Judgments
Judgments
  1. Home
  2. /
  3. High Court Of Gujarat
  4. /
  5. 2012
  6. /
  7. January

Glory Ship Management Pvt Ltd vs Jaisu Shipping Company Pvt Ltd &Opponents

High Court Of Gujarat|01 November, 2012
|

JUDGMENT / ORDER

(Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE RAVI R.TRIPATHI) 1. The present appeal is filed by original defendant No.2 – Glory Ship Management Pvt. Ltd. being aggrieved by judgment and order dated 27.04.2005 and 09.05.2005 in Misc.Civil Application No.35 of 2005 in Admiralty Suit No.10 of 2000. The learned Single Judge was pleased to reject the application. The operative part of the order reads as under:-
“21. In the above view of the matter, the Court reiterates its earlier finding and reject this application. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and legal issues which are raised and discussed hereinabove, the Court hereby grants time to defendant No. 2 to file written statement upto 13.05.2005.”
1.1 On perusal of the order, it is noticed that earlier, the Court has recorded a finding as under:-
“7. After considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Court is of the view that the distinction sought to be drawn by Mr. Oza does not find any support and paragraph 39 of the judgment is very clear in which in no uncertain and unequivocal terms, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that non obstante clause used in Section 129 is not merely declaratory, but indicative of Parliament's intention to prevent the application of CPC in respect of civil proceedings on the original side of the High Courts. The Court has not restricted the applicability of CPC merely to the Letters Patent proceedings but the said observations are made in respect of all civil proceedings which impliedly include the admiralty suit proceedings.
8. In the above view of the matter, the Court is of the view that the present application filed under O.VII, R.11 (a) for rejection of the plaint is not maintainable and hence, it is accordingly rejected. However, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the request made by Mr. Oza, the Court hereby extends the time for filing the written statement for two weeks from today.
9. Mr.D.D.Vyas, learned advocate appearing for the original Plaintiff has pressed for cost as the written statement is not filed. Since the time is extended, it is made clear that if written statement is not filed on the next date, the Court would seriously consider the issue regarding awarding of cost.
10. The office is directed to notify A.S. No.
10 of 2000 on 11.05.2005.”
1.2 The learned Single Judge referred to para-39 of the judgment of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. Vs. Motorala Inc., reported in (2005) 2 SCC 145.
“39. Taking into account the extrinsic evidence, i.e. the historical circumstances in which the precursor of Section 129 was introduced into the 1882 Code by a specific amendment made in 1895, we are of the view that the non obstante clause used in Section 129 is not merely declaratory, but indicative of Parliament’s intention to prevent the application of the CPC in respect of civil proceedings on the Original Side of the High Courts.”
2. Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr.R.J.Oza for the appellant-original defendant No.2.
2.1 Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that the original side Rules of the Bombay High Court are meant to regulate civil proceedings before the High Court, but it will not be correct to say that 'Civil Procedure Code' will not be applicable in the event the Rules are found silent or having no specific provision to deal with a particular situation. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that the sole purpose of having original side Rules was only to take care of the situations which may be peculiar for the 'concerned High Court', which in all probability, likely to be different from the other Courts of Civil Judicature, including other High Courts in the country. It is only with that purpose, that is to take care of those situations that the High Court was empowered to have its own 'Original Side Rules'. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that Section 129 of the Civil Procedure Code is very clear. Section 129 provides as under:-
Notwithstanding anything in this Code, any High Court [not being the Court of a Judicial Commissioner] may make such rules not inconsistent with the Letters Patent [or order] [or other law] establishing it to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it shall thing fit, and nothing herein contained shall affect the validity of any such rules in force at the commencement of this Code.”
2.2 Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that the fact that power is conferred on the High Courts to make its own Rules for regulating /conducting their 'Original Civil Side Procedure' under Section 129, is indicative of the 'source' wherefrom 'power to make Rules' flows. That being so, in absence of any specific provision in the Original Side Rules, it is the 'Civil Procedure Code' which can be resorted to. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that there cannot be any better fallacy than to argue that, 'though the High Courts are conferred power by Section 129 of the Civil Procedure Code to make its own Rules for regulating the 'Original Civil Side Procedure, but then the Civil Procedure Code will not be applicable'. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that if the contention raised by learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 herein is accepted, it will lead to a situation wherein 'source' wherefrom power to make its own Original Civil Side Proceedings is concerned, will be found missing.
2.3 In this regard, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that in the 'Original Side Rules', there is Chapter-I in Part-III, which provides for “Regulating the Procedure and practice in Cases brought before the High Court under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890”. Rule-52 of the said Chapter reads as under:-
“52. Where not provided for, rules and practice of O.O.C.J. (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction) to apply. - The other proceedings in suits brought in the Court in the exercise of its Jurisdiction under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 not provided for by these Rules shall be regulated by the rules and practice of the Curt in suits brought in it in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.”
2.4 Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that same has to be the position so far as 'Original Civil Side Jurisdiction' is concerned. He submitted that Rule-52 supports his contention /submission that, 'in absence of any specific provision dealing with a given situation, the Civil Procedure Code will be applicable and will be resorted to'.
2.5 Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant next submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in not appreciating the true and correct ratio laid down by the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. (supra). He submitted that in that case, what was being considered by the Hon'ble the Apex Court is found in para-2 onwards. Paras-2, 3 and 4 are reproduced hereunder for ready perusal:-
“2. This appeal impugns the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in a Letters Patent appeal holding that the amended provision of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ’CPC’) would not apply to the suits on the Original Side of the High Court and that such suits would continue to be governed by the High Court Original Side Rules.
Facts:
3. The appellant company filed Suit No. 3092 of 2002 on 16.9.2002 on the Original Side of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay claiming about Rs. 1000 crores on the ground that it had suffered loss and/or damages on account of an alleged fraud on the part of the respondent, a foreign corporation incorporated in the United States of America. The appellant also obtained an ex parte order against the respondent in the nature of an attachment before judgment of receivables in India. On 17.9.2002, the first respondent claims to have dispatched the plaint and all connected papers by courier along with a covering letter of the same date. According to the appellant, the Sheriff of Bombay was requested to transmit the writ of summons along with the plaint and the other proceedings by Regd. A.D. post or by air mail to the respondent, and the Sheriff had done it. On 1.10.2002 the respondent filed a detailed affidavit along with an application to vacate the ex parte ad interim order made on 16.9.2002, as a result of which the ex parte order was modified by the High Court on 3.10.2002. On 16.10.2002 a second Notice of Motion was filed by the appellant. The respondent filed an affidavit opposing the prayers made in the second Notice of Motion. After hearing the parties, the High Court by an order made on 24.10.2002 refused the ad interim reliefs sought in the second Notice of Motion. Though the appellant preferred an appeal from both the Orders dated 3.10.2002, modifying the earlier ex parte order, and the refusal of ad interim reliefs on 24.10.2002, that appeal was finally withdrawn. On 2.3.2003, the appellant applied for issue of duplicate summons. On 13.3.2003 the respondent filed a comprehensive affidavit in reply to the Notice of Motion. On 9.4.2003, duplicate summons were served upon the respondent. On 2.5.2003 the respondent applied for extension of time purportedly under Order VIII, Rule 1 of CPC, by a letter addressed to the Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court of Bombay. The matter came before the learned Single Judge, who after hearing both the sides was of the view that "granting of 90 days time from 9.4.2003, the date on which the duplicate writ of summons had been admittedly served upon the respondent, would provide ample opportunity to the respondent to file written statement on or before 8.7.2003". Although, a prayer was made that the court may exercise its powers under Section 148 of the CPC and grant further extension of 30 days beyond 8.7.2003, that request was declined on the ground that the "request was premature and would be considered only on 8.7.2003, provided the defendant- respondent was able to show sufficient cause for such an indulgence." Further time to file written statement was granted on payment of costs quantified at Rs.10,000 to be paid to the plaintiff-appellant. According to the respondent, the written statement was ready by 6.7.2003, but had not yet been affirmed. The respondent moved the court for further extension of time. This request was also opposed by the appellant. By an order made on 7.7.2003, the High Court extended time up to 28.7.2003.
4. The appellant filed Appeal No. 608 of 2003 before the Division Bench of the High Court challenging the order extending time to file the written statement. On 28.7.2003, the written statement was actually filed by the respondent. The appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench on 17.10.2003, taking the view that the suits on the Original Side would be governed by the Original Side Rules and not by the amended provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC.”
2.6 From the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the question which fell for consideration of the Hon'ble the Apex Court was that, 'when there is a specific provision made in original side Rules and when there is no amendment made to those original side Rules whether the provisions on the same subject matter contained in Civil Procedure Code, duly amended, subsequently will govern the point or the Original Side Rules will continue to govern'. The Hon'ble the Apex Court after considering the rival submissions of both the sides, reached a conclusion which is recorded in para-39, which is quoted hereinabove. It is clear from perusal of the said para that the Hon'ble the Apex Court has hold that, 'once there is a specific provision in the Original Side Rules, the Civil Procedure Code will not be applicable'.
2.7 Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that this is not the position in the case on hand. In the matter before this Court, the question is, 'whether provisions of O-VII R-11(a) will be applicable and whether the plaint can be rejected on the ground that the plaint is not disclosing any cause of action'. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that there is no specific provision in Original Civil Side Rules to handle the aforesaid situation and therefore, the Court will have to fall back on the Civil Procedure Code, viz. O-VII R-11(a).
3. Learned Advocate Mr.Darshan Parikh for respondent No.2 herein supported the submissions made by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant and submitted that there are more than one points on which one may not find any specific provision in the Original Side Rules. Learned Advocate for respondent No.2 submitted that if the contention raised by learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 is accepted then 'vacuum' will be created. The learned Advocate submitted that as per the settled legal position, 'law never allows vacuum to be created' and therefore, submission made by the learned Advocate for respondent No.1-original plaintiff is liable to be rejected.
4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.D.D.Vyas for respondent No.1-original plaintiff strongly submitted that the matter can be decided without deciding the issue of–'applicability of Civil Procedure Code' to the Original Civil Side Proceedings'. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 submitted that the learned Single Judge has already recorded a finding to the effect that, 'the plaint does disclose cause of action' and therefore, this appeal may be disposed of by saying that, 'even without deciding the issue of applicability of Civil Procedure Code to the Original Side Proceedings, once the learned Single Judge has already held that cause of action is disclosed in the plaint, the matter be proceeded further and decided in accordance with law'.
5. As against that, the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant and learned Advocate for respondent No.2 submitted that the question of applicability of Civil Procedure Code to Original Side Proceedings is required to be decided first because once that is decided, on the basis of that decision, the application filed by original defendant No.2-appellant herein will be decided. It is the case of the appellant as well as that of respondent No.2 that, 'the plaint does not disclose cause of action'. Both the learned Advocates submitted that it could be only after the Court decides the question of applicability of the Civil Procedure Code to Original Side Proceedings, the application filed by the original defendant No.2-appellant herein will be required to be decided afresh by the learned Single Judge in light of the decision and as per the provisions of O-VII R-11(a) of the Civil Procedure Code.
6. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.D.D.Vyas for respondent No.1 submitted that it is under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 that the High Courts are vested with admiralty jurisdiction. That being so, that admiralty jurisdiction is to be governed by the provisions made in Chapter-I of Part-III of original side Rules of the Bombay High Court. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 submitted that it is for the sake of convenience that the Publisher has printed those Rules along with original side Rules of Bombay High Court, otherwise they are independent Rules made by the High Court as is clear from the title of the said Rules - “For regulating the Procedure and practice in Cases brought before the High Court under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890”. Be that as it may, the fact remains that these Rules are framed for 'regulating the procedure and practice in cases brought before the High Court under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890' and in these Rules, there is a specific provision– Rule- 52, which, even at the cost of repetition, is quoted again:-
“52. Where not provided for, rules and practice of O.O.C.J. (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction) to apply. - The other proceedings in suits brought in the Court in the exercise of its Jurisdiction under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 not provided for by these Rules shall be regulated by the rules and practice of the Curt in suits brought in it in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 was requested to reply a simple query, viz. in absence of any provision to deal with a given situation in Original Side Rules of Bombay High Court, which law will be applicable?
8. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 submitted that the Original Side Rules are so exhaustive that he is not able to visualize any such situation and therefore, there is no question of any other law being made applicable to take care of any such situation.
9. With respect, this is nothing but an attempt to avoid the question posed. As seen hereinabove, by Rule 52 a provision is made to take care of such situation.
If the Rules referred to are silent, then the Rules of Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction has to govern the situation. This is a pointer to the fact that, 'when the subordinate legislation has not provided for any given situation, it is the parent legislation which governs the situation'. Taking the same analogy, if in Original Side Rules, there is no provision made for a given situation, it is the parent legislation, i.e. Civil Procedure Code which will govern the situation.
10. In support of his submission, learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1-original plaintiff tried to demonstrate that almost for every situation, a provision is made in the Original Side Rules and therefore, there is no question of any such situation emerging at any time where original side Rules will be found lacking to deal with such situation. He emphatically submitted that the judgment of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. (supra) is very clear and the Hon'ble the Apex Court has held in no uncertain terms that there is a clear intention on the part of the Parliament to prevent the application of CPC in respect of civil proceedings on the original side of the High Courts. In support of his submission, he drew attention of the Court to the contents of paras-31 and 36 of the said judgment. The said paras are reproduced hereunder:-
“31. It is next contended for the appellant that merely because Section 129 of the CPC begins with the non obstante clause, "notwithstanding anything in this Code", the section cannot be construed as a departure from the entire body of the CPC so as to render the rules made by the High Courts to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction into a ’stand alone body of rules”. Our attention was drawn by the learned counsel to pages 318-320 of Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (Ninth Edition), and it was contended that "the non obstante clause has to be read as clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have been incorporated in the enactment by the Legislature by way of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and scope of the operative part of the enactment."
Reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose where it was said:
"The enacting part of the statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously."
36. Reference was made to A.G. Varadarajulu and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. , at para 16. This judgment merely followed the observations made in Aswini Kumar (supra) and Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India . There is no doubt that where the non obstante clause is widely worded, "a search has, therefore, to be made with a view to determining which provision answers the description and which does not". The historical development of the law suggests that the non obstante clause in Section 129 is intended to bypass the entire body of the Code so far as the rules made by the Chartered High Court for regulating the procedure on its Original Side are concerned.”
11. On plain reading of the aforesaid two paras, it is clear that these paras are supporting the submissions made by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant and not the submissions made by learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1.
11.1 As is considered hereinabove, the question before the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Iridium India Telecom Ltd. (supra) was that, 'in the case when there is a specific provision already existing in original side Rules, whether Civil Procedure Code will apply and the answer given is 'NO'. When there is a specific provision already existing in the original side Rules, there is no question of Civil Procedure Code being applicable on that point, but the question is whether the same will be the position when there is an absence of a provision in the original side Rules and in the considered opinion of this Court, the answer is, 'YES'. The Civil Procedure Code will be applicable and it will be only and only Civil Procedure Code which will govern the situation and not anything else.
11.2 This Court is not able to agree to the submissions made by the learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 that, 'there cannot be a vacuum'. In the opinion of this Court, the settled position is that, 'whenever there is a subordinate legislation, as in the case on hand, the High Court has framed the Rules to govern its Original Side Civil Jurisdiction, being empowered by Section 129 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Civil Procedure Code is the parent legislation, in absence of any provision in subordinate legislation, the parent legislation will govern the field and will provide solution to the problem'.
12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds that this appeal is required to be allowed. The same is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order dated 27.04.2005 and 09.05.2005 in Misc.Civil Application No.35 of 2005 in Admiralty Suit No.10 of 2000 is quashed and set aside. The application is remitted back to the learned Single Judge with a request to decide the same in light of the observations made hereinabove and in accordance with law.
At the request of learned Advocate for original defendant No.2, it is clarified that as a consequence of allowing of this appeal, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge to defendant No.2 to file the written statement will remain in abeyance till the application is decided.
Taking into consideration the age of the matter, at the request of the learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1-original plaintiff, the learned Single Judge is requested to give top priority to the application and decide the same as early as possible.
(Ravi R.Tripathi, J.) *Shitole (N.V.Anjaria, J.)
Disclaimer: Above Judgment displayed here are taken straight from the court; Vakilsearch has no ownership interest in, reservation over, or other connection to them.
Title

Glory Ship Management Pvt Ltd vs Jaisu Shipping Company Pvt Ltd &Opponents

Court

High Court Of Gujarat

JudgmentDate
01 November, 2012
Judges
  • N V Anjaria
  • Ravi R Tripathi
Advocates
  • Mr Rj Oza
  • Ms Rujuta Oza