JUDGMENT R.K. Agrawal, J.
1. The General Manager, Modipon Fibre Company, Modlnagar, district Ghaziabad, have filed Special Appeal Nos. 803, 804 and 809 of 1993 against the Judgment and order dated 1.11.1993 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 18116 of 1993, 18117 of 1993 and 18118 of 1993, whereby the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petitions filed by Narendra Pal Gahlot, respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal Nos. 803 of 1993, Om Pal Singh Chauhan, respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal No. 809 of 1993 and Atar Pal, respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal No. 804 of 1993.
2. Special Appeal No. 413 of 1998, has been filed by Dharam Vir, Rajendra Sharma, Hari Ballabh Maheshwari, Suresh Sharma and Ahibaran Singh against the Judgment and order dated 27.4.1998, passed by the learned single Judge whereby the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 30351 of 1993 filed by them has been dismissed.
3. Special Appeal No. 415 of 1998, has been filed by Jasveer Singh, Mool Chandra Gupta and Hari Mohan Goyal against the judgment and order dated 27.4.1998, passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 30354 of 1993 wherein the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition following the judgment and order passed in Writ Petition Wo. 30354 of 1993, Raj Kumar and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors., decided on 27.4.1998 itself.
4. Since all these special appeals involve a common question of law, they have been heard together and are being decided by a common judgment.
5. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to all these special appeals are as follows :
"All the writ petitioners claim themselves to be the permanent employees of Modipon Fibre Company, Modinagar, district Ghaziabad (hereinafter referred to as the Company). Their services were terminated under Clause 19 (a) (bb) of the Certified Standing Orders. Along with the termination order, the company sent a bank draft to each of the petitioners for the amount due upto the date of termination of their services in lieu of notice to pay retrenchment compensation under Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and in lieu of notice under Clause 19 (a) (bb) of the Certified Standing Orders."
6. The order of termination was challenged before this Court by the petitioners through various writ petitions. The Writ Petition Nos. 18116 of 1993, 18117 of 1993 and 18118 of 1993 were allowed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 1.11.1993 by holding that the Certified Standing Orders had statutory effect and the order may be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if they are illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play. This Court further held that the order of termination has been passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and, therefore, are violative of the principles of natural justice. The Court held the order of terminations as arbitrary and quashed the same. However, Writ Petition Nos. 30351 of 1993 and 30354 of 1993 were not decided along with the earlier three writ petitions and were decided subsequently, vide judgment and order dated 27.4.1998. This Court relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, 1995 (5) SCC 75, dismissed both the writ petitions on the ground that the right which the petitioner's claim accrued under a composite statute which provided for a forum of redressal, therefore, the writ petition should not be entertained. The Court further held that in the present case the respondent company would be deprived of the right to prove their case in support of the impugned orders by producing evidence unless the parties are relegated to forum provided under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The Court distinguished the earlier judgment of the learned single Judge in the case of Narendra Pal Singh Gahlot on the ground that these two objections were not considered.
7. The Company has challenged the judgment and order dated 1.11.1993 passed by the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition in Special Appeal Nos. 803, 804 and 809 of 1993 whereas the judgment and order dated 27.4.1998 has been challenged by the employees/ petitioners in Special Appeal Nos. 413 and 415 of 1998.
8. We have heard Sri Vijay Bahadur Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri P. S. Baghel and Sri Vijay Sinha, learned advocates for the Company and Sri R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri A. K. Singh for the employees/writ petitioners.
9. Sri V.B. Singh, learned senior counsel submitted that the writ petitions filed by the employees-writ petitioners were not maintainable as they had been filed against M/s. Modipon Fibre Company, which is a purely private company and is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In support he relied upon the following decisions :
(1) V.S.T. Industries Ltd. v. V.S. T. Industries Workers' Union and Anr., 2001 (1) AWC 2.7 (SC) (NOC) : JT 2001 (1) SC 36.
(2) Workmen of Pepsico India Holdings Ltd. v. Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kanpur and Anr., 2000 (3) AWC 1800.
(3) Heera Lal Sharma v. Indo Gulf Fertilizers and Chemical Corporation, Jagdishpur, District Sultanpur and Ors., (1990) 3 UPLBEC 1727.
(4) Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. Nil of 1993, Rajpal v. Vice Chairman and Managing Director, Modi Rubber Ltd. and Ors., decided on 9.12.1993.
10. He further submitted that the employees-writ petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy to challenge the order of termination by raising an industrial dispute under Section 4K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the labour court as all of them are workmen and therefore, the writ petitions filed by them were not maintainable. In support thereof he relied upon the following decisions :
(1) Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2238, (2) Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U. P. Cooperative Union, Lucknow and Ors., 1991 (2) AWC 1005 : 1991 (2) UPLBEC 898 (FB).
(3) Scooters India and Ors. v. Vijai E.V. Eldred, JT 1998 (8) SC 204.
11. Sri V.B. Singh further submitted that the Certified Standing Orders do not have any statutory force or statutory effect and therefore, neither its provision nor its non-compliance can be questioned under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to him any person aggrieved can file an application for modification of any of the clause of the Certified Standing Orders under Section 10 of the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946. He relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajas than State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. and Krishna Kant and Ors., 1995 (5) SCC 75, and submitted that now the Supreme Court had held that the Certified Standing Order have no statutory force.
12. According to him if the matter is referred before the labour court, the company will get an opportunity to justify their action, as the labour court has full powers and jurisdiction to hold the enquiry itself and permit the parties to lead evidence in case where no enquiry has been held or the enquiry held is found to be defective, which cannot be done by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On merits, he submitted that the services of the writ petitioners were terminated on the ground of gross misconduct, as they were found involved in theft and the company had lost confidence and that is why their services were terminated under Clause 19 (a) (bb) of the Certified Standing Orders without any enquiry. He further relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation Greater Bombay v. P.S. Malvenkar and Ors., (1978) 3 SCC 78 and Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. A.B. Zodge and Anr., (1996) 4 SCC 374. Thus, he submitted that the learned single Judge had erred in law in allowing Writ Petition Nos. 803, 804 and 809 of 1993 and quashed the order of termination and justified the judgment and order dated 27.4.1998.
13. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior Counsel, however, submitted that the employees-writ petitioners are permanent employees/workmen in the company for the last several years and without giving any show cause notice or any opportunity of hearing their services were terminated, which is wholly arbitrary and is in utter disregard and gross violation of principles of natural justice, equity and fair play. According to him, the Clause 19 (a) (b) and 19 (bb) of the Certified Standing Orders of the Company violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and they are further opposed to the Directives Principles of State Policy as enshrined in the Constitution of India under Article 39(a) and 41 of the Constitution of India.
14. Sri R.N. Singh further submitted that Modipon Fibre Company is a registered public limited company under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and its activities are of vital national importance and welfare of the State. The employment in such a company is a public employment and the property is a public property, though it is not chartered by the Crown but not only the undertaking, but also the Society has a stake in its proper and efficient working. The service condition of those who worked for them must be fair, certain and secular. Thus, it Is having public duties and responsibilities to perform and if need arises, the Courts should lift the corporate veil to ascertain its activities. According to him, a writ can be issued to any official of a society to compel him to carry out the terms of the statute under or by which the said Society is constituted or governed and also to companies or corporations to carry out duties placed on them by the statute authorising their undertaking. According to him a writ can also be issued to companies constituted by the statute for the purposes of fulfilling the public responsibilities. He submitted that the writ petition filed by the employees were fully maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as this Court has ample power under Article 226(1) of the Constitution of India to exercise jurisdiction over any proceeding for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Thus, he submitted that the learned single Judge was not justified in dismissing the two writ petitions vide judgment and order dated 27.4.1998 on the ground of being not maintainable. He further submitted that the existence of alternative remedy in the present case i.e., raising an industrial dispute is not an absolute bar in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as this is a rule of policy, confidence and distinction and not a rule of law and in appropriate cases and exceptional circumstances, the Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to him, alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in cases where the writ petition is to seek enforcement of any of the fundamental right, where there is a violation of principles of natural justice or where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. He relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1998 (8) SCC 1 and a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumar v. State Sugar Corporation and Ors., 2001 (4) AWC 3032 : (2001) 3 UPLBEC 571. It was further submitted that Article 226 confers wide power on the High Court to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226 writs can be issued to any person' or authority. The terms 'authority' used in the context must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term of Article 12 which is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. Words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentality of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty and owing positive obligation to the affected party. The duty on the person or authority named not be Imposed by statute, and they are, amenable to writ jurisdiction as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Andi Mikta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Swarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. v. V.R. Rudani and Ors., (1989) 2 SCC 691. It was also submitted that Parliament enacted the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (1946 Act in short), which provided that it was an Act to require employment in industrial establishment to formally define condition of employment under them. By Section 3, a duty is cast on the employer governed by the Act to submit to the certifying officer draft standing orders proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment. The standing orders of the company has been duly certified under the 1946 Act on 4.6.1970, They have later amended terms and conditions of the termination of services by establishment on 19.12.1988, Clauses 19 (a), 19 (b) and 19 (bb) confer absolute and unfettered discretions on the employer which had become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between the employers and his employees. It is also relevant to state that the principles of natural Justice must be read into the impugned standing orders. This Court can lift the veil and can judge the fairness and reasonableness under Section 4 of the Standing Orders Act, 1946. Principle of natural justice is that no man should be condemned unheard and intends to prevent the authority to act arbitrarily affecting rights of the concerned person. An order involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the Rules of natural justice under Article 14 as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Ors., (1984) 3 SCC 369. It was further submitted that it Is well-settled law that right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution would Include right to livelihood. The order of termination of the services of an employee visits with civil consequences of jeopardising not only his livelihood but also career and livelihood of dependents. The deprivation thereof must be in accordance with just and fair procedure prescribed by law, confirming to Articles 14 and 21 and has to be just, fair and reasonable and not fanciful, oppressive or at vagary. The principles of natural justice is Integral part of the guarantee of equality assured by Article 14. Thus, rules sets out ,in the impugned standing orders are void and ultra vires. The principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of D.K. Yadav v. J.M. Industries Ltd., JT 1993 (3) SC 617, would be applicable. It was further submitted that the termination orders were passed by the respondent No. 2 in pursuance to terms and conditions of termination of service framed in certifying standing order in Clauses 19 (a), 19 (b) and 19 (bb) empowering the respondent No. 2 to terminate the services of permanent employees without giving any reason and by giving notice, which is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act as being opposed to public policy and is also ultra vires and is unconstitutional. It wholly ignores the audi alteram partem rule. The principles laid down in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101, is fully applicable to the present case. It is also violative of directive principles contained in Articles 39(a) and 41 of the Constitution of India and, it cannot be supported on the basis of mutuality on the ground similar right is conferred on employees also. The Court, when called upon to do so, shall strike down unfair and unreasonable contract or unfair and fanciful clause in a contract, entered into between the parties who are not equal of bargaining power. In the above view, it is clear that object or consideration of Clauses 19 (a), 19 (b) and 19 (bb) is opposed to public policy and is unlawful and void. The impugned termination orders of their services without complying with the provisions of Section 6N of the Act, 1947, is illegal and violative of principles of natural justice. It was apparent on the face of record that Section 6N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was not taken recourse to by the employers and thus being violative of Section 6N of the said Act. Therefore, writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution praying a writ of ccrtiorari is maintainable even against the company. It was further submitted that under Section 4A(1) of the 1946 Act the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette constitute labour courts for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the first schedule and for performing such other function as may be assigned to them under this Act. Thus, the jurisdiction is conferred upon the labour court to adjudicate the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the Certified Standing Orders. Thus, the labour court under Section 4A of the Act are competent to hear and adjudicate matters falling in the first schedule as well as the Industrial Tribunal under Section 4A of the 1946 Act.
15. He further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of .Rajas than Transport Corporation (supra), has held that Certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act are statutory Imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employer and employees, though they did not amount to statutory provisions. This case did not consider the case of Hon'ble Supreme Court in D.K. Yadau (supra), nor D. T. C. v. D. T. C. Congress Mazdoor nor Central Inland Water Transport Corporation (supra), has been considered. So far as the relief is concerned, in Rajasthan Transport case also, it has been held that it cannot be denied to an employee. It was submitted that no approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, of his action has been taken when the compliance of Section 33(2)(b) is mandatory. The provisions of Section 33(2)(b) suggests that authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide. An order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date of non-approval of the order of dismissal, which contravenes the provisions of Section 33 invites punishment under Section 31(1) with imprisonment and fine. The order of dismissal or discharge being incomplete and inchoate until the approval is obtained. It cannot effectively terminate the relationship of the employer and employees. If the approval is not accorded by Tribunal, the employer would be bound to treat the employee and paying his full wages for that period, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Zadpur Zila Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors., 2002 (4) Supreme 296.
16. Sri R.N. Singh, learned senior counsel further submitted that the learned single Judge while allowing the writ petitions vide judgment and order dated 1.11.1993 had upheld the claim of the writ petitioners by holding that the action/termination order has been passed in gross violation and utter disregard of the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play, whereas another learned single Judge vide judgment and order dated 27.4.1998, had dismissed the other two petitions on the ground of alternative remedy. This Court, should adopt a view, which advances the cause of justice, and not the technical view of relegating the writ petition as to the alternative remedy of raising an industrial dispute, as the employees/writ petitioners belong to weaker sections. Thus, he submitted that the judgment and order dated 1.11.1993, passed by the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition should be upheld whereas, the judgment and order dated 27.4.1998, be set aside and instead the remaining two writ petitions which have been dismissed should be allowed so that justice be done.
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we find that it is not in dispute that Modipon Fibre Company is a company incorporated under the Companies Act and carries its activities in accordance with the various enactments. It is not a statutory company as it has not been created under any statute to carry out any specific purpose, though it may be a public company commonly understood in which the public may be shareholders/members, but it does not get the status of statutory company/corporation owned or controlled by the State. On the other hand, it is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of fibres as any other private person. The business of manufacture and sale of fibres, which is carried out by the company is not as a result of any statutory provision. In the case of V.S. T. Industries Ltd. (supra), a question arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as to whether a company which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes involved any public function so as to make it amenable to writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court laid down the principles when an activity of a private body can be said to public function and subject matter of Judicial review. In para 7 of the reports, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows :
"In De Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edition, it is noticed that not all the activities of the private bodies are subject to private law, e.g., the activities by private bodies may be governed by the standards of public law when Its decisions are subject to duties conferred by statute or when, by virtue of the function it is performing or possibly its dominant position in the market, it is under an implied duty to act in the public interest. By way of illustration, it is noticed that a private company selected to run a prison although motivated commercial profit should be regarded, at least relating to some of its activities, as subject to public law because of the nature of the function it is performing. This is because the prisoners, for whose custody and care it is responsible, are in the prison in consequence of an order of the Court, and the purpose and nature of their detention is a matter of public concern and interest. After detailed discussion, the learned authors have summarised the position with the following propositions :
(1) The test of whether a body is performing a public function, and is hence amenable to judicial review, may not depend upon the source of its power or whether the body is ostensibly a "public" or a "private" body.
(2) The principles of judicial review prima Jade govern the activities of bodies performing public functions.
(3) However, not all decisions taken by bodies in the course of their public functions are the subject matter of judicial review. In the following two situations judicial review will not normally be appropriate even though the body may be performing a public function :
(a) Where some other branch of the law more appropriately governs the dispute between the parties. In such a case, that branch of the law and its remedies should and normally will be applied ; and
(b) Where there is a contract between the litigants. In such a case the express or Implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern the transaction, or other relationship between the parties, rather than the general law.
Thus, where a special method of resolving dispute (such as arbitration or resolution by private or domestic Tribunals) has been agreed by the parties (expressly or by necessary implication), that regime, and not judicial review, will normally govern the dispute."
18. The Apex Court further held that:
"In the present case the appellant is engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes will not constitute any public function. The requirement in setting up a canteen when the establishment has more than 250 workmen is only a condition of service relating to a workman providing better facility to work and to discharge their duties properly and maintain their own health or welfare. In other words it is only a labour welfare device for the benefit of its work unlike a provision where Pollution Control Act makes it obligatory even on a private company not to discharge certain effluents. In such cases public duties is owed to the public in general and not specific to any person or group of persons. Further the damage that would be caused in not observing them is immense. If merely that can be considered a part of the conditions of service of a workman is violated then we do not think that there is any justification to hold that such activity will amount to public duty. "
19. In the case of Workmen of Pepsico (supra), this Court had held that no public duties is involved where private company terminated the services of its employees and the writ petition is not maintainable. Similar view was taken in the case of Heera Lal Sharma (supra) and Raj Pal (supra).
20. So far as the contention advanced by Sri R.N. Singh, that Modlpon Fibre Company has been incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act and is governed by the said Act and various other enactments' while discharging its day to day functions and the general public is interested in its affairs as it is treated as a public company is concerned, suffice is to mention that the said company has not been created under any statute for discharging any specific purpose. It is just like any other company doing business in the country. It is not involved in discharging any public function or duty while terminating the services of its employees as held by the Apex Court in the case of V.S. T, Industries (supra). Thus, the writ petition is not maintainable against a private company. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhdeo Singh and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram, 1975 (1) SCC 421, relied upon by Sri R.N. Singh would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, in as much as the said case is related to Corporation constituted under specific enactments and were owned and controlled by the State. Thus, the Corporations were held to be covered under the term State as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and it was held by the Apex Court that the order of removal from service of an employee of the said Corporation in the contravention of regulations framed under the respective Acts would enable an employee to approach the Courts for a declaration against the Corporation for continuance in service. Thus, we are of the view that the company is not discharging any public function while it terminated the services of the writ petitioners. In this view of the matter, the writ petitions filed by the employee-writ petitioners was not maintainable.
21, So far as the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Whirlpool Corporation (supra), is concerned, in the aforesaid case, the action of the Registrar, Trade Mark in issuing notice to M/s. Whirlpool Corporation was under challenge as being wholly without jurisdiction. The Apex Court repelled the objection regarding alternative remedy.
Before the Apex Court, the question of discharging of public function by a private body and its amenability to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 was not involved. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Singh (supra), the employee was terminated from service by U. P. State Sugar Corporation, which was held to be a State within the meaning of the term "State" as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the writ petition was entertained.. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anadi Mikta Sadguru Shree Muktqjee Vemdas Swami Swarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Ors. v. V. R. Rudani and Ors., relied upon by Sri R.N. Singh, would be of no assistance to him as it has already been held by us that the Company is not discharging any public function, so as to make it amenable to its writ jurisdiction. Moreover, the aforesaid decision has came up for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V.S.T. Industries Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that in Anadi Mikta's case, this Court examined the various aspects and the distinction between an authority and a person and after analysis of that decision referred in that regard came to the conclusion that it is only circumstances, when the authority or the person performs a public function or discharges a public duty. Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked, since it has already been held in the present case that the company is not discharging any public duty or performing any public function, Article 226 cannot be invoked. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudhir Chand Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. and Ors. (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Certified Standing Orders become statutory condition of service and if any provision of such rules read with Certified Standing Orders confer absolute unfettered discretion on the employer to allow or disallow rightful claim of the employees would be unfair and unreasonable and also subject to test of Article 14 and the Court can judge the fairness and reasonableness as of the Certified Standing Orders and declaration is bad and an enforceable the proceedings arose out of a suit and not under writ jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), has held that the Certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment Standing Order Act, 1946, are statutorily imposed condition of service and are binding both upon the employees and employers, though they do not amount to statutory provision. Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief offered before the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act or by the Civil Court. Thus, the Certified Standing Orders being not a statutory provision, though they are statutory conditions of service, any violation thereof by a private body not. discharging any public function or public duty are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and cannot be challenged straightaway before this Court. Thus, the writ petitions being not maintainable, are liable to be dismissed.
22. Since we have held that the writ petitions itself were not maintainable, we are not going into merits of the matter and leave it open to the writ petitioners to raise their grievances before the appropriate forum.
23. In the result, the Special Appeal Nos. 803, 804 and 809 of 1993 are allowed and the judgment and orders dated 1.11.1993 is hereby set aside and the Writ Petition Nos. 18116 of 1993, 18117 of 1993 and 18118 of 1993 are dismissed. Special Appeal Nos. 413 and 415 of 1998 fail and are hereby dismissed.