider the effect of the amended provision of Order 21, Rule 58, C.P.C., in view of Act 104 of 1976. In Southern Steelmet and Alloys v. B.N. Steel , a Bench of this Court held that "the adjudication referred to under Order 21, Rule 58, C.P.C. (as amended in 1976) is not summary and it is the intention of Legislature under the amended C.P.C., that it should be a decision as if rendered in a regular suit resulting in an appelable decree, the fuller examination of the rights of parties has to be held after giving them adequate opportunity to place all relevant materials before the Court so that the court could ultimately decide and adjudicate on all questions including questions relating to title or interest in the property attached." It is clear (from the ratio laid down in the above said decision that) in view of the amended provisions of Order 21, Rule 58, C.P.C., the question of filing a separate suit is barred and all questions relating to title or interest in the property attached have to be decided and adjudicated only in the claim proceedings and not by a separate suit.
18. In VISHWANATH AGARWAL’s case (12th supra) wherein in it was held that:
“In Major Singh v. Rattan Singh (Dead) by LRs and others 15, it has been observed that when the courts below had rejected and disbelieved the evidence on unacceptable grounds, it is the duty of the High Court to consider whether the reasons given by the courts below are sustainable in law while hearing an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
[15]
30. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao and another , it has been ruled that the High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record, no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view of ours has been fortified by the decision of this Court in Abdul Raheem v. Karnataka Electricity Board & Ors.17.
19. In GURVACHAN KAUR AND OTHERS’S case (13th supra) it was held that:
“It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent.”
20. As held in Vidhyadhar’s case ( supra) concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below cannot be disturbed in a second appeal unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record, no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. Substantial questions of law’ means not only substantial questions of law of general importance, but also substantial question of law arising in a case as between the parties. Any question of law which affects the final decision in a case is a substantial question of law as between the parties. A question of law which arises incidentally or collaterally, having no bearing on the final outcome, will not be a substantial question of law. Learned counsel for the appellant-claim petitioner however, submits that the claim petitioner purchased the property on 01.11.2006 (Ex.P.3) and he claims title through his vendor Tunuguntla Jagan Mohan Rao under Ex.P.2 agreement of sale-cum-GPA.
21. According to the petitioner, 2nd respondent (J.Dr)-Kothapalli Krishna Kumari has been in possession and enjoyment of the property ever since its purchase in the year 1973; that 2nd respondent J.Dr has got three sons by name Kothappli Sarath Babu, Krishna Mohan and Venu Madhav besides only one daughter Vallabhaneni Padmini who was given in marriage to Vallabhaneni Sudhakar Chowdary of Vijayawada in the year 1995; that at the time of marriage of Vallabhaneni Padmini the schedule property was given as Pasupu Kumkuma and that gift deed dated was also executed subsequently on 18.8.2005 Ex.P.1; that the said Vallabhaneni Padmini executed a registered agreement of sale cum general power of attorney dated 12.12.2005 (Ex.P.2) in favour of Jagan Mohan Rao and that the said Jagan Mohan Rao inturn sold the same to the petitioner herein vide Ex.P.3. The title to an immovable property flows as per the provisions of Sec.54 of Transfer of Property Act and all the parties are governed under this provision. In order to enforce any right in the property a person should have a legally valid title in terms of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. On perusal of Ex.P.2, the recitals would go to show that entire sale consideration was paid under the document Ex.P.2. So this GPA-cum-agreement of sale is not a merely GPA given by the vendor Vallabhaneni Padmini to the petitioner’s vendor Tunuguntla Jagan Mohan Rao. The right of the petitioner in this case is much dependent upon the title of his vendor. P.W.2-T.Jagan Mohan Rao categorically admitted in his evidence that in Ex.P.2 there is no mention of names of the tenants and their particulars and he did not collect any rents from the tenants who are occupying the said building; so also he did not obtain any mutation proceedings in connection with the property purchased by him; that he is not paying any electricity consumption charges also. P.W.2 also admitted that he is running Annapurna Business Solutions at Hyderabad (Software business) which is a firm and he purchased the house of Krishna Kumari J.Dr. daughter on behalf of the firm. According to P.W.2 he did not mutate his name in the municipal record and he is not paying any electricity consumption charges nor collecting rents from the tenants, and in Ex.P.2 nowhere it is stated that she delivered the possession of the property either on the date of agreement of sale or at any time. When Ex.P.2 does not state that possession was delivered to P.W.2 by Padmini and when no evidence was produced to show that he is collecting the rents or he is possession of the property, the Courts below rightly opined that Ex.P.2 agreement of sale cum G.P.A. cannot confer any title or interest in the property to P.W.2 that is to convey the same to P.W.1. On adjudication of the evidence on record, as rightly held by the lower appellate Court, PW.2 could not get any rights in the property from his vendor V.Padmini. When he himself had no title, the petitioner/appellant cannot claim or acquire any better right. Both the courts below therefore, came to right conclusion that Ex.P.2 agreement of sale-cum-GPA cannot confer any title or interest in the property to PW.2 that is to convey the same to PW.1, consequently, the petitioner/appellant did not acquire any title. Therefore, it follows that the vendor of the claim petitioner has no title in the property and when he himself had no title, the appellant/petitioner cannot acquire better title than what his vendor had in the property. This being the factual position the concurrent findings arrived by the Courts below based on proper appreciation of evidence on record does not warrant any interference by this Court. I therefore, do not see any substantial question of law in this appeal.
22. The other contention of the appellant that no separate possession need to be given, cannot be accepted for one reason or other as Ex.P.2 is a GPA-cum-agreement of sale and the evidence goes to show that there are tenants in the petition schedule property. Moreover Ex.P.2 GPA is for consideration of Rs.50,00,000/-. The recitals go to show that the vendor had agreed to sale the property on a bill contract of Rs.50,00,000/- and also received the total consideration amount. So this is not merely a power of Attorney. Moreover, from a perusal of the contents of Ex.P.2 no where it is stated therein that she delivered possession of the property to the GPA either on the date of the agreement of sale or at any time. According to Ex.P.2 Vallabhaneni Padmini herself retained possession as is seen from this document that she authorized PW.2 to deliver possession to the prospective purchaser on her behalf. Thus, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant does not stand to reason in view of the clear recitals in the document. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the second respondent/JDr and her family indebted to several creditors amounting to Rs.15 to Rs.17 crores and to screen away the properties beyond the reach of creditor, they have brought into existence of G.P.A-cum-sale and therefore, the findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below does not warrant any interference in these matters.
23. Considering the above circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the Courts below on proper appreciation of entire evidence on record came to correct conclusion and the same needs no interference by this Court. Accordingly, I do not see any merit in the second appeal and the same is dismissed being merit less.
24. It is however, submitted that there were more number of creditors amounting to Rs.15 to Rs.17 crores, therefore the contention of the petitioner that only such portion of the property which is sufficient to realize the decretal amount does not stand consideration. Apart from that according to the respondents the memo dated 30.9.2010 was not filed before the court within the time and it was filed after the auction was conducted. It is also clear that the memo do not contain the name of the court, date of filing or any endorsement and when it has been filed after sale was conducted and the presiding officer had no opportunity to pass any order at the time of auction. Therefore, when once the memo was not brought in time, no orders were passed after the auction by the Presiding Officer. Therefore, the presiding officer has rightly not considered the memo and there are no grounds to interfere with the same.
25. For the above reasons, and in view of dismissal of the Second Appeal, I do not see any illegality, irregularity or error of jurisdiction in the Civil Revision Petition. Therefore, I do not see any reasons to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the Courts below.
26. In view of the facts and circumstances above, the second appeal and civil revision petition are dismissed. Interim orders granted earlier stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.
27. Miscellaneous petitions if any pending in the appeal and revision petition shall stand closed.
V.SURI APPA RAO,J Dated: 27.06.2014 Sur/kvrm THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.SURI APPA RAO SECOND APPEAL No.996 of 2010 and CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4551 OF 2010 DATED: 27.06.2014
[1] AIR 1977 SC 615
[2] AIR 1951 SC 280
[3] (2011)1 SCC 673
[4] (2011) 1 SCC 681
[5] (2012)8SCC 148
[6] (2012) 1 SCC656
[7] AIR 1989 MADRAS 311
[8] AIR 1963 SC 1150
[9] AIR 1929 MADRAS 704
[10] 2002(5)ALD 72
[11] 2012(1) ALD 442
[12] (2012)7 SCC 288
[13] (2010) 15 SCC 530
[14] 2008(5)ALD 72 (SC)
[15] AIR 1999 SC 1441