JUDGMENT O.P. Garg, J.
1. This first appeal from order is directed against the order dated 24.3.1998 passed by Sri K. N. Ojha. District Judge, Bhadohi at Gyanpur allowing Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1997 and directing the trial court to decide the suit on merits as cause of action survives against Dwarika Nath Dubey, the present appellant who is said to be acting as Manager of the Committee of Management, Sri Kashi Raj Maha Vidyalaya Inter College, Aurai, Bhadohi.
2. Heard Sri A. P. Sahi, learned counsel for the defend ant-appellant and Sri G. N. Verma, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent.
3. Suit No. 245 of 1995 was dismissed by the trial court on the application, paper No. 271C, moved by the defendant--Ram Achal Dubey (since deceased) by invoking the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11. C.P.C. on 23.11.1996. The plaintiff-respondent filed Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1997, which was allowed by the impugned order dated 24.3-1998. Application No. 271C was rejected and the case was remanded with the direction that the suit shall be decided on merits.
4. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant urged that the learned District Judge has committed a grave illegality and irregularity in recording a finding that the cause of action in the suit still survives, particularly when the period for which Prabhu Nath Mishra who is alleged to have been elected as Manager of the institution has elapsed as according to him, he was elected in May, 1993. It was also pointed out that the learned District Judge has recorded a categorical finding that the cause of action does not survive against Ram Achal Dubey, as his period of alleged managership has also elapsed.
5. This case has a chequered history. At one stage or the other, a number of writ petitions came to be filed before this Court by either of the parties. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12923 of 1996, this Court, by its order dated 10.4.1996 had observed that a proper application for amendment may be moved to challenge the fresh election if it takes place during the pendency of the suit. The present defend ant-appellant was elected as Manager during the pendency of the suit. He filed Special Appeal No. 357 of 1996 against the order dated 10.4.1996 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12923 of 1996. This Special Appeal was decided on 25.4.1996 in which it was observed that the trial court shall not be influenced by any observations made by learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12923 of 1996.
6. It is true that the period of election, which was held in the year 1993 has elapsed but there is a dispute about the correctness or otherwise of the members enrolled by either of the parties on the basis of which alleged rival elections had taken place. The election of the present appellant-Dwarika Nath Dubey has been challenged in the suit by means of an amendment, which has been duly incorporated. In the light of the above facts, the cause of action survives against Dwarlka Nath Dubey the present appellant and the learned District Judge is, therefore. Justified in remanding the case for decision afresh, on merits, to the trial court.
7. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The trial court has dismissed the suit by invoking the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 (a), C.P.C. which provides that a plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent urged that the Court below has committed a grave error in rejecting the plaint under the aforesaid provision as the said provision is applicable to a case, which does not disclose a cause of action. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on Rameshwar and others u. Jot Ram and others, AIR 1976 SC 49. In" which the Apex Court has observed that it is basic to our procedural Jurisprudence that the right to relief must be Judged to exist as on the date a suit or institutes the legal proceedings. This is an emphatic statement that the right of a party is determined by the facts as they exist on the date the action is instituted. Granting the presence of such facts, then he is entitled to its enforcement. Later developments cannot defeat his right. The Court's procedural delays cannot deprive him of legal Justice or rights crystallised in the initial cause of action. Courts can, however, take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly, but this can be done only in exceptional circumstances. Rights vested by statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine. A reference was also made to a recent decision of this Court in Purnmasi Yadav v. Narbedeshwar Tripathi and others, 1998 (32) ALR 611. In that case, the two Courts below had taken into account materials beyond the plaint to declare the case of the plaintiff as frivolous and vexatious. It was held that it was beyond the scope of Order VII. Rule 11, C.P.C. The plaint alone was to be read for an order under that provision and non-disclosure of cause of action was certainty a point different from non-maintainability of suit.
8. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant urged that the trial court has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath and others, AIR 1987 SC 1926. It was a case of election petition. It was held that for non-disclosure of cause of action, election petition can be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. even after settlement of issues.
9. I have thoroughly studied the aforesaid decision and find that it is not squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case, the election petition/plaint did not disclose any cause of action and, therefore, it was held that the plaint/election petition could be rejected on account of non-disclosure of cause of action even after the settlement of issues. The trial court has wrongly interpreted the aforesaid ruling of the Apex Court and has misapplied law to reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 (a). C.P.C. which as a matter of fact did not apply to the present suit in which a positive and concrete cause of action was disclosed. It was, at best, a case where the relief could not be granted as it became infructuous on account of lapse of time against Ram Achal Dubey, who had ceased to be Manager after the expiry of the specified period. The trial court lost sight of the fact that the cause of action survived against Dwarika Nath Dubey who was elected as Manager after Ram Achal Dubey (since deceased).
10. For the reasons stated above, the order passed by the Ist appellate court, i.e., District Judge, Bhadohi at Gyanpur in Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1997 is not only according to law but Justified and is in keeping with the spirit of the directions passed by this Court in the writ petition. There is no reason why the defendant-appellant should feel shy to contest the suit in which cause of action still survives. Moreover, in view of the holding that the plaint was wrongly and illegally rejected by the trial court by invoking the provision of Order VII, Rule 11 (a), C.P.C., the learned first appellate court has no option but to remand the case for decision on merits. In view of the casual and slip shod approach and attitude of the trial court, remand of the case was necessitated.
11. In the result, the appeal is devoid of merits and substance and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.