JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 27.8.1999 by which the learned revisional court allowed the revision filed by the respondents setting aside the order dated 8.1.1991, passed by the trial court allowing the application of the petitioners-plaintiffs for amendment of the plaint under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called C.P.C.).
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioners/plaintiffs filed Suit No. 46 of 1989 against the respondents/ defendants for injunction, i.e., restraining them to raise any construction over the land in dispute. Application for interim relief under Order XXXIX, Rule 1. C.P.C. was also moved and for deciding the same, trial court appointed a Commissioner who submitted the report on 14.3.1989 stating that the construction was being raised. Within a period of one month from the date of the institution of the plaint, an application under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. was filed to amend the plaint seeking the relief of demolition of the construction raised subsequent to the filing of the suit and the same was allowed by the trial court vide order dated 8.1.1991.
3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, respondents/defendants filed Revision No. 14 of 1991 which has been allowed by the revisional court vide order dated 17.8.1999, hence this petition.
4. Heard Shri R. B. Tripathi and Shri H. P. Mishra, learned counsel for the parties.
5. Shri Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that as the construction had been raised subsequent to institution of the suit, the amendment sought by the petitioners/plaintiffs has rightly been allowed by the trial court, and the revisional court has committed gross error in setting aside the said order.
6. On the contrary, Shri Mishra, the learned counsel for the respondents/ defendants has submitted that in a limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court should not interfere with the revisional court's order which is based on reasons and the revisional court has rightly held that the application was barred by provisions of Order II, C.P.C. and petition is liable to be dismissed.
7. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
8. It is settled legal proposition that amendment in the pleadings may generally be allowed and the amendment may also be allowed at a belated stage. However, it should not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. The amendment sought should be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties. Application for amendment may be rejected if the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleadings had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him injury which could not be compensated in terms of cost or change the nature of the suit itself as it cannot be permitted to create an entirely new case by amendment. A right accrued in favour of a party by lapse of time cannot be permitted to be taken away by amendment. Amendment can also be allowed at appellate stage. Introduction of an entirely new case, displacing even admission by a party is not permissible. (Vide Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 363 ; Nanduri Yogananda Laxminarsimhachari and Ors. v. Agasthe Swarswamivaru, AIR 1960 SC 622 ; Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Ladha Ram and Co., AIR 1977 SC 680 ; Pandit Ishwardas v. State of M.P., AIR 1979 SC 551 and Mulk Raj Batra v. District Judge, Dehradun, AIR 1982 SC 24).
9. Similar view has been reiterated in G. Nagamma and Anr. v. Siromanamma and Anr., (1996) 2 SCC 25 and B.K. Narayana Pillai v. Parameshwaran Pillai and Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 712. However, a party cannot be permitted to move an application under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code after the judgment has been reserved. (Vide Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 993).
10. If the plaintiff wants to add certain facts, which the plaintiff had not chosen to mention in the original plaint and the same had been in his knowledge when the plaint was instituted, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to make fresh allegation of facts by way of amendment at a belated stage (Vide Gopal Krishnamurthi v. Shreedhara Rao, AIR 1950 Mad 32). In Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust (Pvt.) Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 2091, the Apex Court held that in case of gross delay, application for amendment must be rejected. Same view had been reiterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Surjit Singh Atwal, AIR 1979 SC 1701.
11. In Haridas A. Thandani and Ors. v. Godrej Rustam Kirmani, AIR 1983 SC 319 ; Radhika Devi v. Bajrangi Singh, 1996 (2) AWC 724 (SC) : AIR 1996 SC 2358 ; Dondapati Narayana Reddy v. Duggtreddy Venkatanarayana Reddy, (2001) 8 SCC 115 and Prem Bakshi and Ors. v. Dharam Deo, 2002 (1) AWC 484 (SC) : 2002 (3) RD 104, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Court should be extremely liberal in allowing the amendment of pleadings unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side. The Court must bear in mind that amendment sought should not change the nature of the suit or adversely affect the valuable right of limitation accrued to the opposite party. In Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v. Km. Jyoti Sahay and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 462, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that amendment can be allowed to permit a party to withdraw or explain away the admission made by it, provided the Court is satisfied that the admission has been made under bona fide mistake,
12. In G. Nagamma and Ors. v. Siromanamma and Anr., JT 1998 (4) SC 484. the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in an application under Order VI, Rule 17, even an alternative relief can be sought ; however, it should not change the cause of action or materially affect the relief claimed earlier.
13. In Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, AIR 1985 SC 817, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action, but where the amendment does not constitute the addition of a new cause of action, or raises a new case, but amounts to not more than adding to the facts already on record, the amendment should be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation.
14. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :
"It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the Tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy ; Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated, with a view to promote substantial Justice--subject, course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court."
15. In Muni Lal v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 642, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the relief of amendment should be granted to "render substantial justice without causing injustice to the other party of violating fair-play and the Court should be entitled to grant proper relief even at the stage of appellate forum." Similar view has been reiterated in Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604.
16. In A.K. Gupta and Sons v. Damodar Valley Corporation, AIR 1967 SC 96, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the amendment does not constitute the addition of new cause of action or raises a different case but amounts to no more than an additional different approach to the same facts, the amendment should be allowed even if the statutory period of limitation has expired. While deciding the said case, reliance had been placed upon the judgment in Charan Das v. Amit Khan, AIR 1921 PC 50 and L.J. Leaon and Co. Ltd. v. Jardine Skinner and Co., AIR 1957 SC 375.
17. In Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :
"The power to allow an amendment is undoubtedly wide and may, at any stage, be properly exercised in the interest of justice, the law of limitation notwithstanding, but the exercise of such far-reaching discretionary power is governed by judicial consideration and wider the discretion, greater ought to be the care and circumspection on the part of the Court."
18. In Ganesh Trading Co. v. Maoji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that where amendment is found to be necessary for promoting the ends of justice and not for defeating it, the application should be allowed. Similar view had been reiterated in B.K.N. Pillai v. P. Pillai and Anr., AIR 2000 SC 614.
19. In Laxmidas Dahyabhai Kabarwala v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabarwala, AIR 1964 SC 11, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :
"It is true that save in exceptional cases, leave to amend under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code will ordinarily be refused when the effect of the amendment would be to take away from a party a legal right which had accrued to him by lapse of time. But this rule can apply only when either fresh allegations added or fresh relief sought by way of amendment. Where, for instance, an amendment is sought which merely clarifies an existing pleading and does not in substance add to or alter it, it has never been held that the question of a bar of limitation is one of the questions to be considered in allowing such clarification of a matter already contained in the original pleading. The present is a fortiori so."
20. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :
"The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of the fact and law to mould the relief."
21. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kameshwar Prasad v. Prademanju Agarwal, AIR 1997 SC 2399.
22. In Estrella Rubber v. Dass Estate Pvt. Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, the Supreme Court held that mere delay in making the amendment application is not enough to reject the application unless a new case is made out, or serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the other side so as to take away any accrued right.
23. Similarly, in Siddalingamma and Anr. v. Mamdha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Doctrine of Relation Back applies in case of amendment for the reason that the amendment generally governs the pleadings as amended pleadings would be deemed to have been filed originally as such and the evidence has to be read and appreciated in the light of the averments made in the amendment petition. Similar view has been reiterated in Raghu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 699.
24. But in Vishwambhar and Ors. v. Laxmi Narayan, 2001 (3) AWC 2315 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 2607, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the amendment, though properly made, shall not relate back the date of filing of the suit and cure the defect of limitation where the amendment changes the basis of the suit itself and in such an eventuality, suit has to be considered to have been filed on the date of amendment for the purpose of limitation.
25. In Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, (2002) 2 SCC 256, the Apex Court held that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied : (i) that the relief, as claimed ordinarily has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted ; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties ; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. The Court further observed as under :
"Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial note of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the controversy either as to their existence or in their impact is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties."
26. The amendment may be necessary for the reason that decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be founded ; without the amendment of the pleadings, the Court would not be entitled to modify or alter the relief as relief not founded on pleadings cannot be granted. (Vide Shri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25-IA 195 and Trojan and Co. v. R. M. N. N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235).
27. In Fritiz T.M. Clement and Anr. v. Sudhakaran Nadar and Anr., (supra) the Apex Court examined the similar issue and held as under :
"There is nothing in these two sub-paras which changes the basis and character of the suit. Nor can they have any prejudicial effect vis-a-vis he defence of respondents .......... Some of these averments may, at best be considered unnecessary but do not tantamount to setting up a new case or cause of action. So also, the mere fact that in regard to quantification of the fee, some changes are sought to be introduced while retaining the total amount claimed in the original plaint, does not mean that the nature of relief claimed has undergone a material change. Therefore, the grounds of rejection of amendments are legally unjustified and based on non-application of mind to the exact nature of amendments."
28. In Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and Anr., AIR 2002 SC 3369, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that amendment of pleadings is permissible even If the version of a suit for permanent injunction into a suit for declaration for title and recovery of possession is said to be changed for the reason that it would violate multiplicity of litigation, and in case where an independent suit is maintainable, there is no reason as to why same relief cannot be sought by an amendment in the plaint. In order to curtail the multiplicity of the legal proceedings, amendment should be allowed. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan and Ors., AIR 1960 SC 335 and Siddalingamma and Anr. v. Mamtha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that such an application should be allowed even if it is filed at a belated stage. The Supreme Court further held that it is not permissible for the trial court to examine the correctness or genuineness of the contents of the application at the time of entertainment stage in such an application, observing as under :
"The plaintiff has alleged the cause of action for the reliefs now sought to be added as having arisen to him during the pendency of the suit. The merits of the averments sought to be incorporated by way of amendment are not to be judged at the stage of allowing prayer for amendment."
29. Thus, in view of the above, the law of amendment of pleadings can be summarised that amendment of pleadings should ordinarily be allowed if the amendment is found to be necessary for just and proper decision of the controversy between the parties. Application should not be rejected only on the ground of delay. However, such application should be rejected if it altogether alters the nature of the suit or where it takes away the accrued right of the opposite party or where the plaintiffs suit would be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment or the amendment sought has not been made in good faith or suffers from lack of bona fides, or the amendment sought would withdraw the admission made by a party in the original pleadings. If an independent suit is permissible on the subsequent events occurred during the pendency of the suit, the amendment may be allowed in order to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings.
30. The learned revisional court has set aside the order of the trial court allowing the amendment on the basis of the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C., which provides that if a party could seek a particular relief at the time of the institution of the plaint and does not ask for the said relief, it would amount to waiver/ relinquishment of such right and subsequent suit shall be barred for grant of such relief. In Mohammad Khalil Khan and Ors. v. Mahbub Ali Mian and Ors., AIR 1949 PC 78, the scope of application of the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. was considered by the Privy Council. The Court held that if the occasion for a particular lis arises subsequent to the institution of the suit, it cannot be barred by the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. and in order to determine as to whether the said provisions are attracted or not, the Court has to consider as to what was the cause of action in the earlier suit on which the plaintiffs founded their claim and whether they included all the claims which they were entitled to make in respect of that cause of action in that suit, or if they failed to include all the claims then by force of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. they are precluded to include the same by bringing the subsequent suit. The Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsunnissa Begum, (1987) 11 MIA 551, wherein it has been held as under :
"The correct test in all cases of this kind is whether the claim in the new suit which in fact founded on a cause of action distinction from that which was the foundation of the foremost suit."
31. In State of Rajasthan and Anr. v. Nav Bharat Construction Co., (2002) 1 SCC 659, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in respect of dispute regarding subsequent claims arisen after the first reference cannot be held to be barred by the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. for the reason that subsequent claim may be founded on a different cause of action. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. T. P. Kumaran, (1996) 10 SCC 561 : 1996 (11) SCC 112 ; Ladu Ram v. Ganesh Lal, (1999) 7 SCC 50 and Maharashtra Vikrikar Karmchari Sangathan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 622.
32. Thus, the settled legal proposition in respect to the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. emerges is that if a party does not ask for a relief for which he was entitled to at the time of the institution of the suit, it would amount to waiver of that right and cannot be claimed later in a subsequent suit.
33. The instant case requires to be considered in the light of the aforesaid legal proposition. Admittedly, it has been stated in the plaint that the construction had been started in the disputed land by the respondents/ defendants. The Commissioner appointed by the Court for granting the interim relief also mentioned the said fact in his report. If the construction had been made subsequent to institution of the suit, the learned revisional court failed to appreciate that the provisions of Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. were not attracted at all, and being a subsequent development, and in order to avoid multiplicity of the legal proceedings as the petitioners/plain tiffs could have filed a separate suit for demolition of the construction raised during the pendency of the suit, the revisional court ought not to have interfered with the order passed by the learned trial court.
34. Thus, in view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the revisional court's order is liable to be set aside.
35. Petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 27.8.1999 is hereby set aside and the order of the trial court dated 8.1.1991 is restored. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. As the suit had been filed in 1989 and a period of 14 years has already elapsed, the trial court is requested to conclude the trial expeditiously.
36. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.