IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD FIRST APPEAL Nos. 3518 to 3519 of 2012 With CIVIL APPLICATION Nos. 12343 to 12344 of 2012 In FIRST APPEAL Nos. 3518 to 3519 of 2012 ================================================================ GENERAL MANAGER Appellant Versus CHAUDHARI VAHJIBHAI JETHABHAI & 1 Defendants ================================================================ Appearance:
MR AJAY R MEHTA, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s) No. 1 MR AV PRAJAPATI, ADVOCATE for the Defendant(s) No. 1 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI
Date : 20/12/2012 ORAL JUDGMENT (PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.UDHWANI) The appellant, ONGC, has sought to challenge common judgment and order dated 18/07/2012 passed by learned 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Mehsana in Land Acquisition Reference Cases No.253 of 2011 to 254 of 2011. Since the appeals were sought to be argued only on the issue of quantum of compensation and the rate at which market value of the land in question was assessed and no question of fact was involved, the appeals were heard for final disposal at the admission stage.
2. There is no dispute about the facts that the lands in question were acquired by the appellant for its project out of the lands situated at Village Kukas, Taluka & District Mehsana and the Land Acquisition Officer had awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.40/ per square meter. Upon the references being made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’), the claimants claimed compensation at the rate of Rs.2,000/ per square meter on several grounds and relied upon the award made in respect of lands acquired in the adjoining village of Lakhavad. In that case of land acquisition which was finally settled by Division Bench of this Court vide decision dated 08/12/2010 in First Appeal No.872 of 2010, the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published on 03/07/2004 and the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was at the rate of Rs.8.80 per square meter, against which this Court awarded additional compensation at the rate of Rs.400/ per square mtrs. In the present case, the Land Acquisition Officer has awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.40/ per square meter, while the relevant notification under Section 4 of the Act was dated 13/12/2005. After elaborate reference to the evidence and contentions of the parties, the Reference Court has, by the impugned judgment, awarded additional compensation at the rate of Rs.417/ per square meter.
3. The main argument for the appellants was that the price of the land considered by the Land Acquisition Officer was jacked up by almost 11 times in the main judgment and such increase was not justified in view of lack of evidence as regards the fertility, exact location and yield of the land in question. Learned Counsel, Mr.Vyas, appearing with Mr.A R Mehta vehemently argued that the trial Court had erred in relying upon the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court insofar as the land in question in that case was situated at Village Lakhavad and those lands were at some distance from the land in question. He also submitted that the lands were already in possession of the appellants when the proceedings were initiated and, therefore, the direction regarding payment of interest on the additional compensation, at the rate of 9% from the date of taking possession or from the date of issuing notification under Section 4 whichever is earlier, for the first year and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum till realization was likely to cause complications and disputes.
4. The question raised in these appeals is no more res integra in view of decision of this Court rendered in First Appeal No.3555 of 2012 and allied matters on 10/12/2012, wherein this Court in paragraph Nos.4 and 5 has held as under:
“4. It was however seen from the record and it could not be disputed that boundaries of Village Kukas and Village Lakhavad are common and not only that but the boundaries of Village Kukas and Mehsana are also common. In such circumstances, the award made in respect of land situated in Village Lakhavad and the findings recorded and the amount awarded by this Court in First Appeal No.872 of 2010 were not only relevant but binding. Further in view of the proximity of land to the city of Mehsana, fertility and yield of the land receded into the background in determining the prevailing market price of the land. It was fairly conceded by learned Counsel, Mr.Vyas that the appellants had also hardly led any evidence worth the name to assist the Court in determining the market value and even the rates prescribed by the Government for the purpose of assessment of stamp duty in the form of Jantri were also not placed before the trial Court. Under such circumstances, the assessment of market value of the land on the basis of the aforesaid judgment and the difference of five years in the date of notification under Section 4 clearly appear to be fair and reasonable.
5. It was fairly conceded on behalf of respondents by learned Counsel, Mr.B D Karia appearing with Mr.A V Prajapati that there cannot be any complication or dispute in calculating the interest ordered to be paid by the impugned judgment, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in R. L. Jain (D) by LRS. Vs. DDA And Others [(2004)
4 SCC 79] and even then it may be clarified, as requested for the appellants, that the date of taking of possession of the lands from the respondents shall be taken to be the date from which the appellants ceased to pay rent for the same land to the respondents.“
5. So far as the case on hand is concerned, as noticed above, Notification under Section 4 was issued on 13/12/2005 i.e. within one and half years of the Notification issued in case of the lands of same Village Kukas where from First Appeal No.872 of 2010 arose. Therefore, there were all the more reasons to rely upon the previous award for the referral Court. Furthermore, as can be noticed from the award under challenge, appellants had hardly led any evidence worth the name to assist the Court in determining the market value and even the rates prescribed by the Government for the purpose of assessment of stamp duty in the form of Jantri were also not placed before the trial Court.
6. On the facts of the present case discussed above, the decisions in case of General Manager, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel, [(2008) 14 SCC 745]; Pal Singh Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh [AIR 1993 SC 225 (paragraph No.5)]; Attar Vs. Union of India [(2009) 9 SCC 289] and Basant Kumar Vs. Union of India [(1996) 11 SCC 542], are of no relevance.
6.1 In case of Kasturi Vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 1 SCC 354], wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, on facts found that despite there being evidence as to requirement of development on the acquired lands, development charges were not deducted from the price of lands and thus passed an order for deducting such development charges. Whereas, in the case on hand, there is no evidence showing that the development was required and, therefore, there can be no question of deduction of 1/3rd of the price as argued by learned Advocate for the appellants.
7. The argument however is that since the date of Notification under Section 4 in the above case is prior in point of time and the project for which the lands were acquired was different, reliance could not have been placed on previous award. Reliance is placed on the case of Union of India Vs. Pramod Gupta (Dead) by Lrs [(2005) 12 SCC 1]. This decision deals with principles of res judicata and in the instant case we are not concerned with that principle and, therefore, the reliance placed on the said case by learned Advocate for the appellant is misconceived.
8. It was fairly conceded on behalf of respondents by learned Counsel, Mr.B D Karia appearing with Mr.A V Prajapati that there cannot be any complication or dispute in calculating the interest or additional amount under Section 23 (1A) of the Act, ordered to be paid by the impugned judgment, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in R. L. Jain (D) by LRS. Vs. DDA And Others [(2004) 4 SCC 79] and even then it may be clarified, as requested for the appellants, that the date of taking of possession of the lands from the respondents shall be taken to be the date from which the appellants ceased to pay rent for the same land to the respondents.
9. Accordingly, with the clarifications as aforesaid, the appeals are summarily dismissed.
10. Civil Applications would not survive and stand disposed in view of this order.
(D.H.WAGHELA, J.) (G.R.UDHWANI, J.) sompura