JUDGMENT Arun Tandon, J.
1. Heard Colonel Ashok Kumar Advocate on behalf of petitioner, Sri K.C. Sinha Advocate on behalf of the respondents.
2. Petitioner was selected and was sent for training to Arty Centre Nasik Road Camp, Maharashtra on 4th May, 2004. It is alleged that he was orally discharged under order of the Lt. Col. S.S. Sajwan from the Camp at Nasik Road. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Lt. Colonel S.S. Sajwan, the petitioner filed a statutory appeal under Section 26 of the Army Act. During pendency of the appeal the petitioner had approached this Court earlier by filing Writ Petition No. 28694 of 2004. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court vide judgment and order dated 16th February, 2005 with a direction upon respondent authority to consider and decide the statutory representation of the petitioner dated 18th May, 2004. It is alleged that the authorities attempted to mislead the petitioner and as a result whereof he filed a contempt petition before this Court being Contempt Petition No. 506 of 2005. The contempt petition is pending consideration.
3. Now the Chief of Army Staff, New Delhi has passed the impugned orders dated 12th Mach, 2005 and dt. 26th May, 2005 whereby the statutory appeal has bent rejected. Against the orders dated 12th Mach, 2005 and dated 26th May, 2005 the present writ petition has been filed. The relief prayed for by the petitioner are as follows:
(i) Order the Respondent No. 1 to treat the petitioner as having continued in uniform with all the consequential benefits to the petitioner.
(ii) Issue writ of certiorari summoning the records and quashing the order dated 12th March 2005 and 26th April 2005 with all the consequential benefits of the petitioner.
(iii) Issue any other writ order or direction considered expedient and in the interest of justice and equity.
(iv) Award cost of the petition to the petitioner.
4. From the records of the present writ petition it is apparently clear that the initial order of discharge dated 4th May, 2004 was passed at Nasik Road and was communicated to petitioner in the State of Maharashtra itself. The order dated 12th March, 2005 is an order passed by the Brigadier at Nasik Road in the State of Maharashtra and the order dated 26th April, 2005 is an order passed by the Chief of the Army Staff at New Delhi. Both the aforesaid orders have been passed on the statutory appeal filed by the petitioner.
5. Since the order on the statutory appeal filed by the petitioner has been passed at New Delhi, the communication of the said order to the petitioner at a place within the State of U.P. will not give a cause to the petitioner to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in (1997) 1 UPLBEC 236: Ex. No. 1387-5234 M Sepoy/D.B./M.T., Chabi Nath Rai v. Union of India and Ors., has specifically held that mere communication of the appellate order, cannot be the basis for inferring territorial jurisdiction in a Court of Law, cause of action whereof is otherwise not within its territorial jurisdiction. Suffice is to reproduce the relevant portion of the Division Bench judgment of this Court, which is quoted herein below:
In case an appeal is dismissed and the order is communicated where the petitioner resides, the service of notice itself does not give any cause of action but it is only a communication of a decision on the appeal or representation made by him. In a case the order of termination or other penalty is imposed it is not effective unless it is communicated, but the same principle is not applicable when an appeal preferred by the petitioner himself, is decided.
6. A Full Bench of this Court, in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2005(1) UPLBEC 108, after considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Chandra Gahtori reported in 2001(2) UPLBEC 1275 has clarified that a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature At Allahabad will not be maintained if no cause of action has arisen within the State of U.P., merely on the ground that the petitioner was residing at a particular place within the State of U.P. after passing of the impugned order. The Full Bench has also explained scope of the law laid down in the case of Dinesh Chandra Gahtori and has held that it does not lay down as absolute proposition that a writ petition cannas be filed in any High Court of India merely on the ground that Chief of the Army Staff may be sued in any High Court. It has further been observed that the law laid down, by the Larger Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court comprising of 7 Hon'ble Judges in the case of Khajju Singh v. Union of India 1961 SC 532 still hold good.
7. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, from the fact as noticed herein above, it is apparently clear that no cause of action, even partly, accrued in the State of U.P.. Mere residence of the petitioner at a place within the State of U.P. after discharge from training would not confer jurisdiction upon this Court to entertain this petition. None of the respondents have residence or office within the State of U.P. In such a fact situation this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. The conclusion so arrived at are in conformity with the law declared by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 61529 of 2005 J.C. Thind v. Union of India and Ors. dated 20.9.2005.
8. At this stage it would be appropriate to deal with the judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner.
(a) Om Prakash v. Divisional Superintendent, Northern Ply. , more or less supports the legal proposition which has been laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Union of India Ors. (Supra), and does not run contrary to it in any manner. Suffice is to refer to paragraph 25 of the said judgment, wherein it has been held that Clause 1-A of Article 226 of the Constitution of India only enlarges the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writ, orders or direction to any government authority or persons notwithstanding whether the seat of such Government or Authority is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and thus it only extends jurisdiction beyond the boundaries of the State, if the cause of action arises within its territory. It may be noticed that initial order impugned in said case was issued at Lucknow i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and subsequently the appeal filed against the said order was dismissed by the officers of the Railways at New Delhi. Thus, part of cause of action in the facts of the aforesaid case had arisen within the State of UP.
(b) 2001 (2) UPLBEC 1275 Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff and Anr. was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. aches been explained, as noticed herein above.
(c) 2003 (1) UPLBEC 1 Vijay Bihari Srivastava v. U.P. Postal Primary Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Anr. is clearly distinguishable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as the same pertains to the law of precedents and judicial discipline to be followed by respective Benches of this Court.
(d) State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika has laid down as proposition of law that an order of dismissal would take effect only from the date of its service. The said law is not in dispute and the said judgment does not in any way deal with the issue of territorial jurisdiction.
(e) 2003 (3) AWC 1977 Brij Mohan v. Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi and Ors. is a Division Bench judgment of this Court wherein the Hon'ble Court has held in the facts of the case that the Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said writ petition. The legal proposition indicated in the said judgment is not in controversy.
9. In view of the aforesaid, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed. However, petitioner is at liberty to seek redressal of his grievances before a Court of Law having territorial jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.