1. Substituted respondents No.1/1 to 1/3 were issued notices pursuant to Court's order dated 26.7.2012. Seen the office report dated 12.9.2012. Service is deemed sufficient.
2. Heard Sri Amit Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
3. The petitioner, admittedly, is a tenant and respondents are landlord of accommodation in question i.e. House No.1, Sinonia Fathak, Barua Sagar, District Jhansi. The landlord issued a notice dated 15/17th March, 1988 to the petitioner-tenant demanding arrears of rent and terminating his tenancy and thereafter filed Small Cause Suit No.43 of 1988 in the Court of Judge Small Cause/Civil Judge, Jhansi for eviction of petitioner-tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent.
4. The petitioner-tenant filed written statement renouncing his status as tenant of plaintiff-respondent and denying her title also on the property in dispute. Thereafter, plaint was got amended by plaintiff adding para 5-A i.e. ground for eviction available under Section 20(2)(f) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972").
5. Vide judgment dated 22nd January, 1992, the Judge, Small Cause Court, Jhansi decreed the suit on the question of default whereagainst petitioner preferred S.C.C. Revision No.21 of 1992 which was allowed by District Judge, Jhansi vide judgment dated 6.5.1994 and the case was remanded to the Trial Court for deciding the suit afresh. Thereafter, again the Trial Court vide judgment dated 29th August, 1997 has decreed the suit directing ejectment of petitioner-tenant from the premises in question besides payment of damage pendentelite and future and the decision has been affirmed in revision by Revisional Court, i.e. Additional District Judge, Jhansi vide judgment dated 18th August, 2004 dismissing S.C.C. Revision No.75 of 1997 of the petitioner- tenant.
6. It is contended by Sri Singh that Trial Court in its judgment dated 29.8.1997 found that petitioner-tenant was not in default of arrears of rent and therefore, ground under Section 20(2)(a), Act, 1972 for his eviction did not exist yet has decreed the suit on the ground that in written statement, petitioner-tenant has denied ownership and title of plaintiff-landlord, to the accommodation in question; and, Revisional Court having confirmed the said judgment, has erred in law. It is submitted, when petitioner's tenancy was terminated by sending notice for non-payment of rent for four months, and this ground is not substantiated for his ejectment, the issue is decided in his favour, the petitioner tenant thereafter could not have been evicted by relying on the ground mentioned under Section 20(2)(f) of Act, 1972, in the same proceeding unless his tenancy is terminated on the ground of denial of title of landlord.
7. However, I find from the judgment, impugned in this writ petition, that both the Courts below have relied on Apex Court's decision in Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K.Krishna Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2187 observing that title of landlord, if denied, and ownership is renounced in the written statement in an eviction suit, the Trial Court, in the same suit, can decide that question and if finds that such renouncement or denial of title is not founded on valid and bona fide reasons, it can pass decree of eviction on the ground of Section 20(2)(f) of Act, 1972.
8. Before this Court the learned counsel did not place anything to distinguish the above authority of Apex Court.
9. In Majati Subbarao (supra) a contention was raised that denial of title in a written statement shall not provide a ground for ejectment of tenant in the same proceedings but may give another reason to initiate ejectment proceedings afresh, by landlord. It was contended that denial of title must be anterior to filing of eviction petition. Denial of title in the course of eviction petition would not constitute a ground for eviction. The Apex Court, repelling the contention, held, it is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or appeal can take into account events which are subsequent to the filing of suit in order to give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropriately. Referring to a Constitution Bench judgment in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesoda Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745, the Court said, in the matter of determination of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position under Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover possession of property only on one or more of the grounds, enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after termination of contractual tenancy, the landlord under the definitions of "landlord" and "tenant", contained in the Rent Acts, remains a landlord, and, a tenant remains a tenant, because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means 'a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. The difference between the position obtaining under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act, in order to recover possession of leased premises, determination of lease is necessary because during continuance of lease, landlord cannot recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts, the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on fulfilment of conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminated contractual tenancy. The Court thereafter referred to and affirmed several decisions of various other High Courts namely, Sada Ram Vs. Gajjan Shiama, AIR 1970 Panj & Har 511; Shiv Parshad Vs. Smt. Shila Rani, AIR 1974 Him Pra 22 and Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao Vs. Sarvepalli Narayana Rao Sarada, (1978) 1 Ren CJ 368 (Andh Pra) and confirmed the view that even a denial of landlord's title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned, furnishes a ground, for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a written statement containing the denial has been filed. The Apex Court also said that any other view would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by tenant's denial of his character as a tenant or the landlord's status as owner or about his title in his written statement, which must be avoided.
10. This decision has been followed and applied under Act, 1972 by this Court in Shyam Sunder Vs. IXth Addl. District Judge, Aligarh & Ors., 2000(1) ARC 165 where, in para 6, the Court has said :
"The tenant says that he has not denied the title of the landlord and even if he has denied the title the advantage cannot be taken in the same suit. The plaintiffs have to file another suit because the cause of action must arise before the suit is filed. The cause of action to evict the tenant in the present case, if any, on the ground of denial of title has arisen after filing of the written statement. It is subsequent to the institution of the suit. The tenant cannot be evicted in the same suit. He also cited a Privy Council decision reported in Maharaja Jeypore vs. Rukmani AIR 1919 PC 1. It is true that this Privy Council decision supports the petitioner. But in the present case the landlord - respondents after the death of Smt. Shanti Devi have filed an application for amendment. They got their plaint amended and have also sought the eviction of tenant on the ground that he has denied the title of the landlord in the written statement. The tenant has filed his objection and additional written statement. The tenant knew the case of the plaintiff. An issue was also framed on this question. Both the courts below have decided the same. The tenant now cannot say that landlord should file another suit. Apart from it there is no justification for driving the landlord to file another suit. The eviction of the tenant can and should be considered in the same suit if the ground exists. This will avoid the multiplicity of the proceeding and unnecessary litigation. It is for this reason that this approach has been accepted by the Apex court in Majadi Subarao Vs P.V. Krishna Rao (1989) 4 SCC 732. The Apex court after referring to the Privy Council decision has approved the decision of the High Court taking the similar view."
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed nothing to persuade this Court to take a different view than what has been observed in the aforesaid decisions. Reliance however placed by him on Apex Court's decion in Shanti Devi Nigam Vs. Madan Lal Gupta, 2004 (2) ARC 118 lends no support since this decision has no application to the issue involved in this case. Therein the only question up for consideration before Apex Court was validity of notice, terminating tenancy on the ground of Section 20 (2)(a) of Act, 1972. The tenant asserted that notice must conform the requirement of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1882"). The High Court accepted the view and reversed otherwise findings recorded by Courts below. The Apex Court reversed findings of High Court and relying on Constitution Bench judgment in V. Dhanapal Chettiar (supra) held that a notice under Section 106 of Act, 1882 was not required to be sent for seeking eviction under the provision of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The provisions in Act, 1972 are in pari materia with that of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Therefore, Apex Court, following Constitution Bench judgment in V. Dhanapal Chettiar (supra) reversed High Court's finding and confirmed Trial Court's judgment.
12. In the present case, it is not the dispute that tenancy was terminated and thereafter suit was filed. In the written statement, title of landlord was denied whereafter landlord sought amendment in his plaint and added grounds seeking eviction of tenant on the ground of denial of title. This ground has found favour with the Courts below and ejectment order has been passed.
13. In view of the above exposition of law and discussion, particularly when petitioner has not been able to show anything otherwise, the judgments and orders, impugned in this writ petition deserve confirmation and affirmation from this Court also.
14. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that Courts below have committed any error apparent on the face of record in passing the impugned judgments which warrant any interference.
15. Dismissed.
16. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Order Date :- 13.9.2012 KA