JUDGMENT D.P. Singh, J.
1. Heard Sri N.D. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Indal Singh, learned counsel for the workman at length.
2. The writ petition arises out of proceedings under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, It is admitted position that the respondent No. 3 who was posted as Peon-cum-Guard with the petitioner Bank worked at least from 24th October, 1979 to 30th June, 1981 when his services were terminated on 1.7.1988. The aforesaid termination resulted in a reference under Section 4K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The labour court passed an award dated 29th January, 1986 whereby the respondent workman was reinstated with full back wages and restored to his position as on 1.7.1981 with the same salary. The petitioner challenged the award through a writ petition before this Court. However, the writ petition was dismissed by this Court by an order dated 17th July, 1986. Thereafter, since the salary was not being paid to the respondent workman, he lodged a case under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act which application was allowed vide order dated 22nd June, 1989. The appeal against the said order was also dismissed on 9th January, 1991. Both these orders have been challenged in this writ petition.
3. Counsel for the petitioner raised three submissions before me :
4. Learned counsel for the respondent workman, on the other hand, submitted that none of these grounds were taken before the courts below, therefore, they cannot be urged for the first time in the writ petition. Further, he contends that bonus and leave encashment is also a part of wages. The last contention is that in any event, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, as on the facts of this case equity is heavily against the petitioner.
5. No other point has been urged by either of the parties.
6. The terms "wages" has been defined in Section 2(vi) of the Act and the relevant portion reads as under :
"2 (vi) "wages" means all remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes-
(a) any remuneration to which the person employed is entitled in respect of overtime work or holidays or any leave period ;
(b) .....
(c) .....
(d) any sum to which the person employed is entitled under any scheme framed under any law for the time being in force ; but does not include-
(1) any bonus (whether under a scheme of profit sharing or otherwise) which does not form part of the remuneration payable under the terms of employment or which is not payable under any award or settlement between the parties or order of a Court;
(2) .....
(3) .....
(4) .....
(5) .....
(6) ....."
7. The section itself is explicit that any sum payable under an award or any remuneration with respect to holidays or leave period is covered by it. The only exception made is that bonus under a scheme of profit sharing is excluded but bonus forming part of the remuneration has not been excluded. The award has not been filed by the petitioner. The petitioner has also not averred either before this Court or before the authorities below, that claim included under the head of bonus did not form part of the remuneration payable to the employees of the petitioner bank. It is settled that the workmen are entitled for grant of bonus as regular remuneration under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.
8. Further, remuneration for holidays and leave period are also included within the said term.
Therefore, the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force and is rejected.
9. The submission that the claim is time barred, also has no legs to stand. The authority has considered this aspect and on the facts disclosed in the application under Section 15 has found that there was sufficient cause shown therein to justify and explain the delay in making the application. Therefore, the authority has condoned the delay in making the application. This being a finding of fact, and also not shown to be perverse or against the evidence on record cannot be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
10. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be correct. Though, the award has not been filed by either of the parties, however, from a perusal of both the impugned orders, it is apparent that the award had not quantified the wages payable to the respondent workman. Also, there is nothing on record to show that any application under Section 6H for quantification of the award or its execution was filed. The petitioner had clearly stated that the respondent workman was reinstated in service on 2.9.1999 and since is getting all emoluments admissible to him. This fact has not been denied. Though, it is stated that it has been treated to be an appointment on probation. Be it may that so, but there appears to be a bona fide dispute as to the exact amount of wages to be paid to the respondent workman. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Goel v. Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Ltd. and Ors., 1973 ALJ 538, has held that in such bona fide disputes with regard to the amount of wages to be paid, the authority is not entitled to award compensation at ten times of the claim. Thus, in my view, the amount of compensation awarded to the respondent workman by the authorities below was not justified.
11. The contention of the learned counsel for the workman that ground of maintainability was not taken is devoid of any merit. A bare perusal of the impugned orders show that the grounds were urged. So far as, the applicability of the principles of equity is concerned, it has a double edge. From the pleadings, it does not appear that the respondent workman adopted the normal procedure. He should have applied first for quantification of the wages under the award and then put the same into execution. Though, there was some delay in implementing a part of the award, but, it is not such a case where it can be said that the action or omission of the employer was wholly mala fide. To me, equity in the present case appears to be evenly balanced.
12. On the basis of the discussions above, the writ petition is partly allowed and the award of compensation is hereby quashed. The rest of the order, however, is maintained. Whatever the petitioner has deposited on the basis of the interim order of this Court would be adjusted when the impugned orders, as truncated by this Court is implemented. The writ petition is, therefore, partly allowed on the terms mentioned above. Costs on parties.