JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. These Special Appeals have been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8.12.2004 staying the operation of the order dated 30th October, 2004 passed by the District Judge, Baghpat, by which the services of the respondent-employees stood terminated.
2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these Appeals are that the said respondent-employees had been appointed as Stenographers vide order dated 29th May, 2003 along with four others, with a clear stipulation in their appointment letters that it was purely an ad hoc and temporary appointment, liable to be terminated at any time without notice. The said respondent-employees joined the services in pursuance of the said appointment letters. However, as the work of the employees was not found satisfactory, vide letter dated 17th March, 2003 (Annex. 2) the District Judge asked them to learn/improve and the Senior Administrative Officer was directed to test them periodically and submit the progress report. The employees however did not show any improvement whatsoever and did not learn the shorthand and typing even though extension of time was granted time and again. Several progress reports, i.e. reports dated 17.8.2004, 14.9.2004 and 26.10.2004, (Annexures 3, 4 and 5) were submitted to the District Judge to show that they were not making any improvement and did not know the shorthand at all. The matter was reported, to the High Court on the Administrative Side and the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice vide order dated 20.9.2004 directed the matter to be placed before the Hon'ble Administrative Judge of that District for passing appropriate orders. The Administrative Judge, after considering the entire case, directed the District Judge to take appropriate action as he may deem fit, and in pursuance thereof, the services of the respondent-employees stood terminated vide order dated 30.10.2004 (Annex. 8). Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, the said employees filed Writ Petition Nos. 51562 and 52224 of 2004, wherein the learned Single Judge stayed the operation of the order dated 30.10.2004. Hence, these Special Appeals.
3. Sri Sudhir Agarwal, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Shri Amit Sthalker, Advocate, appearing for the appellant has submitted that the services of the said employees had been terminated in terms of their appointment letters as they had been appointed on ad hoc basis with the clear stipulation that their services were liable to be terminated any time without notice. There was no occasion for the learned Single Judge to stay the operation of the order dated 30th October, 2004, Moreso, the relief granted by the learned Single Judge amounted to final relief which could not have been granted at the interim stage.
4. On the other hand, Shri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent-employees submitted that the services of the employees had been terminated without any enquiry or giving a show cause notice. They had been awarded good entries and overlooking the same, their services stood terminated, and therefore, the order dated 30.10.2004 is mala fide; the learned Single Judge has rightly stayed the operation of the said orders and there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the said order.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The Hon'ble Apex Court has consistently held that the Court should not pass an interim order which amounts to a final relief. Whether the petitioner is entitled for any relief has to be adjudicated upon at the time of final disposal of the writ petition. The Court should not pass an interim order without considering the issues of public interest, balance of convenience, as to whether prima facie case is made out; as to whether the party concerned could be compensated in terms of money etc., and other relevant considerations. [Vide Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 330; State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties and Anr., AIR 1985 SC 1289; A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1986 SC 1490; State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Mohd. Yakoob Khan and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 167; U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee and Ors. v. Dr. B. Shitat Nandwani, AIR 1992 SC 671; Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal and Anr., AIR 1993 SC 2412; St. John's Teachers Training Institute (for Women) and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., (1993) 3 SCC 595; Dr. B.S. Kshirsagar v. Abdul Khalik Mohd. Musa, 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 593; Bank of Maharashtra v. Race Shipping and Transport Co. (P) Ltd., AIR 1995 SC 1368; Commissioner/Secretary, Government of Health and Medical Education Department v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 214; Shiv Shankar and Ors. v. Board of Directors, U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors., 1995 Supp (2) SCC 726 ; Union of India v. Shree Ganesh Steel Rolling Mills Ltd., (1996) 8 SCC 347; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Vyavsaya and Co., AIR 1997 SC 993; Central Board of Secondary Education v. P. Sunil Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 377; and Stale of U.P. and Ors. v. Ram Sukhi Devi, 2004 AIR SCW 6955].
7. The logic behind this remains that ill-conceived sympathy masquerades as interlocutory justice exposing the judicial discretion to the criticism of private benevolence and the Court should not be guided by misplaced sympathy, but should rather pass interim orders making accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. The Court should not embarrass the authorities under the Statute by taking over the functions to be performed by them.
8. In Union of India v. Era Educational Trust, AIR 2000 SC 1573, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering its large number of judgments held that while passing interim order in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, principles laid down for granting interim relief under Order XXXIX of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should be kept in mind. It can neither be issued as a matter of right nor it should be in the form which can be granted only as final relief.
9. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that ex-parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh for grant of injunction are--(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex-parte injunction would involve greater injustice than grant of it would involve; (c) even if ex-parte injunction should be granted, it should only be for limited period of time; and (d) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the Court.
10. In Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 1499, the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of grant, of interim relief which amounts to final relief, observing that High Court should exercise its discretion, while granting interim relief, reasonably and judiciously and, if loss can be repairable or the loss can be satisfied by giving back wages etc., no interim order should be granted. Hon'ble Apex Court further observed as under :
"It should be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the damage cannot be repaired, for the reason that if no relief for continuance in service is granted and ultimately his claim....is found to be acceptable, the damage can be repaired by granting him all those monetary benefits which he would have received and he continued in service. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in such cases it would be imprudent to grant interim relief."
11. Similar view has been reiterated in Council for Indian School Certificate Examination v. Isha Mittal and Anr., (2000) 7 SCC 521.
12. In State of U.P. and Ors. v. Modern Transport Company, Ludhiana and Anr., (2002) 9 SCC 574, the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of granting interim relief wherein the party could be compensated at the time of disposal of the writ petition. The Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under :
"It is unfortunate that the High Court has given no reason whatsoever in support of its order. It is expected that when interim orders are passed which, in effect, results in the writ petition itself being allowed, the High Court must give reasons in support thereof."
13. In Union of India and Ors. v. Modiluft Ltd., AIR 2003 SC 2218, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while making the similar observations held that an interim order passed in equity must be one which is equitable to all the parties concerned and it must meet ingredients of Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
14. Similar view has been reiterated in Regional Officer, CBSE v. Ku. Sheena Peethambaran and Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 719.
15. Similarly, in State of Haryana v. Suman Dutta, (2000) 10 SCC 311, the Hon'ble Apex Court deprecated the practice passing interim orders amounting to final order observing as under :
".....the High Court erred in law in staying the order of termination on interim measure in the pending writ petition. By such interim order if an employee is allowed to continue in service and then ultimately the writ petition is dismissed then it would be tantamount to usurpation of public office without any right to the same."
16. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decisions, no interim relief, which amounts to a final relief, should be granted at the initial stage. In the instant case, relief could have been granted to the said employee at the final stage if the Court was satisfied that the termination order could not have been passed and all the consequential benefits could then have been granted to him. There was no occasion for the Court to pass an interim order of such a nature, since it cannot be contended that the order passed by the authority concerned was without jurisdiction; or the respondent-employees could not be compensated in terms of money and other benefits after final adjudication. Thus, the orders impugned are liable to be set aside.
17. Admittedly, an employee appointed on temporary basis, is not governed by any service Rules and he is bound by the terms and conditions incorporated in the appointment letter. It is a settled legal proposition that a person, who has been appointed on ad hoc basis with the conditions stipulated in his appointment letter that his services can be terminated at any time without notice, does not have a right to claim any relief, if his services are terminated in terms thereof.
18. In State of U.P. and Ors. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691, the Apex Court has categorically held as under :
"Under the service jurisprudence a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service."
19. In a case like the instant, the Court has to be satisfied about the legally justiciable right of the employee which has been infringed, for which he could resort to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36, has held that "A person can be said to acquire a lien on a post only when he has been confirmed and made permanent on that post and not earlier" and further held that "a Government servant holding a post temporarily does not have any right to hold the said post."
20. A temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary servants. Similarly, in R.K. Misra v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation, AIR 1987 SC 2408; Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 496; Commissioner of Food and Civil Supplies v. Prakash Chandra Saxena, (1994) 5 SCC 177; Ram Chandra Tripathi v. U.P. Public Services Tribunal and Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 180; Madhya Pradesh Hast Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 638; and Kaushal Kishore Shukla (supra), the Apex Court has categorically held that incumbent to a post who has been given appointment on temporary basis, terminable without notice, has no right to hold the post and he is not entitled for any opportunity of hearing before his services are dispensed with as his termination does not amount to forfeiture of any legal right.
21. In Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1558, the Hon'ble Apex Court that in such cases even principles of natural justice do not require to be observed. The Court placed reliance on the observations made in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation, 1971 (2) All E.R. 1278, wherein it has been observed as under :
"A breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice or an essential administrative fault cannot give him a remedy in the Courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain."
22. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461, the Apex Court explained the difference of a permanent employee and an employee holding the post on probation and held that the services of a probationer cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause. "This is based on the principle that a substantive appointment to a permanent post in a public service confers substantive right to the post and the person appointed on that post becomes entitled to have lien on that post." However, interpreting/enforcing the terms of appointment, which provided for discharge of the said probationer from service at any time during the period of probation or extended period of probation, without any notice or without assigning any reason, the Court held that as his termination was in consonance with the terms and conditions of his appointment letter, he cannot be heard raising the said grievance.
23. In State of Punjab and Ors. v. Surindra Kumar and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 1593, the Apex Court has held that the Court must seek the adherence to the said terms and conditions of the appointment and there is no reason why terms and conditions incorporated in the appointment letter cannot be enforced in a contract of service.
24. In Hindustan Education Society and Anr. v. Sk. Kaleem Sk. Gulam Nabi and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2126, the Apex Court has held that where the rules specifically provide for permanent appointment on probation for a specific period and an employee is appointed without stipulating any condition regarding probation, the inference is to be drawn that he was not appointed in substantive capacity. In Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti and Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 534, the Apex Court has held that a society can terminate the services not only of a temporary employee but also of a permanent employee by giving him one month's notice or three months' pay and allowances in lieu thereof if the terms of appointment and rules so permit and such termination may be valid in a given case even if the principles of natural justice have not been complied with.
25. In Chandradeo Gautam v. State of U.P. and Ors., JT 2000 (10) SC 199, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the termination of services of temporary employee does not require interference on being removed on any ground as it does not cast any stigma or aspersion on him. In Nazira Begum Lashkar and Ors. v. State of Assam, AIR 2001 SC 102, the Apex Court held that where appointment neither confers any right nor any equity in favour of the employee, as the appointment was purely temporary and could be terminated without notice, no grievance can be entertained by such employee. Moreso, he cannot claim any equitable relief from any Court.
26. Similar view has been reiterated in Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 1145; K.S.P. College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 677; Punjab State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Baldev Singh, (1998) 5 SCC 450; A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. P.V. Swaminathan, (2001) 10 SCC 83; Union of India v. A.P. Bajpai, AIR 2003 SC 923; Dhananjay v. Chief Executive Officer Zila Parishad. AIR 2003 SC 1175 and Dr. Chanchal Goyal (Mrs.) v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485. Even if an employee continued for a long time, that does not crystallize into any enforceable right nor such an employee can claim any lien over the said post unless he stands regularised. [Vide Dr. A.K Jain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (1987) Supp. SCC 497; Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission and Ors. v. Dr. Narinder Mohan and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1808; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Dr. Deep Narain Tripathi and Ors., (1996) 8 SCC 454; and Union of India and Ors. v. Harish Balkrishna Mahajan, (1997) 3 SCC 194].
27. A temporary or ad hoc appointment does not confer any legal right. Such an appointee cannot claim equity in his favour, nor the equitable relief can be granted to him by the Court even if he had worked for an unusual long period, on humanitarian considerations. A person holding a temporary/ad hoc post is not a member of service in accordance with the statutory Rules and, therefore, cannot have any vested right in the post. [Vide Nazira Begum Lashkar (supra) and P.D. Agarwal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1676]. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in cases where the person was holding the tenure post by observing that by efflux of time appointment comes to an end automatically on the expiry of the tenure of appointment, and such appointee cannot claim any relief either on the basis of equity, or humanitarian considerations, or in law. (Vide Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070; State of U.P. v. Dr. S.K. Sinha, AIR 1995 SC 768]. The only relief/protection an ad hoc appointee can claim in law is that he should not be replaced by another ad hoc employee, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dr. A.K Jain v. Union of India and Ors., 1987 Supp SCC 497; Rajbinder v. State of Punjab and Ors., 1998 Supp SCC 428; and State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, AIR 1992 SC 2130].
28. Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised that an ad hoc appointment means a stop-gap arrangement. The appointment is defeasible, and thus, incapable of creating any legal right in favour of the appointee for the reason that such an appointment is made in public interest considering the administrative necessity, temporarily, or to meet a temporary necessity for a specific purpose. An ad hoc appointee cannot have any grievance whatsoever as he is not deprived of any right or vested interest in the post. He cannot claim to be a member of the service in accordance with the rules. The only protection law gives to an ad hoc appointee is not to be replaced by another ad hoc appointee. Thus, he has to make room for a regular appointee whenever he comes to join.
29. In the instant case, the respondent-employees were bound by the terms and conditions incorporated in their appointment letters. They could be removed any time without notice. Therefore, they could have no grievance against the order of termination dated 30.10.2004.
30. However, considering the gravity of the fact-situation, which we lace everyday in the High Court also since there are large number of Stenographers/Typists who are not capable of taking down the dictation in shorthand and cannot type the same correctly, and in order to do substantial justice and examine the serious charges levelled by the appellants that the respondent-employees and other employees were not knowing shorthand and typing and their appointments itself were fraud upon the statutory power of the District Judge, on 16.12.2004, we requested Shri Ashok Khare to be the sole Judge of his clients and asked him to test the said employees and make a statement as to whether his clients were fit to be retained in service. Instead of taking this responsibility, Shri Khare raised a grievance that some of the Stenographers appointed along with the respondent-employees who had been below them in the merit list have been illegally retained. In view of these submissions, we suggested that Shri Khare may satisfy himself regarding their performance also and all such employees would appear before him, who would take their test of shorthand and typing and then make a statement as to who was fit to be retained and who should go out. However, Shri Khare suggested that instead of appointing him as the sole Judge of his clients, it would be more appropriate to assign the work to the Registrar General of this Court.
31. Accordingly, vide order dated 16.12.2004, we directed the Registrar General of this Court to conduct the shorthand and typing tests of all the six persons appointed in the District Judgeship of Baghpat to assess their competence in taking down the dictation in shorthand and typing.
32. In pursuance of the said order, they appeared on 7th January, 2005 before the learned Registrar General and the tests were conducted. However, all the said employees also approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petitions against the order dated 16.12.2004, i.e. Ratnesh Kumar Srivastava v. District and Sessions Judge and Anr. [Special Leave Petition (C) No. 196 of 2005], Dinesh Kumar v. District and Sessions Judge and Anr. [Special Leave Petition (C) No. 212 of 2005] Shailesh Singh and Ors. v. District and Sessions Judge and Ors. [SLP (C)....CC 242-243 of 2005] and Dhirendra Kumar Jaiswal v. District and Sessions. Judge and Anr. [SLP (C)....CC 249-250 of 2005].
33. Rule 5 (c) of the Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 provides that no person who is not already on the staff attached to a Subordinate Civil Court shall be appointed to a post in the ministerial establishment unless he possesses in the case of a candidate for the post of Stenographer a diploma or certificate from a University or a recognised shorthand and typewriting institution, showing that he possesses a speed of at least 100 words per minute in shorthand and 35 words per minute in typewriting. It is, thus, clear that for appointment to a post of Stenographer, the candidate must possess a speed of at least 100 words per minute in shorthand and 35 words per minute in typewriting along with the qualification, referred to herein above.
34. The copies of dictations taken in shorthand and the typed papers as well as the report were produced before us on 10.1.2005. The relevant part of the report reads as under :
"The transcribed material may indicate that :
(1) Sri Amit Kumar Pandey appears to have committed 93 mistakes and if a concession of 20 mistakes is granted, total mistakes committed by Sri Amit would be 73.
(2) Sri Shailesh Singh appears to have committed 136 mistakes and if a concession of 20 mistakes is granted total mistakes committed by Sri Shailesh would be 116.
(3) Sri Hiteshwar Chand appears to have committed 151 mistakes and if a concession of 20 mistakes is granted, total mistakes committed by Sri Hiteshwar Chand would be 131.
(4) Sri Ratnesh Srivastava appears to have committed 309 mistakes and if a concession of 20 mistakes is granted total mistakes committed by Sri Ratnesh Srivastava would be 289.
(5) Sri Dhirendra Kumar Jaiswal appears to have committed 323 mistakes and if a concession of 20 mistakes is granted, total mistakes committed by Sri Dhirendra Jaiswal would come out to be 303.
(6) Sri Dinesh Kumar who has taken down the dictation in long hand, appears to have committed 322 mistakes and if a concession of 20 mistakes is granted, total mistakes committed by Sri Dinesh would 302."
35. The report as well as the original copies indicate that Shri Dinesh Kumar could not take the dictation in shorthand at all rather he has taken the dictation in long hand. Out of 400 words, Sri Dinesh committed 322 mistakes (words have either wrongly been typed or left untyped by him). Similarly, Shri Dhirendra Jaiswal committed 323 mistakes, while Shri Ratnesh Srivastava committed 309 mistakes. Even in respect of others, the situation is far from satisfactory. Further, none of the writ petitioners claims that he possesses a diploma certificate from a University or a recognised shorthand and typewriting institution as mandatorily required by the Rules in this regard.
36. Shri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the petition raises very serious question regarding the competence of the Administrative Judge to issue instructions to the learned District Judge i.e. the Appointing Authority to terminate the services of the respondent-employee as the District Judge, once appointed them after holding the test, there was no occasion for this Court to doubt the correctness of the selection process keeping in view the status of the District Judge, as such a high official cannot be presumed to have acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the institution; presumption that act has been done in a regular manner cannot be ignored. Moreso, this Court sitting in judicial side may also not have the power to pass the order directing them to appear in a test afresh.
37. Shri Sudhir Agarwal, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants has vehemently opposed the submissions made by Shri Khare contending that such test was conducted by the Joint Registrar duly authorised by the Registrar General. Performance of the employees had been far from satisfactory, rather shameful as the employees at Sl. Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of the report could not type correctly and out of 400 words, they, after a grace of 20 mistakes, committed mistakes not less than 289. 303 and 302. Appointment of the employees is nothing less than fraudulent, which cannot be permitted to perpetuate or bear fruits. Presumption of fact that they were appointed on merit stands proved to the contrary. This Court is fully competent to pass order in judicial as well in administrative side which have been passed herein.
38. The submission made by Shri Khare that the District Judge, i.e. the Appointing Authority holds a very high office and the decision taken by him while making appointment should not be doubted, may have some relevance but the law in this regard has been that when a man of high status and unquestionable impartiality takes a decision, the Court should be slow to interfere with his opinion but the fact remains "that the power so entrusted with a high ranking authority or body is not always a safe or sound evidence against misuse". [Vide Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101 and National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences v. Dr. K. Kalyan Raman and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 1806].
39. Even otherwise, Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act provides for a presumption that every action of Statutory Authority is carried out in accordance with the law. The expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" are defined in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act"). The presumptions falling under the former category are compendiously known as "factual presumptions" or "discretionary presumptions" and those falling under the latter as "legal presumptions" or "compulsory presumptions". Unless the presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted the Court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof. However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet; another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. [Vide Union of India v. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882; Gopal Narain v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 370; Maharaja Pratap Bahadur Singh v. Thakur Man Mohan Dey and Ors., AIR 1966 SC 1931; Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 856; Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., AIR 1968 SC 870; State of Punjab v. Satyal Pal Dang and Ors., AIR 1969 SC 903; Sone Lal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1142; R.S. Nayak v. A.P. Antulay and Anr., AIR 1986 SC 2045; Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337; Municipal Board, Saharanpur v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 264; K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 510; Kiran Gupta v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 719; Superintendent, Narcotics Control Bureau v. R. Paulsamy, (2000) 9 SCC 549; State Government of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil and Anr., (2001) 1 SCC 652; Updesh Kumar and Ors. v. Prithvi Singh and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 703; S. Venkatappa v. Narayanappa and Ors., (2001) 4 SCC 705; Karewwa and Ors. v. Hussensab Khansaheb Wajantri and Ors., AIR 2002 SC 504; T. Shan/car Prasad v. State of A.P., (2004) 3 SCC 753 and Engineering Kamgar Union v. Electro Steels Castings Ltd. and Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 36].
40. In Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 183, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the presumption provided in Illustration (3) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act is based on well-known maxim of law "omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta" (i.e. all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done). The Court further held that this presumption is, however, one of the fact. It is an optional presumption and can be displaced by the circumstances, indicating that the power lodged in an authority or official has not been exercised in accordance with law.
41. Undoubtedly, person other than the Appointing Authority should not pass an order nor a Higher Authority can direct the Appointing Authority to pass the order or perform any function in a particular manner. The powers are to be exercised only by the authority upon whom the Statute has conferred the power. Orders have to be passed by the Competent Authority and by no one else taking the personal judgment in individual case unless the instructions issued by a superior authority are binding upon such a person as per the Statutory Rules. The Superior Authority are not supposed to mortgage their own discretion, volition or decision to the decision making authority. [Vide Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P., Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110; State of U.P. and Ors. v. Ram Naresh Lal, AIR 1970 SC 1263; Purtabpur Company Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 1896; Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 597; Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 322; Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr., AIR 1986 SC 1571; Karan Singhji Jadeja and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., JT 1995 (6) SC 146 and Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 260].
42. Article 235 of the Constitution of India provides for power of the High Court to exercise complete administrative control over the Subordinate Courts. This control, undoubtedly, extends to all functionaries attached to the Subordinate Civil Courts including the ministerial staff and servants in the establishment of the Subordinate Civil Courts. The view stands fortified by the judgments of various High Courts including Mohd. Ghouse v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 AP 497;
and Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, AIR 1961 Cal 1.
43. In State of West Bengal and Anr. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447, the Apex Court held that in view of the provisions of Article 235 of the Constitution, the administrative control of the High Courts is not limited only to the Judicial Officers but also to the functionaries of that Court and in a matter pertaining thereto. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court and Anr., AIR 1974 SC 710.
44. Full Benches of the Punjab High Court in Amar Singh v. Chief Justice, Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh, AIR 1976 P&H 215; and Gujarat High Court in R.M. Gajjar v. State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1978 Guj 102, after considering the entire legislative history of Article 235 of the Constitution and all earlier judgments on the point, came to the conclusion that if the administrative control cannot be exercised over the administrative and ministerial staff, the purpose of superintendence provided therein would stand frustrated and such an interpretation would be wholly destructive to the harmonious, efficient and effective working of the Subordinate Courts, if the High Court would denude of powers of control over the other administrative functionaries and ministerial staff of the District Court and Subordinate Courts other than Judicial Officers. The Courts are institutions or organism where all the limbs complete the whole Court and when the Constitutional provision is of such wide amplitude to cover both the Courts and persons belonging to the Judicial Office, there would be no reason to exclude the other limbs of the Courts, namely, administrative functionaries and ministerial staff of its establishment from the scope of control.
45. A similar issue was examined by this Court while deciding the Writ Petition No. 17907 of 1996, Subedar Singh and Ors. v. District Judge, Mirzapur, decided on 24.2.1997, in which one of us (B.S. Chauhan, J.) was a party, and it was observed that administrative control over the subordinate Courts is complete and its extent to the employees of the establishment, including the ministerial and administrative staff. It was also observed that when any illegality comes to the notice of the Inspecting Judge, he cannot be supposed to be merely a silent spectator because the District Judge could have himself taken the action for removing the illegality.
46. While deciding the said case reliance had been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in. Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 193, wherein it has been held :
"The control over the subordinate judiciary, vested in the High Court under Article 235, is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation."
47. The said judgment stood affirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court observing that no infirmity could be found with the reasoning and conclusions given by the High Court. [Subedar Singh v. District Judge, Mirzapur and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 201].
48. A Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 30 of 2001, Ravindra Nath Chaubey v. District Judge, Ballia, decided on 10.8.2004 has taken the view that the administrative control of the High Court extends to all the employees of the Subordinate Courts including the ministerial staff and in view thereof, any direction issued by the High Court is binding on all of them.
49. The control of the High Court in general superintendence of the working of the Subordinate Court is complete as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh, (2003) 4 SCC 239, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court reached the said conclusion, after placing reliance upon the large number of earlier judgments including Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa, AIR 1976 SC 1899; High Court of Punjab and Haryana v. State of Haryana, AIR 1975 SC 613; Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739; State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand, AIR 1976 SC 1841 ; and State of Assam v. S.N. Sen, AIR 1972 SC 1972.
50. Be that as it may, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed all the petitions filed by them vide order dated 7.1.2005 observing as under :
"Having heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners, we are satisfied that no fault can be found with the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court.
The special leave petitions are dismissed."
51. Therefore, it is evident that their Lordships have approved our order dated 16.12.2004 and the ground that we do not have the power to pass this kind of order is not available to the respondent-employees. The Appellate Court, undoubtedly, can exercise all the powers which can be exercised by the writ Court.
52. In Smt. Abida Begam v. R.C.E.O., AIR 1959 All 675, a Division Bench of this Court held :
"It may not be possible for us to grant a decree in the suit, but, in spite of that fact, we think that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant the relief as against the defendant No. 1, even though this matter had not come in its writ jurisdiction on an application under Article 226."
53. It may be mentioned that in the said case, the Division Bench was deciding a special appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge who had decided a second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. Thus, the Court was not exercising writ jurisdiction but the jurisdiction of second appeal. However, it was observed that even in such a jurisdiction in certain exceptional cases, the Court can issue writs. Thus, the decision in Abida Begam's case (supra) is an authority for the proposition that in exceptional case a Judge sitting in a particular jurisdiction can issue a directive relating to another jurisdiction also so as to do justice,
54. Similar view has been reiterated in Shail (Smt.) v. Manoj Kumar and Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 785.
55. The scope of powers of the writ Court in Article 226 of the Constitution is very wide. In Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 81, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while explaining the scope of powers of a writ Court, observed as under :
"This Article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex Jade confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised."
56. Therefore, we do not find any force in the submissions made on behalf of the respondents in this regard.
57. The facts and the questions raised on the basis thereof, in this appeal, call upon us to answer some vexed questions relating to the appointment of inefficient and unqualified stenographers in the lower judiciary, which malady has also gripped our own Court in its day-today functioning.
58. The disclosure of the state of affairs of the selections of stenographers at the Baghpat District Judgeship and our own discovery of facts in respect of the respondents after the tests were conducted under our orders, clearly establish the caprice of personal taste, resulting in undeserving appointments. The selections and consequential appointments of the respondents reflect a total disregard of rules. The selections, as is evident from the results of the test conducted under our orders, were a direct result of nepotism/corruption and a complete go-bye to objectivity. They appear to have been actuated by malice and by compromising merit entirely.
59. The results disclosed before us are startling. The system of shorthand introduced by Sir Isaac Pitman way back in 1837 still appears to be absolutely foreign to the respondent-employees, who appear to have not even the minimal knowledge of the subject to their credit. Shorthand, according to its description in the Encyclopaedia Britanica, is the art of writing legibly by means of brief signs, at a rate sufficiently rapid to record speech. It is the method of rapid writing through brief and easily written, signs. The system was introduced in ancient times by Romans and Greeks for recording the speeches of their master orators. It attained a new impetus in the medieval ages when a demand arose for learning the exact utterances of religious leaders. The importance of the subject has attained immense proportions in modern times with its growing need as it is now-a-days employed widely in reporting the proceedings of Parliament and legislative bodies, the trial of cases in Courts of law and in the field of correspondence.
60. Our Courts, too, having felt this pressing need, have made such provisions compulsory, and it is an important integral part of the judicial functioning. The efficiency of the system hinges on the role of these scribes who are entrusted with the onerous task of recording orders and judgments exactly, truthfully and rapidly.
61. Such being the importance of the post, the merit and efficiency of the occupant thereof cannot be compromised at any cost and has to be fiercely guarded. Inefficiency has to be kept out and safeguards by prescribing minimum standards have to be provided for. As the post is a responsible one, it requires a very high degree of skill and proficiency, and as such, only the best should be appointed.
62. Shorthand and stenography are a piece of art which has to be carried though without mistakes in an efficient manner. Any lowering down of the standards of efficiency would result in chaos as is evident in this case.
63. Selections on such posts should therefore be insulated from any pulls and pressures. The bane of inefficient, incompetent and undeserving appointments is required, to be plugged and remedied immediately before the system is drowned in it. The appointment of the respondents is a generosity which has cost us deeply at the altar of efficiency, and to our mind, is a blunder that has hit at the root of the institution.
64. In such a situation, it is the duty of the Court to undo an evil which has been perpetrated on account of our own indulgence, benevolence and undeserved favour. To protect such a mischief would be to punish ourselves and our officers whose precious time is wasted at the hands of incompetent employees. It is the public at large which suffers ultimately.
65. The job of the stenographers in the Court is an integral part of administration of justice. If a Judge does not get a competent hand, it would hamper the judicial work. Thus, the grievance of the appellant cannot be overlooked. Appointment of an undeserving hand in the Court may also be a relevant factor for non-speedy disposal of cases. Moreso, we fail to understand as to why the cause of the society should be made to suffer by showing undeserving mercy and misplaced sympathy upon a person, who appears to have been appointed on extraneous considerations.
66. It is the duty of the High Court to see that not only sufficient staff are provided to the officers of the Subordinate Courts but such staff should also be efficient to carry out the onerous duties. At present, thousands of cases are pending in the Subordinate Courts. In case, the Stenographers attached to the Judicial Officers are inefficient, the Judicial Officers will not be able to dictate the judgments and it would affect the efficiency of the Judicial Officers as well as the administration of justice. Sometimes, due to exigencies of service, ad hoc appointments are required to be made. But the District Judge must ensure some process of selection even in such ad hoc appointments so that the efficiency is not compromised.
67. It has been suggested at the Bar that in a particular case, competent hands may not be available from the reserved category and, therefore, the District Judge should be permitted to select the candidates by lowering down the standards. Such an argument is not acceptable in view of the provisions of Article 335 of the Constitution which completely bars employment of reserved category candidates by compromising with the quality and efficiency of the administration of justice. [Vide Dr. Preeti Srivastava and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2894; and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 498].
68. We find that a large number of employees are working in the Subordinate Courts, both on the regular side, as well as in the Fast Track Courts. In absence of efficient hands to assist the Fast Track Courts, the Courts would start limping and the purpose for which they are established, would stand frustrated. In order to increase the efficiency of the Subordinate Courts, we recommend that all the ad hoc employees posted, until the regular selection is made, should be subjected to a test to find out their suitability to work even as ad hoc employees. We recommend that wherever the complaints are received, the District Judges should put such staff to suitable test. There is no bar in law for the District Judge to find out the suitability of such employees. For this purpose, the District Judge may put all the ad hoc employees to test to find out their suitability to continue in the ad hoc employment. In the instant case, the performance of the employees who are still in service have also been found far from satisfaction. Therefore, we request the learned District Judge, Baghpat to give them time to improve and then to assess their suitability for their retention.
69. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the Court should not pass an interim order, which tantamount to final relief unless, it is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case, and that too is to be passed by recording reasons. The Writ Court ought not to have passed the impugned orders, without considering that they had no right to the post as had merely been appointed on ad hoc basis. The presumption that the Appointing Authority had appointed them only on merit stands rebutted in the tests taken in pursuance of our order dated 16.12.2004.
70. The appeals have merit and are allowed. We set aside the orders dated 8.12.2004, passed by the learned Single Judge.
71. Before parting with the case, we would also like to express our anguish in respect of the prevailing pathetic condition in the High Court also in this respect, which requires to be remedied immediately by taking appropriate measures. It is, thus, desirable to draw the attention of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to take appropriate steps for improving the appalling situation, and if found necessary, issue appropriate direction to the Registrar General to hold the suitability test and gauge the per format ion of stenographers employed in the High Court.
72. At this stage. Shri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent-employees has submitted that as nothing survives in the case, it would be desirable that the writ petition filed by the respondent-employees i.e. Ratnesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Anr. [Writ Petition No. 51562 of 2004] ; Dhirendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of U.P. and Anr., [Writ Petition No. 52174 of 2004] ; and Dinesh Kumar v. State of U.P. and Ors. [Writ Petition No. 52224 of 2004], may also be taken on record and dismissed. The learned Counsel for the appellant also submitted the same submission. In view of the above, these three writ petitions are also taken on board and dismissed.