JUDGMENT S.C. Verma, J.
1. Assailing the award of the Labour Court dated August 28, 1981, the petitioner have alleged that the appointment of the workmen was time bound and after expiry of the tenure of appointment, temporary services automatically came to an end. The respondents workmen cannot claim the benefit of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, the provision of retrenchment as such does not apply in those cases where the appointment itself was time bound. It has also been alleged that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal, it was not necessary to have taken the approval or sanction of the Labour Court as required under Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act for termination of the services of respondents workmen.
2. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Chandigarh v. Suresh Chandand Anr., (1978-II-LLJ-1)(SC).
3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel.
4. No one has appeared on behalf of the workmen. The Labour Court has disallowed the stand of the petitioner mainly on the ground that as the proceedings for confirmation of the said workmen were pending before the Labour Court, it was incumbent upon the employer to have taken the sanction, as provided under Section 6-E of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court has held that even the services of the time bound workmen would not automatically come to an end without the permission of the Labour Court, In case of Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Chandigarh (Supra) the Apex Court has held that:
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12. Now, if the effect of contravention of Section 33 were to make the order of discharge or dismissal void and inoperative the workman would straightaway be entitled to an order of reinstatement as soon as he establishes in the complaint made by him under Section 33-A that the employer has contravened Section 33 in making the order of discharge or dismissal. There would be no need to go into the further question whether the order of discharge or dismissal is justified on the merits, it is difficult to imagine how the law can permit an order of discharge or dismissal which is void and inoperative to be justified on merits. There can be no question of justification on merits of an order of discharge or dismissal which is found to be null and void. The very fact that even after the contravention of Section 33 is proved, the Tribunal is required to go into the further question whether the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the employer is justified on the merits, clearly indicates that the order of discharge is not rendered void and inoperative by such contravention. It is interesting to note that GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. speaking on behalf of the Court in Equitable Coal Co. case (1958-I-LLJ-793)(SC), characterised the breach of Section 33 as a technical breach not having any invalidating consequence on the order of discharge or dismissal. If the scope of the inquiry under Section 33-A is what it has been held to be in the decision in Automobile Products of India (1955-I-LLJ-346)(SC), Equitable Coal Co. (supra) and the Punjab National Bank cases (1959-II-LLJ-666)(SC) the conclusion must inevitably follow that the contravention of Section 33 does not render the order of discharge or dismissal void and of no effect."
5. According to the petitioner, the provisions of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act are almost akin to Section 6-E of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court has not considered the effect of the time bound appointment of workmen-respondents. The Labour Court has further not considered nor recorded any finding that the services of respondents-workmen were terminated after the expiry of the term of appointment and not for any other legal infirmity. The termination was held to be not in accordance with law, merely because sanction of the Labour Court was not taken. In my opinion this by itself would not invalidate the action of termination. The Labour Court has also not recorded any finding that the respondents workmen have completed 240 days of employment and they were entitled to the benefit of Section 6-N. The Labour Court further erred in not considering that the benefit of provisions of 6-N would not be applicable to time bound appointment specially in the present case when the appointment came to an end after a period of three months on July 1, 1975.
6. In the case of M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machillipatnam, A.P. and Anr. (1994-I-LLJ-597)(SC), it has been held that:
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9. Regulation 14 aforesaid has to he read as a statutory term of the contract of employment between the Corporation and the appellant. The order of appointment had fixed a target in respect of the performance of the appellant which admittedly the appellant failed to achieve within the period of probation which was extended up to two years. As such the Corporation was entitled not to confirm the appellant in terms of the order of appointment and to terminate his service during the period of probation without any notice in terms of Regulation 14 (4) aforesaid. Clauses 10 and 11 of the order of appointment along with Regulation 14 shall be deemed to be stipulations of the contract of employment under which the service of the appellant has been terminated. Any such termination, even if the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act were applicable in the case of the appellant, shall not be deemed to be "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) having been covered by exception (bb). Before the introduction of Clause (bb) in Section 2 (oo), there were only three exceptions so far as termination of the service of the workman was concerned, which had been excluded from the ambit of retrenchment (a) voluntary retirement ; (b) retirement on reaching the age of superannuation ; and (c) on ground of continued ill-health. This Court from time to time held that the definition of "retrenchment" being very wide and comprehensive in nature shall cover, within its ambit termination of service in any manner and for any reason otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The result was that even discharge simpliciter was held to fall within the purview of the definition of "retrenchment". State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money (1976-I-LLJ-478)(SC) Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (1980-II-LLJ-72)(SC) Now with introduction of one more exception to Section 2 (oo) under Clause (bb) the legislature has excluded from the purview of "retrenchment" (i) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry ; (ii) such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained in contract of employment. It need not be impressed that if in the contract of employment no such stipulation is provided or prescribed, then such contract shall not be covered by Clause (bb) of Section 2 (op). In the present case, the termination of service of the appellant is as a result of the contract of employment having been terminated under the stipulations specifically provided under Regulation 4 and the order of the appointment of the appellant. In this background, the non-compliance of the requirement of Section 25-F shall not vitiate or nullify the order of termination of the appellant."
The above principle of law laid down by Apex Court would be fully applicable to the present case.
7. The Labour Court grossly erred in holding that there was no basis for the termination of the services.
8. For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the award of the Labour Court dated August 28, 1981 is not In accordance with law and is liable to be quashed. I accordingly set aside the award dated August 28, 1981. The respondents workmen are not entitled to any relief. It is however, made clear that in case the respondents workmen have received any wages on the basis of interim order, they would not be liable to refund the same to the employer. The petition stands allowed.