JUDGMENT S.U. Khan, J.
1. This is landlord's writ petition arising out of eviction/ release proceedings initiated by him on the ground of bonafide need under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Some of the contesting respondents were tenants opposite parties before the trial court and rest were substituted before the courts below after the death of their predecessor tenants opposite parties. Release application was registered as P.A. Case No. 49 of 1992 on the file of prescribed authority /I Additional Civil Judge, Muzaffar Nagar. In the release application, respondents 6 and 7 Mitra Sen and Desh Raj were impleaded as alleged sub-tenants. Sri Mitra Sen died and was substituted by his legal representatives. Release application was allowed on 11.11.1994.
2. Accommodation in dispute is commercial in nature rent of which is quite nominal, virtually negligible.
3. Against judgment and order dated 11.11.1994 two appeals were filed one by Dr. Ved Bhushan and others being R.C. Appeal No. 60 of 1994 and the other by Mitrasen being R.C. Appeal No. 62 of 1994. In the appeals on 18.9.1995, which was a date fixed in the appeals one advocate Sri Man Mohan Mittal filed a compromise along with an application stating therein that the parties in appeal had entered into compromise, which was being filed by him (Sri Man Mohan Mittal, Advocate). Sri M.M. Mittal was not the counsel of any of the parties. Copy of the said compromise is annexure 5 to the writ petition. The landlord objected that no such compromise had been entered into. Sri Mittal also stated that under compromise tenant had given Rs. 50000/- to him for payment to landlord. On 25.9.1995, landlord filed objections along with affidavit. Counter affidavit to that was also filed. Sri Mittal was directed to give his oral evidence. His evidence was recorded on 13.10.1998, copy of which is annexure 8 to the writ petition. The appellate court held that compromise had in fact taken place hence appeals were decided in terms of the compromise through judgment and order dated 30.3.1999. Landlord has challenged the said order through this writ petition.
4. A sketch map of the accommodation in dispute (which is double storied) has been filed in this writ petition. Frontage of the accommodation in dispute is about 16.5 feet and depth is about 30.6 feet.
5. Half of the accommodation in dispute towards east (both floors) having frontage of 8 feet 3 inch was to be vacated by the tenants under the compromise on the condition that on the remaining half (western portion) of the accommodation in dispute Dr. Ved Bhushan respondent No. 2 would remain in possession of the ground floor and Mitrasen of the first floor as owners In para 7 of the said agreement, it was stated that the right of the tenants in the property which they agreed to surrender to the landlord was estimated to be Rs. 3 Lakhs and that rupees eighty thousand would be paid in addition by the tenants to the landlord and it would be deemed that in lieu of this amount of Rs. 3,80000/- tenants had purchased the western half portion and they were entitled to get sale deed of the same executed from the landlord. It was also noted that earlier also some talks of compromise had taken place and in pursuance thereof Rs. 30000/- had been given to the landlord which was to be adjusted from the amount of Rs. 80000/- required to be paid by the tenants to the landlord and balance amount of Rs. 50000/- was being deposited with Sri Mittal for payment to the landlord. Under clause 16 of the compromise, it was provided that if any dispute arose in respect of the same or any clarification was required then the decision of Sri Mittal would be acceptable to both the parties as compromise had been affected due to his efforts. Compromise bears the date of 16.9.1995. It was filed before appellate court on 18.9.1995.
6. Under Section 34(1)(f) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it is provided that the authorities under the Act including prescribed authority or appellate authority shall have same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under C.P.C. in respect of several matters including recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith.
7. In order to decide as to whether the formal agreement in between the parties as filed by Sri Mittal (annexure 8 to the writ petition) was arrived at or not, the oral evidence of Sri Mittal is very important. He stated that the parties had met him and told him that they intended to compromise the matter and he was requested to listen to the parties concerned and them to draft the compromise. He clearly stated that the parties on blank stamp papers put their signatures and handed over the same to him. It is admitted to the tenants also that signatures were made by the parties on blank stamp papers and compromise was written thereupon afterwards. He further stated that both the landlord as well as the tenant Dr. Ved Bhushan met him several times in connection with the compromise. He further sated that parties told him that earlier also matter of compromise had been discussed in between them and Rs. 30000/- had been paid by the tenants to the landlord however in respect of further amount there was some misunderstanding and he was requested to act as mediator in between the parties keeping in view all the facts and circumstances. He also stated that both the parties met him separately and it was agreed that he must remove the differences between the two in respect of such terms of the agreement on which parties were at issue. It was also stated that on 13th and 14th September 1995 terms were finalized which were recorded in a rough draft and the same was given to both the parties. He also stated that on 16.9.1995 he had gone to Allahabad hence on the said date on his instructions his clerk got transcribed the agreed draft of compromise on the blank stamp papers which had already been signed by the parties. He also stated that in the afternoon of 17th September, landlord came to him and enquired about the compromise whereupon it was shown to him and he perused that for five to seven minutes and after approving the same returned that to him. In para 13 of his statement Sri Mittal clearly stated that no one appointed him as arbitrator and in case he had been asked to act as arbitrator, he would have clearly refused.
8. During arguments learned Counsel for the tenant stated that he was not asserting that what was filed by Sri Mittal was an arbitration award.
9. From the case of the parties and from the evidence of Sri Mittal advocate two things are quite clear; one is that parties were interested in compromising the matter and the other is that all the parties had assigned some role to Sri Mittal in the matter of compromise. It also appears that some of the terms of compromise had been agreed in between the parties however there was some dispute in respect of other terms.
10. The argument of learned Counsel for the tenants is that Sri Mittal was only authorized by the parties to draft the compromise and apart from that he did not play any other role in the compromise hence what was filed by him was a valid, binding compromise entered into by the parties and only drafted by him. If the compromise is partly the result of decision of Sri Mittal on some of the points then it can not be said to be a compromise or agreement. However if it is held that on the contentious issues Sri Mittal played the role of mediator and on the basis of his suggestion and persuasion both the parties ultimately agreed to all the points mentioned in the compromise then the position will be slightly different. In that eventuality it can not be said that Sri Mittal play the role of arbitrator.
11. However since 1976, it has been provided under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. that the agreement or compromise in a pending suit must be in writing and signed by the parties. Signatures on the blank papers can not be taken to be signatures on the deed which is subsequently drafted on those blank papers. Law does not appreciate signatures on blank papers. The Allahabad High Court had already added the provision of writing and signature by the parties to the agreement or compromise in a pending suit through amendment to Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. dated 31.8.1974. In the main provision the requirement of writing and signature of the parties was added by the legislature with effect from 1.2.1977.
12. Accordingly I hold that the compromise, which was filed by Sri Mittal, fell short of "agreement in writing and signed by the parties."
13. Learned Counsel for the tenants has cited the following authorities to contend that if parties agreed that whatever is decided by a third party will be acceptable to them then decision by the said third party will amount to valid compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C.
AIR 1924 Alld. 570 Himanchal Singh v. Jatwar Singh and Ors.
1933 ALJ 1127 Akbari Begum v. Rahmat Hussain and Ors.
14. That was the position before insertion of requirement of writing and signature under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. hence the said authorities are not applicable.
15. Learned Counsel for the landlord has argued that even otherwise agreement is not lawful as ownership of part of tenanted accommodation can not be transferred to the tenant in proceedings under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and further agreement to sell is compulsorily registrable in Uttar Pradesh since 1.1.1977 hence the said agreement for sale contained in the alleged compromise is not legal.
16. I am not deciding this question in view of my finding that the compromise can not be enforced or accepted for want of signatures at proper time i.e. after it is written.
17. Accordingly writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order passed by the appellate court deciding appeals in terms of compromise is set-aside. Matter is remanded to the appellate court to decide the appeals on merit. During pendency of appeals eviction of the tenants shall remain stayed on the condition that with effect from June 2006 they pay rent / damages for use and occupation to the landlord at the rate of Rs. 3000/- per month. This amount shall be deposited before the appellate court by 7th of each succeeding month. This direction is being issued in view of judgment of Supreme Court reported in Atma Ram Properties v. Federal Motors .