JUDGMENT
1. The appeal is taken up and disposed of ex parte in the absence of the respondent, Union of India.
2. The writ petitioner-appellant was discharged from service in 1979 and disability pension withheld from him in or about 1981. The ground therefor was mental unfitness. It is submitted by the appellant that the report of the Medical Board should have been forwarded to him and in case he was not mentally sound, it should have been forwarded in accordance with the rules to the next of kin so as to allow him the right of appeal.
3. The writ petition has been filed after more than 24 years. Although representations were made in the meantime The Hon. Mr. Justice Sunil Ambwani, in his Lordship's impugned order dated 18.3.2005 has dismissed the writ petition on the ground of latches and delay. We respectfully agree with his Lordship that there was inordinate delay in this case and on that ground alone the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
4. The following cases were cited and relied on by the appellant:
AIR 1984 S C 866 H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.; AIR 1984 SC 1527 G.P. Doval and Ors. v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U.P. and Ors., AIR 89 SC 985 P.L. Shah v. Union of India and Anr.
5. The judgement of the Supreme Court in H.D. Vora's case was a case in which the requisition of the property was challenged after a lapse of 30 years. The Apex Court repelled the submission that the High Court ought to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches. The Apex-Court observed that the challenge urged on behalf of third respondent was also on the ground that requisition is by its very nature temporary in character and it cannot enure for an indefinite period of time and the order of requisition therefore ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration of a reasonable period of time and that it could not under any circumstances continue for a period of about 30 years. Thus the writ petition was entertained on the reason that on account of lapse of time, a cause of action arose to declare the requisition as invalid. The above case is clearly distingushable and has no applicability in the facts of the present case. The next case relied on by counsel for the appellant is G.P.Doval's case (supra). In the writ petition under Article 32 provisional seniority list was challanged after 12 years. The writ petition was entertained by the Supreme Court holding that the department had neither finalised the provisional seniority list for 12 years nor had given reply to the representation made against it. In the above circumstances, the writ petition was entertained. The above case also is distinguishable as keeping the list provisional was a fault of the Department, for which the petitioner were not to blame. Another case relied on by counsel for the appellant is P.L. Shah's case (supra). In that case the challenge was made to wrong fixation of subsistence allowance, although suspension was prolonged. The Tribunal rejected the claim on the ground that it had been filed after more than 5 years from the passing of the order fixing the subsistence allowance. The Apex Court held that cause of action in respect of such prayer arises every month in which the subsistence allowance at the reduced rate was A paid; hence there was no latches and the Tribunal ought not to have dismissed the claim on the above ground. This case has also no application in the facts of the present case.
6. The Supreme Court in AIR 1977 SC 1979 Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass v. Union of India and Ors. upheld the order of High Court which dismissed the writ petition filed by an my servant after four years of discharge. It was said in paragraph-3 of the Judgement;-
"3. It may perhaps be that the appellant was misdirected in regard to the remedies which he should have adopted, but what stares one in the face is that it was for the first time in September, .970 that the appellant invoked the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated December 21, 1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation and therefore, the High Court was justified in dismissing it summarily."
7. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass 's case (supra) is fully attracted in the facts of the present case. Challenge to the order of discharge after four years was held to barred by latches and in the present case the order of discharge is sought to be challenged after 24 years.
8. Regarding delay, in writ matters, the Courts usually go by a self imposed rule of treating the matter as barred by time after the lapse of three years, which the usual period of limitation for filing-suits. But the rule is not an inflexible one. Delays, even large delays can be overlooked in special writ matters where question of public importance are involved. The case of an individual might become a sort of test case and in such an event the Court might see it fit to take up the case even after some excessive delay.
9. Also, in very deserving cases, the Court might feel compelled to exercise of judicial discretion, on the basis of sound and well settled judicial principles when justice requires the matter to be dealt with so urgently and strongly, that the point of delay and delay alone should not be made the guiding factor in the decision of the writ the court coudoues large delays. Our case is not such as one. The writ petitioner would have appealed at the material time, if at all on ground that the Medical Board had erred and he was in fact mentally sound and fit. The point of time when the mental insanity of the writ petitioner become an issue has long gone by; nobody can now test whether the writ petitioner was fit at that disant point of time Had the writ petitioner come with reasonable expedition after the decision had been taken by the respondent authorities, tests would have been carried out and the writ Court would be in a position to judge the matter. Today we cannot, just because a rule of procedure was infringed, assume against the authorities, and opine that the Madical Board had erred. The writ petitioner has changed the circumstances in such a manner by allowing time to lapse, that he puts the respondents in a position of disadvantage today. As such the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay of more than 24 years: we respectfully uphold the judgement passed by the learned Single Judge.
10. After the order is passed and two other matters are disposed of, learned counsel of the Union of India seeks to put in appearance. His name might be recorded. We do not invite any submissions from him.
11. The appeal is, thus, dismissed.