JUDGMENT Mukerji, J.
1. This appeal involves the decision of a question as to who is the owner of a particular land in suit. It appears that the respondent here, Chunni Lal, was sued by the appellant Ganga Ram in the revenue Court for ejectment. Ganga Ram's case was that he was the proprietor of the land and Chunni Lal held a grove, that Chunni Lal had out down the grove shortly before the institution of the suit and had thereby laid the land open to resumption by the zemindar. Chunni Lal's case was that he was the proprietor of the land. He was referred to the civil Court to obtain a declaration.
2. Chunni Lal's suit was dismissed by the Court of first instance, but has been decreed by the Court of first appeal. The learned Judge found that Chunni Lal's predecessors, Chatri and Ghanshiam, had purchased the land in suit from the proprietors, Hira Singh and Ajit Singh. He explained why, in spite of the purchase of the land, the purchasers were recorded as grove-holders in the papers and holding that the predecessors-in-title of Chunni Lal were owners of the land and not mere grove-holders, decreed the suit.
3. It appears that two ancient sale-deeds were adduced into evidence on behalf of Chunni Lal. These were rejected by the Court of first instance as not proved, but were admitted, on appeal, by the learned Judge who allowed the production before him of copies of khewats, which were public documents. It further appears that on one of the sale-deeds purporting to have been executed by Hira there is no mark or signature purporting to have been made either by Hira himself or somebody else on his behalf.
4. The first ground of appeal taken here was that having regard to a certain ruling of this Court it was not competent to the lower Court to accept the two sale-deeds in evidence and to assume that the sale-deeds had been properly signed on behalf of the executants. Since the ruling in Sheo Nandan Ahir v. Ram Lagan Singh [1915] 13 A.L.J. 921 was given, this Court in a Full Bench judgment delivered by five learned Judges, ruled that even where an ancient document does not purport to have been signed by the executant, it was open to the Court to presume that the party who signed for the executant signed it with an authority from him. There can be no doubt, therefore, that one of the documents came within the purview of the Full Bench case in Bodha v. Sukhram Singh A.I.R. 1925 All. 1. Even if the second document did not come within the purview of the Full Bench case, one of the sale-deeds would be enough to confer proprietary interest on the transferees. The transferees will be co-sharers and will hold the land not as grove-holders, but as proprietors. A proprietor may hold a larger share than he is entitled to. In another view the transferees would be entitled to hold rightfully a proportionate share and their possession as to the rest would become adverse to the other co-sharers. In any view of the case, it is clear that the learned Judge did not commit any error in law in admitting the two sale-deeds into evidence.
5. The second ground of appeal is that the lower Court should not have accepted additional evidence in appeal. The lower Court evidently was anxious to see how the two sale-deeds were relevant and to make the sale-deeds relevant, it was necessary to find out who were the proprietors in 1847 and 1849. The khewats were public documents and it is impossible to say that the lower Court was not entitled to accept those documents in evidence for doing full justice to the case. It was argued before me that if the documents were admitted, the defendant should have been given an opportunity to rebut those khewats. But no such complaint was made before the lower appellate Court, nor was any ground of appeal taken in this Court that sufficient opportunity was not given to the appellant to rebut the evidence.
6. If the sale-deeds and khewats be admitted in evidence the learned appellate Judge's judgment becomes perfectly legible and sensible. There is no other point urged.
7. The appeal is hereby dismissed with costs including counsel's fee in this Court on the higher scale.