Hon'ble Attau Rahman Masoodi,J.
Heard Sri Asok Pande, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Vijay Bahadur Singh, learned Advocate General along with Smt. Bulbul Godiyal, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri Mohd. Mansoor, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Sri A.N. Trivedi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Sri Vivek Kumar Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, and Sri Abdul Moin, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents.
The petitioner has challenged the decision of the State Government and the consequential appointment of the respondent no.4- Hon'ble Mr. Justice Syed Rafat Alam, the former Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Allahabad High Court, presently occupying the office of the Chairman, Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi to the post of Chairperson of the U.P. State Human Rights Commission under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 on the ground that the appointment was impermissible keeping in view the bar of Section 11(a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
Sri Asok Pande, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the process of appointment to exclusively consider the candidature of only one Chief Justice without there being any requisite statutory exercise having been undertaken for holding selections, the process adopted by the State Government apart from the aforesaid debarment clause has vitiated the same.
A preliminary objection has been raised by Sri Vijay Bahadur Singh, learned Advocate General for the State of U.P. who contends that the petitioner has no individual grievance so as to maintain this writ petition which is not a public interest litigation and consequently in the absence of any such pleadings to substantiate her locus, the present writ petition does not deserve to be entertained.
Sri Asok Pande, learned counsel for the petitioner, replying to the said submission has urged that the petitioner is not a stranger to such proceedings and for this he has invited the attention of the Court to paragraphs 20 to 23 of the writ petition that have been supplemented by a supplementary affidavit contending that the petitioner herself has moved various complaints before the U.P. State Human Rights Commission and has supplied two copies of the complaints to urge that she has sufficient interest to maintain this petition, hence the preliminary objection deserves to be overruled.
Having considered the submissions raised we find that if the petitioner is a complainant before the State Human Rights Commission then it cannot be said that she does not have any locus to maintain this petition in her individual interest, inasmuch as the occupation of the office of a Chairperson by an individual while dealing with such complaints would be directly related to the status of the petitioner as a person aggrieved before the Commission. We are, therefore, not inclined to dismiss the petition on account of any absence of locus on the part of the petitioner.
Sri Asok Pande, learned counsel for the petitioner, on merits has vehemently urged that in view of the provisions of Section 11(a) of the 1985 Act the respondent no.4 would be ineligible for further engagement or appointment as the Chairperson of the U.P. State Human Rights Commission. The reason would be clearly discernible from the section itself which spells out the ineligibility of any further employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State. The argument rests on the premise that the appointment as a Chairperson of the Commission would be an employment even if the Chairperson is not an employee under the State Government. It would further be under the State Government inasmuch as the appointment is by the State Government and Section 26 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 clearly stipulates the terms and conditions including salaries and allowances payable to the Chairperson and Members of the Commission to be fixed by it.
Sri Pande, therefore, submits that the State Government exercises control over the Chairperson and its Members and hence they are under the State Government. He also submits that the State Human Rights Chairperson being under the direct control of the State Government in respect of his appointment and terms and conditions including salaries and allowances, amounts to an employment under the State Government. He, therefore, submits that this clearly attracts the ineligibility clause of the 1985 Act, referred to hereinabove, and consequently this legal defect cannot sustain the impugned appointment of the Chairperson.
Sri Pande has further urged that it is the intention of the Legislature and such similar provisions contained in other laws that should be taken into consideration to construe the aforesaid provision attracting the ineligibility as pointed out above. Through another supplementary affidavit he has invited the attention of the Court to Article 319 of the Constitution of India which also entails such ineligibility for the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission, the provisions of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2014 in respect of the Chairperson of the said authority and the provisions of Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayuktas Act, 1975 to contend that there are such similar disqualifications that have been prescribed, and consequently the same principle should be applied to construe that the appointment of a Chairperson of the State Human Rights Commission should be treated to be an employment under the State Government whereby the ineligibility is clearly attracted.
Sri Singh, learned Advocate General, on the other hand has urged that the constitution of the Commission under Section 21 of the 1993 Act and the appointment under Section 22 would leave no room for doubt that it is the State Government which constitutes the Commission, and the consequential act of appointment follows after a recommendation is made by the Committee as defined under sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act. His Excellency the Governor, then under his warrant and seal, issues the letter of appointment. This is not an employment as understood in service jurisprudence as that of a master and a servant or even in terms of employer and employee relationship. He contends that once a Chairperson is installed in office, his removal is only by His Excellency the President of India after an inquiry through the Supreme Court. The State Government, therefore, does not exercise any such control in relation to the removal of a Chairperson who can otherwise himself resign from his office. Salaries and allowances which are payable and the terms and conditions of service are in order to facilitate the functioning of the Chairperson as the Chairman of the State Human Rights Commission. The Human Rights Commission is a body to conduct and supervise all inquires relating to human rights violations which is not subject to any control or supervision by the State Government. He has substantiated his arguments by contending that this appointment of a Chairperson is not under the State Government but is under the 1993 Act which the State Government is obliged to constitute and execute the appointment accordingly. The Chairperson of the Commission, therefore, is not an authority to function under the Government, but is an independent functionary under the provisions of the 1993 Act.
Sri Singh has relied on the reasoning of a constitution bench judgment in the case of Hargovind Pant Vs. Dr. Raghukul Tilak & others, (1979) 3 SCC Page 458 paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 to urge that the said ratio is attracted in the case of an appointment of a Chairperson which is not an employment and is not under the State Government. He has further invited the attention of the Court to the division bench judgment in the case of Y.N. Nagaraja Vs. State of Karnataka and others, Writ Petition No.10278 of 2008, decided on 5.11.2008 to contend that a similar provision was interpreted and relying on the Apex Court decision, referred to hereinabove, the writ petition was dismissed holding that it was not an employment under the State Government attracting a similar disqualification in the aforesaid case.
We have considered the submissions raised and in order to appreciate the controversy the provision of Section 11 (a) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is extracted hereinunder :-
"(a) the Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal shall be ineligible for further employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State;"
The aforesaid provision categorically recites that the ineligibility will be for further employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State.
The question is as to whether the appointment of a Chairperson of the U.P. State Human Rights Commission is an employment under the Government of the State or not? For this Sections 21, 22, 23 and 26 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 are extracted hereinunder :-
"21. Constitution of State Human Rights Commissions-(1) A State Government may constitute a body to be known as the....................... (Name of the State) Human Rights Commission to exercise the powers conferred upon, and to perform the functions assigned to, a State Commission under this chapter.
Provided further that in relation to the Jammu and Kashmir Human Rights Commission, this sub-section shall have effect as if for the words and figures "List ll and List lll in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution", the words and figures "List lll in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in respect of matters in relation to which the Legislature of that State has power to make laws" had been substituted.
(6) Two or more State Governments may, with the consent of a Chairperson or Member of a State Commission, appoint such Chairperson or, as the case may be, such Member of another State Commission simultaneously if such Chairperson or Member consents to such appointment:
Provided that every appointment made under this sub- section shall be made after obtaining the recommendations of the Committee referred to in sub-section(1) of section 22 in respect of the State for which a common Chairperson or Member, or both, as the case may be, is to be appointed.
22. Appointment of Chairperson and Members of State Commission -
(1) The Chairperson and [Members] shall be appointed by the Governor by warrant under his hand and seal:
Provided that every appointment under this sub-section shall be made after obtaining the recommendation of a Committee consisting of -
(a) the Chief Minister -- Chairperson;
(b) Speaker of the Legislative Assembly -- Member;
(c) Minister in-charge of the Department of Home, in that State--Member;
(d) Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Assembly-Member:
Provided further that where there is a Legislative Council in a State, the Chairman of that Council and the Leader of the Opposition in that Council shall also be members of the Committee.
Provided also that no sitting Judge of a High Court or a sitting District Judge shall be appointed except after consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court of the concerned State.
(2) No appointment of a Chairperson or a Member of the State Commission shall be invalid merely by reason of [any vacancy of any Member in the Committee referred to in sub-section(1).
23. Resignation and Removal of Chairperson or a Member of the State Commission -
(1) The Chairperson or a Member of a State Commission may, by notice in writing under his hand addressed to the Governor, resign his office.
(1A) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the Chairperson or any Member of the State Commission shall only be removed from his office by order of the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity after the Supreme Court, on a reference being made to it by the President, has, on inquiry held in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that behalf by the Supreme Court, reported that the Chairperson or such Member, as the case may be, ought on any such ground to be removed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in [sub-section (1A)], the President may by order remove from office the Chairperson or any [Member] if the Chairperson or such [Member], as the case may be -
(a) is adjudged an insolvent; or
(b) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties of his office; or
(c) is unfit to continue in office by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or
(d) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or
(e) is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which in the opinion of the President involves moral turpitude.
26. Terms and conditions of service of Chairperson and Members of the State Commissions - The salaries and allowances payable to, and other terms and conditions of service of, the Chairperson and Members shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government;
Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson or a Member shall be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment."
The aforesaid provisions clearly demonstrate that the debarment by way of ineligibility is confined to an employment under the Government of a State. The State Commission is to be constituted by the State Government under Section 21 of the 1993 Act. Upon its constitution the appointment has to follow by His Excellency the Governor on a recommendation of a committee as defined in sub-section (1) of Section 22 extracted hereinabove. This mode of recommendation and appointment by the Governor consists of deliberation on the name of a particular person who has occupied the office of the Chief Justice of a High Court. The recommending body does not have any option to choose any other person except the former Chief Justice of a High Court. There is no control at all of the State Government and rather it is a recommendation by the committee under Section 22 which takes the shape of an appointment by His Excellency the Governor. Consequently, the State Government, as a matter of fact, in its executive authority has no other role to play except to constitute the Commission whereafter the appointment has to be carried out in terms of Section 22 of the said Act. The prescription of salaries and allowances and other terms and conditions of service have to be prescribed by the State Government. This, in our opinion, is only to provide for the facilities and the perks as well as the payment of salary and allowances and not to exercise any control over the authority of the Chairperson. The Chairperson is a creation of the recommendation of a committee under Section 22 and his formal appointment is executed by His Excellency the Governor with the issuance of a letter of appointment on the recommendations of a committee. The recommending body as constituted under Section 22 is not a substitute for a Government of the State. It is a body consisting of the political leadership of the State and is therefore not a representative of the Government of the State so as to bring about any control by the State Government on the office of the Chairperson. The constituents of the recommending body are not functioning as a State Government while making recommendations, even though they are part of an administrative system of governance. The said recommending body becomes functus officio upon the appointment of a Chairperson by the Governor.
There is no other control or supervision over the exercise of authority after the appointment of a Chairperson so as to construe that the Chairperson becomes subject to employment or a functionary under the State Government. The State Government also does not have the authority to remove the Chairperson. This also reflects that there is no control by the State Government over the appointment or continuance of the Chairperson. There is no contract of service as understood under service jurisprudence. The absence of any factor of superintendence and control over the Chairperson of a State Human Rights Commission is, therefore, critical and decisive of the legal quality of the relationship that is being debated at the bar. The issue of an employment under the Government has been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Hargovind Pant (supra) as relied on by the learned Advocate General in paragraphs no.4 to 7 that is extracted hereinunder :-
"4. The first question that arises on the applicability of the words "employment......under the Government of India" is whether the office of Governor is an 'employment' within the meaning of that expression in clause (d) of Article 319. What is the sense in which that word has been used in this Article? Semantically, the word 'employment' is not a word with a single fixed meaning but it has many connotations. On the one side it may bear the narrow meaning of relationship of employer and employee and on the other, it may mean in its widest connotation any engagement or any work in which one is engaged. If the former be the sense in which the word 'employment' is used in clause (d) of Article 319, the office of Governor would certainly not be an employment, because the Governor of a State is not an employee or servant of any one. He occupies a high constitutional office with important constitutional functions and duties. The executive power of the State is vested in him and every executive action of the Government is required to be expressed to be taken in his name. He constitutes an integral part of the legislature of the State though not in the fullest sense, and is also vested with the legislative power to promulgate ordinances while the Houses of the Legislature are not in session. He also exercises the sovereign power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. He is vested with the power to summon each House of the Legislature or to prorogue either House or to dissolve the legislative assembly and this power may be exercised by him from time to time. He is also entitled to address either House of the Legislature or both Houses assembled together and he may send messages to the House or Houses of the Legislature with respect to a bill then pending in the legislature or otherwise. No bill passed by the Houses of the Legislature can become law unless it is assented to by him and before assenting to the bill he may return the bill, provided it is not a money bill to the Houses of the Legislature for reconsideration. He has also the power to reserve for consideration of the President any bill which in his opinion would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that court is by the Constitution designed to fill. There is also one highly significant role which he has to play under the Constitution and that is of making a report where he finds that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is the Governor's report which generally forms the basis for the President taking action under Article 356 of the Constitution. It will be seen from this enumeration of the constitutional powers and functions of the Governor that he is not an employee or servant in any sense of the term. It is no doubt true that the Governor is appointed by the President which means in effect and substance the Government of India, but that is only a mode of appointment and it does not make the Governor an employee or servant of the Government of India. Every person appointed by the President is not necessarily an employee of the Government of India. So also it is not material that the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President. It is a constitutional provision for determination of the term of office of the Governor and it does not make the Government of India an employer of the Governor. The Governor is the head of the State and holds a high constitutional office which carries with it important constitutional functions and duties and he cannot, therefore, even by stretching the language to a breaking point, be regarded as an employee or servant of the Government of India. If, therefore, the word 'employment' were construed to mean relationship of employer and employee, the office of Governor would certainly not be an 'employment' within the meaning of clause (d) of Article 319.
5. But if we accept the wider meaning of the word 'employment' as connoting any engagement or any work in which one is engaged as in the expression 'self-employment' the office of Governor would clearly be an 'employment' within the meaning of clause (d) of Article 319. That, however, would not be enough to attract the applicability of this provision. There is a further requirement which is necessary and that is that the employment must be under the Government of India. Now, what is the meaning of this expression "under the Government of India"? Fortunately, there are two decisions of this Court which throw some light on this question. The first is the decision in Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court where the question was as to whether the officers and members of the staff of the High Court could be said to be persons "serving under the Government of India or the Government of a State, in a civil capacity" so as to be within the scope of Article 320(3) (c) which requires consultation with the appropriate Public Service Commission in disciplinary matters. This Court speaking through Jagannadhadas, J., pointed out: "the phrase 'a person' serving under the Government of India or the Government of 'a State' it seems to have reference to such persons in respect of whom the administrative control is vested in the respective executive Governments functioning in the name of the President or of the Governor or of a Rajpramukh. The officers and staff of the High Court cannot be said to fall within the scope of the above phrase because in respect of them the administrative control is clearly vested in the Chief Justice-". The question which arose in the other decision in Baldev Raj Guliani & ors. Vs. The Punjab & Haryana High Court & ors. was a similar one and it related to the applicability of Article 320(3) (c) to Judicial officers in the State. Here, in this case also the Court took the same view and, after referring to the earlier decision in Pradyat Kumar Bose's case with approval, held that "just as the High Court staff are not serving under the Government of the State, the Judicial officers are also not serving under the State Government", because they are "entirely under the jurisdiction of the High Court for the purpose of control and discipline". It will, therefore, be seen that the employment can be said to be under the Government of India if the holder or incumbent of the employment is under the control of the Government of India vis-a-vis such employment. Now, if one applies this test to the office of Governor, it is impossible to hold that the Governor is under the control of the Government of India. His office is not subordinate or subservient to the Government of India. He is not amenable to the directions of the Government of India, nor is he accountable to them for the manner in which he carries out his functions and duties. He is an independent constitutional office which is not subject to the control of the Government of India. He is constitutionally the head of the State in whom is vested the executive power of the State and without whose assent there can be no legislation in exercise of the legislative power of the State. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the office of Governor is not an employment under the Government of India and it does not come within the prohibition of clause (d) of Article 319.
6. We may point out that the Governor of a State is not the only constitutional functionary whose employment is not under the Government. There are under the Constitution many other high functionaries, such as Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, who do not hold any employment under the Government of India, although they exercise State power. This Court, while examining the constitutional position of a High Court Judge, pointed out in the Union of India Vs. S.H. Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 193 that a High Court Judge is not a Government servant: there is no relationship of employee and employer subsisting between him and the Government. He is a holder of a constitutional office which has important constitutional functions and duties. One of us (Bhagwati, J.) pointed out in that case at page 463 of the Report (SCC Page 236, para 49) that a High Court Judge:
"..... is as much part of the State as the executive Government. The State has in fact three organs, one exercising executive power, another exercising legislative power and the third exercising judicial power. Each is independent and supreme within its allotted sphere and it is not possible to say that one is superior to the other. The High Court, constituted of the Chief Justice and other Judges, exercising the judicial power of the State and is coordinate in position and status with the Governor aided and advised by the council of Ministers, who exercises the executive power and the Legislative Assembly together with the Legislative Council, if any, which exercises the legislative power of the State. Plainly and unquestionably, therefore, a High Court Judge is not subordinate either to the executive or to the legislature. It would, indeed, be a constitutional heresy to so regard him. He has a constitutional function to discharge, which includes adjudication of the question whether the executive or the legislature has over-stepped the limits of its power under the Constitution. No doubt Article 217, clause (1) provides for appointment of a person to the office of a High Court Judge by the President, which means in effect and substance the Central Government, but that is only laying down a mode of appointment and it does not make the Central Government an employer of a High Court Judge. In fact a High Court Judge has no employer: he occupies a high constitutional office which is coordinate with the executive and the legislature."
These observations apply equally to the office of a Judge of the Supreme Court. We are mentioning this merely to bring home, through comparable constitutional functionaries, the validity of the proposition that holders of high constitutional offices exercising State power and drawing salaries from State coffers may nevertheless be not employees or servants or holders of employment under the Government.
7. We are, therefore, of the view that the office of Governor of a State is not an employment under the Government of India and it does not, therefore, come within the prohibition of clause (d) of Article 319 and on this view, the appointment of respondent 1 as the Governor of Rajasthan cannot be held to be invalid."
The principles enunciated therein for constitutional offices would also apply with no less rigour on the appointment of a Chairperson of the U.P. State Human Rights Commission even though the Chairperson is not occupying a constitutional office.
The Chairman of the State Human Rights Commission and the Commission itself is to oversee any human rights violation including that by the State Government and its authorities. The Commission is therefore created and was intended to be created by the Legislature to oversee such activities including that of the State Government and its officials. The legislature, therefore, never intended to make the office of Chairperson of a State Human Rights Commission to be subordinate and subservient to the State Government. The scheme of the 1993 Act nowhere reflects any such intention and consequently the Chairperson of a Human Rights Commission is not under the employment of the State Government. In such a situation the forfeiture clause under the 1985 Act is not attracted. What is prohibited is an employment under the Government. The recommendation of a Chairperson is not for an employment under the Government or even under the control of the Government of the State. Thus, the prohibition is only against an employment under the Government of the State or the Centre. A little assistance can be had for understanding the words "under the control of the Government" from the judgment relied on by the learned Advocate General in the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Vs. Sanatam Dharam Girls Secondary School & others, (2007) 1 SCC Page 268.
The reasoning given by the division bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Y.N. Nagaraja (supra) would therefore also come to the aid of the proposition as advanced by the learned Advocate General.
Coming to the arguments advanced by Sri Pande on certain analogous provisions, Article 319 also entails a similar provision of ineligibility in relation to the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission. Similar are the provisions under the Telecom Regulatory Authority Act and the Uttar Pradesh Lokayukta and Up-Lokayuktas Act, 1975. We may point out that the provisions that have been quoted in paragraph 6 of the supplementary affidavit by the petitioner in respect of the 1975 Lokayukta Act are not the correct provisions and rather is the unamended section which has been relied on. Section 5 (3) of the 1975 Act has undergone a vital amendment by U.P. Act 4 of 2012 w.e.f. 15.3.2012 and the same reads as under :-
"5(3) On ceasing to hold office, the Lokayukta or an Up-Lokayukta shall be ineligible for further employment under the Government of Uttar Pradesh."
Having considered the submissions on this aspect as well the Court has come across a judgment in the case of Union of India & another Vs. U.D. Dwivedi, (1997) 3 SCC Page 182 where Article 319 of the Constitution was interpreted in relation to the Member of a Union Public Service Commission who had been appointed under the Government of India in the Defence Research and Development Organisation. The Apex Court in paragraph 7 ruled as under :-
"7. Clause (c) of Article 319 prohibits holding of any employment either under the Government of India or under the Government of a State by a person who has been a member of the Union Public Service Commission, except as the Chairman of Union Public Service Commission or as the Chairman of a State Public Service Commission. There is no dispute that Professor Sampath was a member of the Union Public Service commission. Therefore, apart from the post of the Chairman of Union Public Service Commission or Chairman of a State Public Service Commission, he was ineligible for employment in any other capacity under the Government of India or a State Government. That is the constitutional mandate. Whether the employment was held under a contract or otherwise is quite immaterial for this purpose. The fact of the matter is that Professor Sampath was employed as the Chairman of the Assessment Board at Recruitment and Assessment Centre. The constitutional mandate cannot be evaded by giving Professor Sampath a contract and not a letter of employment. Clause (c) of Article 319 bars "any other employment" which will include even an employment by contract under the Government of India or the State Government."
The Apex Court in that case found that even if it was a contractual engagement, it was an employment and, therefore, the same was hit by the prohibition contained in Article 319. The aforesaid decision does not come to the aid of the petitioner, inasmuch as in the instant case the engagement is not either on contractual basis or on the strength of any service condition so as to draw a parallel from that case.
There is another argument which has been advanced on the strength of the averments made in paragraphs 24 to 26 of the writ petition contending that the choice having fallen only on one person is to seek favour and such an appointment later on obliges the occupant of the office to favour the ruling party. It is urged that a person who was still holding an office of the Central Administrative Tribunal has been chosen to hold another office of the State Human Rights Commission.
The aforesaid argument, in our opinion, is trying to create a doubt in the matter of a choice of recommendation by the competent body. The recommendations cannot be questioned on grounds of doubtful validity or on grounds of questionable speculative suspicion about the choice of the recommending body. The said argument is a suspect proposition which is subjective in nature and is within the realm of a speculative argument. The apprehension expressed by the petitioner in the aforesaid paragraphs cannot be countenanced inasmuch as offering the post to a former Chief Justice is not a badge of servitude or of slavery or an outcome of quid pro quo. The offer is keeping in view the status of a former Chief Justice which is the choice of the legislature to occupy the office of the Chairperson. The aforesaid arguments advanced are to close in probably a theme of a moral judgment and not on any objective assessment of the black letter law. The acceptance of such an office by a former Chief Justice is his personal opinion and cannot be a matter of judicial review on such apprehensions that have been expressed by the petitioner. Falling of a choice on one particular former Chief Justice and not on any other is beyond the pale of any legal scrutiny by us on the facts of the present writ petition.
Sri Pande has also urged about the transparency in the process of recommendation. We do not find any such substantial material or any averment in the writ petition that may be sufficient to invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction to enter upon any such inquiry on the facts of the present case.
There being no merit in any of the grounds so raised, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
Order Date :- 11.1.2016 Anand Sri./-