JUDGMENT A.P. Sahi, J.
1. These writ petitions challenge the order of transfer, transferring the petitioners from their respective posts, from one Development Authority to another and since the issues involved in these 6 writ petitions are almost common with a slight distinction in 2 of them as would be explained hereinafter, these writ petitions are being heard and disposed of by this common judgment.
2. I have heard Sri U.N. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Chandan Sharma and Sri Neeraj Tiwari for the petitioners in 5 writ petitions and Sri Vikas Budhwar for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 45320 of 2005 and Sri Sudhir Agrawal, learned Addl. Advocate General on behalf of the State and Sri A.K. Mishra and Sri H.R. Misra respective counsel for the Development Authorities.
3. The impugned orders dated 15.5.2005 and 6.6.2005 are under challenge in Writ Petition No. 45481 of 2005, 45320 of 2005, 45310 of 2005 and 45304 of 2005. The petitioners in these 4 writ petitions are Junior Engineers, who were posted on the date of passing of the impugned order in Agra Development Authority, Allahabad Development Authority and Ghaziabad Development Authority. Sri D.K. Shukla has been transferred from Agra Development Authority to Kanpur Development Authority whereas Sri Deepak Anand has been transferred from Allahabad Development Authority to Lucknow Development Authority. Sri Pawan Kumar Verma and Sri P.K. Sharma have been transferred from Ghaziabad Development Authority to Saharanpur Development Authority as Junior Engineers. The orders impugned recite that the transfer orders have been issued in compliance and pursuant to the order of the Lucknow Bench of this Court dated 21.12.2004 passed in public interest litigation Writ Petition No. 2435 of 2001.
4. That other 2 writ petitions i.e. Writ Petition No. 45334 of 2005 and 45336 of 2005 have been filed by Sri R.P. Singh and Sri Hargovind Swarnker, who are Assistant Engineers challenging the order dated 6.6.2005 whereby Sri R.P. Singh has been transferred from Ghaziabad to Gorakhpur and Sri Hargovind Swarnker has been transferred from Allahabad to Kanpur in public interest. These two are Assistant Engineers and the order of transfer impugned by them does not refer to the decision of the Lucknow Bench as in the case of the other 4 writ petitions. This is the only distinction on facts between the case of the 4 petitioners at serial No. 1 to 4 and the petitioners in these 2 writ petitions. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that this entire transfer chain is on account of the order passed by the Lucknow Bench of this Court: and is not a transfer on account of any administrative exigency.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners have urged that the State Government could not have passed the transfer order as none of the petitioners were functioning at Lucknow and, as such, they could not have been transferred on the strength of the order dated 21.12.2004 which was even otherwise not binding on them as they were not parties to the writ petition at Lucknow. They have further urged, that the transfer could not have been effected even otherwise without framing a separate policy in the case of the petitioners, as admittedly the petitioners, who belong to centralized services of the Development Authorities through out the State form a different class. In this regard it has been urged that it has been the practice in the past that the State Government frames a separate guideline/policy for transfer of servants of the centralized services of the Development Authority. Since no such separate policy has been framed this year, the State Government cannot enforce the policy dated 12.5.2005, which is meant exclusively for government servants. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that even if the aforesaid policy dated 12.5.2005 is assumed to be applicable to the petitioner, the same has also not been adhered to and instead of resorting to transferring 10 % of the employees, approximately 70 % of the employees have been transferred. It has also been urged that in the case of Hargovind Swarnker (Writ Petition No. 45336 of 2005), he has been sent back to Kanpur where he had already worked for more than 6 years before and, as such, it contradicts the stand taken by the respondents. In the case of R.P. Singh and Hargovind Swarnker it has been urged that the transfer orders are not in consonance with the Lucknow Bench order as they have not completed 10 years of service and, therefore, they could not have been transferred. In essence the contention is that the High Court order dated 21.12.2004 has not been followed. One of the other contentions advanced is that the authorities have wrongly interpreted the orders of the Lucknow Bench and that of the Apex Court dated 7.2.2005 by incorrectly calculating the period of 10 years as meaning to be 10 years of cumulative total service at a particular place. It has been suggested that the calculation ought to have been 10 years at the present place of last posting and it was wrong on the part of the State Government to have included the earlier tenure of posting for calculating 10 years at the same place. Such a calculation by the respondent - State Government has no rational and the action is arbitrary. In essence the contention is that the period of 10 years should be taken to mean 10 years of the last place of posting at one continuous stretch.
6. The learned Addl. Advocate General in reply to the aforesaid contentions has urged that in the case of Junior Engineers, which includes the case of the first 4 petitions in this judgment, the order of transfer dated 15.5.2005 and 6.6.2005 respectively are not only in compliance of the order of the High Court (Lucknow Bench) dated 21.12.2004 but is a composite order also applying the new transfer policy dated 12.5.2005 formulated by the State Government for all the government servants. He has urged that the said transfer orders have been passed by considering the impact of the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004 and it has been implemented in its true letter and spirit and also the consequential action taken by the State Government under the new policy to adjust all employees by applying a uniform pattern. He has urged that while implementing the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004 it is but obvious and natural that other employees who were not covered by the order of the High Court also had to be adjusted as the transfer order could not be implemented unilaterally by posting the Engineers of the Lucknow Development Authority at some other place. It is a natural consequence of the implementation of the Lucknow Bench Order that the others have to be transferred to accommodate the transferees from Lucknow Development Authority.
7. Sri Agrawal has further submitted that neither the Lucknow Bench order nor the judgment of the Apex Court dated 7.2.2005 prohibited and prevented the State Government from implementing a uniform policy for the rest of the employees in the development authorities apart from the employees of the Lucknow Development Authority. His contention is that according to the own case of the petitioners, it has been the practice of the State Government in the past to separately implement a transfer policy in respect of the members of the centralized services of the development authorities. Inviting the attention of the Court to Section 5-A (6) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 and Rule 37 (2) of The U.P. Development Authorities Centralized Services Rules 1985, Sri Agrawal has submitted that the action of passing the transfer orders is well within the jurisdiction of the State Government and there is no violation of any Statute or Rule framed there under. It has been pointed out that the petitioners have failed to make out any case on the ground of mala fide as well, and in the absence of any such pleadings to substantiate the same, no ground has been made out for interference with the impugned orders. There is neither any discrimination nor any violation of the Courts order as urged on behalf of the petitioners and that the transfer order was passed in consonance with the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 7.2.2005 as also keeping in view the latest policy of the State Government pertaining to transfer dated 12.5.2005. The transfer policy has been uniformly applied to all development authorities and in case there is some slight variation and deviation in any individual case, the State Government shall endeavour to rectify it in case the same is pointed out by an aggrieved person. While advancing his submission, Sri Agrawal on behalf of the State Government has stated that the State Government had proceeded to pass the orders of transfer after having collected the entire material that was relevant for the purpose in order to implement the policy dated 12.5.2005 and to carry out the transfer orders keeping in view the orders passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. Without burdening the Court with a plethora of judgments on the subject matter, Sri Agrawal has cited the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Gobardhan Lal, decided on 23.3.2004, reported in AIR 2004 SC 2165, to contend that even if the transfer order had been made in violation of the administrative guidelines, they cannot be interfered with unless it can be shown and established, that the order is in violation of some statutory rule or is vitiated by mala fides. The aforesaid decision of the Apex Court had reversed the judgment of this Court reported in 2000 ALJ 1466, holding that transfer orders cannot be interfered with unless they are in violation of Rules or they are vitiated by mala fides and the High Court cannot take over the administration by framing guidelines in this regard. Sri Agrawal has also pointed out that this Court has been pleased to direct the consideration of the representation in a similar matter without interfering with the transferring order. He contends that the same is a final judgment and that this Court should also apply the same judgment and refuse to interfere with the impugned order.
8. Sri U.N. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel in rejoinder has submitted that after having examined the impact of the Lucknow Bench order dated 21.12.2004 and the order of the Apex Court dated 7.2.2005 different Benches of this Court as well as of the Lucknow Bench have passed interim orders staying the operation of the transfer orders in respect of employees who are similarly situate as the petitioners. In view of this, he contends that the State Government should consider the impact of the aforesaid interim orders and should extend the same benefit to the petitioners or else the action of the State Government can be very safely held to be discriminatory.
9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and noticed their respective submissions, the first question, which requires to be dealt with, is the impact of the order of the Lucknow Bench dated 21.12.2004 and the judgment of the Apex Court dated 7.2.2005. A perusal of the order dated 21.12.2004 would demonstrate that the said writ petition was a public interest litigation filed by certain residents of a locality in the city of Lucknow complaining of violation of building bye-laws and the master plan resulting in public inconvenience at large. While examining the aforesaid contentions of the petitioners therein, the Lucknow Bench taking note of an Affidavit filed by the Vice Chairman of the Lucknow Development Authority was of the opinion that the Engineers employed in the development authority who could be responsible for the pathetic situation being faced by the residents of the said locality ought to be transferred on the ground of improving administrative efficiency and eradicating mal-administration. Accordingly, the learned Judges in that case issued directions to the Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Board to prepare a list of Engineers of the Lucknow Development Authority and Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow, who have worked for more than 10 years at Lucknow and to transfer them out side Lucknow at the end of the academic Session and complete the said process by 15.5.2005. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to the then existing transfer policy in respect of the employees of the development authorities dated 2.6.2003. A perusal of the said policy dated 2.6.2003, which has been produced before the Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be an indicator for the period of 10 years, which has been referred to in the order of the High Court, dated 21.12.2004. The matter was taken up to the Apex Court by the Union of Diploma Engineers of the Development authority on the apprehension that such Engineers, who have put in less than 10 years of service, are also likely to be transferred. The Special Leave petition was filed against the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004 as is evident from a copy of the Special Leave Petition, which was also produced before me. The Apex Court after having examined the facts of the case, clarified that the order of the High Court would be implemented in respect of those engineers who have "served" the authority for 10 years. Thus, what can be gathered from the aforesaid facts is that the order of transfer was in respect of such engineers who had been successful in some how the other staying back at Lucknow for more than 10 years on one pretext or the other which had given rise to suspicion against them for having colluded with defaulting builders and such unscrupulous elements who had violated the development plans of the Lucknow Development Authority. It was in order to eradicate the aforesaid stated inefficiency that the High Court issued the orders in respect of the Lucknow Development Authority and the Awas and Vikas Parishad, Lucknow. A perusal of the directions of the Lucknow Bench indicates that the said direction was not for the other development authorities of the State. The out come of the aforesaid position is that the State Government was at liberty to transfer all such employees who were not covered by the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004. The order of the High Court does not prohibit or prevent the transfer of employees of other development authorities apart from the Lucknow Development Authority who have put in less than 10 years of service. In effect, the order was confined to the Engineers posted at the Lucknow Development Authority and it was not a general mandamus. Even the order of the Apex Court does not indicate the implementation of the order of the High Court in respect of employees of other development authorities. The contention, therefore, on behalf of the petitioners has to be judged in the light of the aforesaid fact but at the same time it has to be remembered that implementation of the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004 would also bring about necessary changes in other development authorities and in such an eventuality Engineers of the other development authorities, who have put in less than 10 years of service, could also be transferred as it would not be possible to find Engineers in every development authority of the same equal number as are being transferred from Lucknow and who have put in more than 10 years of service. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, there would be certain adjustments, which have to be made in order to carry out the mandate of the High Court.
10. There is one more fact, which has to be taken note of, and which has been stated across the Bar on the basis of the instructions received by the learned Addl. Advocate General from respective development authorities. Sri Deepak Anand (petitioner in Writ Petition No. 45320 of 2005) has approximately put in 21 and a half years of service cumulatively at Allahabad Development Authority. Similarly Sri P.K. Sharma and Sri Pawan Kumar Verma (petitioners herein) have approximately put in 17 years and 13 years of cumulative, service at Ghaziabad. Sri Hargovind Swarnker has put in approximately 9 years of service at Allahabad and has been sent back to Kanpur where according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, he had already served for more than 6 years. Similarly Sri R.P. Singh had approximately put in 8 to 9 years service at Ghaziabad. A perusal of the aforesaid facts, if to be believed, would leave no room for doubt that all the petitioners aforesaid have put in fairly long years of service at the same place, if not at one stretch, at least cumulatively.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner insisted that the period of 10 years service should be considered to be continuous service at the place of last posting. In case such an interpretation is not given than the learned counsel for the petitioner urges the same would result in an incoherent interpretation inasmuch as persons would be sent back to places where they have completed the requisite number of years and this would be contrary to the submissions advanced on behalf of the State Government.
12. The Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. S.S. Kourav, AIR 1995 SC 1056, has held that expediency of a transfer cannot be subjected to judicial review merely on the ground that the transferee had already worked in the past at the place where he was again being transferred to. The State Government has applied the policy of counting the cumulative period of an employee being stationed at a particular development authority and, as such, such a policy cannot be held to be arbitrary or discriminatory. Applying the aforesaid principles, it cannot be said that the State Government has in any way violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The counting of the cumulative period is a method in order to implement the transfer policy and it cannot be labelled as irrational. The argument of the learned counsel for the petition on this score, therefore, is unacceptable.
13. Even the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004 and the judgment of the Apex Court have used the word "served" in connection with computing the period of 10 years. The aforesaid Orders have not drawn any such distinction so as to mean that 10 years of continuous service at a stretch at the last place of posting. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to interpret the aforesaid judgment otherwise cannot be countenanced.
14. The suggestion that on account of the re-transfer, as in the case of Hargovind Swarnker would bring about and in consistency in the implementation of the policy has to be rejected as such orders at times have to be implemented in administrative exigency. However, to remove the doubt in the mind of the petitioners Sri Sudhir Agrawal has offered that in case Sri Hargovind Swarnker does not wish to join at Kanpur, where he has already served earlier for more than 6 years, he can be sent to any other development authority provided he moves a representation in this regard. No other such cases could be pointed out so as to gather an impression that by following such a policy an element of discrimination or arbitrariness would be attracted.
15. Coming to the other limb of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned orders dated 15.5.2005 and 6.6.2005 have been passed only on account of the order of the Lucknow Bench and not otherwise, cannot be accepted for simple reason that while implementing the order of the Court, the State Government also chose to implement the general policy of transfer dated 12.5.2005 and which was also necessary as transfers had to be effected at different development authorities to accommodate the Engineers transferred from the Lucknow Development Authority. While doing so there was no prohibition on the State government to have adopted a general transfer policy. The policy dated 12.5.2005 is for all government servants. At this juncture, the relevant statutory provisions have to be examined to test the argument of the petitioners as to whether the policy dated 12.5.2005 could be implemented with regard to members of the centralized services of the development authorities as well.
16. To put the matter in short, Sub-section (6) of Section 5-A of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act 1973 is quoted herein below:
"(6) It shall be lawful for the State Government or any officer authorized by it in this behalf, to transfer any person holding any post in a Development Authorities Centralized Service from one Development Authority to another."
17. This is supplemented by Rule 37 (2) and (3) of the U.P. Development Authorities Centralized Service Rules 1985 quoted herein below:
"37. (2) In regard to the matters not covered by these rules or by special orders, the members of service shall be governed by the rules, regulations and orders applicable generally to U.P. Government Servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State.
(3) Matters not covered by Sub-rules (1) and (2) above shall be governed by such orders as the Government may deem proper to issue."
18. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions leaves no room for doubt, that the State Government has the power to transfer the members of the centralized service and for such purpose has the power to apply such government orders applicable to government servants, for which no provision has been made under the Urban Planning and Development Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, is absolutely unfounded and the submissions advanced by the learned Addl. Advocate General apply with full force in this context. The Government Order dated 12.5.2005, which is in respect of government servants, can be applied in the case of petitioners as well even if there is no separate Government Order for them in view of the clear provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 37 quoted herein above.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioners have failed to point out any violation of statutory rule or regulation and on the contrary it is established that the Rules clearly authorize the State Government to transfer the petitioners who are admittedly the members of the centralized services of the development authorities.
20. Coming to the argument on behalf of the petitioners that almost 70 % of the employees have been transferred and, as such, the same does not conform to the guidelines of the State Government, which visualize only 10 % transfer, what can be gathered is that the State Government in order to streamline the services in the development authorities and in order to remove any possible future doubt or suspicion with regard to mal functioning of Officers, has proceeded to adopt a uniform policy which does not discriminate between the officers of the same class. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, reported in JT 1993 (3) SC 678, has held that such guidelines are instructions issued by the Government and cannot be said to have statutory force so as to give rise to a cause of action for an employee and challenge the same in a court of law. It has been time and again held that a transfer order can only be interfered with provided it has been passed in violation of Statutory provisions or is otherwise vitiated by mala fides. Whether a person should be transferred or not is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide and not for the courts to administer. The Apex Court has gone to the extent of describing such an interference, other than the grounds referred to herein above, to be a case of judicial impropriety as stated in the case of A.K. Ray v. State of Orrisa, 1995 (suppl.) (4) SCC 169. In the case of State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Saxena, AIR 1998 SC 925, the Supreme Court went on to hold that a previous order of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not amount to restricting the power of the Government to subsequently withdraw alter or modify a transfer order inasmuch as the High Court had not and cannot take over the administration of the State. Applying the aforesaid principles, in the instant case, the previous orders issued with regard to transfer policy of 10 years, it cannot be said that the State Government had been prohibited for all times in future, not to frame and implement a fresh policy as has been done in the present case by introducing and implementing the policy dated 12.5.2005.
21. The aforesaid conclusions, further find support from the decision, relied upon by the learned Addl. Advocate General in the case of State of U.P. v. Gobardhan Lal, AIR 2000 SC 2165 (paras 8, 9 and 10). Thus, even if the guidelines have been deviated from or not implemented in its exactitude and has been modulated to meet an exigency, the same cannot be subject to judicial review in the light of the decisions referred to herein above. The letter dated 14.6.2005 communicated to the learned Addl. Advocate General Sri Sudhir Agrawal has been placed before the Court sent by the Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, has been placed before the Court to demonstrate that the State Government has proceeded to implement a policy uniformly and in accordance with Rules keeping in view the orders passed by the High Court on 21.12.2004 and the Apex Court on 7.2.2005. The learned Addl. Advocate General has further submitted that the transfer orders do not intend in any way to whittle the effect of any order of the Court and due care has been taken of for abiding by such orders.
22. Replying to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that several interim orders have been granted, copies whereof have been appended along with a supplementary- affidavit in Writ Petition No. 45334 of 2005 the learned Addl. Advocate General has stated, that the said orders were passed as an interim measure whereas the present matter is being heard extensively and that interim orders cannot be binding as a precedent. In this regard, it would be suffice to say that the contentions which have been advanced in these petitions do not appear to have been considered and deliberated upon in the writ petitions wherein the interim orders have been passed either by this Court at Allahabad or at the Lucknow Bench. The order in the case of Awadhesh Kumar Agrawal and that of Amrit Pal Singh and Rohit Khanna in respect of writ petitions at the Lucknow Bench have proceeded on the applicability of the policy of 10 years. The order does not indicate consideration of the new policy dated 12.5.2005 as also the relevant statutory provisions and the impact thereof coupled with the law laid down by the Apex Court as referred to herein above. In view of this, the aforesaid orders do not lend any support to the petitioners. So far as the interim order dated 26.5.2005 in the case of Virendra Kumar Sharma (Writ Petition No. 42101 of 2005) is concerned that interim order was passed only on the basis of the averments made by the petitioners as referred to in the order itself. At this juncture, it is relevant to point out that the impugned order of transfer dated 6.6.2005 in Writ Petition No. 45334 of 2005 and 45336 of 2005 do not refer to the order of the Lucknow Bench and the orders clearly state that they have been passed in public interest. What is to be noted is that in the case of other 4 writ petitions which are being decided by this judgment, the order of transfer were passed on 15.5.2005 and 6.6.2005 respectively after the transfer policy dated 12.5.2005 had been promulgated by the State Government. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri U.N. Sharma relying on the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 851, has urged that the impugned order in the first 4 writ petitions cannot be treated to be orders other than for the reasons contained therein in respect of the petitioners inasmuch as it only recites that it has been issued in pursuance of the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004. Learned Addl. Advocate General has urged, and rightly so, that while implementing the order of the High Court dated 21.12.2004 other transfers had to be made which were done. In accordance with the policy dated 12.5.2005 as adjustments had to be carried out in the regard. Moreover, the said transfers are the routine chain of transfers and which was not prohibited either by the orders of the Lucknow Bench or restricted in any way in respect of the other development authorities by the Apex Court in its order dated 7.2.2005.
23. Coming to the question of the right of the petitioners to challenge an order of transfer it is by now well settled that an employee does not have any such vested right. Reference may be had to the case of Rajendra Rai v. Union of India, JT 1992 (6) SC 732 and Union of India v. N.P. Tomas, JT 1992 (suppl.) SC 220. The Apex Court has further indicated that unless and until there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal, the High Court should not interfere as stated in Union of India v. H.N. Kirtania, JT 1989 (3) 131. Not only this, the Apex Court in the case of Gujrat Electricity Board v. Atma Ram, JT 1989 (3) SC 20, has gone to the extent of saying that a public servant must carry out the order of transfer or else non-compliance thereof can expose him to disciplinary action.
24. Another interim order was brought to my notice after orders had been reserved by me which was delivered in the case of Ramesh Kumar Jaiswal v. State of U.P. and Ors. by the Lucknow Bench along with other connected petitions. The said interim order indicates that another learned single Judge has refused to interfere with the transfer order in writ petition No. 2952 (S/S) of 2005. The learned Judges have proceeded to pass the interim order by stating to the following effect:-
"Since we are dealing with the interim applications of the petitioners for stay of their transfer orders, we cannot attach a finality to our orders nor a decisive finding can be recorded at this juncture but certainly we can draw a balanced principle to deal with the situation having arisen out of this Court's verdict of December 21, 2004 and the consequential transfers."
25. The aforesaid order has proceeded on the assumption that there is no policy framed by the State Government for the development authorities. I have already discussed hereinabove that the State Government has adopted a new policy and the impugned orders of transfer have been passed thereafter. I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the reasoning in the said interim order with regard to calculation of 10 years of service in respect whereof I have already recorded findings herein above. Even otherwise, the question of period of 10 years in respect of the petitioners or such other employees of development authorities other than the Lucknow Development Authority does not arise at all as there was no such direction either by the Lucknow Bench or by the Apex Court as has already been discussed herein above. There was no challenge to the new policy dated 12.5.2005 and which does not even find reference in the interim order dated 17.6.2005.
26. Another relevant aspect which requires to be considered is the observation made in the interim order dated 17.6.2005 to the effect that the order dated 21.12.2004 was a judgment in rem. From a perusal of the aforesaid order dated 21.12.2004 and the judgment dated 7.2.2005, I find it difficult to accept the same to be a judgment in rem. A judgment in rem as understood by our courts is a judgment which conforms to the provisions of Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reference may be had to AIR 1983 SC 684 (paras 122 to 142). The issue before the Lucknow Bench was only with regard to such engineers who were posted at Lucknow and whose further continuance beyond 10 years was detrimental to the interest of the Lucknow Development Authority. The issue was, thus, confined only to Lucknow and not with regard to other development authorities. Nevertheless, the aforesaid interim order has not yet finally adjudicated any issue and has issued Interim directions and, therefore, are not binding while determining the case of the petitioners before this Court.
27. Thus, on a conspectus of the facts of this case and the statutory provisions applicable together with the law on the subject, it is evident that the impugned orders of transfer cannot be faulted with on any ground. Consequently, in none of the writ petitions, the impugned orders call for any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
28. However, the State Government is directed to apply the policy uniformly and not to favour any person individually so as to give rise to a cause of action, which may be described, to have resulted from an arbitrary or a mala fide action. The learned Addl. Advocate General has assured the Court that in case any individual case of undue favour or cases wherein the Rules have been violated are pointed out, the same shall be rectified without any hesitation. In respect of individual cases arising out of a serious nature of hardship, the State Government may re-consider a transfer order in the light of the guidelines and policy framed by it.
29. With the aforesaid observations, all the writ petitions are dismissed without any orders as to costs.