JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated 6th January, 2003, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench in O.A. No. 1893 of 1994 rejecting petitioner's application for correcting the date of birth.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner joined the service of the respondents as Tailor 'D' on 20.6.1963 and his date of birth was recorded in the Service Book as 17.5.1934. Subsequently, he filed an application in 1982 to correct his date of birth as 17.2.1943 which was not accepted. Thus, he filed O.A. No. 729 of 1989 before the Central Administrative Tribunal which was disposed of by the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 15.2.1993 directing the respondents to hold an enquiry, giving opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence and to examine the issue afresh. An enquiry was held and the application of the petitioner was rejected vide order dated 4.3.1994. Petitioner again challenged the said order before the learned Tribunal filing O.A. No. 1893 of 1994 which has been rejected vide impugned judgment and order dated 6.1.2003. Hence, this petition.
3. Shri K.C. Saxena, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that petitioner had joined the service on 20.6.1963 and at the time of entrance in service his date of birth had been recorded as 17.5.1934. Subsequently, he passed by Matriculation in 1965 and in the Certificate of Matriculation his date of birth has been recorded as 17.2.1943 and being an admissible document in evidence his date of birth should have been corrected by the respondents as the said Certificate is admissible Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, and being prepared in performance of the official duty by the Educational Authorities, the presumption of its correctness is always there as provided Under Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act. In the earlier judgment, the Tribunal has accepted that the date of birth recorded in the Service Book was wrong in view of the documentary evidence, i.e., High School Certificate, and therefore, by virtue of application of the doctrine of res-judicata the respondents were not permitted to hold that petitioner's date of birth had rightly been recorded in his Service Book. The judgment of the learned Tribunal is liable to set-aside.
4. We have considered the submissions made by Sri Saxena and perused the record.
5. Subsequent to joining the Service in 1963, petitioner passed the High School Examination in 1965 wherein his date of birth has been recorded as 17.2.1943. This is the document which came into existence subsequent to the entrance in service. While getting the date of birth recorded in the said Certificate respondents had not be involved. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered this issue in an identical case in Union of India v. Kantilal Hematram Pandya, AIR 1995 SC 1349 and held that Court may not place any reliance on a document or Certificate of date of birth which had been brought into existence for the benefit of the pending proceedings as the correctness and genuineness of such a certificate is not free from doubt.
6. Similarly, Rajasthan High Court in R.S. Mehrotra v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, 1991 (63) FLR 76, has held that the documents obtained subsequent to the date of joining the service cannot be relied upon for the purpose of correcting the date of birth as it might be very easy for the employee to mention another date in the papers while preparing the other documents, which came into existence subsequently and the Industrial Tribunal should not have accepted the claim of the workman placing reliance on such documents.
7. In Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Sakharam Sitaram Shinde, 1996 (72) FLR 562, the Bombay High Court has taken a similar view observing that the possibilities of fabricating the documents just to support the bogus claim of an employee cannot be ruled out in such circumstances.
8. The Rajasthan High Court in Nagar Mahapalika, Bareilly v. Labour Court, Bareilly and Anr., 1995 (71) FLR 950, held that the Industrial Tribunal committed an error in placing reliance on the documents prepared by the employee subsequently. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court while deciding Writ Petition No. 42485 of 1992, L.H. Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Shri Jacob and Ors., Decided on 12.12.1996.
9. Therefore, it is not safe in such a case to place much reliance on the document which came into existence subsequent to the entrance into the service.
10. It is settled proposition of law that the date of birth entered in the Service Book cannot be corrected at a belated stage. Where the date of birth entry remains in existence for a long time, the same does not require to be disturbed. In Union of India v. Harnam Singh, AIR 1993 SC 1367, the Apex Court, while deciding the case of correcting the date of birth held as under :-
"A Government servant, after entry into service, acquires the right to continue in service till the age of retirement, as fixed by the State in exercise of its powers regulating conditions of service, unless the services are dispensed with on other grounds contained in the relevant service rules after following the procedure prescribed therein. The date of birth entered in the service records of a civil servant is, thus, of utmost importance for the reason that the right to continue in service stands decided by its entry in the service record. A Government servant who has declared his age at the initial stage of the employment is, of course, not precluded from making a request later on for correcting his age. It is open to a civil servant to claim correction of his date of birth, if he is in possession of irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth as different from the one earlier recorded and even if there is no period of limitation prescribed for seeking correction of date of birth, the Government servant must do so without any unreasonable delay. In the absence of any provision in the rules for correction of date of birth, the general principle of refusing relief on grounds of laches or stale claims, is generally applied to by the Courts and Tribunals. It is nonetheless competent for the Government to fix a time limit, in the service rules, after which no application for correction of date of birth of a Government servant can be entertained. A Government servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time so fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous. The law of limitation may operate harshly but it has to be applied with all its rigour and the Courts or Tribunals cannot come to the aid of those who sleep over their rights and allow the period of limitation to expire. Unless altered, his date of birth as recorded would determine his date of superannuation even if it amounts to abridging his right to continue in service on the basis of his actual age. Indeed, as held by this Court in State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka, AIR 1971 SC 173, a public servant may dispute the date of birth as entered in the service record and apply for its correction but till the record is corrected he cannot claim to continue in service on the basis of the date of birth claimed by him....."
11. Kantilal Hematram Pandya (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated a similar view observing as under :
"He allowed the matter to rest till he neared the age of superannuation. The respondent slept over his rights to get the date of birth altered for more than thirty years and woke up from his deep slumber on the eve of his retirement only...........State claims and belated applications for alteration of the date of birth recorded in the Service Book at the time of initial entry, made after unexplained and inordinate delay, on the eve of retirement, need to be scrutinized carefully and interference made sparingly and with circumspection. The approach has to be cautious and not casual. On facts, the respondent was not entitled to the relied which the Tribunal granted to him."
12. The Apex Court has consistently followed, the said ratio as is evident from the judgments in Secretary and Commissioner, Home Deptt. and Ors. v. R. Kirubakaran, AIR 1993 SC 2647; Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 1499; Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Khadri, (1995) 2 SCC 82; Collector of Madras and Anr. v. K. Rajamanickam, (1995) 2 SCC 98; Union of India and Ors. v. Saroj Bala (Mrs.), AIR 1996 SC 1000; Union of India v. Ram Suia Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 421; State of Orissa and Ors. v. Shri Ramanath Patnaik, AIR 1997 SC 2452; G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. West Bengal v. Shib Kumar Dushad and Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 696; Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. S.M. Jadhav and Anr., AIR 2001 SC 1666 and Cement Corporation of India Ltd. v. Reghbir Singh and Anr., AIR 2002 SC 277.
13. In State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Mohan Lal Sharma, JT (2002) 10 SC 207, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while examining the issue of correction of date of birth the Court must be very slow in accepting the case of applicant if issue has been agitated at a much belated stage and it must examine the pros and cons involved, in the case even if not raised by the parties. In the said case, the application for correcting the date of birth was rejected observing, that if it was allowed the applicant had joined the service, when he was below 18 years of age, and therefore, accepting such an application would amount to sanctifying the illegal entrance in service.
14. There is a presumption that official acts are regularly performed though such a presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence. [Vide Jhaman Lal v. State of Rajas than and Ors., AIR 1965 Raj. 86; Somasudarshan Goud v. The District Collector, Hyderabad and Anr., AIR 1978 AP 420; Ganga Ram v. Smt. Phulwati, AIR 1970 All. 446; Saheed Ahmed v. Syed Qumar Ali and Anr., AIR 1973 All, 23; Gopal Narain v. State of UP. and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 370; Maharaja Pratap Bahadur Singh v. Thakur Man Mohan Dey and Ors., AIR 1966 SC 1931; Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 856; State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang and Ors., AIR 1969 SC 903; Sone Lal and Ors. v. State of UP., and Ors.; AIR 1978 SC 1142; Municipal Board, Saharanpur v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 264; K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 510; Kiran Gupta v. State of UP. and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 719; Superintendent, Narcotics Control Bureau v. R. Paulsamy, (2000) 9 SCC 549 and the State Government of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil and Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 652].
15. In Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 183, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that presumption provided in Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is based on well-known maxim If law "omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta" (i.e., all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done). The Court further held that this presumption is, however, one of the fact. It is an optional presumption and can be displaced by the circumstances, indicating that the power lodged in an authority or official has not been exercised in accordance with law.
16. For rebutting the long standing entry regarding the date of birth of an employee in his service record is a difficult task for the reason that the case of applicant has to be considered in view of the provisions of Sections 35 and 114 of the Evidence Act.
17. In Harpal Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 361; Brij Mohan v. P.B.N. Sinha, AIR 1965 SC 282 and Ramprasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 326, it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that unless it is proved that the entries had been recorded in exercise of the official duties by a Government servant, the same cannot be held to be admissible Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. In case, it is proved that it got recorded by an illiterate Chowkidar or by someone else or entries had been made without proper checking, the same requires corroboration and cannot be assumed to be correct.
18. In Mohammed Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625, it was held that the age of the girl mentioned in the School Register at the time of admission was a good evidence Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. School Register was found to be admissible on the ground that these entries were made ante litem mortem.
19. In Updesh Kumar and ors. v. Prithvi Singh and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 703, the School Admission Register was held to be made admissible Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Even the age mentioned in Matriculation Certificate by the Education Board was held to be done in accordance with law as required Under Section 114, Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act.
20. School should be a Government one-only then it can be held that date of birth had been recorded by a public servant in exercise of his official duty. No such presumption would be there in respect of Admission Register of the private school. Entries therein shall require corroboration. [Vide Rammurti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 SC 1029; Brij Mohan Singh (supra)].
21. In Ramdeo Chauhan v. State of Assam, AIR 2001 SC 2231, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining the issue regarding admissibility of School Admission Register Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, held that as it was not clear as under what provision of law, the School Register was maintained, the entries made in such a Register cannot be taken as a proof of age of the person concerned for any purpose.
22. Date of Birth, the Secondary School Certificate not to be taken to be correct unless corroborated by parents-who got the same entries made. [Vide Biradmal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, AIR I988, SC 1796 and Tom Devi v. Sudesh Choudhary, AIR 1998 Raj. 54 (DB)].
23. Thus, in view of the above, it may be held that the date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate may give rise to presumption of being correct date of birth, but it cannot be a conclusive proof thereof. More so, in a fact-situation it may require corroboration to be proved to be the correct date of birth.
24. The instant case, requires to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. Petitioner had joined the service on 20.6.1963 and at the time of preparing his Service Book his date of birth had been recorded as 17.5.1934. Petitioner while signing his G.P.F. Form on 2.11.1981 and while getting his Identity Card on 28th March, 1981, signed the documents containing his date of birth as 17.5.1934, and he did not make any protest in this regard. Petitioner had applied for the first time in 1982 for correction of date of birth, i.e., after more than 19 years of continuation in service. In the mean time, many seniority list should have been issued by the respondents containing his same date of birth but there is nothing on record to show that petitioner had ever protested. There is nothing in favour of the petitioner except the High School Certificate which he obtained subsequent to joining the service in 1965 and in the High School Certificate his date of birth had been shown as 17.2.1943. In the said Certificate petitioner's name had been shown as Eshtesam Ullah Khan, son of Najakat Ullah Khan, whereas, petitioner's name is Service Book has been recorded as Estesham Khan, son of Lalloo Khan. There is variance in the name of the petitioner as well as his parentage. Petitioner could not furnish any explanation before the Tribunal or before this Court as why petitioner's and his father's names have been different in the High School Certificate from the Service Book.
25. Much reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the earlier order passed by the Tribunal contending that there has been a specific finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal in his favour, the date of birth recorded in the Service Book had been held to be wrongly recorded.
26. Averment made in this regard is preposterous. The Tribunal while deciding his earlier case, vide judgment and order dated 15.2.1993 has merely made an observation that documentary evidence must be given preference as in certain circumstances, it may be held to be an evidence of unimpeachable character unless proved otherwise. The said observation was made only for the purpose of issuing a direction to the authorities concerned to hold an enquiry. The learned Tribunal concluded the judgment as under :-
"Accordingly, the respondents are directed to hold an enquiry in the matter after associating the applicant with the enquiry and it will be open for the applicant to furnish proof in support of his case and the respondents will nominate an Enquiry Officer whose name will be given to the applicant and in case, in the enquiry it is found that what has been stated by the applicant is correct, his age shall be corrected by the respondents and benefit of same shall be given to him."
27. It is evident from the aforesaid direction that petitioner was given an opportunity to lead appropriate evidence before the Enquiry Officer. In the instant case, what to talk of leading the evidence petitioner did not make any attempt to do so. Shri Saxena, learned Counsel for the petitioner has fairly conceded that no application had ever been made by the petitioner before the Enquiry Officer that he was willing to adduce any evidence or examine any person in this respect. It was the solemn duty of the petitioner to lead appropriate evidence in support of his case, failing which he cannot be permitted to raise the grievance in this regard.
28. It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. [Vide Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181; M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 1608; National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2779; Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and Ors., (1999) 1 SCC 141; Chitra Kumari v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1237 and State of U.P. and ors. v. Chandra Prakash Pandey, AIR 2001 SC 1298].
29.In Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-
"The findings, in the absence of necessary pleadings and supporting evidence cannot be sustained in law."
30. Similar view has been reiterated in Vithal N. Shetti and Anr. v. Prakash N.
Rudrakar and Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 18.
31. Thus, it is the duty of the party concerned to lead proper evidence before the Authority concerned. In the instant case, even before this Court, petitioner did not file any document to show as on what basis the date of birth stood recorded in the Matriculation Certificate.
32. Acquiescence, being the principle of equity, must be made applicable in a case where the order has been passed and complied with without raising any objection.
33. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pannalal Binjraj and ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1957 SC 397, had explained the scope of estoppel observing that once an order is passed against a person and without raising any objection he submits to the jurisdiction or complies with such order, he cannot be permitted to challenge the said order merely because he could not succeed there, for the reason that such conduct of that person would disentitle him for any relief before the Court. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manaklal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, AIR 1957 SC 425; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amaravati and Ors., AIR 1969 SC 329; Dr. G. Saxena v. University of Lucknow, AIR 1976 SC 2428; Maj. Chandrabhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1814; Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, AIR 1986 SC 1043 and Madan Lal and ors. v. State of J. and K. and Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1088.
34. In State of Punjab v. Kishan Niwas, AIR 1997 SC 2349, the Hon'ble Apex Court examined a case where the services of the employee were terminated in exercise of the powers under Article 31(2)(b) of the Constitution. The Appellate Court reduced the punishment imposed by the trial Court. In the Departmental Appeal, the order of dismissed was also converted into that of a lesser punishment. The employee had acted upon it and joined the post. He was held not entitled to challenge the reduced punishment as he was stopped by his conduct.
35. In Union of India and Anr. v. N. Chandrasekharan, AIR 1998 SC 795, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :-
"It is not in dispute that all the candidates were made aware of the procedure for promotion before they sat for the written test and before they appeared before the Departmental Promotion Committee. Therefore, they cannot turn around and contend later when they found that they were not selected, by challenging that procedure......"
36. In Power Control Applicances and Ors. v. Sumeet Medicines Pvt. Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 488, the Apex Court held as under :-
"Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights......It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim.... It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as involved in laches. In Harcourt v. White, 54 ER 382, Sir John Romily said : 'It is important to distinguish mere negligence and acquiescence.' Therefore, acquiescence is one facet of delay.....If the acquiescence in infringement amounts to consent, it will be a complete defence as was laid down in Mouson (J.G.) and Co. v. Boehm, (1884) 26 Ch.D. 406. The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the defendant as was laid down in Rodgers v. Nowill, (1847) 2 De GM and G614."
37. Similar view has been reiterated in Sumeet Machines v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 615.
38. Similar principle had been made applicable even in contractual matters. (Vide State of Orissa v. Narain Prasad, (1996) 5 SCC 740 and State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Anil Kumar Sunil Kumar and Party and Anr., JT 2000 (4) SC 186].
39. Undoubtedly, inaction in every case does not lead to an inference of implied consent or acquiescence as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in P. John Chandy and Co. (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas, (2002) 5 SCC 90. But the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances, in an individual case.;
40. Therefore, as the petitioner did not raise the issue for two decades, rather accepted the date of birth recorded in the Service Book while getting the Identity Card and filling up the G.P.F. Form in 1981. His conduct disentitles him for the relief claimed.
41. Thus, in view of the above, the case is summed up that the petitioner joined the service on 20.6.1963. At that time his date of birth in his Service Book had been recorded as 17.5.1934. He passed the Matriculation subsequent to joining the service in 1965, and in his High School Certificate his date of birth has been shown as 17.2.1943. Petitioner never made any application for correcting the date of birth, even after obtaining the High School Certificate, for more than 17 years. In 1981 when he filled up the forms to get the Identity Card and G.P.F. account his date of birth had been recorded as 17.5.1934. He did not raise any objection. First time he filed the application for correction of his date of birth in 1982. Tribunal disposed of his earlier petition issuing certain directions. Petitioner did not try to lead any kind of evidence to prove his case. Thus, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of his own mistake. The petitioner did not ask the Enquiry Officer to summon the record of the school where he got the Primary Education or attended the Junior High School No explanation had ever been furnished as on what basis the different date of birth stood recorded in the Matriculation Certificate. He did not make any attempt in this respect rather tried to shift the burden upon the respondents to do the same while holding the enquiry. The only document which petitioner claims to be in his support is the High School Certificate which cannot be relied upon as it came into existence subsequent to joining the service. More so, the names of petitioner and his father are different in Service Book and the said Certificate. Therefore, it becomes doubtful as to whether the Certificate belongs to the petitioner, as it does not inspire any confidence whatsoever. More so, no explanation has been furnished as to why the petitioner did not submit any application and why such a Certificate had not been produced at an earlier date.
42. Thus, in view of the above, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the learned Tribunal.
43. The petitioner is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.