THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO.383 OF 2012 DATED 25th JULY, 2014 Between:
Dr. S. Malla Reddy … Petitioner and The Government of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and others … Respondents ORDER: (Per the Hon’ble The Chief Justice Sri Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta) At the outset, we make it clear that judgment and order in this matter has been rendered without deciding the title of the State in the land in question.
I have had the benefit of going through draft judgment and order of my learned Brother His Lordship Justice Sanjay Kumar. While agreeing to the ordering portion, I would like to add some words of my own as follows.
As it appears from the writ petition, counter-affidavit, affidavit in reply following facts are admitted either expressly or by necessary implication.
(i) Alienation of land to an extent of 20.0 acres in Sy.No.23 & Sy.No.25/2 of Pet Basheerabad Village, Qutbullahpur Mandal, R.R. District in favour of the 4th respondent by the impugned order dated 23.8.2006.
(ii) Possession of the land has been handed over to the 4th respondent.
(iii) The 4th respondent has made construction thereon.
(iv) The price was fixed and realized by the 1st respondent at the rate of Rs.1.50 (Rupees one lakh and fifty thousand only per acre) subject to result of the pending cases and subject to terms and conditions laid down in BSO.24.
What are disputed are as follows.
(a) The charge of the writ petitioner that the above land was alienated is without due process of law namely without following the provisions of A.P. (Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands and Land Revenue Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).
(b) Even though market price was intended to be realized, the same would not have been fair one.
(c) The decision and consequential final order of alienation of land smacks of arbitrariness and favouritism and the entire exercise does not stand to the scrutiny of principle of equity, fair play as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Besides aforesaid dispute, the respondents have taken up plea of delay in filing writ petition and, on the ground also seeking dismissal. Thus, I notice from the contentions and rival contentions, the following questions arise.
(i) Whether the instant writ application is maintainable on the ground of delay and laches.
(ii) Whether Government has power to alienate the lands at such price (admittedly concessional) under the above rules for the purpose of establishing educational institution.
(iii) If so, such action and the impugned G.O. is amenable to judicial review.
(iv) Whether alienation of land under impugned G.O. is arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is opposed to public policy.
As far as the question of delay is concerned, I find from the records that the impugned order was passed on 23.08.2006. Admittedly before taking decision to alienate the land, there has been no public notice by way of advertisement or otherwise. It was on the basis of representation and correspondences between the 4th respondent and 1st respondent. So the petitioner is not supposed to have knowledge from the date of passing of the order. This document is not a registered one, so much so any member of the public like the petitioner could know on obtaining certified copy of the registered document. Admittedly, the land alienated was a vacant one and this was sought to be taken by the fourth respondent for the purpose of construction of school building and also for the purpose incidental thereto. In the counter none of the respondents says when construction was started so that any one could notice change of use of land or reason therefor. No document has been shown that the petitioner was having knowledge from 2006 itself. It appears from the petition which was filed on 26.11.2012 with copy of news item of the English daily ‘The Hindu’ published sometime in September, 2010, fact of alienation of the said land was brought to knowledge of the public. We can safely presume that the petitioners at least had knowledge from September, 2010 when above publication was made. It carried the news that a political party to which the petitioner belonged demanded of the State Cabinet to immediately cancel expressing disapproval of the development of the above land in the interest of the fourth respondent for just 50 lakhs instead of realizing 200 crores.
According to us, in a case of this nature time has to be reckoned from the date of knowledge in the context of plea of delay or acquiescence. It can be safely concluded considering the material annexed to the writ petition that the instant writ petition was filed after one year and 10 months from the date of knowledge. I think that this action is not extraordinarily delayed one, so much so the petitioner should be non-suited altogether from this action as question of validity of order of alienation has been raised on legal and constitutional provision with particular reference to the price thereof. Plea of acquiescence is not enforceable as against constitutional provision and legal provision because of passage of time, more so when the action is in rem in contrast to action in personam.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R & M TRUST v. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP[1] cited by learned counsel for the respondent was dealing with a case, on fact, that the public interest litigation was filed after consuming three years time and that eventually causes a serious prejudice to the respondents who have already altered their position and made construction acting bona fide upon decision sought to be questioned. In that context, the Apex Court held in paragraph-34 as follows:
“34. There is no doubt that delay is a very important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We cannot disturb the third-party interest created on account of delay ”
I think that this decision was intended to apply on the peculiar facts in that case and it will be clear from para 35 of the report where Their Lordships explained as to how delay would entail fatality to the interest of the respondent vis-à-vis third party.
“35. We are of the opinion that delay in this case is equally fatal, the construction already started by the appellant in 1987 and building had come up to three floors. Thereafter it was stopped in 1988 and in March 1991 it resumed after permission was granted. The writ petition was filed in November 1991 meanwhile construction was almost complete. Therefore, delay was fatal in the present case and learned Single Judge rightly held it to be so. It was also brought to our notice that 46 multi- storey buildings have come up in this area. Learned counsel has produced photographs to show that buildings more than three and four floors have been constructed in and around this area.
(emphasis supplied) While reading in totality of the above judgment it does not appear that any statement of law has been spoken that on the ground of delay alone, the action has to be dismissed.
In this case, factually there has been no question of third party interest having been created. No document worth is produced with counter affidavit of fourth respondent to establish that by the time the writ petition was filed construction has been made or completed at site investing any amount except making bare statement. Rather a number of litigants have been filed questioning title and right of first respondent in the land in question; fourth respondent is also party to the same.
In the case of CHAIRMAN & M.D., BPL LIMITED v. S.P. [2] GURURAJA , in paragraph 32, of the report the Hon’ble Supreme Court previously ruled impact of delay in the equity of the matter. In that case, one year delay was found to be fatal as the Court noticed that allottee of the land had not only taken possession but also made sufficient investment by making construction. This judgment is also not the authority to apply to each and every case to non-suit the writ petitioner on the ground of delay alone.
In my view, plea of delay become most vital factor to dismiss action on account thereof in a case where if entertained, will cause irretrievable injury and prejudice to the third party, if any. On the other hand if on examination of the material it is found that core issue relates to apparent illegality that needs scrutiny within the parameter of the power of Judicial review without affecting right and interest, if any, accrued during the period the petitioner looked on, the Court will not dismiss the action on ground of delay alone.
In this case, only alienation of the land has taken place and no registered conveyance has been made no case of creation of third party interest having been made out. Accordingly, I do not think it would be proper for this Court to non-suit the writ petition altogether as it is contended by the learned counsel for all the respondents. However, taking note of the admitted facts of alienation of land this Court can certainly examine the legality and validity of the order of alienation, without disturbing legitimate equity, if any, allowed to be accrued because of inaction for quite some time as stated above.
Considerably strong plea has been taken in the writ petition with required materials, that decision of alienation is without any support of law namely aforesaid Rules. Even if it is under Rule it cannot be sustained at the price it was done.
In this context, I venture to trace the legal provisions for alienation of the State land.
Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules lays down general principles of alienation. The said legal provision is set out hereunder:
3. General Principles:- (a) Alienation of State land to a local body or local authority for unremunerative public purposes will ordinarily be allowed or made free of any initial charge for occupancy right (i.e.) free of the market value of or the value of the occupancy right in the land. Where, however, the land to be alienated has been previously acquired at the expense of the Government and in the case of alienation of land to local bodies or local authorities for remunerative public purposes and of alienation to a company, private individual or institution for any public purpose the question of collecting the market value of the land from the alienance will be considered.
(b) No application for alienation of land under these Rules to a company, association, society, institution or any other corporate body should be considered unless such company, association, society institution or other corporate body has been registered under the Indian Companies Act VII of 1913.
(c) Applications for alienation of lands for educational purposes whether from local bodies or local authorities (including Gram Panchayat) or from private associations or individuals should be addressed to the District Collector through the District Educational Officer in the case of institutions for boys and through the Inspectors of Girls Schools in the case of institutions for girls.
On a careful reading of Rule 3 of the Rules, it manifests inter alia as follows:
(i) In case of alienation of said land to local body or local authority for unremunerative public purposes will ordinarily be allowed or made free of any initial charge for occupancy right i.e., free of the market value of the occupancy right in the land.
(ii) In case of alienation of the land to any private individuals or institutions for public purpose, the question of collecting market value is to be considered.
‘Public purpose’ has been defined under Rule 2 (j), which is as follows:
2(j). “Public Purpose” means a purpose which confers or is conductive to the good of a considerable section of the community at large or of the locality or region, like the construction of schools, temples, churches, mosques, choultries, roads, hospitals and office buildings of a local body or local authority proper but not any purpose which is but ancillary to a public purpose.
Thus it is clear that in case of alienation of land to any private individual or institution, it is permissible but the purpose would be public as defined and market value would be realized. “Market Value” is defined under Rule 2 (i), which is as follows:
2(i). “Market Value” with reference to a particular land means the value that the land would fetch in the open market, if sold, subject to an appropriate charge for land revenue which in the case of assessed land is the assessment or ground rent shown against it in the Revenue registers and which in the case of poramboke land and unassessed land in villages is the assessment to be fixed by the Revenue Department officials at the rates adopted for assessed land of similar quality in the locality excluding all cases in which such similar lands, in the neighbourhood are held free of assessment or at favourable rates of assessment.
Explanation 1 :- In the case of lands lying within the limits of Municipal towns or areas under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 the appropriate charge for land revenue should be taken to be the assumed agricultural assessment.
Explanation 2 :- Market value of a land includes the value of the trees standing on the land as fixed in the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967 and the Rules issued thereunder besides the value of the occupancy right of the land but does not include the land revenue on the land.
Clauses (b) & (c) of Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules are method to proceed with exercise of alienation of land. Clause (c) of Rule 3 provides an application has to be made for educational purpose by amongst other private associations or individuals and this has to be addressed to the District Collector through the District Educational Officer. Thus, clause (c) specifically mentions apart from other thing, for educational purpose request for alienation may be considered. Rule 4 provides for power of the respective officials, which is as follows:
4. Powers of alienation of land:- (a) (i) The Board of Revenue is empowered to sanction alienation of land in favour of local bodies or local authorities for any bona fide public purpose provided that the market value of the land does not exceed Rs.20,000 and to sanction, in favour of local bodies or local authorities, lands which contain buildings when the complied market value of the land and the buildings does not exceed Rs.20.000 is each case.
Note :- The above powers are vested in the collective Board of Revenue.
(ii) The Board of Revenue (Single Member) is empowered to sanction land to local bodies or local authorities for bona fide public purposes provided that the market value of the occupancy right in the land together with the capitalized value of the assessment foregone, if any, on the land does not exceed Rs.10,000 but if the assessment is not foregone, its capitalised value should not be taken into account for the above purpose.
(iii) The Board of Revenue (single Member) is empowered to sanction alienation to lands in favour of companies private associations, societies, institutions or any other private corporate bodies or private individuals provided the market value of the occupancy right in the land does not exceed Rs.3,000 in each case.
(b) (i) Collectors of Districts are empowered to sanction alienation of lands in favour of local bodies or local authorities if the total market value of the occupancy right in the lands as calculated under Clause (ii) of sub rule (a) of this rule does not exceed Rs.5,000 in each cases provided that where however the land is given for the purpose of a road or appurtenances thereto, such as graved depots, store sheds and the like, District Collectors on sanction alienation of land where the market value of the land calculated as explained above does not exceed Rs.5,000 in each case.
(ii) Collectors of Districts are empowered to sanction alienation of lands in favour of Companies, private associations, societies. Institutions or other private Corporate bodies or private individuals when the market value of the occupancy right in the lands does not exceed Rs.1,000 in each case.
(c) Every case of alienation of land other than those falling under the provisions of Clauses (i) to (iii) of sub rule (a) and of Clauses (i) and (ii) of sub rule (b) of this rule either in favour of local bodies or local authorities or companies or private associations, societies, institutions or other private corporate bodies or private individuals, whether subject to or free of charge for land revenue requires the sanction of the State Government for which an application should be made in Form in Appendix I.
(d) Notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (i) to (iii) of sub rule (a) and Clause (i) and (ii) of sub rule (b) of this rule, every case of alienation of land for denominations purposes (i.e.) constructions of temples, mosques, churches, chatrams, etc., requires the sanction of the Government.
Note:- Before recommending the alienation of land for denominational purposes mentioned in this sub-rule, District Collectors should invariably satisfy themselves that no communal trouble is likely to arise if the alienation is sanctioned and make specific mention of their having been thus satisfied in their recommendation.
(e) No land should be alienated to an alienee without the orders of the State Government.
(f) Where the market value of the land to be alienated is such that the sanction of the State Government of Board of Revenue would be required, the previous sanction of that authority should be applied for through the concerned District Collector and the Board of Revenue and through the concerned District Collector respectively.
Note:- (1) In cases of alienation to local bodies or local authorities, for bona fide purposes, the District Collector may if the alienation is
within his powers of sanction, permit the occupation of the lands before the survey of the lands required or before the final sanction of the alienation, provided there is proper resolution before him from the local body or local authority concerned and he is satisfied that matter is urgent and the work could be carried through only if the occupation of the lands is permitted in advance sanction of alienation of the lands. If case is one in which the alienation has to be sanctioned by the Board of Revenue or the State Government the District Collector should in similar circumstances move the appropriate authority for the grant of the requisite permission, in the latter case though the Board of Revenue furnishing detailed and specific reasons in support of his proposal in that regard.
(g) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules the Government hereby reserve to themselves the ownership of all Sandalwood trees existing on any land at the time of its alienation and also that of those trees that they grow subsequently.
(h) In case of alienation of land to local bodies when the local bodies do not like to take over trees standing on the alienated to them on payment of the value and the Collector considers that it is desirable to keep all or some of the trees on the land as a public amenity the trees shall be handed over to the local bodies subject to suitable conditions to maintain the ownership of the Government in the trees. Examples of conditions; (1) No live trees should be cut without the permission of the Collector, (2) The sale proceeds of withered and wind fallen trees and of trees cut with Collector permission should be credited to Government.
Clause (c) of Rule 4 specifically provides application has to be made in Form-I in Appendix-I. Rule 5 provides how this application for alienation is to be processed and the power to be exercised.
On combined reading of Rules 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the aforesaid Rules, it is thus clear that this is usual and general procedure for alienation of the lands under the aforesaid Rules.
However, Rule 10 of the above Rules has conferred special power that really overrides general power for alienation of land.
Rule 10 provides as follows:
10. Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing rules, the Government may, if it desires to sell or otherwise alienate any of its lands or other property in Telangana Area, it may do so by following any reasonable procedure including public auction, where such alienation/sale is deemed necessary.
Basing on the aforesaid legal position, I find in this case as my learned Brother has also found that no application was made by the 4th respondent as contemplated clauses (b) & (c) of Rule 3 following the aforesaid procedure. This exercise of alienation was started with a representation made by the school to the Hon’ble the then Chief Minister who then asked the officials to process it and then action was taken and the Collector’s report was called for.
From the affidavits of the 1st respondent, it appears that initially decision was taken to offer the land for alienation on payment of proposed market value at Rs.4,000/- per sq. yard prevailing then. This proposal was forwarded to the 1st respondent for alienation of 20 acres of Government land on 27.4.2006 and it was also recommended that advance possession could be given for construction of building of educational institutions subject to realization of the basic value at Rs.3,000/- per sq. yard and also subject to outcome of the Court proceedings. On receipt of the same, the Government thereafter took decision instead of realizing market price or even basic value as suggested above, to realize drastically concessional rate at Rs.1.50 lakhs per acre. This decision of the Government was placed before the Council of Ministers who approved the proposal on 11.8.2006 and then the Department, accepting the decision, issued the impugned Order of alienation. The justification for reduction of price was that valuable land with structure was acquired from the school for widening adjacent road and the compensation of the land was not given but only structural compensation paid. It was sought to justify further that the 4th respondent was doing great service in the field of education during the last 35 years of the establishment in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and they have come forward to offer education to the poor and marginalized students of A.P. through their institutions. It seems to us that since the compensation with respect to the land was not paid, as a compensatory measure, the aforesaid concession was made.
The aforesaid version truly supports the version of the 4th respondent with regard to alienation of the land at concession price instead of market price. According to us above justification is legally misplaced, as Rule does not provide payment of consideration by any adjustment. Even rationally both the transactions are independent of each other.
Neither in the affidavit of the 1st respondent nor of the 4th respondent, anything is spoken about under what provision of the above rule the decision of alienation was taken at the aforesaid price. But it is very clear from the records and related statement of affidavits of the 1st and 4th respondents as we have already observed that no application was made in the prescribed form as required under Rule 5 read with Appendix-I.
This exercise was undertaken pursuant to mere representation of the school on a plain paper and acting thereupon by the then Hon’ble Chief Minister and subsequent approval of Council of Ministers, Government Order was issued. Thus, it can safely be presumed that Rule 10 of the above Rules has been invoked by the Government. In any view of the matter, alienation to any private individuals or companies or body corporate of Government land cannot be made without realizing at least market price be it under Rule 3 or Rule 10. Rule 10 postulates a reasonable procedure including public auction or, however, it does not make that public auction is the only method.
The Supreme Court has time and again said that when the object of the action is to maximise revenue, a reasonable method has to be taken. The object of holding public auction is to achieve optimum price even more than market price prevailing in ordinary course of business. The decision of the Supreme Court has also been quoted by the learned Brother that public auction is not always conducive to achieve the purpose. Public auction now-a-days does not ensure fetching reasonably expected optimum price. If it is found that the rate achieved by way of public auction is much less than the market price, it would not be the better option, other course of action may be resorted to even by negotiation amongst the participants.
In the case of NATURAL RESOURCES ALLOCATION, IN RE,
[3]
SPECIAL REFERENCE No.1 of 2012, Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down amongst others if revenue maximisation is not the object in alienation of this sort of land a reasonable fair method is permissible to achieve object of alienation. It will be clear from the discussion of the judgment as follows:-
This judgment was rendered on a reference made by His Excellency President of India under Article 143 of the Constitution of India on the following amongst questions which are relevant for our purpose.
(1) Whether the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by the conduct of auctions?
(2) Whether a broad proposition of law that only the route of auctions can be resorted to for disposal of natural resources does not run contrary to several judgments of the Supreme Court including those of the larger Benches?
After considering all the previous judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, Justice D.K. Jain (as His Lordship then was) speaking for majority of the Hon’ble Judges stated the law on the issue involved in this case in para-113 of the report as under:
113. Finally, reading auction as a constitutional mandate would be impermissible because such an approach may distort another constitutional principle embodied in Article 39(b). The said Article enumerating certain principles of policy, to be followed by the State, reads as follows:
“39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.—The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing— (a) * * * (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;”
The disposal of natural resources is a facet of the use and distribution of such resources. Article 39(b) mandates that the ownership and control of natural resources should be so distributed so as to best subserve the common good. Article 37 provides that the provisions of Part IV shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles laid down therein are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. Therefore, this Article, in a sense, is a restriction on “distribution” built into the Constitution. But the restriction is imposed on the object and not the means. The overarching and underlying principle governing “distribution” is furtherance of common good. But for the achievement of that objective, the Constitution uses the generic word “distribution”. Distribution has broad contours and cannot be limited to meaning only one method i.e. auction. It envisages all such methods available for distribution/allocation of natural resources which ultimately subserve the “common good”.
Then in paragraphs 119, 120, 147, 148 & 149 the following are statement of law.
119. The norm of “common good” has to be understood and appreciated in a holistic manner. It is obvious that the manner in which the common good is best subserved is not a matter that can be measured by any constitutional yardstick—it would depend on the economic and political philosophy of the Government. Revenue maximisation is not the only way in which the common good can be subserved. Where revenue maximisation is the object of a policy, being considered qua that resource at that point of time to be the best way to subserve the common good, auction would be one of the preferable methods, though not the only method. Where revenue maximisation is not the object of a policy of distribution, the question of auction would not arise. Revenue considerations may assume secondary consideration to developmental considerations.
120. Therefore, in conclusion, the submission that the mandate of Article 14 is that any disposal of a natural resource for commercial use must be for revenue maximisation, and thus by auction, is based neither on law nor on logic. There is no constitutional imperative in the matter of economic policies —Article 14 does not predefine any economic policy as a constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of Article 39(b) imposes no restrictions on the means adopted to subserve the public good and uses the broad term “distribution”, suggesting that the methodology of distribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes that alienation/allocation of natural resources to the highest bidder may not necessarily be the only way to subserve the common good, and at times, may run counter to public good. Hence, it needs little emphasis that disposal of all natural resources through auctions is clearly not a constitutional mandate.
147. Finally, market price, in economics, is an index of the value that a market prescribes to a good. However, this valuation is a function of several dynamic variables: it is a science and not a law. Auction is just one of the several price discovery mechanisms. Since multiple variables are involved in such valuations, auction or any other form of competitive bidding, cannot constitute even an economic mandate, much less a constitutional mandate.
148. In our opinion, auction despite being a more preferable method of alienation/allotment of natural resources, cannot be held to be a constitutional requirement or limitation for alienation of all natural resources and therefore, every method other than auction cannot be struck down as ultra vires the constitutional mandate.
149. Regard being had to the aforesaid precepts, we have opined that auction as a mode cannot be conferred the status of a constitutional principle. Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximising private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that are competitive and maximise revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, rather than prescribing or proscribing a method, we believe, a judicial scrutiny of methods of disposal of natural resources should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, in consonance with the principles which we have culled out above. Failing which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with Article 14 of the Constitution.
Justice Khehar while concurring with opinion of the majority of the Hon’ble judges stated legal position in the paragraphs 186, 187, 196, 198, 199 & 200 of the report as under:
186. Based on the legal/constitutional parameters / requirements culled out in the preceding three paragraphs (i.e. paras 183 to 185), I shall venture an opinion on whether there are circumstances in which natural resources ought to be disposed of only by ensuring maximum returns. For this, I shall place reliance on a conclusion drawn in the main opinion, namely, Distribution of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximising private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that are competitive and maximise revenue, may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution.” (refer to para 149 of the main opinion, above). I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid conclusion, and would accordingly opine, that when natural resources are made available by the State to private persons for commercial exploitation exclusively for their individual gains, the State’s endeavour must be towards maximisation of revenue returns. This alone would ensure that the fundamental right enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India (assuring equality before the law and equal protection of the laws), and the directive principle contained in Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India (that material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good), have been extended to the citizens of the country.
187. A similar conclusion would also emerge in a slightly different situation. This Court in a case dealing with a challenge to the allotment of retail outlets for petroleum products (Common Cause v. Union of India (1996) 6 SCC
530) has held that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not countenance discretionary power which is capable of being exercised arbitrarily. While accepting that Article 14 of the Constitution of India permits a reasonable classification having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved, it was held that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not permit the State to pick and choose arbitrarily out of several persons falling in the same category. Transparent and objective criteria/procedure have to be evolved so that the choice amongst those belonging to the same class or category is based on reason, fair play, and non- arbitrariness. Envisage a situation as the one expressed above, where by reasonable classification based on some public purpose, the choice is limited to a set of private persons, amongst whom alone, the State has decided to dispose of natural resources. Herein again, in my opinion, if the participation of private persons is for commercial exploitation exclusively for their individual gains, then the State’s endeavour to maximise revenue alone, would satisfy the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 14 and 39(b) of the Constitution of India.
196. Hypothetically, assume a competitive bidding process for tariff, amongst private players interested in a power generation project. The private party which agrees to supply electricity at the lowest tariff would succeed in such an auction. The important question is, if the private party who succeeds in the award of the project, is granted a mining lease in respect of an area containing coal, free of cost, would such a grant satisfy the test of being fair, reasonable, equitable and impartial. The answer to the instant query would depend on the facts of each individual case. Therefore, the answer could be in the affirmative, as well as, in the negative. Both aspects of the matter are being explained in the succeeding paragraph.
198. In a slightly changed factual scenario, the conclusion may well be different. If before the holding of the process of auction for the award of a power project (based on competitive bids for tariff), it is made known to the contenders that the successful bidder would be entitled to a mining lease over an area containing coal, those competing for the power project would necessarily incorporate the profit they were likely to make from such mining lease. While projecting the tariff at which they would supply electricity, they would be in a position to offset such profits from their costs. This would result in an opportunity to the contenders to lower the tariff to a level lower than would have been possible without the said lease. In such a situation the gains from the coal mining lease would be enmeshed in the competitive bidding for tariff. Therefore, it would not be just to assume in the instant sequence of facts, that the coal lot has been granted free of cost. One must read into the said grant, a reciprocal consideration to provide electricity at a lower tariff. In the instant factual scenario, the allotment of the mining lease would be deemed to be aimed at “subserving the common good” in terms of Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, even the allotment of such a mining lease, which appears to result in the allocation of a natural resource free of cost, may well satisfy the test of fairness and reasonableness contemplated in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. More so, because a fair playing field having been made available to all those competing for the power project, by making them aware of the grant of a coal mining lease, well before the bidding process. The question of favouritism, therefore, would not arise. Would such a grant of a natural resource, free of cost, be valid? The answer to the query, in the instant fact situation, may well be in the affirmative.
199. The policy of allocation of natural resources for public good can be defined by the legislature, as has been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Likewise, policy for allocation of natural resources may also be determined by the executive. The parameters for determining the legality and constitutionality of the two are exactly the same. In the aforesaid view of the matter, there can be no doubt about the conclusion recorded in the main opinion that auction which is just one of the several price recovery mechanisms, cannot be held to be the only constitutionally recognised method for alienation of natural resources. That should not be understood to mean that it can never be a valid method for disposal of natural resources (refer to paras 186 to 188 of my instant opinion).
200. I would, therefore, conclude by stating that no part of the natural resource can be dissipated as a matter of largesse, charity, donation or endowment, for private exploitation. Each bit of natural resource expended must bring back a reciprocal consideration. The consideration may be in the nature of earning revenue or may be to “best subserve the common good”. It may well be the amalgam of the two. There cannot be a dissipation of material resources free of cost or at a consideration lower than their actual worth. One set of citizens cannot prosper at the cost of another set of citizens, for that would not be fair or reasonable.
On a reading of the object of alienation as provided under the above Rule 3 is not for maximisation of the revenue, it is amongst others for public purpose including educational purpose. Rule 3 nowhere provides if the alienation is for a charitable or philanthropic purpose, concessional price is to be offered. According to us, reasonable method as provided for alienation or sale under Rule 10 will be achieved in this case if the market price as it was initially decided to be realized, is recovered, after all this alienation is sought to be made for educational purpose not for maximization of revenue.
As far as the concept of malice in law in this exercise is concerned, it is not inferred at all if the procedure mentioned in Rule 10 read with Rule 3 is strictly followed and it will ensure required degree of fairness and reasonableness as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
O R D E R (Per Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar) This public interest litigation lays a challenge to G.O.Ms.No.1217, Revenue (ASN.V) Department, dated 23-08-2006, whereby the Government of Andhra Pradesh directed alienation of an extent of Ac.20.00 guntas of Government land in Survey Nos.23 & 25/2 of Pet Basheerabad Village, Qutbullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, to St.Ann’s High School, Secunderabad, the fourth respondent (for brevity, the school), at the rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre. The petitioner asserts that this alienation is opposed to public interest as the market value of the land as on that date was Rs.5.00 crores per acre. He further contends that the alienation is contrary to the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Alienation of State Lands and Land Revenue Rules, 1975 (for brevity, ‘the Rules of 1975’).
According to the petitioner, the school directly made a representation to the former Chief Minister, Dr. Y.S. Rajasekhar Reddy, on 29-10-2005 for allotment of the subject land. Having filed a copy of the official ‘note file’, the petitioner asserted that the concerned revenue officials had then recommended that the subject land should be alienated to the school upon payment of its value. The value was determined at Rs.3,000/- per square yard (Rs.1.45 crores per acre). However, considering the report of the District Collector, Ranga Reddy, the Special Chief Secretary to the Government favoured adopting the basic value of Rs.1,600/- per square yard (Rs.77,44,000/- per acre), as the beneficiary was an educational institution. The former Chief Minister however directed alienation of the subject land to the school on payment of the nominal value of Rs.1.50 lakh per acre, aggregating to Rs. 30 lakh for the total extent. The reasons for this reduction in the price were stated to be the service rendered by the school in the field of education; impending loss of its land and buildings in road widening; and lastly, similar allotment of land to Birla Institute of Technology and Science (BITS) at Jawaharnagar village.
In the context of the law applicable to the subject alienation, the petitioner stated that under the Rules of 1975, the Government was empowered to alienate Government land at nominal rates only to local bodies or local authorities for a public purpose. Rule 3 thereof however provides that in case of alienation of land to a company or private individual/institution for a public purpose, collection of market value of the land should be considered. As the school was controlled by a private society and collected fees from its students, the petitioner contended that the State Government ought to have charged the market value of the land instead of a nominal price. He asserted that this action had resulted in loss to the State exchequer to the tune of more than Rs.100.00 crores. He also asserted that the Government had not undertaken any enquiry about the school and as to whether it deserved the special treatment bestowed upon it. He pointed out that there was no policy as to allotment of Government lands on the lines as was done in the instant case. He further pointed out that the Government had not undertaken any public enquiry by issuing an advertisement calling for applications to ascertain whether any other institution could undertake a similar exercise and that the entire issue proceeded only on the basis of the representation made by the school directly to the then Chief Minister. As regards the school’s loss of land and buildings at Secunderabad, the petitioner pointed out that it had been compensated to the tune of Rs.1,19,15,545/- for the structural loss as per the letter dated 27-08-2010 of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC). This communication also confirmed that the school had lost 1720 square yards in the road widening for which it did not receive any separate compensation.
The petitioner contended that the subject alienation violated the doctrine of public trust whereunder the Government could not deal with State properties at its whims and fancies as it held the same for the benefit of the general public. The petitioner further contended that reference to B.S.O. No.24 in the impugned G.O. clearly demonstrated the lack of application of mind by the authorities as the said B.S.O had no application to the instant case in the light of the Rules of 1975, which governed the field. He stated that he had approached the authorities by way of representation dated 08-05-2012 requesting invalidation of the subject alienation but to no avail. He therefore prayed for a writ of mandamus declaring the impugned G.O. as arbitrary and illegal.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh filed a counter through its Principal Secretary, Revenue department, stating thus: The school submitted representation dated 29-10-2005 requesting allotment of Ac.20.00 guntas of Government land in Ranga Reddy District for establishing an educational institution. The District Collector, Ranga Reddy, under his report dated 01-02-2006, informed the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Government of Andhra Pradesh, that the land admeasuring Ac.25.25 guntas in Survey No.23 and Ac.59.39 guntas in Survey No.25/2 of Pet Basheerabad village was classified as Government land. One Syed Ahmed Ali Khan had instituted a civil suit for declaration of his title in respect of this land along with other lands claiming that the same formed part of Survey Nos.101 and 104 of Kompally village. This litigation was pending at the appellate stage before the High Court. The Correspondent of the school however gave an undertaking that the alienation in its favour could be made subject to the outcome of the Court litigation.
It was further stated that the basic value of lands in the vicinity of this land was fixed at Rs.3,000/- per square yard and that the Mandal Revenue Officer, Qutbullapur Mandal, had recommended a market value of Rs.4,000/- per square yard. The District Collector adopted the same market value and requested the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, to recommend the proposal for alienation of this land in favour of the school on payment of the suggested market value subject to the outcome of pending Court cases. This proposal was forwarded to the Government by the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, under letter dated 27-04-2006. The Government directed handing over of advance possession of the allotted land to the school subject to realization of the basic value of Rs.3,000/- per square yard and also subject to the outcome of the Court litigation. This order was passed under Government Memo No.54419 dated 02-06-2006. In the meanwhile, the school submitted a representation stating that it had lost a major part of its buildings and land at Secunderabad owing to road widening and as it was a charitable society rendering selfless service, it requested fixing the land price at the Government concessional/nominal rate as was given to BITS. Taking note of the fact that the school had been doing great service in the field of education since its establishment in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and had come forward to offer world class education to the poor and meritorious students of Andhra Pradesh; as it had lost 1720 square yards of land in the road widening and only structural compensation was paid to it; and as BITS was allotted land at the nominal rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre in Jawaharnagar village of Ranga Reddy District, the Government opined that the school deserved similar dispensation. Accordingly, in partial modification of the orders passed earlier, the Government ordered alienation of the subject land to the school on payment of the nominal rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre. This was approved by the Council of Ministers under Resolution No.186/2006 dated 11-08-2006 which led to the issuance of the impugned G.O.
Reference was also made in the counter to the cases pending before this Court concerning the subject land and the orders passed therein. The Principal Secretary concluded by pointing out that the impugned G.O. had been issued six years ago while the petitioner had come up with the instant case after a considerable time and that it was liable to be dismissed on this ground.
The school filed a counter through its Correspondent. Therein, it raised the following points: The delay on the part of the petitioner was sufficient ground for dismissal of the case on the issues of maintainability, delay and laches. The school was established in the year 1871 in the land donated by the Nizam at Sardar Patel Road, Secunderabad, and was a premier institution for education of girls. It was a non-profit charitable institution. Due to congestion and traffic hazards, one of the students died in an accident which led to the widening of the road abutting the school and construction of a foot over bridge. A major portion of the school’s heritage building consisting of 64 class rooms was demolished in the course of the road widening. In this context, the school made representations on 20-09-2005 and 18-01- 2006 to the authorities to allot a suitable alternative land to enable it to locate and establish an international standard school. Pursuant to these representations, the Government under Memo dated 02-06-2006 agreed to alienate the subject land and hand over its advance possession subject to the outcome of the pending litigation. Thereafter, the impugned G.O. was issued directing alienation of the subject land at the price of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre. The sale consideration was deposited to the credit of the Government and, under panchanama dated 15-09- 2006, vacant and physical possession of the subject land was delivered to the school.
The Correspondent stated that the land had been levelled and several building units had been constructed along with a compound wall. Complete infrastructure was developed to run the school with international standards along with sports facilities etc. The school was stated to be running presently with about 1200 students from LKG to eighth standard in addition to a special school for physically and mentally challenged orphans. The Correspondent stated that the record relied upon by the petitioner did not reflect the true facts and asserted that representations were made by the school to the Government and the District Collector, Ranga Reddy, on 17-09-2005, 20-09- 2005, 26-10-2005 and 18-01-2006.
Referring to the Rules of 1975, the Correspondent stated that the same empowered the Government to alienate Government land to the school for running an educational institution. As to fixation of the price, the Correspondent sought to justify the same by pointing out that the school was delivering yeoman service in the field of education for the last 135 years and that it had lost prime land and a major portion of its buildings in the road widening, whereby it was unable to run its existing SSC school. Non-payment of compensation for its land was stated to be one of the factors for fixing a nominal price for the subject land. Allotment of 200 acres of land to BITS, Pilani at Jawaharnagar village at Rs.1.5 lakh per acre was also a factor. The Correspondent stated that owing to demolition of its school building at Secunderabad, it had to shift its SSC School and special school for physically and mentally challenged orphans to the subject land. The Correspondent denied that the school was running on commercial terms. She denied that any loss was caused to the State exchequer. She pointed out that upon obtaining statutory permission from the GHMC, after paying fees amounting to nearly Rs.3.00 crores, the school had constructed buildings by incurring vast expenditure for running the school. She concluded by stating that the subject allotment was not in violation of public policy as the school was involved in the field of education and other charitable activities and prayed for dismissal of the case.
In his reply, the petitioner pointed out that though allotment of the subject land had also resulted in parting with physical possession thereof in favour of the school, no actual deed of conveyance alienating it had been executed till date. He therefore asserted that ownership of the subject land still vested with the Government. He pointed out that there was no policy of allotting lands to those affected by road widening and therefore, the school would only be entitled to payment of compensation on par with others similarly situated. He further pointed out that the school at Secunderabad was not an International School and by virtue of the road widening, the school took advantage to get its hands on a vast extent of Government land for establishing a new institution. The petitioner pointed out that the school had lost only 1720 square yards in the road widening, whereas the land allotted to it in lieu thereof was a huge extent of 96,800 square yards, clearly establishing that there was no comparison. He pointed out that as per the representations made by the school to the Government, only 20% of the allotted land was proposed to be used for building purpose and that there was no policy that Government land should be allotted to educational institutions at nominal price basing on such criteria. He asserted that there was no comparison between the land allotted to BITS and the present allotment. He stated that the land allotted to BITS was in a rural area and the land market value in that area was around Rs.1.5 to Rs.2.00 lakh per acre. He further stated that the conditions of allotment and the constitution of the two organizations was not a matter of record and therefore, no comparison could have been drawn between these two beneficiaries. He further stated that the school was collecting a building fund and the fee charged by it was not affordable by the common man. He concluded by stating that the school, like any other educational institution, had to spend money on its infrastructure and buildings and that it could not therefore be singled out for favourable treatment on wholly extraneous considerations.
Heard Sri Gandra Mohan Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the State and Sri Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel, representing the school.
Admittedly, various cases pertaining to the subject land are still pending adjudication before this Court and the issue of title to this land is yet to be decided. However, as the present public interest litigation only pertains to the proposed alienation of the subject land by the Government at a nominal price, treating it as Government land, and the issue is as to whether such alienation was in conformity with the rules, it can be decided independently. The decision rendered herein would however be subject to the result of the other cases and more particularly, the case relating to the title dispute. Pendency of the connected cases therefore poses no hindrance to the independent disposal of this case.
Before we proceed further, it may be noted that the State and the school raised the plea that this case deserved to be dismissed on the ground of delay. Reliance was also placed on case law in this regard. Reference was made to the observations of the Supreme Court in R & M TRUST V/S. KORAMANGALA RESIDENTS VIGILANCE GROUP[4] that the sacrosanct jurisdiction of public interest litigation should be invoked sparingly and in favour of a vigilant litigant and not for those who invoked the jurisdiction for publicity or for serving their private ends. The Supreme Court pointed out that delay was an important factor while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and third party interests should not be disturbed owing to such delay.
In CHAIRMAN & MD, BPL LTD. V/S. S.P. GURURAJA
[5]
, the Supreme Court affirmed its earlier observations in NARMADA
[6]
BACHAO ANDOLAN V/S. UNION OF INDIA on the issue of delay.
The petitioner therein was non-suited on the ground that it was guilty of laches in not approaching the Court earlier. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had, in that case, committed a manifest error in failing to take into consideration the delay which defeated equity. The allotment was made in the year 1995 and the challenge to the same was a year later. By that time, possession of the land had been taken and sufficient investment was already made. Delay of this nature, per the Supreme Court, should have been considered by the High Court to be of vital importance.
I n DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V/S. RAJENDRA
[7]
SINGH , the Supreme Court reiterated that delay rules apply to public interest litigation also and if there is no proper explanation for the delay, a PIL is liable to be summarily dismissed on account of delay. In that case, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners were very much conversant with environment and ecology but had approached the High Court with a delay and therefore, their writ petitions were liable to be dismissed.
It is no doubt true that there is a fair amount of delay in the filing of this public interest litigation. The impugned G.O. was issued in 2006 while this case was filed only in the year 2012. However, the petitioner sought to explain this delay by stating that the subject allotment was not given publicity and therefore remained hidden from the public eye. The building permit orders filed by the school reflect that the first permission was obtained only in the year 2011. There is no indication that there was any activity in the subject land by the school prior to that date whereby the allotment in its favour would have been publicly known. However, the petitioner himself filed a press clipping from ‘The Hindu” Newspaper dated 24-09-2010 relating to the subject allotment wherein his name was also mentioned. It may therefore be safely presumed that the petitioner had knowledge of the subject allotment at least in the year 2010. Thus, there was a delay of at least two years on his part in approaching this Court. However, as pointed out by the petitioner, it is not as if the subject land was free of litigation whereby the school can claim any vested rights owing to this passage of time. The issue as to the title to the subject land itself is still open in the pending civil litigation. Therefore, the judgments cited would have to be viewed in this context. Though delay and laches would be applicable in public interest litigation, each case would have to be viewed on its own peculiar facts and circumstances and there can be no strait-jacket formula as to when a PIL would be defeated by delay. Glaring illegalities such as alienation of Government land by State players based on their own whims and fancies and in utter violation of the public trust doctrine cannot be ignored by this Court on technicalities. Unlike fine wine, such illegalities would not mature or change status and remain as vile and reprehensible as they were in their inception. We cannot therefore turn a blind eye to the wrongs, if any, committed by the State in the course of the subject allotment merely because this case was filed with some amount of delay. The effect of such delay shall however be dealt with separately hereinafter.
In so far as the merits of the matter are concerned, perusal of the impugned G.O. reflects that reference was made therein only to the representation dated 29-10-2005 made by the Correspondent of the school. This representation was addressed to the former Chief Minister, Dr. Y.S. Rajasekhar Reddy. It reads as under:
“Request for allotment of suitable land to St. Ann’s High School, Secunderabad in Survey Nos.25/1 & 25/2 of Pet Bashirabad Village, Qutbullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District to shift one of its school in the interest of public and safety of students.
Matters to be taken up by:
(i) Advocate General, High Court of A.P. may be asked to see that Civil Appeals before Hon’ble High Court in respect of the said property are listed and disposed off as early as possible as observed by Justice B. Prakash Rao in said appeals.
(ii) Collector, Ranga Reddy District may be asked to assign the land of 20 Acres to the School in Sy.No.25/1 & 25/2 of Pet Bashirabad Village, Qutbullapur Mandal, Ranga Reddy District like an assignment made to the Police Station in the same Sy.No.25/1.
“Brief Note of History of Land” enclosed.”
The ‘Brief Note’, running into 3 pages, recorded the litigative history pertaining to the subject land and concluded with the advice that instructions be given to the Revenue Authorities to round off the ‘non- existing Survey Nos.101 and 104 of Kompally village’.
It may be noted that in this representation dated 29-10-2005, the school sought allotment of the subject land for ‘shifting’ one of its schools.
While so, the other representations made by the school, filed along with its counter-affidavit, make for an interesting reading. The earlier representation dated 17-09-2005 was addressed by the school to the former Chief Minister, wherein reference was made to the road accident near the school and the suggestion made by the former Chief Minister himself as to an alternative site to relocate the campus to ease the congestion and ensure safety of the school children. Reference was also made therein to the meeting held on 17-09-2005 and the submission of a written representation of the same date. The representation highlights that a freehold land was available at Mahendra Hills, Marredpally, and the school requested allocation of 10 Acres of the said land for the purpose of its relocation. The school further stated that once the alternative site and necessary structure was ready for the well-being and education of the school children, it would facilitate widening of the road near the school at Secunderabad for the common good of one and all.
The representation dated 20-09-2005 submitted by the school to the District Collector, Hyderabad, reads to the effect that during the course of the meeting held with the then Chief Minister on 17-09-
2005, he had suggested that the school shift one of its institutions to a more convenient location in order to reduce traffic congestion. The school requested the District Collector to allot an unencumbered freehold land at a nominal rate within the limits of Secunderabad close to the existing school in order to accommodate about 3000 students from the existing school without causing inconvenience to them. The school stated that it would like to set up a model school and requested allotment of Government land of an extent of 20 Acres or any suitable extent at a nominal rate.
Under its representation dated 18-01-2006 submitted to the District Collector, Ranga Reddy, the school stated that in view of the increasing traffic congestion at Secunderabad, it had been requested to shift part of its institution elsewhere so that the road could be widened and as it would lose a major part of its existing buildings and a substantial area of land, it may be allotted suitable land as close as possible to the existing school and requested for allotment of 25 Acres next to Pet Basheerabad police station in Survey No.25 of the village to enable it to start construction so as to shift part of its institution to the new venue.
The representation dated 22-02-2006 made by the school to the Chief Minister reads to the effect that as per his advice, the school had identified a piece of Government land (20 Acres) at Pet Basheerabad in order to shift a part of its institution and help the Government in the road widening. The school undertook to offer to the people of the twin cities and the whole of Andhra Pradesh a girls school of international standard at the newly allotted land and prayed for fixation of the lowest Government rate to enable it to serve the people of Andhra Pradesh.
In its representation dated 04-05-2006 addressed to the Special Chief Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, the school reiterated that it would use the allotted land only to the extent of 20% for building purposes and the rest of the land would be used for other purposes. It was on this basis that a request was made to allot the land to it at a Government concessional/nominal rate.
Building permits dated 07-02-2011, 23-03-2013 and 04-11-2013 are placed on record by the school evidencing that it was authorized to undertake construction of 1711.72 square metres, 11,756 square metres and 16,341.5 square metres respectively (29,809.22 square metres, in all) in the subject land. The fee paid by it in this regard was Rs.2,27,70,030/-, Rs.55,32,605/- and Rs.69,96,380/- respectively (Rs.3,52,99,015/-, in all) The plan reflects that the school buildings proposed to be constructed in the subject land were not only for SSC course but also for ICSE course as provision was made for classes XI and XII.
The extract of the ‘note file’ filed by the petitioner reflects that the Finance Department of the State pointed out that the Revenue Department’s proposal to alienate 20 acres of land to the school required Cabinet approval. The Finance Department also pointed out that the said land was valuable having alternate uses and as it was stated to be only part relocation, the Revenue Department was advised to verify whether the entire extent of land was necessary. The Finance Department pointed out that the Revenue Department had not taken a decision as to the land value to be adopted and as the school was not a charitable institution, land had to be given to it either at basic value or at market value. Upon this communication, a decision was taken by the Revenue Department to fix the rate at the basic value as prepared by the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration. However, it appears that at this stage, the Correspondent and Principal of the school submitted representation dated 03-06-2006 to the former Chief Minister stating that the school had lost major buildings at Sardar Patel Road, Secunderabad and that it was a charitable society rendering selfless service for over 135 years and would like to offer a truly international school with world class facilities and other amenities to the people of Andhra Pradesh. The school further pointed out that the fixation of price should be only for the built up area and in its case, the built up area would be only 20% of the total area and the rest of the land would be used for providing amenities like play grounds, swimming pool and fine arts enclave etc., and requested fixation of the price at a nominal rate as was given to BITS. The ‘note file’ also reflects that no orders had been issued by the Government in favour of BITS allotting Government land. It was at this stage that the proposal was mooted to adopt the basic value of Rs.1,600/- per square yard. However, as the institution was unable to pay this rate, the concessional rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre was considered. The ‘note file’ records that as the school was doing yeoman service in the field of education and as it had come forward to offer world class education to the poor and meritorious students of Andhra Pradesh; and as it was going to lose a major portion of its land; and as a nominal rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre was adopted in the case of BITS, Pilani, in partial modification of the earlier orders, the subject land was directed to be alienated to the school on payment of the nominal rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre.
The sequence of events preceding the allotment of the subject land to the school, as set out by the petitioner in his affidavit, was not denied by the State. Similarly, the contents of the ‘note file’ placed on record by the petitioner are also not denied. It may therefore be safely assumed that the progression of the matter at different levels of the State, as stated by the petitioner and duly supported by the ‘note file’, can be taken to be correct.
The school filed copies of its representations to the State and its officials at different points of time. The first such representation was dated 17-09-2005 and perusal thereof throws up certain crucial aspects. It appears that the suggestion for an alternative site to relocate the campus of the school emanated not from itself but from the former Chief Minister. Following up on this suggestion, the school seems to have submitted a written representation seeking allotment of land admeasuring Ac.10.00 guntas at Mahendra Hills in Marredpally Mandal, Hyderabad District. In its subsequent representation dated 20-09-2005, the school enhanced its site requirement to 20 acres. Thereafter, the school itself seems to have suggested the subject land for allotment in its representation dated 29-10-2005. Therewith, the school attached a note tendering advice to the Government for protecting the subject land from those claiming it to be part of Kompally village.
The ‘note file’ also confirms that the proposal for allotment of the subject land did not emanate from the authorities, as there is no mention therein of any exercise by the State authorities to identify a particular land or selection of the subject land as suitable for allotment to the school. The proposal of the school to allot the subject land seems to have been accepted at face value and thereafter a report was called for from the revenue authorities. Consideration thereafter appears to have centered only upon the price at which the subject land should be allotted. This was despite the Finance Department of the State pointing out that the land was valuable and was amenable to alternate uses. The Finance Department also pointed out that the school only proposed part relocation of its institution and that a view had to be taken as to whether the entire extent of the subject land was necessary for allotment to the school. The Finance Department also noted that the school was not a charitable institution and the land therefore had to be given either at basic value or at market value and advised the Revenue Department to take a suitable view in this regard.
The Revenue Department, though it suggested fixation of the price at the market value of the subject land, duly fixing the same at Rs.4,000/- per square yard, took into consideration the plea of the school that it was unable to pay the basic value and recommended a concessional rate of Rs.1,600/- per square yard. At this stage, the file was placed before the former Chief Minister who cited the three reasons, already cited supra, for reducing the price of the subject land drastically. Basing on these three reasons, the former Chief Minister ordered that the subject land be alienated to the school on payment of the nominal rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre.
It is however an admitted fact that no sale deed has been executed till date and despite the same, possession of the subject land was handed over to the school. It was also granted three building permissions entitling it to raise constructions thereon. It may be noted that one of the reasons cited by the school for reducing the price, as is evident from the ‘note file’, was that it proposed to use only 20% of the total area for construction purposes leaving the rest for amenities like play grounds, swimming pool, etc. The three building permit orders filed by the school demonstrate that it has been permitted to put up constructions of 29,809.22 square metres in the subject land. However, it is not possible for the Court to ascertain as to whether the extent of coverage of the constructed area in the subject land would be only 20% of the total area or more. The fact that the school banked on its proposal to limit the construction to 20% of the total area of the subject land as a ground for reduction in price would however bind it and it cannot now state that it has made constructions all over the land so as to seek any consideration on equitable grounds at this stage.
It is also relevant to note that the school itself gave an undertaking in W.P. No.22411 of 2006 that it would not claim any equities and would hand over vacant possession of the subject land in an ‘as is where is’ position in the event the petitioner therein emerged successful. Therefore, construction of buildings by the school was always subject to this undertaking and it cannot claim equities independently in the present case ignoring the undertaking given by it. It may also be noted that the undertaking given by the school was taken note of by a learned Division Bench of this Court in its order dated 07- 02-2008 in W.A. No.3 of 2008 while confirming the order passed in W.P. No.22411 of 2006.
The counter filed by the State reflects that the allotment of the subject land to the school was not in exercise of any general policy decision. Be it noted that the school is not a charitable organization but only a registered society. There is no evidence that its educational institutions are run purely on charitable lines. No material has been placed before this Court by the school to counter the averments made by the petitioner that it charges fees and also accepts hefty deposits from its students. The very fact that the school paid in excess of Rs.3.50 crores towards the three building permits indicates that it is not lacking for funds. Thus, as matters stand the school, being a private organization offering educational facilities be it with a profit or a non- profit motive, did not fall into an independent category warranting special treatment. In the absence of a policy to the effect that educational institutions, State owned or otherwise, should be allotted lands at concessional or nominal rates so as to encourage and strengthen educational facilities in the State, the Government must necessarily explain as to how it has favourably dealt with the isolated issue of the school.
The first representation of the school dated 17-09-2005 demonstrates that the school had a meeting with the former Chief Minister on the said date in the context of the road accident which had occurred near its existing premises in Secunderabad resulting in the death of a student. The former Chief Minister himself made the suggestion of an alternative site to relocate the school’s campus to ease traffic congestion and ensure safety of the children. The entire exercise seems to have evolved from this suggestion. At that stage, though there appears to have been a proposal by the GHMC to widen the road at the Secunderabad premises of the school, no details as to the exact extent of damage that would be caused to the land and structures of the school were available. It may be noted that even at the stage of the final recommendation by the former Chief Minister that the subject land be allotted to the school at the nominal rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre, the reason cited by him was that the school ‘was going to lose’ a major portion of its land and buildings. It now emerges that 64 class rooms housed in the ground and first floors of the school’s heritage building were demolished. The extent of land lost by the school in the course of road widening was determined at 1720 square yards.
Admittedly, the school received structural loss compensation to the tune of Rs.1,19,15,545/-. Thus, the only loss sustained by the school which remained to be compensated was its land loss. In this regard, the school fairly conceded that the land on which its institution stands at the existing Secunderabad premises was not purchased by it but was allotted to it free of cost by the Nizam. No details, however, are forthcoming as to the total extent of the land allotted by the Nizam, whereby this Court could strive to measure the extent of inconvenience caused to the school by the loss of 1720 square yards in the road widening. Admittedly, the school is continuing to operate its institution at the Secunderabad premises even after the loss of 1720 square yards in the road widening. While so, by virtue of the allotment of the subject land the school seems to have established a new institution. Though the thrust of the written representations made by the school was to the effect that it would relocate its SSC facility to the subject land, the plan placed on record by the school itself shows that the institution at the subject land offers ICSE and ISC education i.e. from Nursery to XII class. There is no indication of the school having restricted its operations at the existing premises in Secunderabad to either SSC or ICSE/ISC. In effect, it was not so much a part relocation of its existing institution but rather, addition of a new institution.
It may well be true that the school has rendered yeoman service in the field of education of girls. However, once it failed to qualify for any special treatment, being on par with any other private educational institution, the State must necessarily justify the largesse meted out to it. There is no indication of any exercise having been undertaken by the State to identify as to whether any other existing educational institution in the State could have set up an institution on par with the school at the subject land. No opportunity was afforded to any other competing educational institution in this regard.
Allotment of the subject land was purely on the basis of the exercise of the school itself and at that, on its own identification of the land to be allotted and alienated to it! The ‘note file’ does not demonstrate as to whether the Finance Department’s suggestions were cared for. No exercise was undertaken to determine as to whether the subject land was more useful for any other public purpose and whether the entire extent had to be alienated to the school for a mere part- relocation of its existing institution.
Though the Chief Minister cited the alleged land allotment made to BITS, Pilani, as a comparable ground for reducing the price to Rs.1.5 lakh per acre, it may be noted that the ‘note file’ specifically records that no orders were issued by the Government in favour of BITS. No material has been placed before this Court as regards this allotment, even if true. In any event, no exercise seems to have been undertaken at any level to ascertain as to whether the land in Jawaharnagar village which was said to have been allotted to BITS, Pilani, was comparable to the subject land in Pet Basheerabad village. In the absence of such an exercise, the State could not have come to a reasoned decision to put the two lands on par with each other, whereby the same concessional rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre could have been adopted and offered to the school.
Article 39(b) of the Constitution of India prescribes that the State shall direct its policy towards securing ownership and control of the material resources of the community which are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. However, it would necessarily have to follow a transparent procedure while distributing such resources.
In NATURAL RESOURCES ALLOCATION, IN RE, SPECIAL
[8]
REFERENCE NO.1 OF 2012 , the Supreme Court observed thus:
“The norm of “common good” has to be understood and appreciated in a holistic manner. It is obvious that the manner in which the common good is best subserved is not a matter that can be measured by any constitutional yardstick—it would depend on the economic and political philosophy of the Government. Revenue maximization is not the only way in which the common good can be subserved. Where revenue maximization is the object of a policy being considered qua that resource at that point of time to be the best way to subserve the common good, auction would be one of the preferable methods, though not the only method. Where revenue maximization is not the object of a policy of distribution, the question of auction would not arise. Revenue considerations may assume secondary consideration to developmental considerations.
Therefore, in conclusion, the submission that the mandate of Article 14 is that any disposal of a natural resource for commercial use must be for revenue maximization, and thus by auction, is based neither on law nor on logic. There is no constitutional imperative in the matter of economic policies— Article 14 does not predefine any economic policy as a constitutional mandate. Even the mandate of Article 39(b) imposes no restrictions on the means adopted to subserve the public good and uses the broad term “distribution”, suggesting that the methodology of distribution is not fixed. Economic logic establishes that alienation/ allocation of natural resources to the highest bidder may not necessarily be the only way to subserve the common good, and at times, may run counter to public good. Hence, it needs little emphasis that disposal of all natural resources through auctions is clearly not a constitutional mandate.”
The Supreme Court concluded that auction, despite being a more preferable method of alienation/allotment of natural resources, could not be held to be a constitutional requirement or limitation for alienation of all natural resources and therefore, every method other than auction could not be struck down as ultra vires the constitutional mandate. The observations of the Supreme Court thereafter are also of relevance and are extracted hereunder:
“Regard being had to the aforesaid precepts, we have opined that auction as a mode cannot be conferred the status of a constitutional principle. Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision, and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive prerogatives. However, when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximizing private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that are competitive and maximize revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution. Hence, rather than prescribing or proscribing a method, we believe, a judicial scrutiny of methods of disposal of natural resources should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, in consonance with the principles which we have culled out above. Failing which, the Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, shall term the executive action as arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious due to its antimony with Article 14 of the Constitution.”
[9]
I n R.S. GARG V/S. STATE OF U.P. , the Supreme Court pointed out the difference between malice in law and malice on fact and affirmed that any action resorted to for an unauthorized purpose would construe ‘malice in law’. The Supreme Court observed that malice in its legal sense means malice such as may be assumed for a wrongful act done intentionally but without just cause or excuse or for one of reasonable or probable cause. Malice in its legal sense however would mean malice such as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable or probable cause.
Reference was also made to the earlier judgment in SELVI J.
[10]
JAYALALITHAA V/S. STATE OF KARNATAKA , wherein the Supreme Court again dealt with the issue of legal malice or malice in law reiterating the principles laid down in RAVI YASHWANT BHOIR V/S. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, RAIGAD[11] to the effect that ‘legal malice or malice in law’ means something done without lawful excuse, i.e., it is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others, done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable cause and therefore, passing of an order for unauthorized purpose constitutes malice in law. The Supreme Court summed up that it is trite law that if discretionary power has been exercised for an unauthorized purpose, it is generally immaterial whether its repository was acting in good faith or in bad faith and the order becomes vulnerable and liable to be set aside. So far as the legal regime applicable to the subject allotment is concerned, the Rules of 1975 were framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 172 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli. The Introduction to the Rules reflects that they were promulgated as there were no rules governing alienation of State lands lying in the Telangana area for public purposes as in the case of State lands situated in the Andhra area of the State. Rule 2 of the Rules pertains to definitions and under Clause (b) thereof ‘alienation of land’ is defined to mean placing land at the disposal of for a public purpose or for any specified purpose. ‘Market value’ is defined under Clause (i) of Rule 2 to mean the value that the land would fetch in the open market, if sold. ‘Public purpose’ is defined under clause (j) of Rule 2 to mean a purpose which confers or is conducive to the good of a considerable section of the community at large. Construction of schools is one of the public purposes mentioned therein. Rule 3 of the Rules prescribes general principles and reads as under.
“3. General Principles:- (a) Alienation of State land to local body or local authority for unremunerative public purposes will ordinarily be allowed or made free of any initial charge for occupancy right (i.e.) free of the market value or the value of the occupancy right in the land. Where, however, the land to be alienated has been previously acquired at the expense of the Government and in the case of alienation of land to local bodies or local authorities for remunerative public purposes and of alienation to a company, private individual or institution for any public purpose the question of collecting the market value of the land from the alienee will be considered.
(b) No application for alienation of land under these Rules to a company, association, society, institution or any other corporate body should be considered unless such company, association, society, institution or other corporate body has been registered under the Indian Companies Act VII of 1913.
(c) Applications for alienation of lands for educational purposes whether from local bodies or local authorities (including Gram Panchayat) or from private associations or individuals should be addressed to the District Collector through the District Educational Officer in the case of institutions for boys and through the Inspectoress of Girls Schools in the case of institutions for girls.”
Rule 4 deals with the power of alienation of Government land and reads to the effect that the Board of Revenue (Single Member) or the District Collectors are empowered to sanction alienation of land in favour of companies, private associations, societies or private individuals in the event the market value of the occupancy right in the land does not exceed a particular value. The value in this regard is fixed at Rs.3,000/- for the Board of Revenue (Single Member) and Rs.1,000/- in the case of District Collectors. Under Rule 4(c), it is prescribed that every case of alienation of land other than those falling under the preceding clauses in favour of companies, private associations, societies or private individuals would require the sanction of the State Government for which an application should be made in the Form prescribed in Appendix I. Rule 6-A prescribes that the grant of alienation of State land be it for religious, educational or for any other purpose, would always be subject to the conditions prescribed. Thereunder, as many as 11 conditions are set out and are stated to be inexhaustive. Rule 10 of the Rules prescribes that notwithstanding anything contained therein, the Government may, if it desires to sell or otherwise alienate any of its lands or other property in Telangana area, it may do so by following any reasonable procedure, including public auction, where such alienation/sale is deemed necessary.
A learned Judge of this Court had occasion to deal with the Rules of 1975 in ROAD METAL INDUSTRY V/S. SECRETARY TO
[12]
GOVERNMENT OF A.P., REVENUE DEPARTMENT , and observed that the said rules prescribe meaningful statutory standards and realistic procedural requirements to be followed by the Government and its officers in the matter of disposal/alienation/grant of lease of Government lands. Such meaningful statutory standards were stated to have been prescribed in order to avoid the risk of possible arbitrary use of discretionary power. As the rules were mandatory in nature, alienation of Government lands in Telangana area, per the learned Judge, had to be in conformity with the prescribed standards under the said rules. The learned Judge pointed out that any decision by the Government contrary to the rules would have to be declared ultra vires as the power to alienate can be exercised by the Government only in conformity with the said rules. Procedural fairness and regularity envisioned by the rules was held to be a bastion against arbitrariness. This Court respectfully agrees.
I n AKHIL BHARTIYA UPBHOKTA CONGRESS V/S. STATE
[13]
OF MADHYA PRADESH , the Supreme Court was dealing with the question as to whether the State Government could allot 20 acres of land to a private organization without issuing an advertisement or adopting a procedure consistent with the doctrine of equality so as to enable other similar organizations/institutions to participate in the process of allotment. The Supreme Court emphasized that the State cannot give largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of political entities and/or officers of the State. Every such decision must be founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well- defined policy, which shall be made known to the public and such policy must be implemented by adopting a non-discriminatory and non- arbitrary method irrespective of the class or category of persons proposed to be benefited by the policy. The distribution of largesse like allotment of land should always be done in a fair and equitable manner and the element of favouritism or nepotism should not influence the exercise of discretion, if any, conferred upon the particular functionary or officer of the State. While affirming that the State could allot lands to the institutions/organizations engaged in educational, cultural, social or philanthropic activities, the Supreme Court pointed out that it would be necessary that the actual exercise of allotment should be done in a manner consistent with the doctrine of equality. The competent authority should, as a matter of course, issue an advertisement incorporating therein the conditions of eligibility so as to enable all similarly situated eligible persons/ institutions/ organizations to participate in the process of allotment, whether by way of auction or otherwise. In a given case, the Government may allot land at a fixed price but in that case also, allotment must be preceded by a wholesome exercise consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. The allotment of land in that case was held to be illegal and a blatant act of favouritism on the part of the State.
The same principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in HUMANITY V/S. STATE OF WEST BENGAL
[14]
, wherein it pointed out that it had repeatedly held that in the matter of granting largesse, the Government has to act fairly and without a semblance of discrimination. The Supreme Court also observed that setting up of a private school, though it may have some elements of public interest, and may not be totally a business enterprise but profit motive could not be ruled out. The facts of that case were somewhat similar to the case on hand inasmuch as there also, allotment had been made at the request of the beneficiary, as in the present case, and the second allotment, which was under challenge before the Supreme Court, was of a much larger plot of land brought about in terms of the request of the allottee for a bigger plot. The Supreme Court observed that the subsequent change was not brought about by the Government in its own discretion but was in response to a written request of the allottee. Such allotment was held to smack of arbitrariness falling foul of Article 14.
In S.P. GURURAJA2, the Supreme Court observed that once the Court finds that the power exercised by statutory authorities can be traced to a provision of a statute, unless and until violation of mandatory provisions thereof is found out and/or it is held that a decision is taken for an unauthorized or illegal purpose, the Court would not ordinarily interfere either with a policy decision or with any decision taken by executive authorities pursuant to or in furtherance thereof. The Supreme Court concluded that malice in common law or acceptance means ill will against a person, but in the legal sense, it means a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse.
Though the school would contend that the alienation in its favour was made under the Rules of 1975, no material is brought before us to support the same. There is no transparency whatsoever in the subject allotment and the same was motivated solely by the arbitrary and adhoc approach of State actors.
Non-application of mind by the authorities is manifest from the fact that none of the authorities in the hierarchy even referred to the Rules of 1975 or the procedure prescribed thereunder. On the other hand, the impugned G.O. states that the allotment is subject to the terms and conditions laid down in Board Standing Order No.24. Needless to state, the said BSO had no application to the subject allotment when the statutory Rules of 1975 governed the field. Further, Rule 6 (a) of the Rules of 1975 stipulates in detail the conditions subject to which the alienation of State land is to be made, be it for an educational or other public purpose. In the light of the conditions prescribed in the statutory rules themselves, there was no question of importing the general conditions prescribed in the wholly inapplicable Board Standing Order No.24. The fact that the authorities did not even consider this aspect, as is evident from the impugned G.O. itself, clearly manifests that the issue was not considered in the light of the Rules of 1975.
No exercise was undertaken to identify the public interest, apart from the educational aspect, which would be served by offering a nominal rate to the school. The perceived growth of employment and development opportunities by such allotment was not studied or considered as a ground for reducing the price. It is no doubt true that the State need not always be guided by a profit motive when it deals with or parts with Government lands. However, exercise of discretion by the State in this regard must always be transparent and above board on the face of the record so as to withstand judicial scrutiny. A n adhoc and singular approach, as is evident in the present case, bereft of a policy backbone, cannot be countenanced.
As pointed out by the petitioner, the doctrine of trust would apply on all fours to a case of this nature and the State failed to justify its action in reducing the price when it parted with Government land. When the Revenue and Finance departments of the State had suggested that the basic value of the land at least was to be charged from the school, citing wholly extraneous grounds for further reduction cannot be an acceptable justification. The Rules of 1975 do not allow any relaxation in terms of reduction of the market value. This aspect of the matter was completely lost sight of. Even if the same was permissible, citing the as yet undetermined future loss of land and buildings by the school as a ground for reducing the price for the subject land requires to be rejected peremptorily. At the stage when the former Chief Minister did so, the school had not even parted with either its land or structures for road widening. Now, it is apparent that only 1720 square yards of the land was lost by the school, which does not seem to have hampered its continuing with its existing educational institution at Secunderabad. In so far as the building loss is concerned, the school was compensated for it to the tune of over Rs.1.19 crore. Whether the loss of 1720 square yards of land in Secunderabad area required allotment of 20 acres of land in a prime and upcoming area in Pet Basheerabad village, at a nominal rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre as compared to the value of Rs.1,45,20,000/- (at Rs.3,000/- per square yard) or the value of Rs.77,44,000/- per acre (at Rs.1,600/- per square yard) is an issue which was never considered or addressed by any of the authorities.
Further, the Rules require that the beneficiary who seeks alienation of Government land should make an application to the District Collector in the first instance. In the present case, as already stated supra, the suggestion with regard to allotment of an alternative site emanated not from the school but from the former Chief Minister. The application made by the school pursuant to this suggestion was also addressed to the former Chief Minister directly. It was only thereafter that the District Collector was brought into the picture. This sequential progression clearly demonstrates that the exercise was skewed from its very inception.
No doubt, the school seems to have made constructions on the subject land but as its title is still inchoate it cannot assert any vested rights at this stage. Allotment of the subject land to the school at the reduced rate of Rs.1.5 lakh per acre falls foul of the law on more than one count and the impugned G.O. therefore beseeches interference by this Court.
That being said, this Court cannot ignore the fact that any order passed at this stage invalidating the very allotment of the subject land to the school would not only affect it adversely but also severely impact several students and families who are now availing educational facilities and employment opportunities from the newly constructed institution on the subject land. The delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court, thereby allowing this situation to develop, would therefore weigh against him in seeking outright invalidation of the subject allotment. However, that by itself is not enough to justify the throw away price at which the Government allotted the subject land. This kind of undue favour to a private institution at the expense of the exchequer cannot be countenanced.
As the authorities failed to judiciously exercise their discretion while determining the market rate at which the subject land should have been alienated to the school, it would be necessary for them to do so at least at this late stage. Upon such determination in the context of the year of allotment, 2006, the same shall be communicated to the school which shall pay sale consideration at the said rate along with interest thereon calculated at 9% per annum. The amount already deposited by the school shall be adjusted against the sale consideration so determined. Upon such payment and depending on the result of the pending Court cases, it would be open to the State to complete the formalities for alienating the subject land to the school through a duly registered deed of conveyance. This order, in our considered opinion, would subserve public interest while protecting the interests of all the stakeholders involved. Needless to reiterate, this order is subject to the result of the pending litigation. In the event the school fails to remit the amount due as determined, after adjustment of the sale consideration already deposited, within the time stipulated by the State, the alienation proposal in its favour under the impugned G.O. shall stand cancelled and it shall be open to the State to take necessary steps pursuant thereto, including resumption of possession of the land.
The case is accordingly disposed of. Before issuing copies of this order, the Registry is directed to substitute the ‘Government of Telangana’ in the place of the ‘Government of Andhra Pradesh’ in the cause title in terms of the deeming provision in Section 104 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014. No order as to costs.
--------------------------------------------- KALYAN JYOTI SENGUPTA, CJ 25TH JULY, 2014 GBS/Svv
[1]
(2005) 3 SCC 91
[2]
(2003) 8 SCC 567
[3]
(2012) 10 SCC 1
[4]
------------------------------------- SANJAY KUMAR, J
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
(2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 91
(2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 567
(2000) 10 Supreme Court Cases 664
(2009) 8 Supreme Court Cases 582
(2012) 12 Supreme Court Cases 1
[9]
(2006) 6 Supreme Court Cases 430
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
LAWS (SC)-2013-9-88 AIR 2012 SC 1339
2001 (6) ALD 166
(2011) 5 Supreme Court Cases 29
(2011) 6 Supreme Court Cases 125