JUDGMENT O.P. Garg, J.
1. Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged. Heard Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Rajeshji Verma, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 as well as the learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 3. The order dated 8.3.1995, passed by State Public Services Tribunal. U. P.. Lucknow, in Claim Petition No. 3T/III/88 preferred by Sri Anand Prakash Misra--respondent No. 2 quashing his dismissal order dated 28.7.1983 has given rise to the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent No. 2 was appointed as Clerk In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Chibramau, district Farrukhabad and took over charge on 28.1.1981. There were serious allegations against him to the effect that he had squandered the market fee, which he had collected through the farmers ; he was retaining the receipt books and other documents with him. The respondent No. 2 lodged an F.I.R. to the effect that when he was proceeding to the check post, the official records were snatched away from him and that on account of injuries, which he had sustained, he became upset and forgot the details of snatched records. On investigation, the said F.I.R. was found to be false. The Secretary of the Mandi Parishad lodged an F.I.R. against the respondent No. 2 under Sections 409/420 and 218, I.P.C. A criminal case was registered against Sri Anand Prakash Misra, respondent No. 2. Departmental proceedings were also initiated against him. A charge-sheet was served on Sri Misra who submitted his explanation on 9.10.1982. Sri Misra applied for inspection of records on 9.1.1983 and claimed personal hearing on 11.1.1983. According to him, he was not allowed to inspect the records and no opportunity for personal hearing was afforded to him. After concluding the departmental enquiry, an order was passed on 28.7.1983 dismissing Sri Misra from service. The respondent No. 2 thereafter preferred an appeal and during the pendency of the appeal, he also flled a claim petition before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal (for short Tribunal). During the pendency of the claim petition before the Tribunal, the criminal case against Sri Misra was dismissed as the prosecution had failed to produce the witnesses in spite of the fact that as many as 77 dates were fixed in the case for the purpose. The Tribunal held that the enquiry conducted against Sri Misra was not in conformity with the well-established procedure, inasmuch as, no witnesses were examined and no personal hearing was afforded to Sri Misra, and that the principles of natural Justice had been violated. Accordingly, on the above findings and on the basis of the fact that the criminal case against the respondent No. 2 had come to an end, the Tribunal quashed the order of dismissal dated 28.7.1983. It is against this order of the Tribunal that the present writ petition has been filed.
3. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that Sri Anand Prakash Misra, respondent No. 2 was charged in respect of four separate acts of misconduct, such as, (i) disobeying the orders for submitting the records, (ii) for embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds, (iii) interpolation and fabrication in the Government records, and (iv) for destroying and removing the records. According to the learned counsel, a charge-
sheet, which contained 13 charges, was served on Sri Mishra on 26.8.1982 to which an explanation was submitted by him. However, since thereafter, inspite of the fact that a number of opportunities were afforded to the delinquent employee, to participate in the enquiry, he deliberately avoided to appear and consequently, on the basis of the material available on record and the admission of Sri Anand Prakash Misra--respondent No, 2, the order of dismissal was passed. It was further urged that since the order of dismissal was passed on 28.7.1983, it was not necessary to supply the copy of the report of enquiry to him as has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Thiru K. V. Perumal and others. JT 1996 (6) SC 604. It was maintained on behalf of the petitioner that the order of dismissal has been passed after completing the departmental enquiry according to law and that the Tribunal was not justified in passing a blanket order of setting aside the order of dismissal passed against Sri Mishra.
4. Sri Rajeshji Verma, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 pointed out that the departmental enquiry against the respondent No. 2 was farce as from the report of enquiry and other documents, it would be clear that it was not conducted in a fair and impartial manner. The enquiry was virtually ex parte enquiry. The copies of the relevant documents demanded by Sri Mishra were not furnished to him and that the inspection of the documents was also denied. It was also pointed out that admittedly Sri Mishra was not provided with an opportunity of hearing in spite of the fact that Sri Mishra had asked for it. The order of dismissal, according to Sri Rajeshji Verma, is illegal as it is based on no evidence. According to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, the Tribunal-respondent No. 1 was fully justified in setting aside the dismissal order placing reliance on the decision in Uma Shankar Yadav v. Registrar Co-operative Societies, U. P., Lucknow and others. 1992 (2) UPLBEC 849. Sri Verma placed emphatic reliance on the aforesaid case law and in support of his contention, he also made reference to the decisions In Union of India u. Mohd. Ramjan Khan, (1991) I UPLBEC 450; Sarnam Singh v. President Konch Sahkari Kraya Vikraya Samiti Ltd., Konch District Jalaun and Others. (1992) 1 UPLBEC 464 ; Gaya Prasad v. U. P. Public Services Tribunal. Lucknow and another, 1993 (3) UPLBEC 1773 ; Dharam Pal Singh v. Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd., Bareilly and others, (1993) 2 UPLBEC 1010 and Committee of Manage merit, Kisan Degree College v. Shambhu Saran Pandey and others, (1995) 1 UPLBEC 217. According to the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, the Tribunal rightly held that the dismissal order was not passed by following due procedure prescribed by law. On the other hand. Sri B. D, Mandhyan, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that strict and sophisticated rules of evidence which are required to be proved under the Evidence Act, may not apply in a case of domestic enquiry. Relying upon State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1512, it was urged that all materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible and even reliance can be placed on hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. According to the learned counsel, the sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny.
5. There is no dispute about the fact that scope of judicial review of punishment in cases where enquiry has been held is different from the cases where no enquiry has been held. In cases where the extreme penalty of dismissal from service is passed, strict and close scrutiny of the evidence in support of a finding is necessitated. It was held in Rattan Singh's case (supra) that absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the face of record. In my quest to reach the truth, I have shifted the material pertaining to the departmental enquiry against the respondent No. 2 and I have no hesitation in recording the finding that the enquiry report was submitted against the respondent No. 2 in a slip-shod manner. The inspection of the relevant documents by the respondent No. 2 was not allowed in spite of the fact that he had moved an application for the purpose. Unless the copies of the documents were supplied to the respondent No. 2 or at least Inspection thereof was allowed, he could not have prepared his defence properly and effectively. The respondent No. 2 also begged for a personal hearing but it was also denied. Certain documents were taken into consideration by the enquiry officer without getting them proved. No oral evidence was recorded to connect the documents or to speak about the credibility or veracity of their contents. To say the least, the enquiry has not been fair and impartial and the principles of natural Justice, which are the signature tune of the entire process of domestic enquiry, were flagrantly violated. The order of dismissal was passed against the respondent No. 2 on the basis of an enquiry, which as a matter of fact, remained merely an empty formality. The Tribunal-respondent No. 1, therefore, rightly quashed the order of dismissal passed against the respondent No. 2 and to this extent, there can be no quarrel.
6. Now the question is whether the respondent No. 2 should be allowed to go scot-free in spite of the fact that the charges against him were serious. The proper course to be adopted by the Tribunal was to have permitted the petitioner to hold an enquiry afresh. It appears that the Tribunal was swayed away by the fact that the criminal case against the respondent No. 2 had come to an end for the reason that in spite of 77 adjournments, no evidence was led by the prosecution. This fact, by itself could not provide a justification to throttle the entire process of enquiry. Criminal charge as well as the departmental proceedings against an employee can proceed simultaneously. Even if the respondent No. 2 was discharged/acquitted of the criminal charge, domestic enquiry could be brought to a logical end on the basis of the material available before the enquiry officer. Even in the case of Uma Shankar Yadav (supra) relied upon by the respondent No. 2, a fresh enquiry was directed after setting aside the order of punishment. In State of U. P. v. Ravindra Nath Chaturvedi and another, JT 1995 (6) SC 614, the Supreme Court found that no opportunity was given to the delinquent employee and that no witness was examined to prove the case of the State, it set aside the order of High Court and directed a fresh enquiry by the departmental authorities. In that case, High Court had set aside imposition of penalty on the respondent on the aforesaid two grounds but no order for fresh enquiry was passed. The Supreme Court directed the enquiry officer to conduct and complete the enquiry within a specified period. Such directions have been passed in a plethora of cases, which need not be mentioned to unnecessarily burden this judgment. Taking into consideration the gravity of the charges against the respondent No. 2, I find that the Tribunal was not justified in not directing a fresh departmental enquiry against the respondent No. 2. It was an eminently suited case in which a fresh enquiry should have been directed.
7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, in part. While maintaining the impugned order dated 8.3.1995 passed by the Tribunal quashing the order of dismissal dated 28.7.1983, it is directed that the departmental enquiry shall be conducted afresh against the respondent No. 2 on the basis of the charge-sheet and the reply already submitted by respondent No. 2, after affording a reasonable opportunity to inspect the relevant documents, to lead evidence in defence and personal hearing. The enquiry shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of issuance of a certified copy of this judgment to the learned counsel for the petitioners.