IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION No. 4530 of 2012 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI ========================================================= 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether this case involves a substantial question 4 of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
========================================================= GEETABEN WD/O JAYANTIBHAI DHANJA (PATEL) - Applicant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & 1 - Respondent(s) ========================================================= Appearance :
MR RJ GOSWAMI for Applicant(s) : 1, MR LR PUJARI APP for Respondent(s) : 1, MS ROOPAL R PATEL for Respondent(s) : 2, ========================================================= CORAM: HONOURABLE MS JUSTICE SONIA GOKANI 22nd June, 2012 CAV JUDGMENT
1. Original complainant has preferred this Application, who lodged complaint with Morbi City Police Station, being I-CR No.30/2012 for the offences punishable under Sections 306, 376, 506 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Respondent No.1-accused herein filed regular bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No.78 of 2012 on 1st March, 2012 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court at Morbi. The Court has granted regular bail on 6th March, 2012, after hearing both the sides. Being aggrieved by the impugned order, on various grounds raised in the present application, this Application for cancellation of bail is preferred under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. It is urged by the learned advocate for the applicant- complainant that the entire family was working in a factory of the respondent and grave offences have been committed against the prosecutrix, who was barely 16 years old under the pretext that the father of the prosecutrix had borrowed money from the respondent-accused to the tune of Rs.90,000/- and thereafter, for the purchase of a new house, a sum of Rs.2,04,000/- has been lent by the respondent and he had ensured to deduct the same from the salary of all the family members, who were working in his factory.
4. He further argued that the complainant herself elaborately reveals ill-intention on the part of the respondent who had taken liberty with the person of the prosecutrix at every stage and also committed an offence of rape on her. If the husband of the complainant eventually committed suicide on account of shock due to such abhorable conduct and cruelty perpetrated by the respondent, he urged that the Court ought to have regarded all these circumstances before granting the regular bail.
5. Learned APP appearing for the State has urged that there has been sufficient material available to substantiate version of the complainant. The fact is also on record that the entire family was engaged in the factory and the offence of rape was committed prior to the date of the incident of suicide, however, on account of obligation of the applicant, the same was not complained. It is natural for such young girl and the family nor to reveal the same earlier, he urged that this conduct eventually led to the death of father of prosecutrix.
6. Learned advocate appearing for respondent No.2 urged that there has been no misconduct after the grant of bail, the complaint has been filed at a belated stage and it is discretionary relief to enlarge the person on bail and the same need not be interfered. Reliance is placed on following judgments:
(i) 1984 (1) SCC 284;
(ii) 2005 (8) SCC 21;
(iii) 2005 (4) SCC 178;
(iv) 2004 (13) SCC 617;
(v) 2004 (11) SCC 165;
(vi) 2010 (6) SCC 753;
(vii) 2009 (11) SCC 392;
(viii) 2009 (8) SCC 325;
(ix) 1999 (3) AIR SC 1.
(a) In case of Aslam Babalal Desai vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1:
– grounds of cancellation of bail under Ss. 437 (5) and 439 (2) – are discussed this way.
The grounds for cancellation of bail under Sections 437(5) and 439(2) are identical, namely, bail granted under Section 437(1) or (2) or 439(1) can be cancelled where (i) the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity, (ii) interferes with the course of investigation, (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence of witnesses, (iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country, (vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency, (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. It must also be remembered that rejection of bail stands on one footing but cancellation of bail is a harsh order because it interferes with the liberty of the individual and hence it must not be lightly resorted to.”
(b) In case of Ashok Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2009) 11 SCC 392, the question arose of cancelling the bail granted by the High Court. The Supreme Court observed thus:
“11. Since the accused is on bail for a considerable length of time, we do not think it appropriate to cancel the bail, though there appears to be some substance in the plea that the impugned order granting bail suffers from various infirmities. Let the trial be completed within three months. If the complainant or any witness seeks protection for appearance before the Court during trial, the same shall be provided by the police officials concerned. The trial court would take up the matter on continuous basis to complete the trial within the period indicated above.”
(c) In case of Devender Kumar vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 753; Apex Court held that:
“As there was no allegation of misuse of bail granted by the High Court, cancellation of bail for the sole purpose of police remand to recover the marriage articles in a case of cruelty under Sections 498-A, 406, 506, 323, etc. of IPC was not held to be a sufficient ground.”
(d) In case of Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee vs. State of W.B., reported in (2004) 11 SCC 165, the Supreme Court has laid down the principles while deciding the application for cancellation of bail. It held that the High Court is not to decide as if it sits in an appeal against the conviction while deciding the question of cancellation of bail, by holding thus:
“The High Court has approached the case as if it is an appeal against the conviction by giving findings on factual issues which are yet to be decided, which is too premature and is likely to prejudice the trial. That apart, since the only ground on which the cancellation of bail could have been ordered being the ground of intimidation which is not satisfactorily proved, the High Court erred in cancellation the bail granted to the appellant.”
(e) In case of Ramcharan vs. State of M.P., reported in (2004) 13 SCC 617:
“The Supreme Court held that the bail can be cancelled on existence of cogent and overwhelming circumstances but not on reappreciation of the facts of the case and therefore, in the absence of any supervening circumstances which might warrant recalling of the order which granted bail, suo motu cancellation of bail by the High Court merely on the ground that the bail order was passed on some misapprehension of factual position was not sustainable. It further held that different considerations are required to be weighed while dealing with applications for cancellation of bail and for grant of bail respectively.”
(f) In case of Nityanand Rai vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 178, the question was of cancellation of bail on the ground of misconduct of the accused while on bail, as this is not the case here, no further dilation of this authority is required.
(g) In case of State of U.P. vs. Amarmani Tripathi, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 21, the Supreme Court re- stated the principles of cancellation of bail in the following manner:
“20. In Panchanam Mishra v. Digambar Mishra this Court observed:
“The object underlying the cancellation of bail is to protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty by the bail order from tampering with the evidence in the heinous crime.... It hardly requires to be stated that once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent, the accused in order to get away from the clutches of the same indulge in various activities like tampering with the prosecution witnesses, threatening the family members of the deceased victim and also create problems of law and order situation.”
21. Therefore, the general rule is that this Court will not ordinarily interfere in matters relating to bail, is subject to exceptions where there are special circumstances and when the basic requirements for grant of bail are completely ignored by the High Court.
22. While a detailed examination of the evidence is to be avoided while considering the question of bail, to ensure that there is no prejudging and no prejudice, a brief examination to be satisfied about the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case is necessary ”
(h) In case of Bhagirathsinh s/o Mahipat Singh vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1984) 1 SCC 284:
“Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. Even where a prima facie case is established, the approach of the court in the matter of bail is not that the accused should be detained by way of punishment but whether the presence of the accused would be readily available for trial or that he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence.”
7. On having, thus, heard learned advocates for the parties and on having examined the material on record as also the order impugned, it can be noted that the Sessions Court granted regular bail mainly because of the delayed complaint. The Court noted in the order that the incident of rape narrated in the complaint appears to have happened in the year 2008 when daughter-in-law of respondent No.2 was pregnant. Under the pretext of looking after a pregnant woman, respondent No.2 had taken liberty with the prosecutrix, however, the complaint has been filed in the month of February, 2012. This fact has weighed with the Court in granting regular bail. The Court has also noted the fact that in the suicide note, the deceased has made a mention that he was threatened of being killed and those words are not found potent enough to languish the respondent in jail for a longer duration as a trial in such cases naturally would take a long time.
8. Independently examining material on record, the complaint has been filed by the mother of the prosecutrix on 13th February, 2012 as her husband had committed suicide by hanging himself in front of the factory. A small chit from his pocket, when was found, reflected threats from respondent No.2 and his son. The complaint further reveals that 10 months before the date of incident when they needed additional amount of Rs.2,04,000/- for purchasing of a new house, respondent No.2 who was employer of the deceased husband of the complainant, as also other family members, had helped with the money. In lieu of such a help, he expected the company of one of the daughters of the deceased. He had also gone to the extent of stating that he would rather retain the daughter instead of getting the money back from the deceased. He further took liberty in solitude with the daughter.
He and his son insisted on the daughter working with them as this continued, deceased changed their residence and for the past six months, daughter started working in a beauty salon, where also, the respondent No.2 followed her. A fortnight before, respondent No.2 visited the house and insisted that he would be taking daughter of the complainant. Accused thus, had greatly upset the family and the deceased had ensured to pay back the entire money and requested respondent No.2 not to ever visit the house. Prosecutrix also confided to the parents that when daughter-in-law was pregnant, nearly 2-3 times, the respondent had forced himself on her and committed rape. He had also threatened her to malign in the society. He also followed the daughter, wherever she went. This created enormous tension and therefore, the husband chose to commit suicide. Chronology of events require to be kept in view and this appears to be a continuous threat culminating into suicide of the deceased and therefore, delay in lodging complaint of rape, per se which may not be disregarded or viewed with less sensitivity.
9. On merit, it can be said when the order impugned is examined, there appears to be wrong appreciation of the facts by the Court. There also is an allegation of arbitrary exercise of granting bail on the ground, however, it can be said that the Court possibly has only considered the aspect of suicide of the complainant's husband, disregarding the far graver offence of rape as also the cause of committal of suicide.
It can be well appreciated that the father, out of his desperation and mental trauma and harassment, chose not to fight back and instead committed suicide. It can be said that had there been only the question of prima-facie appreciation of a small chit in the pocket of the deceased that could have entitled the Court to exercise its discretion. But, while doing so, genesis of the crime can not be disregarded. Here is a case of an owner of the factory who was employer of the entire family and prima facie it appears that in lieu of the money that he had advanced to the family for the purchase of house, he chose to take disadvantage of his monetary and social position and subjugated his employees, firstly, by threatening and also by committing the offence of rape and threatening her not to disclose. Prosecutrix, knowing fully well the financial constraint and the huge responsibility on the father, if could not reveal on earlier occasion the details of rape committed on her that ipso facto cannot dilute the offence particularly when the same had continued in terms of his continuous following the prosecutrix as well as threat to the family of retaining the prosecutrix for the purpose of his lust. Not only the grave offence that will have to be regarded, the possibility of quality of justice to suffer, if such person is enlarged on the bail also need to be regarded by the Court, while exercising the discretion.
10. It would not be out of place to take into consideration some of the observations of the Supreme Court, while cancelling the bail of the accused granted in such serious cases.
It is a well laid down principle that this Court cannot re- appreciate the evidence even if it does not agree with some of the findings given by the Court while enlarging the accused on the bail. Moreover, it also needs to be kept in mind that this Court is examining the issue of cancellation of bail on the basis of the material on record and it has not to examine the question of grant of bail at this stage as an appellate authority. Admittedly, as mentioned hereinabove, this is not a case of a misconduct on the part of the accused on being enlarged on bail, but the question of grant on merit is under scrutiny.
11. Resultantly, this Court is of the opinion that the grant of discretion of regular bail in favour of respondent No.2 calls for interference. Prosecutrix was very young when such offence was committed with her by respondent No.2. Moreover, even at present, she is very young. The conduct of respondent No.2 has led the father of the prosecutrix to commit suicide and cumulative circumstances are suggestive that the accused would surely tamper with the evidence by misusing his power and position once on bail and that would have material bearing on the ultimate outcome of the trial, and therefore also, there is a need for intervening into the order of grant of bail by this Court, by cancelling such an order and accordingly the following order.
Impugned order of grant of regular bail to the respondent is cancelled. Respondent shall surrender and be sent to the judicial custody.
(Ms. SONIA GOKANI, J.) At the request of the learned advocate, this Court suspends the judgment pronounced today for 12 weeks.
(Ms. SONIA GOKANI, J.) Bharat*