ORDER Anjani Kumar, J.
1. This revision by defendant Under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure is directed against an order passed by the trial Court whereby the trial Court rejected the application for extension of time in filing written statement on the ground that in view of the amended proviso of Order VIII Rule 1 no extension can be granted. Since more than 90 days have already expired after service of summons on the defendants , thus defendant is deprived from filing written statement. In terms of Order VIII Rule 1 of C. P. C, the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 is amended by amending Act 1999.
2. By the amendment, the following provision is added to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure :-
"Order VII, Rule 1. Written Statement - The defendant shall within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence.
Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons."
3. The trial Court has taken a view that in view of proviso to the amended Rule, since period of ninety days has already elapsed from the date of service of summons on defendant, the Court ceased to have any power for extending the time for filing written statement. It is this order of the trial Court which is under challenge by means of the present civil revision.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon a decision reported in AIR 2003 Andhra Pradesh. 409, Nachipeddi Ramaswamy v. P. Buchi Reddy, wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that Rules 1, 1A and 10 of Order VIII when read together would show that though a defendant is required to file written statement within 30 days after receipt of summons and though the Court can extend the time till 90 days from the date of service of summons, the Court is not divested of power to extend further time for filing the written statement beyond ninety days. It is well settled that this cardinal principle of interpretation of law with an enactment has to be read as a whole and then the entire section has to be read and thereafter the Act has to be interpreted section by section.
5. Similar view has been taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case reported in 2004 (13) All India Cases 926 (M.P., H. C), M. P. Rajya Pashudhan Aum Kukut Vikas Nigam v. Bank of Baroda, Alirajpur decided on 17th September 2003.
6. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a decision of Karnataka High Court reported in AIR 2003 Karnataka 426, Smt. Savitha Gupta v. Smt. Nagaratha decision of Karnataka High Court reported in AIR 2003 Karnataka 345, Sri Prasanna Parvathamba v. Sri M.S. Radhakrishna Dixit, wherein the Karnataka High Court has taken a view after considering the amended provision of Order VIII Rule 1, that from the facts narrated above and the amended provisions of Order VII Rule 1, it is quite clear that the defendant loses the right to file written statement if he fails to do so within the time prescribed. The Court has no power to extend such time even Under Section 148 C. P. C. beyond ninety days.
7. After the decision of Single Judge, Smt. Savitha Gupta v. Smt. Nagaratha (supra) the matter went to a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. The Division Bench of Karnataka High Court, in the case reported in AIR 2004 Karnataka 246, after relying upon Supreme Court decision, held as under:-
"33. A plain reading of the above would show that failure of the defendant to file a written statement empowers the Court to pronounce judgment. The availability of the power to pronounce judgment on the failure of the defendant to file a written statement is nothing but a consequence which the statute provides for the failure. The fact that the provision also gives to the Court the discretion to make such other order as it may think fit does not change the nature of the provision which continues to provide for the consequences flowing from the failure to file the written statement. The approach to be adopted in choosing the consequence of the failure of the defendant has been succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan (1999) 8 SCC 396 in the following.
"xxxxxxx in a case, specially where a written statement has not been filed by the defendant the Court should be a little cautious in proceeding under Order 8, Rule 10, C. P. C. Before passing the judgment against the defendant it must see to it that even if the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been admitted a judgment could possibly be passed in favour of the plaintiff without requiring him to prove any fact mentioned in the plaint. It is a matter of the Court's satisfaction and, therefore, only on account of deemed admission the Court can conveniently pass a judgment against the defendant who has not filed the written statement. But if the plaint itself indicates that there are disputed questions of fact involved in the case regarding which two different versions are set out in the plaint itself, it would not be safe for the Court to pass a judgment without requiring the plaintiff to approve the fact so as to settle the factual controversy. Such a case would be covered by the expression "the Court may in its discretion require any such fact to be proved" used in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression may make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit used in Rule 10 of Order 8."
34. Two other aspects need be noticed at this stage. One of these relates to the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 9 of CPC governing subsequent pleadings while the other pertains to the power of the Court to extend time Under Sections 148 and 151 of the CPC. Order VIII, Rule 9 of the CPC reads as under :
"9. Subsequent pleadings - No pleading subsequent to the written statement of a defendant other than by way of defence to set off or counter-claim shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such terms as the Court thinks fit; but the Court may at any time require a written statement or additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time of not more than thirty days for presenting the same."
35. The provision is in two parts. The first part deals with filing of pleadings subsequent to the written statement of the defendant. The Rule provides that no such pleading subsequent to the written statement shall be presented except when the same is by way of a defence to a set-off or counter claim. The Court may however permit the filing of such pleading upon such terms as it may think fit. This part does not obviously deal with the filing of the written statement. It deals with a stage subsequent to the written statement in which the defendant may either make a counter-claim or claim a set-off. The second part deals with the power of the Court to require either a written statement or an additional written statement from any of the parties and fix a time of not more than thirty days for the same. This part of the provision does not however create a right in the defendant to file a written statement or additional written statement on his own if he has not already filed one. The requirement which the provision deals with is that of the Court and not of the defendant. It is only when the Court in the facts and circumstances of the case is of the opinion that a written statement or additional written statement is necessary in order to effectually determine the controversy before it that it may require the defendant to file a written statement or an additional written statement. Neither the availability nor the exercise of that power has any relevance to the question of Order VIII, Rule 1 of the CPC being mandatory or otherwise. The provisions of Order VIII, Rules 1 and 9 Operate in two different spheres. While one regulates the exercise of the right by the defendant to file a written statement, the other caters to situations where the defendant may not have filed any written statement and may not even interested in filing one, but in which the Court considers such a written statement or additional written statement to be necessary. Rule 9 of Order VIII therefore does not hold the key to a correct interpretation of Rule 1 to Order VIII.
36. Coming then to the exercise of power Under Section 151 of the CPC, we need only refer to the decision of the Supreme Court, 'Nainsingh v. Koonwarjee, AIR 1970 SC 997', where there Lordships held that if the Code makes a specific provision for a particular contingency, resort to inherent powers to deal with the same is impermissible. The Court observed :
"Under the inherent power of Courts recognized by Section 151 of the CPC, a Court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code. Inherent jurisdiction of the Court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provision which would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked."
37. That leaves us with the provisions of Section 148 of the CPC which may be extracted for facility of reference.
"148. Enlargement of time - Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period (not exceeding thirty days in total), even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired."
38. A bare reading of the above would show that the power to enlarge time is exercisable only in cases where the Court has fixed or granted any period for doing any act which is prescribed or allowed by the CPC. The period so fixed or granted can subject to an outer limit of 30 days be extended by the Court in its discretion. The question however is whether, the power to enlarge time in terms of the above provisions can also be extended in derogation of any other limitation which the Code has placed on the performance of any act prescribed or allowed under it. Our answer is in the negative. The defendant's right to file a written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons is unquestionable in the light of Order VIII, Rule 1 of CPC. Beyond the said period, the defendant has to seek enlargement of time in terms of the proviso under Rule 1 of Order VIII which proviso itself restricts the power of extension to a total of 90 days reckoned from the date of service of summons. That being so, one the power to grant extension for filing of the written statement is exhausted in terms of proviso to Order VIII, Rule 1 of CPC and the defendant fails to file a written statement during the extended period, the right to do so is lost. This would in other words imply that the Court cannot allow filing of written statement beyond the period stipulated under Order VIII, Rule 1 of CPC and the proviso thereto. Resort to Section 148 of the CPC would therefore be wholly out of place in such a situation for three precised reasons. 'Firstly because the provisions of Order VII, Rule 1 and the proviso are a Code in themselves with an outer limit prescribed for filing the written statement by the statute itself which cannot be extended by resort to Section 148 of the CPC. It is only in cases where the time is granted or fixed by the Court that an extension Under Section 148 is permissible. Secondly because the power to extend time beyond thirty days prescribed by Rule 1 of Order VIII is wider than that available Under Section 148. While the power Under Section 148 is limited to extension of 30 days only, the power available under the proviso is exercisable for a period of 60 days beyond the initial period of 30 days prescribed under Rule 1. Thirdly because the failure of the defendant to file a written statement within the stipulated period or the extended period admissible under the proviso, the right to file a written statement-and act otherwise permitted by the Code is lost not because the Court will decline to grant an extension but the Court itself does not envisage any extension beyond 90 days. We have therefore no difficulty in holding that the provisions of Section 148 cannot be invoked to grant time beyond the stipulated period of 90 days available under the provisions of order VIII of the CPC.
39. We may while parting refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. J. J. Merchant v. Shrinath Chaturvedi, AIR 2002 SC 2931. The Supreme Court was in that case dealing with the provision of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act which stipulates the procedure to be followed on receipt of a complaint by the Forum. Section 13(2)(a) of the Act provides that copy of the complaint shall be referred to the opposite party by the Forum directing him to give his version within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum. Interpreting the said provision, Their Lordships held that the same was intended to achieve speedy trial of the cases. Their Lordships also referred to the amendments brought in Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC and held that the amended rule contained the legislative mandate of filing the written statement of defence was to be strictly adhered to. The following passages from the said decision are in this regard apposite.
"13. The National Commission or the State Commission is empowered to follow the said procedure. From the aforesaid section it is apparent that on receipt of the complaint the opposite party is required to be given notice directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30 days or such extended period not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum or the Commission. For having speedy trial, this legislative mandate or not giving more than 45 days in submitting the written statement or the version of the case is required to be adhered. If this is not adhered, the legislative mandate or disposing of the cases within three or five months would be defeated.
14. For this purpose, even the Parliament has amended Order VIII Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, which reads thus :-
"Rule 1 : Written statement - The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence;
Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may/be specified by the Court for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later than ninety days from the date of service of summons."
15. Under this Rule also, there is a legislative mandate that written statement of defence is to be filed within 30 days. However, if there is a failure to file such written statement within stipulated time, the Court can at the most extend further period of 60 days and no more. Under the Act the legislative intent is not to give 90 days of time but only maximum 45 days for filing the version by the opposite party. Therefore, the aforesaid mandate is required to be strictly adhered to."
40. We accordingly hold that a Court trying a civil suit does not have any power to extend time for filing the written statement beyond what is stipulated in Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decisions rendered by learned single Judges of this Court taking a different view shall to that extent stand overruled. These revision petitions shall now be placed before the Learned single Judges for hearing and final disposal in accordance with law.
Order accordingly."
8. I see no reason to a differ from the view taken by the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court and holding otherwise than that a failure to file written statement as contemplated under Order VIII Rule 1 entails the penalty on the defendant that defendant cannot file written statement and the suit has to be decided even in the absence of written statement filed on behalf of defendant. Similar view has been taken by me in the case of Ashutosh Agrawal v. Lala Ramanuj Dayal Vaishya Bal Sadan, 2004 (55) Alld. Law Reports 821. For the reasons and view taken in the aforesaid decision of Ashutosh Agrawal (supra) I find no merit in this revision. This revision is dismissed.
9. Considering the importance of the matter, Registrar General is directed to circulate this judgment to all the District Courts.