JUDGMENT Anjani Kumar, J.
1. The petitioner, who was an employee of respondent, is aggrieved by the order dated 18th November, 1986 and 24th January, 1992 and 20th February, 1993 whereby the State Government has not referred the dispute under the provisions of Section 4K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication before the labour court concerned. Against these orders, the petitioner filed the writ petition before this Hon'ble Court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 17367 of 1993. A learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the aforesaid writ petition by the judgment and order dated 10th May, 1993. Aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge the petitioner preferred a Special Appeal being special appeal No. 409 of 1993. This special appeal was allowed and the judgment of the learned single Judge was set aside. In the aforesaid special appeal, this Court issued the following direction :
"The contention of Dr. Padia is that since the State Government itself did not state the reason in the order of rejection, the petitioner/appellant could not be called upon to prove existence of the Industrial Dispute.
On perusal of the impugned order and considering the submission made, we are inclined to take the view that the matter should be remitted to the State Government for consideration and disposal afresh by a reasoned order. This order will be complied within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before respondent No. 1.
With these observations, this special appeal is finally disposed of."
2. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction, the matter was again remitted back to the authority under the mechanism of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act for making reference, i.e., Conciliation Officer, who has already submitted a report before the matter came to this Court that there exists no industrial dispute between the parties and he, therefore, referred the matter to the delegatee of the State Government, i.e., the Deputy Labour Commissioner. The Deputy Labour Commissioner by order dated 31st October, 1996, which is impugned in the present writ petition, has given reasons by holding that there does not exist any industrial dispute which may warrant interference under Section 4K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. Now the present writ petition is filed against the order dated 31st October, 1996, which has been annexed as Annexure-15 to the writ petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Padia submitted that firstly the order has not been passed by the State Government and it has been passed by the Deputy Director Labour Commissioner and secondly, that before passing of the aforesaid order dated 31st October, 1996, the petitioner had not been afforded an opportunity to establish that there exists industrial dispute between the parties. In order to appreciate this argument from the scheme of the Act, the documents filed as Annexures-C.A. 1, C.A. 2 and C.A. 3 to the counter-affidavit also required to be perused. Annexure-C.A. 2 is the order of appointment of the petitioner which stipulates the terms and conditions which are reproduced below :
"(1) You are appointed in the capacity of Supervisor to work at our Agra Centre with effect from 1st June, 1986.
(2) You will assist the Veterinary Officer, Incharge of Agra Centre in supervising the blood collection, inspection, defibrination, separation and preservation of blood and haemoglobin. You will also be responsible for proper cleaning of equipments and maintenance of proper records etc. (3) Your appointment is purely on a temporary basis for a period of six months. However, you will be considered for further extension if the necessity continues and also on your performance.
(4) During the temporary period of your appointment you will be paid a consolidated gross salary of Rs. 800 (Rs. eight hundred only) per month.
(5) Your normal working period will be as per the working of the Slaughter House.
(6) You will be working under our Veterinary Officer, Incharge of Agra Centre.
(7) It will be your duty not to use for your own purpose disclose or divulge to other persons whether during or after your employment any confidential information received by you in the course of your employment with us. Confidential information includes trades secrets, whether written or unwritten.
(8) You agree and undertake that in case of termination of your service under whatever conditions it may happen, you will not use for yourself nor disclose or divulge to others any information or trade secrets concerning your work or that of any of your colleagues and in case of your committing breach of any of the terms of this agreement, you will be liable to be sued for damages.
(9) Your services during the temporary period can be terminated at any time without assigning any reason whatsoever on 15 days' notice. In case you wish to resign during this period, you shall have to give 15 days' notice to us."
4. This clearly shows that the appointment was for a period of six months. The last documents filed along with the counter-affidavit is the order of termination dated November 28, 1987, which is reproduced below :
"You were appointed temporarily as Supervisor with a consolidated salary of Rs. 800 per month for our Blood Collection Centre at Agra vide appointment letter dated 26th June, 1986. This temporary employment was made due to exigencies/unusual pressure of work for a specific period of six months.
We regret to inform you that your services would not be required after 30th November, 1986 and thereafter you stood discharged from services in accordance with Clause No. 9 of the letter of appointment under reference.
In accordance with Clause No. 9 referred above, you will be paid wages in lieu of 15 days notice period.
Please collect your dues from Sahibabad factory."
5. This clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was appointed in managerial and supervisory capacity on the consolidated salary of employer blood collection centre, Agra and his services were terminated in terms of Clause (9) of the letter of appointment giving wages in lieu of 15 days notice. From the impugned order dated 31st October, 1996, it is abundantly clear that the delegatee of the State Government under the provisions of the Act has given reasons that there exists no industrial dispute. The petitioner was working purely on temporary basis in managerial and supervisory capacity and his salary was also more than Rs. 500 as was the limit at the relevant time.
6. In this view of the matter, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the delegatee of the State Government had no jurisdiction of going into the disputed questions of facts for holding that the reference was not liable to be made and reference to the labour court could not be rejected cannot be justified. Further arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that as a matter of general principle, the State Government should refer the dispute for decision to the labour court unless the dispute is frivolous.
7. Learned counsel has also relied upon certain decision of this Court as well as of Apex Court. So far as proposition of law is concerned, there is no dispute, but it is always open to the State Government not to refer a dispute if the State Government is satisfied that there does not exist any industrial dispute within the meaning of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act under the mechanism of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. As already observed it is the delegatee who has submitted report with regard to the existence of the dispute and particularly with a view to comply with the direction of this Court given in the special appeal filed by the petitioner himself. It was not necessary for the respondent No. 1 to go into the respective cases of the workman as well as employee to point out after giving reasons that there does not exist industrial dispute.
8. In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not tenable in law. I do not find any error much less error of law apparent on the face of record which may warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This writ petition is, therefore, devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. There will be no order as to costs.