JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The landlord-respondent filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 praying for the release of the premises in question for her personal need and for the members of her family. The landlord alleged that she has three sons out of which one of them has been married and other two sons were also of marriageable age and, therefore, requires the additional accommodation in Order to give privacy and space to her children. The landlord pleaded that she has only two rooms, one store and two verandah in her possession, which were insufficient for her requirement.
2. The release application was contested by the petitioners, who contended that the release application was not bona fide and was mala fide and that the accommodation in possession of the landlady was more than sufficient and that the remaining two sons were not likely to get married and, therefore, she does not require additional accommodation. The petitioners further contended that respondent No. 3 was only a landlord for the purposes of collecting the rent and that she was not the owner of the premises in question. The petitioners contended that the owner and landlord of the building in dispute was one Shabbir Hussain. After his death his sons Mahmood Hussain, Asgar Hussain, Masood Hussain and Jaheer Hussain became the sole owner and co-landlords and that they have migrated to Pakistan. The petitioners contended that the property has not been transferred or mutated in favour bf respondent No. 3. At another place in the written statement the petitioners contended that respondent No. 3 was only an agent of the original landlord and that she was not the owner and, therefore, could not file an application for release of the premises for her own need.
3. The trial court after considering the evidence on record held that the landlord's need was bona fide and that she required the premises for her children. The Prescribed Authority also came to the conclusion that the landlord would suffer greater hardship than the petitioners, in the event the premises was not released. The prescribed authority further held that respondent No. 3 was the owner and landlord of the premises in question and that her application for release was maintainable. The prescribed authority, accordingly, allowed the release application and directed the petitioners to vacate the premises in question. Aggrieved by the Order of the prescribed authority the petitioners filed an appeal, which was also dismissed.
4. Aggrieved the petitioners have now filed the present writ petition.
5. Heard Sri M. A. Qadeer, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, the learned counsel holding the brief of Sri R. K. Awasthi, for the respondent.
6. It may be stated here that before the appellate court the petitioners had moved an amendment application praying for amendment of certain paragraphs of their written statement whereby the petitioners sought to withdraw certain admissions made by them, namely, that respondent No. 3 was not the landlord and that she was only authorised to collect the rent on behalf of the original landlord. This application was rejected by the appellate authority, against which the petitioners filed a writ petition before this Court which was also dismissed by Order dated 19.8.1988 holding that it was open to the petitioners to challenge the said Order after the final orders in the appeal are passed.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners stated that the petitioners had categorically alleged and contended that respondent No. 3 was not the owner or landlord of the premises in question and that at best she was only authorized to collect the rent on behalf of the original landlord. The learned counsel submitted that since respondent No. 3 was only authorized to collect the rent, she could not file an application for the release of the premises for her own need and that an application for the release of the building could only be filed by the owner of the premises.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that both the prescribed authority as well as the appellate court had erred in holding that the petitioners had admitted respondent No. 3 to be the owner and landlord on account of a clerical error made in the written statement. The learned counsel submitted that if the entire written statement was read it would be clear that the petitioners had nowhere admitted that respondent No. 3 was the owner and the landlord of the premises in question and that it would be absolutely clear that respondent No. 3 was only an agent authorized to receive the rent on behalf of the landlord. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the amendment application ought to have been allowed by the lower appellate court.
9. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the judgment in Lakshmi Shankar Misra v. 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad, 1977 ARC 7 ; Smt. Sughra Begum v. Sri Ram and Ors., 1983 (2) ARC 143 and Naseeruddin and Ors. v. Prescribed Authority, Meerut and Ors., 1988 (1) ARC 517, in which it has been held that an agent or an attorney of a landlord has no locus standi to filing a release application although one may be a landlord within the meaning of Section 3 (f) of the Act for the purposes of realizing the rent. It was further held that the owner or co-owner was authorised and competent to file the release application for his own need or for the need of his family members.
10. There is no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. A person who has been authorised to realize the rent on behalf of the landlord becomes the landlord as contemplated under Section 3 (f) of the Act. But the said agent cannot file a release application for his own need or for his family members under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act inasmuch as he is not the owner of the premises in question. The expression "occupation for himself or for family members" as provided under Section 21 (1) of the Act means that the person must be entitled to occupy the premises in his own right. Obviously, the agent is not authorized to occupy the premises in his own right. Therefore, the agent could not file an application for release of the premises for his own personal need.
11. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to paragraph Nos. 13, 15, 19 and 20 of the written statement to show that the petitioners never admitted that the respondent No. 3 was the owner and landlord of the premises in question and only admitted her to be the landlord for the purpose of realizing the rent. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent invited the Court's attention to paragraph Nos. 1, 24, 25 and 26 of the written statement to show that the petitioners themselves admitted that respondent No. 3 was the owner and landlord of the premises in dispute.
12. In my view, the petitioners have clearly admitted the landlord-tenant's relationship with respondent No. 3. From the reading of the entire written statement it would be clear that the petitioners admit respondent No. 3 not only as a landlord for the purposes of realizing the rent but also as the owner of the premises in question. This is also fortified by the fact that respondent No. 3 had also been issuing rent receipts not as an agent of the landlord but in the capacity of the owner of the premises since 1960 and no objection whatsoever had been raised by the petitioners. The petitioners, therefore, cannot resile from the admission made In the written statement. Consequently, the . amendment application was rightly rejected by the lower appellate court.
13. A perusal of the Order of the prescribed authority indicates that he had considered this plea at length and considered the various evidence on record and thereafter repelled the plea of the petitioner, and came to conclusion that respondent No. 3 was the owner and landlord of the premises in question. This is a question of fact which cannot be agitated again in a writ Jurisdiction. However, having considered the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners and after perusing the Judgment of the prescribed authority as well as by the appellate court, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the prescribed authority does not suffer from any manifest error of law or the jurisdiction which requires interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. In the result, I find no merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case these shall be no Order as to cost.