JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J.
1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners, Messrs. E. Sefton and Co., Mirzapur, have prayed for the issue of an order, direction or writ in the nature of certiorari to be issued to opposite parties, the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh, The Regional Conciliation Officer, Allahabad, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow, to produce before this Court the notification dated 27th December 1954, the award dated 19th June 1955 and the decision dated 26th September 1955, and the further prayer is that on production thereof, the notification, the award and the decision referred to above be quashed.
2. Two person's Aditya Prasad and Tasad-duq Husain were employed by the petitioner company, having been taken into service on the 29th October 1948 and 26th February 1951, respectively. They were retrenched on the 5th April 1954 and 8th April 1954, respectively. It is alleged that, at the time of this retrenchment, none of them made any protest nor was any demand made by them against the Company.
Further, it is alleged that even the opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur, at that stage made no protest and made no demand in respect of that retrenchment; on the other hand, on their applications dated 6th April 1954 and 10th April 1954, respectively, these two person's were given temporary jobs by the petitioner-Company for the period of. three months as ice clerks in a subsidiary business. This temporary employment of these two persons was terminated on the -13th July 1954 and 17th July 1954, respectively.
It is stated that even at this stage there was no protest or demand on their behalf. In the same month of July 1954, the petitioner-Company received a notice from the Regional Conciliation Officer, Allahabad, stating that the latter had received an application from opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union. Mirzapur. with a prayer that a Conciliation Board be constituted in accordance with G. O. No. V-615(u)/XIII-(LL)/51, dated March 15, 1951, to investigate into the matter referred to in that application.
It appears that the matter referred to in that application included the retrenchment of theSe two persons Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain in the month of April 1954. In the notice, the petitioner-Company was directed to nominate its representative who was to sit on the Board of Conciliation, and 20th July 1955 was fixed as the date on which the Company was to put in appearance for the investigation of that matter. Besides this matter relating to these two persons, one more matter was referred to the Conciliation Officer by the opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur, and that raised the question of payment of four months' wages as bonus to the workmen for the year 1952-53.
The petitioner-Company contended that there was no dispute between the Company and its workmen at all and on that account refused to submit to the conciliation proceedings. The representative of the Company, who appeared before the Regional Conciliation Officer in response to the notice issued, explained the point of the view of the petitioner-Company to that Officer. Thereupon the Regional Conciliation Officer held that the conciliation proceedings could not succeed and made a report to the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh, Thereupon, the State Government issued a notification dated the 27th December 1954, which is one of the orders impugned in this writ petition. In this notification, it was stated that the Governor was satisfied that an industrial dispute existed with respect to the matters specified in the notification and that, in the opinion of, the Governor, it was necessary for the maintenance of public order and for maintaining employment to refer the said dispute to the Regional Conciliation Officer, Sri J. N. Srivas-tava, for adjudication. This reference to the Regional Conciliation Officer for adjudication was purported to be made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Ss. 3, 4 and 8 of, the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and in pursuance of the provisions of Clause 11 of G. O. dated July 14, 1954, which had been issued under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act by the State Government and had been notified in the Official Gazette.
The matters referred for adjudication were: "(1) Whether the employers have wrongfully or unjustifiably terminated the services of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. If so to what relief; are they entitled? and (2) Whether the employers should be required to pay bonus to their workmen for the year 1952-53. If so, at what rate, and with details?"
The Regional Conciliation Officer, who was appointed as the Adjudicator, gave his award on the 19th June 1955. By this award the claim for restoration in service of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain was rejected, but they were allowed retrenchment compensation. The award also directed payment of bonus to the workmen for the year 1952-53. This award dated 19th June 1955, is the second order impugned in this writ petition. Two appeals were filed against this award before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench. The two appeals were decided together, The result of; the two decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was that, in place of retrenchment compensation, a direction was issued for reinstatement of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. In addition, the payment of bonus to the workmen for the year 1952-53 was also upheld. This appellate decision of the Tribunal dated the 26th September 1955 is the third order impugned in this writ petition. The petition was filed in this Court on the 20th October 1955. The Court directed issue of notices by registered post and also passed an interim order. It appears that subsequently, the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India was abolished and all the records were also transferred to Bombay.
This has been brought to the notice of the Court by a subsequent application supported by an affidavit presented on behalf of the opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur. The fact that the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench, has been abolished and that its record has been transferred to Bombay are not denied on behalf of the petitioners. On these facts a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the opposite parties that this Court had no jurisdiction now to issue any writ of certiorari tor quashing either the notification or the two orders sought Jo be quashed in the prayer in this petition.
3. There is, of course, no doubt, as contended on behalf of the petitioner, that the Regional Conciliation Officer, who gave the award on the 19th June 1955, still continues to exist and exercise jurisdiction within the jurisdiction of this Court, but the award given by him merged in the appellate decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and that award by itself cannot be quashed without quashing the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal also. This proposition is supported by a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Azamt Ullah v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, U. P., Lucknow, 1955 All LJ 521: ( (S) AIR 1955 All 435) (A).
Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the decision of the Full Bench cited above could not be applied in the present case on two grounds: The first point urged by learned counsel was that an examination of the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal Act, 1950, would, show that, according to the provisions of the two laws the legal position that comes into existence is that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal merges with the award of the adjudicator or the Industrial Tribunal and has thereafter to be treated as an award of the adjudicator or Industrial Tribunal so that what ceases to exist by merger is not the award of an Industrial Tribunal or adjudicator but the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal itself.
The second point urged by learned counsel was that in any case a part of the record of. the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, was still within the jurisdiction of this Court and consequently this Court had not lost jurisdiction to quash the decision of that Tribunal or thereafter to quash the award given by the Adjudicator.
4. The first point was urged by learned counsel on the basis of Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which is to the following effect:--
"16. Effect of decision of the Appellate Tribunal -- Where on appeal from any award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal modifies in any manner whatsoever that award or decision, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal shall, when it becomes enforceable under Section 15, be deemed to be substituted for that award or decision of the Industrial Tribunal and shall have effect for all purposes in the same manner and in accordance with the same law under which the award or decision of the Industrial Tribunal was made as if the Industrial Tribunal made the award or decision as modified by the decision of the Appellate Tribunal."
Learned counsel interpreted this section to mean that, after the Appellate Tribunal had given a decision in any manner modifying the award of the Adjudicator, that decision of the Appellate Tribunal had to be deemed to be substituted for the award and the effect of this substitution was that the decision became the award of the Industrial Tribunal. (It may here be clarified that the words 'Industrial Tribunal' used in the industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, includes an adjudicator appointed under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947).
In order to strengthen his argument, learned counsel referred to the further provision laying down that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was to have effect for all purposes in the same manner and in accordance with the same law under which the award of the Industrial Tribunal was made as if the Industrial Tribunal made the award or decision as modified by the decision of the Appellate Tribunal.
In this connection, he drew our attention to the provisions of Section 6 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under which an award of an Adjudicator has to be submitted to the State Government and thereafter the State Government can enforce it in the manner laid down in that provision of law.
5. In our opinion, this is not the correct interpretation of the position brought about by these two enactments in question. What Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, lays down is that on modification of the award, the decision of the Tribunal has to be deemed to be substituted for the award. The use of the expression 'deemed to be substituted' clearly implies that the result of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal is that the award of the Industrial Tribunal for all purposes becomes non-existent and its place is taken by the decision of the Appellate Tribunal.
Consequently, what becomes non-existent is the award of the Industrial Tribunal and what thereafter exists is the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. It is not merely a case where the decision or the award of the subordinate judicial or quasi judicial authority merges with the decision of the superior authority but the law actually brings about the fiction that the decision of the subordinate Tribunal or authority ceases to exist and thereafter the decision of the superior authority remains in existence incorporating in it the unmodified portion of the award or decision of the subordinate Tribunal or authority.
How the further action on that decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal has to be taken is also indicated by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act itself. Under Section 9 (9) of that Act, the Appellate Tribunal is required to send a copy of the decision to the Industrial Tribunal concerned and another copy to the appropriate Government, as soon as practicable, within one week from the date of the decision.
The decision of the Tribunal has therefore to be communicated to the State Government under Section 9 (9) of that Act. It is not to be communicated in the manner in which an award has to be submitted by the Adjudicator under Section 6(1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After a copy of the decision o the Appellate Tribunal has reached the State Government, of course, the State Government has to enforce that decision in exactly the Same manner and in accordance with the same law under which the. award of the Adjudicator had been made -- viz., the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The provisions of these two enactments thus make it clear that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal remains in existence and has to be enforced as a decision of that Tribunal, and consequently, if that decision of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari by this Court on the ground that the Tribunal has ceased to exist and its record has gone out of the jurisdiction of the Court, no writ of certiorari can be issued even for the purpose of quashing the award of the Adjudicator, whether it remain's as it was originally given by the Adjudicator or as modified by the decision of the Appellate Tribunal.
In cases where the decision of the Appellate Tribunal does not in any manner modify the award of the Adjudicator, Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 may not apply as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner. But, in such a case, the principle of merger of the decision of the subordinate Tribunal with the decision of the superior Tribunal laid down in the Full Bench case cited above would apply.
Since in this case, there is a clear assertion that the Labour Appellate Tribunal of Lucknow Bench has been abolished and the records of the case in which the decision of the Appellate Tribunal which is impugned in this petition was given has gone to Bombay outside the jurisdiction of this Court, no writ of certiorari can be issued to quash that decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal or the award given by the Adjudicator.
6. The second point, which was urged by learned counsel, to the effect that at least a part of the record of the Appellate Tribunal is still within the jurisdiction of the Court, was based on the provisions of Section 6(1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
According to learned counsel, in order that the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal should be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947, as laid down by Section 16 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, the original decision must have been submitted by the Appellate Tribunal to the State Government in accordance with Section 6(1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so that the original decision must still be within the jurisdiction of this Court and it, can therefore, be quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari.
We have already indicated above that the procedure that has to be followed for enforcement of a decision "of the Labour Appellate Tribunal does not involve compliance with Section 6(1) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. That provision is confined to the submission of the award by an Adjudicator to the State Government. In the case of a decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, there is a separate and specific provision in Section 9 (9) of; the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which indicates how the decision of the Tribunal is to be communicated so that subsequently it can be enforced.
The method of communication that has been prescribed is that a copy of the decision is to be sent to the Adjudicator and another copy to the State Government. The State Government has to take proceedings for enforcement of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal on the basis of the copy received by it under Section 9(9) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The law does not thus require that the original decision must be sent to the State Government.
It would form part of the record of the case in which that decision is given by the Appellate Tribunal and we have before us a definite assertion in the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 1 that the record of that case with the original decision of the Appellate Tribunal has been. transferred to Bombay and is no longer within the jurisdiction of the Court.
The existence of the copy of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal which might have been received by the State Government under Section 9 (9) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1951, cannot be said to be the record in which the decision was given and against which alone a writ of certiorari can be directed. That is a mere copy of the decision Sent in order that further action may be taken by the appropriate authority on it. The existence of such a cony of the decision within the jurisdiction of the Court does not entitle the Court to quash the decision itself which forms part of the record at present in Bombay and outside the jurisdiction of this Court.
Consequently, in this case the preliminary objection, in so far as it relates to the prayer of the petitioner-Company for quashing the award dated 19th June 1955 and the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 26th September 1955, must prevail and the petition to that extent must be rejected.
7. So far as the notification dated 27th December 1954 is concerned, it did not incorporate in it any decision or determination by any judicial or quasi-judicial authority. It was a notification issued by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of its administrative and executive power conferred on it by Section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. No writ of certiorari can be issued for quashing such a notification, as that writ is confined in its scope to quashing of orders or decisions of judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunals only.
In view of these circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this Court should issue some other appropriate order, or direction or writ by virtue of which the action that is now being taken in pursuance of this notification, may be restrained. This prayer was sought on the contention that that notification was void and not in accordance with any law, so that any action taken in pursuance of it could be restrained by this Court by issuing an appropriate order, writ or direction.
It was further urged that the fact that, in pursuance of that notification an award had been given by an Adjudicator and that award had been substituted by a decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow Bench, could not stand in the way of this Court exercising the powers of restraining further action being taken in pursuance of that notification, because if that notification was void and against law, the Adjudicator and the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India in fact got no jurisdiction ab initio to adjudicate upon or give any decision on the disputes referred by the State Government by this notification so that the award and the decision of the Tribunal could be ignored as altogether void.
Briefly put, the contention was that, if any judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunal exercises jurisdiction and the conferment of that jurisdiction is ab initio void, there is no necessity for issue of any writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal and the Court would be competent to issue appropriate directions and orders completely ignoring the effect of that decision. This proposition was contested on behalf of the opposite parties but it is supported by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Moinuddin v. Deputy Director of Military Lands and Cantonments, Eastern Command, AIR 1956 Ail 684 (B).
We may first mention that the Full Bench in the case of Azmat Ullah v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Lucknow (A), cited above, when dealing with the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ of certiorari against the Custodian General, New Delhi, had expressed no opinion on the question whether the Court would have been competent to issue a writ of certiorari if the Custodian General had had no jurisdiction at all to make the order in exercise of his revisional powers under Section 27 of the Evacuee Property Act.
In that case occasion had not arisen to lay down the proposition that, if the judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunal had ab initio no jurisdiction at all, its order could or could not be ignored by the Court when issuing any order, direction or writ against a subordinate judicial or quasi-judicial Tribunal or against public authorities seeking to carry out those orders. The point directly arose and was considered by a Division Bench in the case of AIR 1956 All 684 (B) mentioned above.
In these circumstances, we proceed to consider whether the order dated 27th December, 1954 issued by the Government of the State of. Uttar Pradesh was or was not a valid order and whether it did or did not confer any jurisdiction on the Adjudicator and the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India to deal with the dispute which was referred for adjudication by that order.
8. The validity of the order of 27th December, 1954 was challenged on behalf of the petitioner Company on two grounds : One ground was that the petitioner Company was carrying on industry mentioned in item No. 10 of the 1st schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulations) Act 1951 as amended by the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1953 so that the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 was not applicable to any disputes in this industry.
In Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the expression 'Industrial dispute' is defined as having the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), (hereinafter referred as the Central Industrial Disputes Act) subject to the modification that "industrial dispute's" shall be construed not to include a dispute concerning any industry specified in Sub-section (i) of, Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2(1)(a) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act as amended by the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 1953 reads as follows :
"In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,
(a) "appropriate Government" means
(i) in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf, by the Central Government or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a banking or an insurance company, a mine, oil field or a major port, the Central Government, and
(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, the Provincial Government."
The contention on behalf of the petitioner Company is that the industry carried on by the petitioner Company is a controlled industry which has been specified in this behalf by the Central Government within the meaning of this expression as used in Section 2(a)(i) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. That the industry carried on by the petitioner Company is a controlled industry cannot be doubted. In Section 2 of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951 the legislature laid down a declaration in the following words :
"It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the first Schedule."
By the Industries (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 1953 item 10 of the first schedule was altered so as to include in Clause (c) "textiles made of wool including woollen yarn, hosiery, carpets and druggets." The industry carried on by the petitioner Company is that of manufacturing woollen blankets which are textiles made of wool. Consequently, the industry of the petitioner Company is an industry which is covered by the declaration contained in Section 2 of the Industries Development Regulation Act, 1951 as amended by the Amendment Act of 1953.
Under Clause (ee) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, a controlled Industry has been defined to mean any industry the control of which by the Union has been declared by any Central Act to be expedient in the public interest. Since the industry of the petitioner company has been included in the first schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 and by Section 19 of the Amendment Act of 1953, it is clear that it is an industry which comes within the definition of "controlled industry'' as defined in Clause (ea) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.
The question however still remains whether the mere fact that the industry of the petitioner company is a controlled industry is sufficient to make Section 2(a)(i) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act applicable to it, so as to make the Central Government the appropriate Government for this industry. The relevent clause of Section 2(a)(i) which has been relied upon may now be separated from the rest of the provisions and for convenience reproduced as "any Such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government."
This expression includes within it two requirement's. Firstly, in order that the Central Government should be the appropriate Government, the industry should be a controlled industry and secondly it should be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. The first requirement of the industry being a controlled industry is clearly satisfied by the industry of the petitioner company as has been held above. The main argument has centred round the other requirement that the industry must be specified in this behalf by the Central Government. On behalf of the petitioner company, no notification or Government order of the Central Government has been brought to our notice in which there might have been a specification of this particular industry as an industry Specified for the purposes of Section 2(a)(i) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.
On the other hand, on behalf of the opposite parties, our attention has been drawn to a notification issued by the Central Government, Ministry of Labour on 27th April, 1955 under which the controlled industries engaged in the production or use of certain minerals mentioned in the schedule annexed to that notification were specified by the Central Government for the purposes of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. The controlled industries mentioned in that notification are not covered by the first Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 as amended in 1953.
The controlled industries mentioned in that notification came within the purview of Section 2 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948. Under this provision of law also, the legislature had laid down a declaration that it was expedient in the public interest that the Government should take under its control the development of (a) any industry connected with the production or use of atomic energy and (b) any mineral which is or may be used for the production or use of atomic energy or research into matters connected therewith.' The notification dated 27th April, 1955 says that the minerals noted in the schedule annexed to that notification had been declared by the Government of India in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research to be minerals from which in the opinion of the Central Government any of the prescribed substances defined in Clause (d) of Section 3 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948 were or might be obtained. Consequently, the industries which were specified for the purposes by Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act were industries covered by the declaration of the legislature contained in Section 2 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948 and were controlled industries as defined in Clause (ee) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.
This shows that the Central Government, in order that it should be the appropriate Government for these controlled industries, did actually issue a special notification specifying various industries for the purposes of Sub-clause (i), Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. No such notification appears to have been issued with respect to the industry carried on by the petitioner company.
Learned counsel for the petitioner in these circumstances urged that there was no necessity for a separate specification for the purposes of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act in regard to industries which were already contained in the first schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act as amended in 1953 and that the specification automatically came into existence whenever an industry was either registered under Section 10 or granted a licence under Section 11 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 as amended in 1953.
In fact what he argued was that such registration or licensing amounted to the specification envisaged by Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act. This contention cannot be accepted. Section 10 and 11 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1950 as amended in 1953 deal with "industrial undertakings" and not with an "industry" as such. In Clause (d) of Section 3 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 the word 'Industrial undertaking' was defined to mean any undertaking pertaining to a scheduled industry carried on in one or more factories by any person or authority including Government.
In Clause (i) of the same Section a 'scheduled industry' was defined to mean any of the industries specified in the first schedule. The words 'industrial undertaking' were therefore given by the Act a meaning which was separate and distinct from the word 'industry'. The word 'industry' was envisaged as covering all kinds of undertakings engaged in working on materials mentioned in the first schedule. If the manufacture or production of iron and steel was carried on anywhere under any circumstance, that would be an industry engaged in the manufacture and production of iron and steel. It would not however necessarily be an industrial undertaking.
To be an industrial undertaking, the work of manufacture or production should be carried on in one or more factories by person or authority including Government. Clearly, all industrial undertakings engaged in the manufacture or production of any particular item mentioned in the first schedule would be carrying the industry mentioned in that schedule. But a Single undertaking of that nature would not be synonymous with that industry. Sections 10 and 11 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, required the registration or licensing of an Industrial undertaking engaged in any industry and not the registration or licensing of the industry as a whole.
Registration or licensing of an undertaking carrying on a particular industry could not therefore amount to specification of such industry for any purpose & particularly for a purpose which was not mentioned in the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, which provided for the registration or licensing. In the instant case, we are concerned with the specification not for the purpose of Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, but for the purpose of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.
That specification was to be not only in respect of industries covered by Section 2 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, but also in respect of any other industry which may be covered by a similar provision in any other law, an example of which has already been cited above with reference to Atomic Energy of 1948. Any Specification for the purposes of Sub-clause (1) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be a Specification which would apply for the purposes of that Act irrespective of the question whether the particular industry specified had become a controlled industry as a result of a declaration in one Central Act or in any other Central Act.
In the Atomic Energy Act, 1948, the provisions differed very widely from the provision made in the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, and consequently registration and licensing under the latter Act are not comparable with the steps that have to be taken for controlling the industries covered by Section 2 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1948. Yet, all such controlled industries whether covered by one Act or another Act, have to be specified for the purposes of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act in the same manner.
Such specification must, therefore, be a separate specification designed particularly to satisfy the requirements of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act and so far as the industry of the petitioner-Company is concerned there has been no such separate specification.
9. In support of his argument that the registration or licensing under Ss. 10 and 11 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, should be held to be the specification envisaged in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, learned counsel drew our attention to the fact that the Central Industrial Disputes Act itself contains no provision prescribing the manner in which the specification was to be made and published.
It is true, that, in a number of statutes, a direction is laid down as to the manner in which a particular order, direction, declaration, or specification must be notified by the authority making it and in the majority of the cases the manner prescribed is by publication in the official Gazette. It, however, appears that, in the case of specification for purposes of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act, the Legislature did not consider it necessary to lay down the manner of making and publishing the specification.
When the manner of making and publishing the specification is not laid down in the Act itself, a reasonable inference would be that the specification must be made and published in such a manner that it would come to the notice of all the persons who would be concerned with or interested in the specification. The discretion appears to have been left to the Central Government to choose the appropriate manner of making the specification and giving publicity to it.
Merely because the manner of making and publishing the specification is not laid down in the Central Industrial Disputes Act itself, a presumption cannot be raised that that manner must be laid down in some other law. The specification under Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act has to be made in respect of controlled industries which are declared as such by any other special law. In such a case, it is not possible to hold that the registration and licensing in one special law must be deemed to be a specification for the purposes of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.
It also appears that, in fact, when the Central Government did make such a specification with regard to certain industries declared to be controlled industries under the Atomic Energy Act, 1948, that specification was published in the official Gazette. No such specification has been made or published with regard to the industry carried on by the petitioner-Company, so that the industry of the petitioner-Company is not one for which the Central Government is the appropriate Government under Sub-clause (i).
of Clause (a) of Section 2 of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.
Consequently, the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh was the appropriate Government and the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act could be applied to an industrial dispute arising in the industry of the petitioner-Company, so that the Government of Uttar Pradesh acted in exercise of the powers vested in it when it issued the Notification dated 27th December 1954.
10. The second ground on which the validity of this Notification was challenged on behalf of the petitioner-Company was that in fact it was not necessary to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication for one or more of the purposes mentioned in Section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so that the reference as a whole was void. The necessity of issuing the notification and making the reference were matters which under the law are to be determined by the subjective satisfaction of the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh and it is not within the competence of this Court to see whether the satisfaction of the Government was or was not fully justified.
The fact of the actual existence of the industrial dispute had also to be determined to the satisfaction of the State of Uttar Pradesh and the correctness of this satisfaction is also not open to question in Courts. These principles have been laid down in several decisions of this Court, but it is sufficient for us in this case to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court which covers the point. That case is State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53 (C).
The principle was further reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 532 (D), which was decided by that Court on the 20th March 1957. In both these cases the principle laid down was that the factual existence of the dispute and the necessity of making reference for adjudication for the purposes mentioned in the appropriate law cannot be challenged in Courts. The Courts are competent only to go into the question whether the dispute that was referred constituted an industrial dispute or not.
In the instant case, it has not been urged that the dispute which was referred for adjudication by the Notification dated 27th December 1954 did not constitute an industrial dispute. All that was urged was that in fact there was no dispute at all. This point, as we have said earlier, cannot be gone into by this Court. We might however mention that facts disclosed to us show that Aditya Prasad and Tasad-duq Husain were retrenched in the month of April 1954 whereafter they got temporary employment which continued upto July 1954.
It was while they were under this temporary employment that the dispute was referred on their behalf by opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union to the Regional Conciliation Officer. In the various affidavits filed, the exact date when the reference was made by the Union to the Regional Conciliation Officer has not been mentioned. We have only found in the award of the Adjudicator a mention that the dispute was referred by the Union to the Regional Conciliation Officer in the month of June 1954.
The contention on behalf of the petitioner-Company was that Aditya Prasad and Tasad-duq Husain had lodged no protest and had made no demand either at the time of their retrenchment in April 1954 or at the time of the termination of their temporary employment in July 1954 and further that the Union also had not taken any steps to raise a dispute at those relevant times and consequently it must be held that there was in fact no dispute at all.
This contention fails because there is material on the record to show that the Union did take up the matter on behalf of these two persons to the Regional Conciliation Officer in the month of June 1954, while those two persons were still under temporary employment of the petitioner-Company. The fact that no protest had been raised or demand made by these two persons when they were retrenched in April 1954 and that they acted similarly when their temporary employment terminated in July 1954, were certainly relevant considerations for arriving at the view whether a dispute did or did not exist.
The fact that a reference had been made to the Regional Conciliation Officer in the matter of their retrenchment in the month of June 1954 was another relevant consideration. These were the materials on the basis of which the Government of Uttar Pradesh had to form its. opinion about the factual existence of the dispute. It cannot be said that the opinion formed by the Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh was in these circumstances a perverse or impossible opinion which had no relation to the existing facts.
The factual existence of the dispute having been found by the State Government, it was again for the Government of State of Uttar Pradesh to judge the expediency of making the reference. The existence of that expediency had been mentioned by the State Government in the notification itself and again we cannot sit in judgment over the opinion formed by the Government.
All that we are competent to see is whether the dispute that was referred did or did not constitute an industrial dispute and satisfied the requirements of an industrial dispute as given in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act under which the reference was made. To be an industrial dispute it was not necessary that it should have related to the employment, non-employment or conditions of service of a workman.
The definition of industrial dispute lays down two essential requirements; one requirement is that the dispute should be between an. employer and another employer or between an employer and workmen or between workmen and workmen. The second requirement is that the dispute should be connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person.
The dispute that was actually referred related to the retrenchment of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain which was clearly covered by the expression 'non-employment of any person'. The contention that the person whose non-employment should be the subject-matter of the dispute must also be a workman cannot be accepted.
It does not appear to be necessary to give the reasons for this view in detail. One of the members of this Bench had occasion to consider this question in Prahlad Rai Oil Mills v. State of U. P., Civil Misc. Writ No. 608 of 1953 (All) (E), and this case was decided on the 23rd November 1954. It was held:
"The Second requirement is that the dispute should be connected with the employment or non-employment or with the condition of labour of any person, It is significant that, in this part of the definition the words used are 'any person' and not 'a workman'. It is clear that for a dispute to be an industrial dispute it is not necessary that it should be connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of the employment or conditions of labour of a workman, as long as the dispute is connected with the employment or non-employment etc. 'of any person' it will be an industrial dispute provided, of course, the two parties to the dispute are either employers and employers, or employers and workmen or workmen and workmen."
A similar point arose before the other member of the Bench in J.K. Cotton and Spg. and Weaving Mills Ltd., Kanpur v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 291 of 1955, D/- 25-7-1955 (All) (F). In that case also, it was not held that the dispute must necessarily relate to the employment or non-employment of a workman. The scope of the word's 'any person' was however examined in greater detail and it was held that these words could not include a labourer working in a concern situate in a different country or situate in a completely different type of industry.
The word's have to be given a restricted meaning according to the context and the objects for which the Industrial Disputes Act had been enacted. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Narendra Kumar v. All India Industrial Disputes Tribunal, AIR 1953 Bom 325 (G), was referred to and the views expressed by the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court on this point were followed. It had been held by the learned Chief Judge of the Bombay High Court that the words 'any person' could only mean those persons in whom the workmen themselves were directly and substantially interested. If the workmen have no direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-employment of a person then an industrial dispute could not arise with regard to such person.
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1956, D/- 20-3-1957. ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 532) (D), also supports this view. In that case, the dispute in the reference related to the wrongful termination of the service of one individual Tajarnmul HuSain, Lino Operator. In the notification issued by the U. P. Government referring the dispute under S; 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, there was a mention that a dispute existed between the employer and its workmen.
Dealing with the notification, the Supreme Court held that the word's used in the first part or the notification showed that the Government was labouring under the misapprehension that the dispute was between the employer on the one hand and its workmen on the other which. in fact it was not. Tajarnmul Husain could not be termed workmen (in plural) nor could the U. P. Working Journalists' Union be called "his workmen", nor was there any indication that the individual dispute had got transformed into an 'industrial dispute'.
This view was expressed by the Supreme-Court in the light of the fact that the U. P. Working Journalists' Union which referred the dispute in the matter of Tajarnmul Husain's termination of services was not a union of the workmen employed by the Newspapers Ltd., and was in fact situated in a different city. It was under these circumstances that the Supreme Court was of the view that the reference of the dispute by the State Government was-incompetent as no dispute had been raised by workmen (plural) as had a direct interest in the dispute relating to the termination of the services of Tajammul Husain.
In the present case, the dispute was brought before the Regional Conciliation Officer for the first time by opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur. The name of the Union itself indicates that it is a union of workmen employed at Mirzapur and it was in that capacity that the Union made a reference of the dispute relating to the retrenchment of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. It has not been alleged anywhere on behalf of the petitioner-Company that the Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur, was not competent to take the dispute on behalf of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain presumably because they were themselves members of that Union or in any case the Union did represent workmen employed by the petitioner-Company, It appears even from the award given by the Adjudicator that at no stage was it contended before him that this Union was not competent to take up this dispute as an industrial dispute when it related to the alleged retrenchment of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. There is only an indication in the counter-affidavit filed by Sri J.N. Srivastava, Regional Conciliation Officer, Allahabad, that very likely Aditya PraSad and Tasadduq Husain were members of this Union when he swore in respect of these-persons that 'the aforesaid employees and their Union has a right to raise their disputes even after their retrenchment.' The description of opposite party No. 1, The Textile Mill Mazdoor Union, Mirzapur, as the union of employees, Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain points to the fact that they were member's of this Union. The burden in this case where a petitioner-Company came to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of, law was on that petitioner-Company to show that the Union was not competent to take up this dispute and that their taking up the dispute did not amount to raising a dispute between an employer and workmen.
They failed to do so whereas whatever material has been provided before us indicates that the Union was interested directly in the dispute which arose as a result of the retrenchment of Aditya Prasad and Tasadduq Husain. Both the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner-Company to challenge the validity of the notification dated 27th December 1954 there-lore fail and have to be rejected.
That notification being valid, the Adjudicator who gave the award acted in exercise of competent jurisdiction vested in him to give the award on the dispute referred to him. The decision given by him thereafter came to be substituted by the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India (Lucknow Bench) and that Tribunal has ceased to exist within the jurisdiction of this Court, with the further circumstance that the records of the case are also outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, none of the three orders impugned by this writ petition are liable to be quashed.
11. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. A sum of Rs. 250 is assessed as costs payable to opposite party No. 1 and the same amount is payable to opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 as fees for counsel engaged by them.