ORDER C.A. Rahim, J.
1. This revision is directed against the judgment and order of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia delivered on 1-12-1992. By the aforesaid judgment and order he allowed the said revision and set aside the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ballia dated 16-4-1992 and the case was remanded back with direction to proceed according to ' w. The learned Judge has also directed both the parties to appear before the said Court, for taking part in further proceeding.
2. The complainant filed a case in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ballia against the revisionists for prosecuting them under Sections 161, 167, 217, 218, 409, 467, 468 and 500, I.P.C. On 24-12-1991 the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ballia ordered to register the case and proceeded to examine the complainant, and his witnesses under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. PC. After examining the two witnesses he transferred the case to the Court of the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ballia on 14-2-1992 for disposal. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate heard on the point: of maintainability of the said complaint in view of Section 197, Cr. PC. and after hearing he dismissed the complaint under Section 203, Cr. P.C. on 16-4-1992 against, which a revision was preferred before the learned Sessions Judge, Ballia.
3. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia heard the revision and disposed it of with the finding that the offence complained of is intimately connected with official duty of the opposite party (before him) and that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has no power to hear, suo motu, about the maintainability of the petition complaint when the Chief Judicial Magistrate has already look cognizance arid transferred it to him for disposal. He has held that it was obligatory on the part of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to summon the opposite parties and if at subsequent stage the opposite parties raises any objection as regards bar of Section 197, Cr. P.C., then the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate could decide the said matter.
4. Sri B. N. Tiwari, appearing for the revisionists has submitted that on both the points lower revisional Court erred in giving finding in favour of the other side. According to him the offence complained of is intimately connected with the duty to be discharged by him in official capacity. He has admitted that the revisionists are public servants not removable from their office except with the sanction of the Government. He has submitted that it is necessary to see that the offence alleged must have been committed by the revisionists while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. He has referred the case of State of Maharashtra v. Dr. B. Subbarao 1993 SCc (Cri) 901. Amonst the various documents which were seized in that case were the Identity Card of the Indian Armed Forced bearing his photograph and name, eight files containing different types of maps of India, diagrams and computer information, certain books, project report etc. Most of the documents which can be said to be sensitive which were recovered from the accused were admittedly either the books written by him or the papers read by him. Even the thesis written by the accused on which he was awarded Ph.D. by the Bhabha Institute of Technology was seized by the prosecution. On the basis of the documents seized and the interrogation, a complaint was filed against him under Section 3 read with Sections 9, 6(2) and (b) of the Official Secret Act and Section 24(1)(d) read with Sections 18(2) and 24(2) read with Section 19(b) of the Atomic Energy Act before the Metropolitan Magistrate, who being prima facie satisfied of the offences and their gravity, committed the accused to stand trial before the Court of Sessions. It was challenged by the opposite parties but the Supreme Court held that the conditions of applicability of Section 197, Cr. P.C. are (i) act of omission must have been done by a public servant in the course of service and (ii) it should have been in the discharge of his duty. Considering the facts of that case it was held that both the contentions having been fulfilled, failure to obtain sanction for the prosecution vitiates the entire proceeding against the accused.
5. Sri Sudhakar Pandey, appealing for the defence has referred the case State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : AIR 1991 SC 1260, wherein it is held :
There must be reasonable connection between the act complained of and discharge or purported discharge of the official duty. The act or omission must bear such a relation to the duly that the accused lay reasonable nexus between the offending act or omission and the duly but not a pretended or fanciful claim that, he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.
6. It is not part of the duty of a public servant to enter into the conspiracy, to fabricate the records, falsify the accounts and commit fraud, misappropriation of money and acceptance of illegal gratification, though exercise of powers gives him occasion to commit the offence.
7. No criminal offence can be said to be an official act. The offence complained of may not be official but if it is done in the discharge of official duty and which is immutely connected to it, sanction is needed.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents Sri Pandey has referred the case of K. Salwant Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 266 and the case of M.N. Kaul v. State, 1983 All WC 555 : AIR 1983 SC 610. In these two cases it is held that cheating is not an act to discharge official duty. It has no reasonable connection with the duty imposed on him. The act must bear such a relation to the duly that the public servant could lay a reasonable claim but not a pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty.
9. In S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, 1979 Cri LJ 1367 : AIR 1979 SC 1841 it is held that dishonest misappropriation or conversion of goods by public servant cannot be regarded as an offence alleged to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. Accordingly, sanction to prosecute for an offence under Sections 409, 120-B, I.P.C. was not necessary.
10. In the instant case it has been complained that (he revisionists did some illegal act while in their respective offices for their personal gain and in pursuance of which there was manipulation of records misappropriation of amount etc. mentioned in the petition. Both the Courts below did not consider the merits of it. Learned trial Court held that sanction under Section 197, Cr. P.C. is necessary before taking cognizance which the lower revisional Court disagreed. Learned Judge has also held that the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was not competent to take up the matter of maintainability, suo moto, when cognizance was already taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
11. Learned Judge has stated that when the Chief Judicial Magistrate has passed the order to register the case and proceeded to inquire into the matter he must have considered that there was no bar under Section 197, Cr. P.C. at the time of taking, cognizance.
12. The word cognizance has not been defined in Criminal Procedure Code. Petition of complaint was filed before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and he proceeded to examine Section 200, Cr. P.C. runs as follows :
A Magistrate 'taking cognizance' of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by Magistrate.
13. In the instant case the Chief Judicial Magistrate registered the ease and proceeded to examine the witnesses and the complainant under Section 200, Cr. P.C. Registering a case does not in any imagination be construed as taking cognizance. Examination of the complainant and the witnesses do not also signify that the Magistrate has taken cognizance. Section 200, Cr. P.C. has been framed with the words "Magistrate taking cognizance...shall examine," so before examination of the complainant and the witnesses a Magistrate cannot be said to have taken cognizance. Each and every petition of complaint filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate must be registered in a "Register of complaint," be it dismissed or proceeded with. That does not in any way construe that the Magistrate has taken cognizance. Learned Judge has erred on the point of law in this respect.
14. The Chief Judicial Magistrate after examining the complainant and his witnesses transferred the case to the Court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for disposal. Till then he did not pass any order for issuing summons nor in any order-sheet he has mentioned that he has taken cognizance. The said transfer can be affected by him administratively or under Section 192, Cr. P.C. In the latter case it is necessary for the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance and then transfer. But in the instant case none of the orders speaks that he has gone to that extent. So it is not correct to state that the Chief Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance before transfer.
15. Moreover, if the finding of the learned Judge is accepted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate has taken cognizance first and then transferred the case for disposal, even then the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was within his right to see the maintainability of the petition of complainant. Section 197, Cr. P.C. envisages that no cognizance should be taken in a case where sanction is necessary. The non-obstante clause signifies that if a Magistrate takes cognizance in a case where sanction is necessary the said order becomes bad in law or void. A void order should be considered as non est or non-existant. Any order or finding passed subsequent to it would be void. In that circumstances to prevent the abuse of the process of Court the said matter can be looked into on an application or suo motu. So I do not consider that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was not competent to take up the matter suo motu and pass order as to the maintainability of the petition of complaint.
16. In the instant case when it is found that the petition of complaint was maintainable even then the competency of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate in taking up the matter cannot be questioned. I find that the learned Judge sitting in revisional jurisdiction has erred on the point that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has no such power.
17. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in P. P. Sharma's case AIR 1991 SC 1260 (supra) that it is no part of the duty of the public servant to enter into conspiracy, to fabricate records, commit fraud or misappropriation or demand or acceptance of illegal gratification though exercise of powers gives him occasion to commit the offence and hence no sanction is necessary. In view of S. B. Sana's case AIR 1979 SC 1841 (supra) the Supreme Court held that dishonest misappropriation or conversion or goods by public servant for which a complaint under Sections 409/120-B, I.P.C. is filed, there is no necessity of obtaining sanction. I find that the allegation complained of in the instant case squarely falls within the categories of those decisions and accordingly I find that no sanction is required to prosecute the revisionists. It is no worth saying that in the revisional jurisdiction this Court is empowered to go into the merits of the case and analyse the evidence adduced by the complainant and his witnesses and give a finding of fact. The said duty is casted on the learned trial Court. So it is necessary to remand the case to that Court to look into the prima facie ease of the offence complained of. Though 1 do not agree with some of the finding of the learned Judge yet 1 feel that there is no infirmity in his ultimate finding that the matter be remanded hack to the trial Court for proceeding according to law.
18. The revision, being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. Both the parties shall appear before the learned trial Court on a date to be fixed by him and take part in proceeding so far permissible under the law.