JUDGMENT Chamier and Piggott, JJ.
1. This is an application for revision of an order of the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directing the prosecution of the applicants on various charges in connection with pleadings verified, and evidence given, by them in two cases tried by the Subordinate Judge. It appears that one Musammat Mohra brought a suit to establish her right to certain property as the daughter of Sheo Narain. The applicants and others brought another suit against Musammat Mohra for possession of property on the ground that she was not the daughter of Sheo Narain. The two cases were tried together, and the Subordinate Judge found that Musammat Mohra was the daughter of Sheo Narain. He waited for a month, probably to see whether appeals would be filed against his decision, and as soon as the month had expired he took proceedings against the applicants under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the part of the applicants it is contended that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to take action against them a month or more after he had disposed of the cases in which the offences are alleged to have been committed. We have been referred to several decisions on the subject. A full Bench of the Madras High Court (Miller, J. dissenting) has held that the power conferred by Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised by the court only in the course of the judicial proceedings or at its conclusion, or so shortly thereafter as to make it really the continuation of the proceeding in the course of which the offence was committed, or brought to notice, see, Aiya Kannu Pillai v. Emperor (1908) I.L.R. 32 Mad. 49, which followed a previous decision of the same court in Rahimadulla Sahib v. Emperor (1907) I.L.R. 31 Mad. 140. The Madras High Court declined to follow the decision of the Bombay High Court, In re Lakshmidas Lalji (1907) I.L.R. Bom. 184, in which the learned Judges said that they were unable to find anything in the language of Section 476 making it incumbent upon a court acting under it, to take action if at all, within any particular period or at any particular time. There is also a reported decision to the effect that action should not be taken by a court under Section 476 before the close of the case in which the offence is brought to the notice of the court, see Emperor v. Rustomji Harmusji Tarwalla (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 778. This Court in Girwar Prasad v. King-Emperor (1909) 6 A.L.J. 392 declined to follow the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above, and held that a munsif had jurisdiction to take action under Section 476, eighteen months or more after the conclusion of the case in which the offences were said to have been committed and in In the matter of the petition of Nawal Singh (1902) I.L.R. 34 All. 390 Mr. Justice Banerji upheld the order of a Subordinate Judge passed under Section 476, several years after the conclusion of the case in which the offences were said to have been committed. We agree with the view which has hitherto been taken by this Court that there is nothing in Section 476 which requires a court to take action, if at all, immediately after the conclusion of the case in which the offences are said to have been committed or within any fixed time thereafter. Cases can easily be imagined where it would be impossible or inadvisable to take action immediately on the conclusion of the case. In the present case the Subordinate Judge appears to us to have exercised a wise discretion in abstaining from taking action against the applicants until he knew that no appeal had been filed against his decision. It would have been useless to prosecute the applicants for the offences which they are supposed to have committed, if there had been an appeal in the case and the District Judge had held that Musammat Mohra was not the daughter of Sheo Narain. We express no opinion on the merits of the case or on the advisability of the prosecution which has been ordered. In our opinion the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to direct the prosecution of the applicants, and we have, therefore, no power to interfere with his order. The application is dismissed with costs.